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Abstract 
Using a methodological framework which develops Vera John-Steiner’s 
identification of a ‘generative dialogue’ within collaborative partnerships, this 
research offers a new perspective on the bi-directional flow of influence and 
support between the married authors Siri Hustvedt and Paul Auster. 
Foregrounding the intertwining of Hustvedt and Auster’s emotional relationship 
with the embodied process of aesthetic expression, the first chapter traces the 
development of the authors’ nascent identities through their non-fictional works, 
focusing upon the autobiographical, genealogical, canonical and interpersonal 
foundation of formative selfhood. Chapter two examines the influence of 
postmodernist theory and poststructuralist discourse in shaping Hustvedt and 
Auster’s early fictional narratives, offering an alternative reading of Auster’s work 
outside the dominant postmodernist label, and attempting to situate the hybrid 
spatiality of Hustvedt and Auster’s writing within the ‘after postmodernism’ 
period. The third chapter considers Hustvedt and Auster’s transfictional exchange 
of the ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin and Jacques Lacan through dialogue, 
characterisation and plot, an approach which seems to indicate Auster’s 
assimilation of Hustvedt’s theoretical interests, alongside a shared affinity for 
Martin Buber’s credo of mutuality. Continuing this discussion of self-other 
dialectics, Chapter four demonstrates how Hustvedt and Auster’s visual 
representations encompass models of intersubjectivity informed by the 
phenomenological approaches of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
highlighting how Hustvedt and Auster utilise ekphrastic techniques to foreground 
the collaborative nature of creativity. Guided by Cathy Caruth and Dominick 
3 
 
LaCapra’s alternative readings of Freudian traumatology, the closing chapter 
reflects upon the empathic authenticity of Hustvedt and Auster’s post-9/11 
narratives. Assessing Hustvedt and Auster’s distinctive contributions to the 
knowledge formation in the late Twentieth and early Twenty-First Centuries, the 
conclusion identifies a powerful bond of mutuality defined by the ‘uninterrupted 
conversation’ of their marriage, embodied in a generative dialogue and 
emotionally-freighted intertextual mode which is entirely unique to contemporary 
literature. 
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Introduction 
 
 The purpose of this thesis is to explore a literary marriage and 
collaborative partnership which began with an unexpected encounter almost forty 
years ago. In 1981, Siri Hustvedt, a student at New York’s Columbia University, 
attended a poetry reading at the 92nd Street Y with a friend. After the reading, 
Hustvedt saw ‘a beautiful man’, whom her friend identified as Paul Auster, ‘the 
poet’.1 They began talking, spent the evening in deep conversation and, in her 
words, ‘have been talking about books and ideas for a long time’.2 Since this 
chance meeting, Hustvedt and Auster have collectively published over twenty 
novels, almost a dozen non-fictional works, including several books of poetry, 
essays, film scripts and works in translation, an extensive number of academic 
articles and lectures, op-ed pieces for national newspapers and literary journals, in 
addition to making countless media interviews and personal appearances at 
                                                          
1 Siri Hustvedt, ‘Extracts from a Story of a Wounded Self’ in A Plea for Eros (London: Sceptre, 2006), pp. 
195-228 (pp. 225-26).  
2 Siri Hustvedt, ‘Interview with Tyler Malone’, Full Stop (25 October 2012), <http://www.full-
stop.net/2012/10/25/interviews/tyler-malone/siri-hustvedt/> [Accessed 11 November 2015]. 
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literary events.3 As Hustvedt observes, ‘because we have shared the ups and 
downs of literary life together for so many years…it’s almost like breathing’.4  
 Hustvedt and Auster’s marriage and literary partnership is built upon an 
enduring emotional connection which transcends aesthetic influence or 
competition with the spousal other. In Winter Journal (2012) Auster writes of 
Hustvedt:  
This morning, in the dimness of another January dawn, a scumbled, 
grayish light seeping into the bedroom, and there is your wife’s face turned 
toward your face, her eyes closed, still fast asleep, the covers pulled all the 
way up to her neck, her head the only part of her that is visible, and you 
marvel at how beautiful she looks, how young she looks, even now, thirty 
years after you first slept with her, after thirty years of living together 
under the same roof and sharing the same bed.5 
                                                          
3 As a couple, Hustvedt and Auster are notable for being among the most open and accommodating author-
celebrities on the literary circuit, often committing to extensive promotional tours for new books and 
frequently allowing journalists to interview them at their home in Brooklyn. Hustvedt and Auster have been 
particularly willing to engage directly to the academic community about their work, welcoming me to their 
home in December 2016 to interview them for this thesis. The full transcript of this interview can be read in 
the Appendix to this thesis.  
4 ‘Paul and I met twenty-one years ago and we were both completely unknowns. He was then writing The 
Invention of Solitude…And I was continuing to write poems and beginning to work on my dissertation. So 
we’ve shared his whole prose career…His whole prose career really corresponds with our marriage’. Siri 
Hustvedt, ‘Interview with Robert Birnbaum’, Identity Theory (3 May 2003) 
<http://www.identitytheory.com/siri-hustvedt> [Accessed 17 September 2013],  
5 Paul Auster, Winter Journal (London: Faber, 2012), p. 4. Hereafter referred to in the text as Journal with 
page number cited. 
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Very few married writers openly describe their desire for each another without 
applying the perception-altering, privacy-concealing, prismatic persona of an 
alter-ego; fewer still perform this ritual of respect as frequently as Hustvedt and 
Auster. Auster notably inserted a fictional alter-ego into City of Glass (1984), the 
first part of The New York Trilogy (1987), alongside narrativised versions of his 
new wife, Siri, and his young son, Daniel. For Auster, this metafictional technique 
represented a statement of matrimonial avowal, effectively concretising his love 
for Hustvedt through narrative. He has said that ‘on the most personal level, I 
think of City of Glass as an homage to my wife…an attempt to imagine what life 
would have been like if I hadn’t met her’.6 Elsewhere, affection is literally 
inscribed in the pages of Hustvedt and Auster’s novels: Auster has dedicated two 
novels to his wife: In the Country of Last Things (1987) and 4321 (2017); 
Hustvedt has similarly dedicated two books to her husband: The Blindfold (1992) 
and What I Loved (2003). 
 In this thesis, I want to look at the development of Hustvedt and Auster’s 
undeniably unique literary partnership, one informed by what Vera John-Steiner 
identifies in Creative Collaboration (2000) as ‘a durable ‘we’-ness, built on 
shared vision, patience and careful planning, and a chance to be playful as well as 
critical with one another’.7 The marriage of Hustvedt and Auster is not limited to 
its legal status, its normative sensibilities or the symbolism of its public 
dimension, but as the embodiment of the tension between authorial independence 
                                                          
6 Paul Auster, ‘Interview with Joseph Mallia’, BOMB (23: Spring, 1988), 5-12 (p. 27).  
7 Vera John-Steiner, Creative Collaboration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 9. 
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and emotional interdependence: the negotiated, co-existential duties and 
responsibilities of married life which both sustains and complicates the embodied 
process of aesthetic expression.8 As John-Steiner states, ‘building a resilient sense 
of identity is aided by a self that is stretched and strengthened in partnership’.9 
Fundamental to the mythos of their marriage, Hustvedt and Auster perceive their 
relationship as a partnership between equals, one underpinned by mutual support 
during the creative process.   
 This thesis presents an opportunity to examine the mechanical 
constituency of Hustvedt and Auster’s writing relationship: each reads the work of 
the other prior to publication, offering constructive critical guidance; each tacitly 
acknowledges the influence of the other, while insisting upon the role of the 
unconscious in the embodied process of aesthetic expression. Hustvedt and 
Auster’s commitment to the ‘generative dialogue’ which exists between literary 
partners is further concretised by their dialogically intertextual fictional 
frameworks.10 In The Blindfold (1992), Hustvedt’s protagonist Iris Vegan reads a 
                                                          
8 Hustvedt and Auster repeatedly emphasise the embodied nature of the creative process. In Winter Journal, 
Auster states ‘writing begins in the body, it is the music of the body’ (S 224); Hustvedt has said, ‘it is 
necessary to think hard about the mental-bodily processes at work in creative work at all times…My strong 
feeling is that so-called cognitive functions cannot be so neatly separated from affective and motor-sensory 
functions…While I write about fiction I am not thinking about my cognitive-motor-sensory-affective 
abilities. They are there in me and I use them’. Sam McNerney, ‘Siri Hustvedt on Living, Thinking and 
Looking’, Big Think <http://bigthink.com/insights-of-genius/siri-hustvedt-on-living-thinking-and-looking> 
[Accessed 14 June 2017]. 
9 John-Steiner, p. 127.  
10 John-Steiner, p. 16. 
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copy of Unearth, Auster’s first book of poetry, which was published in 1974. In 
Leviathan (1992), Auster fictively appropriates Hustvedt’s Iris as the fictional 
wife of his narrator, Peter Aaron, another metafictional technique which Auster 
referred to as a ‘transfictional romance’.11 Peter Aaron has been commonly 
interpreted as an Austerian alter ego, while Hustvedt has remarked of Iris, ‘she 
and I aren’t the same person, but she’s close to me’.12 For her novel The Summer 
Without Men (2011), Hustvedt’s narrator, the poet Mia Fredricksen, relates the 
disjuncture between correlation and cause to ‘‘the music of chance’ as one 
prominent American novelist has phrased it’.13 The Music of Chance (1994) is the 
title of Auster’s fourth novel.14 Chance – often represented by his characters’ 
sudden movement between positions of financial and emotional security and 
uncertainty – has been a defining theme of Auster’s work, with the author 
remarking: ‘In the strictest sense of the word, I consider myself a realist. Chance 
is a part of reality: we are continually shaped by the forces of coincidence; the 
unexpected occurs with almost numbing reality in all our lives’.15 These 
                                                          
11 Paul Auster, ‘Interview with Michael Wood’ in Collected Prose (New York: Picador, 2010), pp. 569-90 (p. 
581). 
12 Siri Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, pp. 1-44 (p. 32). 
13 Siri Hustvedt, The Summer Without Men (London: Sceptre, 2011), p. 166. Hereafter referred to in the text 
as Men with page number cited. 
14 At the close of her novel, Hustvedt issues another ironic comment upon serendipitous fortune when one of 
her characters is bequeathed a significant sum of money: ‘Let us be fair: This happens all the time in 
twentieth- and twenty-first-century LIFE; it just happens less often in twentieth- and twenty-first-century 
NOVELS’. (Men 198) 
15 Paul Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected Prose, (New York: 
Picador, 2010), pp. 539-568 (p. 539). More recently Auster remarked ‘I think I made a bit of a rod for my 
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intertextual exchanges signal the ongoing dialogue, transfictional romance and – 
for want of better terminology – narrativised affection between husband and wife, 
whose relationship was itself the product of a chance meeting. In John-Steiner’s 
terms, the transfictional discursivity which deepens and enriches Hustvedt and 
Auster’s intersubjective fiction mirrors the dialogic mutuality of their marriage. 
 However, the notion of a collaborative literary partnership between 
married writers is a problematic one: either writer may actively disavow any 
perceived spousal influence upon their carefully-crafted narratives and authorial 
identity. These impulses may be structural or aesthetic: possibly attributable to the 
residual effect of what David Henry Feldman labels ‘the century of the 
individual’,16 and the drive to preserve narrative ambiguity or protect one’s 
privacy. For John-Steiner, ‘when considering family life and creative work, 
couples face the challenge of overcoming traditional gender roles’.17 Where one 
writer is not only a woman, a wife and a mother, but also the less famous writer of 
the two, these gender roles become even more problematic. Hustvedt has spoken 
at length about ‘the sexism thing’, whereby her writing and academic interests are 
either held in lower regard than that of her husband, or attributed to him without 
                                                          
own back when, in the very first paragraph [to City of Glass], I wrote, ‘Later he would conclude that nothing 
was real except chance.’ Since then, the concept of chance has come to dominate my work in a way that I 
don’t think is entirely justified. So I have a new term for that now, which I would like to throw in the ring – 
the unexpected. This is really what I’m talking about: the infinite number of divergent possibilities that are 
pregnant at every moment of our waking lives’. (Alfred Hickling, ‘Stories are never finished – they keep 
going’, Guardian (28 March 2017), p. 17.)  
16 David Henry Feldman, ‘Foreword’ to Vera John-Steiner, Creative Collaboration, p. ix. 
17 John-Steiner, p. 7. 
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foundation.18 Indeed, almost all critical approaches to Auster’s writing to date 
have overlooked Hustvedt’s role in bringing a range of critical theories to his 
attention: 
I have repeatedly been informed by all and sundry about Paul’s expertise 
on the work of Jacques Lacan. Paul has read exactly one work by Lacan, 
‘The Purloined Letter’, which he came across sometime in the late Sixties. 
That was it. I, on the other hand, have had an abiding interest in 
psychoanalysis since I was in high school and worked hard at 
understanding Lacan, who is often difficult and maddening, and for whom 
I have respect but also profound disagreements, and yet, I know well that 
whatever Paul knows about Lacan has come via his wife.19 
Media depictions of their relationship have served to re-emphasise Auster’s 
authorial autonomy and apparent influence upon his wife, with some even 
attributing her success as a novelist to his prior achievements. The emotional 
balance and reciprocal mutuality of Hustvedt and Auster’s marriage is continually 
called into question by misrepresentations which genuflect to cultural 
constructions of gender. This significantly diminishes Hustvedt’s considerable 
achievements as a novelist, academic and philosopher.  
 Recent studies have sought to reshape the frequently-gendered approach to 
authorial influence between spouses or partners. John-Steiner’s methodology in 
                                                          
18 See Appendix. 
19 Siri Hustvedt, ‘Interview with Tyler Malone’, Full Stop (25 October 2012), < http://www.full-
stop.net/2012/10/25/interviews/tyler-malone/siri-hustvedt/> [Accessed 05 September 2015]. 
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particular identifies the ‘dynamics of mutuality’ and ‘mutual appropriation’ 
fundamental to artistic partnerships, while delineating the ‘generative dialogue’ 
which frequently emerges between artists whose emotional lives are intertwined.20 
Exemplary biographical studies into literary partnerships include A Dangerous 
Liaison (2008), Carole Seymour-Jones’ study of the dialogical nature of Simone 
de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre’s writing relationship; alternatively, there have 
been a number of historical-cultural evocations of marriage within a given 
temporal period, such as Phyllis Rose’s Parallel Lives: Five Victorian Marriages 
(1993) and Katie Roiphe’s Uncommon Arrangements: Seven Portraits of Married 
Life in London Literary Circles 1910-1939 (2008). John-Steiner’s framework is 
particularly useful for this research into Hustvedt and Auster’s writing 
relationship for a number of reasons. Firstly, it allows for the reassessment of 
Hustvedt’s work in relation to the work of her more commercially successful 
husband; it redresses mediatised approaches to their work which emphasise the 
gender split; and it allows for a closer alignment in the theoretical and thematic 
interests of Hustvedt and Auster, while still permitting the spatial and emotional 
separation required for artistic independence. Writing in 1992, Hustvedt observes:  
Our work has been an intimate part of our love affair and marriage for 
twenty-three years, but what I read wasn’t then and isn’t now what I know 
when I’m with him. His work comes from the place in him I can’t 
know’.21  
                                                          
20 John-Steiner, p. 3. 
21 Siri Hustvedt, ‘A Plea for Eros’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 227. 
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In another essay, Hustvedt extends this unknowability of the authorial self to the 
erotic drives of two familiar people:  
I don’t think enduring love is rational any more than momentary love. I 
have been married to the same man for fifteen years, and I can’t explain 
why he still attracts me as an erotic object…It is not because we are so 
close or know each other so well. That solidifies our friendship, not our 
attraction. The attraction remains because there is something about him 
that I can’t reach, something strange and estranging…It must be between 
us – an enchanted space that is wholly unreasonable and, at least in part, 
imaginary. There is still a fence for me to cross and, on the other side of it, 
a secret.22 
This thesis is perhaps less concerned with the unconscious desires or carnal drives 
of two married writers, but these factors undeniably affect the embodied process 
of aesthetic expression, while inviting questions about the knowability of the 
spousal other.  
 In the first chapter of this thesis I will look at how Hustvedt and Auster 
have respectively attempted to establish distinctive authorial identities through 
their narratives. This chapter will focus on Hustvedt and Auster’s strategies for 
coming to terms with the mutable and multiple nature of selfhood, and the 
interplay of conscious thought and unconscious process. This investigation will 
                                                          
22 Siri Hustvedt, ‘Extracts from a Story of the Wounded Self’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 227. Here Hustvedt’s 
insistence upon epistemological uncertainty and the unknowability of the unconscious permits us to glimpse 
the influence of poststructuralist and feminist theories upon her work. 
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first look at depictions of childhood self-consciousness in Hustvedt and Auster’s 
non-fiction, specifically how each attempts to narrativise what the neuroscientist 
Antonio Damasio has termed ‘the autobiographical self’. The chapter will then 
expand to address the transgenerational structures of selfhood, with particular 
reference to genealogical and biological determinants of individual identity. I will 
then turn to the interpolation of authorial identities with the question of canonical 
influence, particularly how Hustvedt and Auster have responded to Harold 
Bloom’s ‘anxiety of influence’ paradigm. This section will focus on Hustvedt’s 
nuanced recalibration of feminist interpretations of two alternative strands of 
literary tradition: Bloom’s heavily masculinised model, and her ambivalence 
towards the ‘confessional’ strain of women’s literature. Chapter one will close 
with an exploration of the reader function, and the essential role Hustvedt and 
Auster perform as the reader, or editor, of the other’s work. Hustvedt and Auster 
share a common interest in storytelling and hermeneutics: the exegetic 
responsibility of writer and reader which, according to Wolfgang Iser, ‘brings the 
literary work into existence’, and facilitates the removal of the ‘subject-object 
division that constitutes all perception’.23 This chapter will attempt to establish 
Hustvedt and Auster as exemplars of the plasticity of the aesthetic mind, while 
drawing attention to the framing of self-subjectivity in Hustvedt and Auster’s non-
fiction.  
                                                          
23 Wolfgang Iser, ‘The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach’ in Reader Response Criticism – 
From Formalism to Poststructuralism, ed. by Jane P. Tompkins (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1980), pp. 50-69 
(p. 50). 
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 The remainder of the thesis will seek to delineate ways in which Hustvedt 
and Auster negotiate influence, independence and interdependence through their 
narratives. Developing the narratives of autobiographical selfhood identified in 
the first chapter, I return to that chapter’s brief discussion of the theoretical and 
critical context from which Hustvedt and Auster’s work emerged. According to 
John-Steiner, ‘constructed knowing’, or ‘situated, contextual and integrated 
modes of thinking’, produces in literary partnerships aesthetically-grounded 
‘social selves’, which are ‘constructed and shaped by participation in the 
communities and culture’ of their epoch.24 Chapter two will look closely at 
Hustvedt and Auster’s relationship to the theoretical positions of poststructuralism 
and postmodernist fiction. Early academic studies into Auster’s City of Glass, the 
first part to The New York Trilogy, applied a range of deconstructive strategies to 
its interpretation. This connection continues to guide many approaches to Auster’s 
writing. Fewer critical assessments of Hustvedt’s relationship to poststructuralist 
theory, or her position within the postmodernist canon, have been attempted. Like 
that of Auster, Hustvedt’s early fiction, particularly her debut novel The Blindfold, 
exhibits a number of the postmodernist traits identified by Hans Bertens and 
Joseph Natoli: ‘other-determination, desire, contingency, change, difference, and 
                                                          
24 John-Steiner, p. 6. John-Steiner is particularly interested in the ‘socially distributed cognition’ identified by 
Russian Formalist Lev Vygotsky, who like Martin Buber and Mikhail Bakhtin emphasised the dialogic 
interaction between self and other. According to John-Steiner, Vygotsky was particularly interested in what 
he termed ‘zones of proximal development’, whereby ‘differences in modes of thought create opportunities 
for expansion’. (John-Steiner, p. 189.) Buber and Bakhtin’s influence on Hustvedt and Auster’s work will 
come under consideration in Chapter three. 
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absence (of self and meaning)’.25 Hustvedt’s continued resistance to 
epistemological faith, as evidenced in her recent essay ‘The Delusions of 
Certainty’ (2016), reflects an ongoing engagement with these critical approaches.  
 However, it is equally possible to situate the recent writing of Hustvedt 
and Auster outside the postmodern critical framework. Hubert Zapf connects 
Hustvedt to what he terms an overtly ethical ‘after postmodernism’ period.26 
Elsewhere Dennis Barone and James Peacock similarly stress the ethical impulses 
behind Auster’s narratives.27 Both Hustvedt and Auster are cited by Peter Boxall 
as being part of ‘a world community’ of literary practitioners, who reflect upon 
                                                          
25 Hans Bertens and Joseph Natoli, ‘Introduction’ in Postmodernism: The Key Figures, ed. by Hans Bertens 
and Joseph Natoli (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2002) pp. i-xii (p. xii). 
26 Hubert Zapf, ‘Narrative, Ethics, and Postmodern Art in Siri Hustvedt’s What I Loved’ in Ethics in Culture: 
The Dissemination of Values Through Literature and Other Media, ed. by Astrid Erll, Herbert Grabes and 
Ansgar Nünning (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), pp. 171-94 (p. 171). A recent collection of essays on 
Hustvedt’s work co-edited by Zapf in partnership with Johanna Hartmann and Christine Marks emphasises 
Hustvedt’s contribution to transdisciplinary knowledge without recourse to postmodern critical frameworks. 
See Johanna Hartmann, Christine Marks and Hubert Zapf, ‘Introduction’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity in 
Siri Hustvedt’s Works, ed. by Johanna Hartmann, Christine Marks and Hubert Zapf (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter Gmbh, 2015), p. 1.  
27 ‘Responsibility, old-fashioned as this may sound, is a virtue in Auster’s works’. Dennis Barone, 
‘Introduction’ in Beyond the Red Notebook: Essays on Paul Auster, ed. by Dennis Barone (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), pp. 1-15 (p. 15). For James Peacock, the dystopian allegory of 
Auster’s Man in the Dark (2008) is countered by the narrative’s foregrounding of the ‘solidarity and solace of 
loved ones to console us and keep us moving forward’. James Peacock, Understanding Paul Auster (South 
Carolina: The University of South Carolina Press, 2010), p. 191. 
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the ‘Twenty-First Century predicament, or epoch or sensibility’.28 The ‘fin de 
siècle mood’ described by Boxall draws into its orbit other approaches to the 
contemporary literary landscape, including ‘late postmodernism’ (Jeremy Green), 
‘post-postmodernism’ (Jeffrey T. Nealon), and ‘metamodernism’ (Timotheus 
Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker). While Green and Nealon’s models 
respectively stress the ‘decadence’ and ‘exhaustion’ of the postmodernist 
project,29 metamodernism offers a cultural mode which ‘oscillates between a 
modern enthusiasm and a postmodern irony, between hope and melancholy, 
between naivety and knowingness, empathy and apathy, unity and plurality, 
totality and fragmentation, purity and ambiguity’.30 Under their model, 
Vermeulen and van den Akker identify a ‘both-neither’ dynamic in metamodernist 
aesthetics which they describe as ‘metaxis’, or the ‘between’: what the German 
philosopher Eric Voegelin terms ‘the language of tension’.31 Though this 
                                                          
28 Peter Boxall, Twenty-First Century Fiction: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), pp. 3-7. Boxall’s inclusion of Hustvedt and Auster reaffirms their unique contribution to 
contemporary literature. 
29 Jeremy Green, Late Postmodernism: American Fiction at the Millennium (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005), p.1; Jeffrey T. Nealon, Post-Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Just-in-Time Capitalism 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 150. 
30 Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker, ‘Notes on Metamodernism’, Journal of Aesthetics and 
Culture (2, 2010), <http://aestheticsandculture.net/index.php/jac/article/view/5677/6306> [Accessed 12 May 
2015]. 
31 Vermeulen and van den Akker, ‘Notes on Metamodernism’. Elizabeth Kovach attempts to place Hustvedt’s 
The Sorrows of an American (2008) within this framework, and it is similarly possible to apply Auster’s more 
recent work to it. Indeed, Auster’s observation to Mark Irwin that he writes from a position of nihilistic 
despair or overwhelming joyfulness seems to echo the dialectical oscillations of metamodernism: ‘At bottom 
I think my work has come out of a position of intense personal despair, a very deep nihilism and hopelessness 
20 
 
language of tension, artists and writers establish what Vermeulen and van den 
Akker term a ‘pragmatic idealism’.32 
 This notion of pragmatic idealism finds a symbiotic alternate in Hustvedt’s 
rejection of Cartesian dualism and certainty, which is conditioned by her 
engagement of scepticism and doubt. Moreover, in Voegelin’s ‘In-Between’ we 
can perceive echoes of Hustvedt’s affinity for philosopher Martin Buber’s concept 
of ‘the Between’; psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud’s notion of an imaginative 
‘Tummelplatz’ (or playground, in Lytton Strachey’s translation); psychologist 
D.W. Winnicott’s potential or transitional space: a zone of transference bisecting 
consciousness and unconsciousness which sees a dialogic interplay of perception, 
memory, and the imagination.33 Hustvedt’s identification of a disciplinary gap, 
split, or between-space where things get, in her words, ‘messy’, ‘mushy’ or 
‘mixed’: what she has referred to an ‘enchanted space’, or a ‘zone of focused 
ambiguity’ where intellect and the imagination interact.34 Elsewhere Hustvedt 
                                                          
about the world, the fact of our own transience and mortality, the inadequacy of language, the isolation of one 
person from another. And yet, at the same time, I’ve wanted to express the beauty and extraordinary 
happiness of feeling yourself alive, of breathing in the air, the joy of being alive in your own skin’. Paul 
Auster, ‘Memory’s Escape: Inventing The Music of Chance – A Conversation with Mark Irwin’ (qtd in 
Barone, p. 12). 
32 Vermeulen and van den Akker, ‘Notes on Metamodernism’. 
33 See Siri Hustvedt, ‘Freud’s Playground’ in Living, Thinking Looking (New York: Picador, 2012) pp. 196-
219 (pp. 200-01). 
34 ‘My ideas are continually evolving through my reading, and I am able to see the ‘truth’ of any number of 
theories, depending on their perspectives. My thought is that if no single theoretical model can hold human 
experience, then it is smartest to apply multiple models to a single problem and see what happens. One does 
not arrive at the same answer, but if one puts those answers together, it is possible to find a zone of what I call 
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proposes that ‘we are living in a secret place we make between us, a place where 
the real and unreal commingle’.35 This oscillation between alternative positions is 
reflective of the metamodernistic ‘language of tension’ and ethical ‘pragmatic 
idealism’, while the hybrid spatiality of Hustvedt and Auster’s narratives seems to 
indicate a move beyond the heavily ironic inflections of the postmodern canon. 
This intermingling or mixing of the real and imaginary, epistemological and 
ontological, conscious and unconscious is complicated further by the interaction 
of Hustvedt and Auster’s writing.  
 The third chapter will consider the alternative theoretical models which 
inform Hustvedt and Auster’s structuring of self-other dialectics, plot and 
characterisation in their writing. Hustvedt in particular, as Christine Marks 
observes, ‘conjoins personal experiences with philosophical, medical, aesthetic, 
and neurobiological discourses in her fictional and nonfictional works to shed new 
light on self-other relations and subjectivity’.36  Both Hustvedt and Auster have 
expressed an admiration for Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogism, whose 
positive (I-Thou) and negative (I-It) philosophical registers overlap with the 
socially-grounded dialogism of Russian formalist Mikhail Bakhtin, and the 
objectifying cognitive mirroring described by the French psychoanalyst Jacques 
                                                          
‘focused ambiguity’. Out of that focused ambiguity one may discover a new question, which in turn may lead 
to another model and so on.’ Siri Hustvedt, ‘Interview with Tyler Malone’, Full Stop.  
35 Siri Hustvedt, ‘A Plea for Eros’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 61. 
36 Christine Marks, ‘Identity Formation at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Intersubjectivity, Art, 
and Medicine in Siri Hustvedt’s Works’ (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, 
Mainz, September 2010), p. 4. 
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Lacan. This chapter will trace instances of the discursive negotiation between the 
psychical and the social in Hustvedt’s The Enchantment of Lily Dahl (1996) and 
Auster’s Moon Palace (1989), highlighting Hustvedt and Auster’s attempt to 
negotiate the tension between the psychical and social construction of identity. 
Recalling John-Steiner’s framework, one might propose that this interest in the 
credo of mutuality operates in symbiotic dialogue with the emotional and 
intellectual foundations of Hustvedt and Auster’s marriage. 
 For the fourth chapter, I will consider how later fictional works by 
Hustvedt and Auster exhibit a familiarity with the phenomenological approaches 
of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Hustvedt and Auster have both 
penned narratives which are particularly self-conscious about the role of 
perception, and deploy a multiplicity of perspectives. Hustvedt and Auster have 
both spoken of their deep affinity for Merleau-Ponty’s writing, and while Auster 
is less conversant with the models of intentionality espoused by Husserl, the 
intersubjective quality of Hustvedt and Auster’s later fiction is undeniable. This 
indicates an intersubjective inflection to Auster’s writing which has hitherto been 
overlooked, and which runs counter to readings of his work which stress its 
metafictional surfaces and his Lacanian approach to self-other dialectics. Focusing 
on Hustvedt and Auster’s deployment of ekphrastic techniques in What I Loved 
(2003) and The Book of Illusions (2002), this chapter will identify and attempt to 
clarify the purpose behind Hustvedt and Auster’s narrativisation of models of 
embodied subjectivity. In this, I will seek to establish how through their 
representations of the visual Hustvedt and Auster concretise the intersubjective 
relationship between subject and object, viewer and viewed, and writer and 
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reader. Further, it offers a form of dialogue between Hustvedt and Auster, and an 
invitation to the reader to experience the complexity of their subjective interiority. 
 The fifth and final chapter will open up this intersubjective modelling to 
address Hustvedt and Auster’s representations of trauma in their fiction. This 
chapter will place recent novels such as Hustvedt’s The Sorrows of an American 
(2008) and Auster’s The Brooklyn Follies (2006) within the canon of post-9/11 
literature, while examining how Hustvedt and Auster have narrativised empathic 
self-other relations in the wake of the tragedy. The chapter will contend that 
Hustvedt and Auster’s approaches to narrativising traumatic affect can be read 
through the psychical latency described by Cathy Caruth and the historiographic 
approach favoured by Dominick LaCapra. The divergent post-Freudian 
approaches of Caruth and LaCapra can be traced back to Sigmund Freud’s 
division of trauma symptoms into melancholia and mourning. Hustvedt has 
spoken of her abiding interest in psychoanalysis, and has written and lectured on 
Freud, and psychiatry more generally. Auster’s interest in psychoanalysis is less 
explicit, though there is some familiarity with Freud and Lacan. Given the 
generative dialogue of their collaborative relationship it is possible to argue that 
his exposure to Hustvedt’s writing on this subject has informed his own narrative 
approaches.  
 In the conclusion, this thesis will propose Hustvedt and Auster as two 
major figures of late Twentieth Century and early Twenty-First Century literature. 
This can be identified in Hustvedt and Auster’s critical and commercial success, 
the stylistic idiosyncrasy of their works, and their nuanced approach to certain 
philosophical questions. While the technical and stylistic differentiations in their 
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work are self-evident, Hustvedt and Auster’s fiction can be read as consciously 
and unconsciously collaborative, characterised by a dialogic intertextuality which 
can only be found in the discursive, intersubjective spaces unique to their 
relationship. According to John-Steiner, ‘generative ideas emerge from joint 
thinking, from significant conversations, and from sustained, shared struggles’.37 
For Auster, ‘your language, your memories, your sense of isolation – every 
thought in your head has been born from your connection to others’;38 for 
Hustvedt, the unconscious nature of assimilation and influence reveals itself 
through the creative process:  
I would think that with both of our works there are things like that that are 
happening...That’s what happens. And especially with the intimacy that 
you have with someone else’s texts. I mean how could it not?...Work that 
you care about becomes imprinted somewhere in your soul. But you know, 
you don’t know about it anymore.39  
There is something in the notion of an explicitly collaborative partnership that 
Hustvedt and Auster disavow: both are fiercely protective of their own 
independent authorial identity, and the self-sufficiency of their embodied process 
of aesthetic expression. Hustvedt and Auster’s married status has inevitably 
coloured critical approaches to their contribution to contemporary fiction. 
However, as married authors, Hustvedt and Auster’s writing inevitably bears the 
                                                          
37 John-Steiner, p. 3. 
38 Paul Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected Prose, pp. 539-68 (p. 560). 
39 See Appendix 1. 
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authorial imprint of the other; this is problematically reconfigured by media 
depictions of their relationship, and further complicated by instances of 
narrativised acknowledgement in Hustvedt and Auster’s work.  
 Nevertheless, this thesis will seek to show how the dialogically intertextual 
exchange between Hustvedt and Auster’s texts is reflective of a more broadly 
discursive structure: the institution of marriage. This shared emotional space can 
be viewed as stimulating Hustvedt and Auster’s embodied process of aesthetic 
expression: each ‘set the work in motion, and this very process results ultimately 
in the awakening of responses’ within each other.40 They live together, they write 
separately, they correct and edit collaboratively: a collaborative exchange which is 
consciously and unconsciously intersubjective, and a process which is 
aesthetically and intellectually rewarding for both Hustvedt and Auster, and for 
us, their readers. 
 
                                                          
40 Iser, ‘The Reading Process’ in Reader-Response Theory, ed. by Tompkins, p. 51. 
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Chapter one: Constructed selves – autobiography, storytelling and 
the canon 
 
Introduction 
 In this opening chapter, I want to explore the embodied basis of Hustvedt 
and Auster’s dialogical intertextuality, and how this has informed Hustvedt and 
Auster’s construction of an authorial self.1 Hustvedt and Auster’s authorial 
identities are but one facet of a self which is multiple, mobile and frequently 
contradictory. Their authorial identities provide the means by which Hustvedt and 
Auster come to terms with the partial, multiple and indeterminate facets of 
selfhood. Before examining the dialogical intertextuality between Hustvedt and 
Auster’s fictional narratives, it is useful to look at their non-fictional texts which 
seek to establish an authorial self through a range of discursive approaches to 
narrativising the autobiographical self. The issues, concepts and theories related to 
selfhood that appear in Hustvedt and Auster’s fictional narratives are addressed 
more overtly in their non-fiction. In this chapter, Hustvedt’s essays and her 
interdisciplinary illness memoir The Shaking Woman, or A History of my Nerves 
(2010) will be compared with Auster’s variants on life-writing: The Invention of 
Solitude (1982), Hand to Mouth (1994), Winter Journal (2012) and Report from 
                                                          
1 I use this definition in a different sense to Michel Foucault, whose author figure, or ‘function’, is the 
embodiment and channel of discourse. Both Hustvedt and Auster would refute Foucault’s conception of the 
author function, instead viewing the reader-author relationship as a collaborative partnership. For a more 
detailed discussion of Foucault’s work, and poststructuralist reconfigurations of authorship, see Chapter two. 
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the Interior (2013). Hustvedt and Auster’s isolation of facets of their 
autobiographical selves throughout these texts exhibits a dialogic intertextuality 
which is both internalised and externalised: it speaks of itself both within and 
without itself. Inevitably, these texts contain multiple references to the shared 
narrative of their marriage, further highlighting the intertextual nature of Hustvedt 
and Auster’s fictional narratives. This chapter will provide an entry point for a 
number of these, while delineating the dialogical foundation to the collaborative 
nature of Hustvedt and Auster’s relationship.  
 The first section will consider Hustvedt and Auster’s respective 
approaches to representations of consciousness through their narratives of 
autobiographical selfhood, which in turn underpin their construction of distinct 
authorial identities. Hustvedt and Auster are both cognisant of the otherness of 
consciousness, with the former writing that ‘the art of autobiography, as much as 
the art of fiction, calls on the writer to shape himself as a character in a story, and 
that shaping requires a form mediated by language’.2 According to Hustvedt, the 
art of autobiography is dependent upon ‘what scientists call episodic or 
autobiographical memory’: the process through which we create ‘a coherent 
narrative sense of a self over time’.3 Auster, referencing the work of the late 
neurologist Oliver Sacks, observes: ‘every whole person…every person with a 
coherent identity, is in effect narrating the story of his life to himself at every 
                                                          
2 Siri Hustvedt, ‘The Real Story’ in Living, Thinking, Looking (New York: Picador, 2012), pp. 93-115 (p. 
103). 
3 Hustvedt, ‘The Real Story’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, pp. 102-03. 
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moment’.4 Qualifying this statement with the observation that we are ‘made by 
others’, Auster’s understanding of subjectivity largely draws upon biological, 
phenomenological and psychological readings of the self.5 This is perhaps 
exemplified by his separation of the narratives of his body (Winter Journal) and 
psyche (Report from the Interior) into two distinct texts, as a reflection upon, or 
problematization of, Cartesian dualism.6 While Auster proposes that the two read 
in tandem may present ‘a bigger picture’ of autobiographical selfhood, there still 
remain ‘holes in the memory’: ‘you grab on to some things, others have 
completely disappeared’.7 
 By contrast, Hustvedt’s repeated deployment of the life sciences through 
her writing departs from Auster’s approach to the mind/body split. The Shaking 
Woman in particular attempts to align the life sciences, specifically the fields of 
                                                          
4 Paul Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected Prose, p.559. Given what 
Hustvedt and Auster have already revealed about their writing relationship, it is highly probable that their 
nuanced appreciation of Sack’s neurological description of the subjective self is a product of the process of 
critical reading and intimate discussion that has characterised their married life.  
5 ‘Your language, your memories, your sense of isolation – every thought in your head has been born from 
your connection to others’. (Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected Prose, 
p. 560.)  
6 This phenomenological approach not only references Descartes, but also the korper (physical body) and 
liebe (living body) of Husserl’s model of subjectivity, which draws upon Descartes mediations for its model 
of intentionality. For a more detailed appraisal of Husserl’s ideas in relation to Hustvedt and Auster’s writing, 
see Chapter three. 
7 Paul Auster, ‘Interview with Gaby Wood’, Daily Telegraph (09 December 2013) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/authorinterviews/10498346/Paul-Auster-interview-theres-
nothing-i-feel-humiliated-by.html> [Accessed 01 January 2017]. 
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neurobiology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis, with the humanities through an 
autobiographical aesthetic where the boundaries of self and other are transgressed: 
Questions about self and other have been central to psychoanalysis, but 
they also range beyond its borders in analytical and continental 
philosophy, other disciplines in the humanities, in psychiatry, and, more 
recently, in the neurosciences. Subjectivity, intersubjectivity, mirroring, 
dialogue, and theory of mind are all terms directed at the problem of the 
between.8 
Jason Tougaw situates Hustvedt’s text within a recent corpus of ‘brain memoirs’ 
which investigate ‘philosophical or abstract questions about the connections 
between body, mind, self, and world physically and experientially concrete’.9  
 Of the two writers, it is Hustvedt whose investigations into this subject are 
more overtly scholarly: with the publication of the The Shaking Woman it 
becomes possible to detect a shift in her self-positioning as a ‘thinker’ rather than 
a ‘novelist’. As outlined in the introduction, the emotional grounding of Buber’s 
self-other ‘threshold of mutuality, or ‘the between’, is a concept Hustvedt 
frequently returns to in her texts. Her understanding of Buber’s theory appears to 
                                                          
8 Hustvedt, ‘Freud’s Playground’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 196.  
9 Interestingly, Tougaw also describes Sacks as the ‘most influential progenitor’ of what he terms ‘nonfiction 
neurological narratives’ which are more explicitly engaged with the ‘social, scientific and philosophical 
implications’ of neurological diagnosis and treatment. In this sense, we might read Report from the Interior as 
a brain memoir. Unlike that of Hustvedt, Auster’s text lacks the ‘explicit focus on the brain – and the writer 
as organism’. See Jason Tougaw, ‘Brain Memoirs, Neuroscience and the Self: A Review Article’, Literature 
and Medicine (30: 1, 2012), 171-192 (pp. 172-174). 
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predate her relationship with Auster, but it resonates with what Auster terms ‘the 
long, uninterrupted conversation’ of their marriage.10 (Journal 195) While 
Hustvedt’s own model of relationality links back to the Buberian principle of ‘‘I’ 
exists only in relation to ‘you’’,11 she stands slightly apart from Auster’s reading 
of Sacks’ coherent identity conception, determining that subjectivity ‘is not the 
story of a stable, absolute ‘I’’. (Shaking 79) Hustvedt has further developed this 
argument to contend that autobiographical memory is:  
Part of our consciousness, but that consciousness is also shaped by 
unconsciousness. What it means to be a thinking subject is an enormously 
complex philosophical and neurobiological issue’ which ‘remains 
unsolved.12 
Hustvedt’s approach to narrativizing the autobiographical self concretises the 
embodied interplay between consciousness and unconsciousness, body and mind. 
Memory, as Hustvedt argues, while frustratingly fragmentary or perpetually 
partial, is bodily felt and fundamental to the construction of autobiographical 
selfhood:  
                                                          
10 Interestingly, Lily Corwin applies a Buberian reading to Auster’s second part of The Invention of Solitude, 
‘The Book of Memory’, to signal a text that uses Buber’s I-I relationship to ‘externalize internal dialogue and 
thus find purpose and meaning’. (Lily Corwin, ‘Is That All There Is?: Martin Buber, Sufficiency, and Paul 
Auster’s ‘The Book of Memory’, Studies in American Jewish Literature (30, 2011), 68-79 (p. 68). 
11 Siri Hustvedt, The Shaking Woman, or A History of my Nerves (London: Sceptre, 2010), p. 55. Hereafter 
referred to in the text as Shaking with page number cited. 
12 Hustvedt, ‘The Real Story’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, pp. 102-03. 
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Between those important events are fogs and lapses. I forget. I forget. I 
forget. And I sometimes displace, condense, project, and generally get 
things wrong about my life…Writing a memoir is a question of organising 
remembrances I believe to be true and not invented into a verbal narrative. 
And that belief is a matter of inner conviction: what feels true now.13  
 Place and space, in terms of the ordering of geo-spatial and genealogical 
traces of selfhood, are equally critical to Hustvedt and Auster’s organisation of 
remembrances. With multiple references to childhood, youth, adolescence, 
parenthood, middle age and infirmity, Hustvedt and Auster’s autobiographical 
texts tread the genealogical terrain of constructed selfhood while attempting to 
trace the psychological basis of their authorial selves. In the second section I will 
therefore address the apparent divide between what Hustvedt identifies as 
maternal (female) and paternal (male) spaces.14 In acknowledgement of Buber, 
some consideration will be given to the dialectical nature of subjectivity and 
emotional relationality, particularly the changing constitution of consciousness 
throughout these individualised processes of identity construction. The porous, 
unknowable boundaries of the self and its transgenerational foundation will also 
be addressed in this section. Representation enacts a continual exchange between 
the narrative of autobiographical selfhood, and the aesthetics of constructing an 
                                                          
13 Hustvedt, ‘The Real Story’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 105. 
14 There is an obvious parallel in conceiving of Hustvedt and Auster – as married writers, parents and co-
creators of a collaborative aesthetic – as embodying maternal and paternal spatiality through the embodied 
process of aesthetic expression. It is a comparison which this thesis rejects as overly simplistic, and too 
narrow, in focus. 
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autobiographical narrative. Quoting Julia Kristeva, Hustvedt comments that ‘what 
is experienced gradually becomes what is represented’.15 Through the 
codification of autobiographical selfhood, Hustvedt and Auster attempt to 
represent the ontological problematic: living inside a body whose furthest origins 
are not always available to consciousness, but whose presence sets in train 
Hustvedt and Auster’s interest in intersubjectivity, and the transgenerational 
determinants of selfhood.  
 The third section will look at the gendered nature of authorship, and 
Hustvedt and Auster’s engagement with the literary canon. Hustvedt observes, 
‘every writer takes from the past’;16 Auster argues that ‘you have to read 
everything you possibly can, and try to forget it’ in order to write.17 Feminism’s 
response to the masculine tradition represented by T.S. Eliot and Harold Bloom, 
and the counter-tradition of women’s writing, complicate this notion of a literary 
inheritance for Hustvedt. Hustvedt’s relationship to feminism is highly nuanced, 
and the extent to which her writing can be read through the prism of a post-
feminist aesthetic worthy of consideration. In a critical and commercial sense, she 
has been situated within a canon of women’s writing, which she partially 
embraces and partially rejects. In one regard, Hustvedt approaches the authorial 
                                                          
15 Julia Kristeva, Time and Sense, p. 243 (qtd. in Hustvedt, ‘The Real Story’, in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 
113). 
16 Siri Hustvedt, ‘My Father/Myself’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, pp. 65-87 (p. 83).  
17 Paul: ‘In 4321 – it’s in a parenthesis in Ferguson 4 – his new uncle Gil Schneiderman says, ‘you have to 
read everything you possibly can and then try to forget it’. What you can’t forget is going to form the 
foundation of your work.’ See Appendix. 
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identity from a feminist literary tradition which acknowledges embodied selfhood 
and the unconscious, while stressing the pluralistic and mobile selfhood espoused 
by poststructuralist feminist thinkers. However, her enthusiastic embrace of 
scientific empiricism indicates a distancing from more radical feminist 
approaches. Ultimately, she places herself between these differentiated positions, 
utilising ideas which align with preceding avenues of knowledge or which open 
up new and unfamiliar terrain.  
 Mediatized approaches to Hustvedt’s work have on occasion been 
characterised by increasingly outlandish responses to her gender: her novels are 
less worthy of critical attention; he is the more cerebral writer; he taught her 
psychoanalysis; he writes her novels for her. Hustvedt and Auster are cautious 
when discussing their writing relationship: Hustvedt has likened this reading of 
her work to the cultural reputations of Simon de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre. 
While Auster has never explicitly described himself as a ‘feminist’ or been a 
vocal proponent of LGBT issues, he aligns his position on issues of gender and 
sexuality with that of his wife.18 Nevertheless, the timbre of Auster’s authorial 
voice is more explicitly masculine, reflective of his position within the male-
dominated tradition of literature. ‘The Book of Memory’ in particular indicates 
the tangible presence of its literary precursors, with Auster describing his text as a 
‘collective work’ written by ‘dozens of authors […] that’s why that book is filled 
with so many references and quotations, in order to pay homage to all the others 
                                                          
18 ‘I’ve learnt so much from her over the years. She’s an ardent feminist and I agree with her in all her 
positions. They are mine as well.’ Paul Laity, ‘‘I’ve waited my whole life to write this book’: Interview with 
Paul Auster’, Guardian (21 January 2017), p. 4.   
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inside me’.19 A case can be made for arguing for an alternative or supplementary 
genealogy of authorial identity, one in which Hustvedt and Auster’s influences are 
imprinted upon their genetic material through the process of reading, whereby 
culture ‘literally becomes material in the brain’.20  
Hustvedt and Auster’s respective responses to literary tradition illustrate 
the critical role that a reader, particularly of one another’s work, has played in the 
construction of their authorial selves. The fourth section of this chapter will 
compare intertextual and reader response theoretical approaches to reading, and 
how these have informed Hustvedt and Auster’s dialogically intertextual 
narratives. In a number of interviews, Hustvedt and Auster have emphasised the 
key role played by the reader as a co-creator of their texts. This operates 
symbiotically with the editorial role each plays for the other, their unconscious 
response to the text of the other, and the critical function the spouse-reader 
performs upon and within the spouse-author’s text. Hustvedt says of Auster: 
I had met the man before I read what he had written, but if I had not loved 
his work as I did or if he had not admired my writing, it would have 
changed things. Our work has been an intimate part of our love affair and 
                                                          
19 It is tempting to view this collective approach as a non-masculine model of aesthetic expression. Given the 
patriarchal foundation of the canon, this is not unproblematic: almost all the ‘others inside me’ described by 
Auster, perhaps inevitably, male. Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected 
Prose, p. 560. 
20 Hustvedt: ‘I’ve been hacking away at this thing about how culture becomes material, literally material in 
the brain – this kind of false dichotomy which has led to all kinds of terrible mistakes in the sciences and the 
humanities’. See Appendix 1. 
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marriage for twenty-three years, but what I read wasn’t then and isn’t now 
what I know when I’m with him. His work comes from the place in him I 
can’t know.21  
It is the tension between solipsism, intersubjectivity and the material objectivity of 
their autobiographical texts that offers an entry-point to the collaborative nature of 
Hustvedt and Auster’s writing, and their distinctly unique contributions to 
contemporary literature. Read in totality, Hustvedt and Auster’s autobiographical 
texts produce portraits-in-mosaic of selfhood, utilising a multiplicity of 
perspectives and implicating the reader in the discursive production of new forms 
of (self) knowledge. The episodic, fragmentary, vertiginous, plural and self-
reflexive nature of these remembrances illustrates the means by which memory 
and identity are formulated. In this sense, they produce an alternative form of 
knowledge, one inherently dialogical and defined by ambiguity and 
intersubjectivity.  
                                                          
21 Hustvedt, ‘Extract from a Story of the Wounded Self’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 227. 
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Narrativising the autobiographical self 
 Using autobiographical narratives which foreground identity, memory and 
language, Hustvedt and Auster have produced works which actively construct an 
authorial identity. These multifaceted, multiple-perspective narratives examine the 
various structures which predicate selfhood: those biological, genealogical, social, 
cultural, philosophical, linguistic and so on.22 Moreover, these texts are deeply 
personal representations of the means by which they came into being first as a 
conscious being, and latterly as writers. In so doing, they exhibit varying degrees 
of affiliation and differentiation: where Auster’s solipsistic texts are 
philosophically ruminative, Hustvedt’s are notable for their literary-scientific 
hybridity. Auster considers his work to be principally concerned with ‘the old 
mind-body problem. Descartes. Solipsism. Self and other, all the old philosophical 
questions’; for Auster, ‘we know who we are because we can think about who we 
                                                          
22 Like much contemporary life writing, Hustvedt and Auster penned their autobiographical narratives in the 
shadow of Roland Barthes. According to Michael Sheringham, Barthes made a ‘major contribution to the 
evolution of the autobiographical form’, principally with the ‘formal inventiveness’ of his text Roland 
Barthes par Roland Barthes (1977): ‘by abolishing overall coherence, perspective and fixity of point of 
view’, the formal ingredients of Barthes’ text serve not to abolish the notion of the individual self, but to 
enact a theatricalized subjectivity made up of multiple currents and constituencies’. By presenting 
subjectivity as ‘a shifting, mobile realm marked by infinite gradations and degrees’, Barthes’ 
autobiographical text constructs a bridge between the realms of poststructuralism and life writing, while 
effectively restoring the Author figure from the coup de grâce delivered by Barthes a number of years 
previously (see Chapter two).  Michael Sheringham, ‘Roland Barthes’ in Encyclopaedia of Life Writing: 
Autobiography and Biographical Forms, Vol. I, ed. by Margaretta Jolly (London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2001), 
pp. 93-5. 
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are’.23 His early autobiographical texts bear a nihilistic preoccupation with 
mortality which is less evident in the more positivistic philosophical positions of 
Hustvedt. The first part of The Invention of Solitude details the unexpected death 
of his father, and reveals the murder of his paternal grandfather by his 
grandmother.24 In Hand to Mouth, Auster’s attempt to forge an authorial identity 
overlaps with his financially-precarious existence, and the end of his first 
marriage.25 Winter Journal, written in the wake of his mother’s death, marks 
Auster’s commitment to documenting what he describes as the ‘phenomenology 
of breathing’, (Journal 1) a project underscored by his lachrymose observation 
that ‘you have entered the winter of your life’. (Journal 230) Winter Journal, and 
its companion volume Report from the Interior, elicit a process of recovered 
memory: an attempt to fill in the existential blanks of his identity. Like The 
Invention of Solitude, both are written in the second person.26 Read together, they 
                                                          
23 Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected Prose, p. 559. Auster’s texts 
might be situated what Tougaw describes as a ‘long-tradition of autobiographical writing that chronicles 
mind-body relationships and their implications for selfhood, including the work of Augustine, Montaigne, 
Thomas De Quincy, Marcel Proust’. Hustvedt may counter Auster’s statement with the observation that ‘we 
do not truly know who or what we are despite being able to think about who or what we are’. 
24 Pascal Bruckner calls The Invention of Solitude the ‘ars poetica and the seminal work of Paul Auster. To 
understand him we must start here; all his books lead us back to this one’. Pascal Bruckner, ‘Paul Auster and 
the Heir Interstate’ in Beyond the Red Notebook: Essays on Paul Auster, ed. by Dennis Barone (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania, 1995), pp. 27-33 (p. 27). 
25 To the writer and translator Lydia Davis. 
26 Conveying what Sarah Churchwell identifies as a ‘paradoxical effect…not to create intimacy but to 
estrange the reader’. Sarah Churchwell, ‘Paul Auster has written a listless book, full of lists’, New Statesman 
(13 September 2012) <https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/culture/2012/09/paul-auster-has-written-
listlessbook-full-lists> [Accessed 03 November 2016]. As evidenced by the headline, Churchwell’s largely 
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convey a sense of democratic monism: in Winter Journal Auster observes ‘you 
have consciously decided to be everyone’, (Journal 117) a statement subsequently 
echoed in Report from the Interior: ‘you think of yourself as anyone, as 
everyone’.27 Each describes intimate documents of Auster’s life in an empathic 
call-and-response with the reader: ‘Holding your infant children in your arms. 
Holding your wife in your arms’. (Journal 230)  
 The early autobiographical writing of Hustvedt is perhaps more explicitly 
‘I’ centered, particularly the first-person documentation of her early essays 
‘Yonder’, ‘Leaving Your Mother’, ‘Extracts from a Story of a Wounded Self’, 
and her brain memoir The Shaking Woman, the writing of which was triggered by 
                                                          
scabrous review of this text raises one of two pertinent points about the purpose of Auster’s project: ‘readers 
expecting much of anything will be disappointed…Winter Journal is eye-wateringly pointless’. However it is 
precisely Auster’s positioning of the mundane and overlooked as of equal value to the seismic and epistemic 
moments of existence that lends the book authenticity. As Churchwell concedes, it is Auster’s fluency and 
skill as a writer that grants his historical document of ontological mundanity a degree of authenticity and 
indeed authority over our contemporary era of instantaneity and hyperreality (and the compunction that 
literature must mine this seam). The phenomenological quality of boredom is continued in Report from the 
Interior, as an object which is not always available to consciousness and is consequently disregarded as a 
vital component within the narratives of our autobiographical selves. Report from the Interior is differentiated 
from Auster’s other autobiographical texts in its apparent disregard for formative epistemic breaks in the 
consciousness of its creator. 
27 Paul Auster, Report from the Interior (London: Faber, 2013), p. 4. Hereafter referred to in the text as 
Report with page number cited. Tempting, perhaps, to link this democratic monism to the creed of American 
exceptionalism: a creed which Auster instead critiques in a lengthy passage which concludes with the rueful, 
heavily ironic observation: ‘Never forget how lucky you are. To be an American is to take part in the greatest 
enterprise since the creation of man’ (Report 57). Just to be sure, this is followed by an account of 
bedwetting: ‘There was a flaw in you that had to be kept hidden from the world’. (Report 82)  
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Hustvedt’s experiencing of a series of self-diagnosed hysterical episodes 
following her father’s death. Without lapsing into overt solipsism, Hustvedt takes 
herself as the subject for a considerable number of her non-fiction pieces as she 
explores the multiple nature of identity and the unknowability of the embodied 
self. Like Auster, the mind-body problem is critical to Hustvedt’s project: in The 
Shaking Woman she describes Descartes’ principle as ‘so vexing, so entrenched a 
duality that it becomes almost impossible to think without it. This split, after all, 
created the distinction between psychiatry and neurology: sick minds versus sick 
brains’. (Shaking 17) Hustvedt’s autobiographical narratives utilise the formula 
‘memory is flux’ to illustrate the centrality of consciousness to identity, alongside 
the difficulty of fixing a stable identity upon past memory:  
To long for the immediacy and presence of what we have lost is human. 
What we retain from that former time in words, images and feelings is not 
stable. Only rarely can we measure our memories against documentary 
evidence, and even then our phenomenological perspective is missing. 
Memory itself exists only in the present.28   
Memory is also mutable, reconfiguring itself and reconsolidating as we navigate 
existence via a cognitive process that is as creative as it is nostalgic: ‘memories 
are revised over time, and their meanings change as we age, something now 
recognised by neuroscience and referred to as the reconsolidation of memory’.29 
What we remember is not what we experienced: we remember our last 
                                                          
28 Hustvedt, ‘The Real Story’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 114. 
29 Hustvedt, ‘The Real Story’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 94. 
40 
 
remembrance of that memory. Memory plays tricks on us and shapes our sense of 
who we are. 
 The recent autobiographical texts of Auster and Hustvedt present a 
composite portrait of the artist, but within that composite portrait gaps, 
uncertainties and inconsistencies remain. Much of what we know about 
consciousness is, as Hustvedt points out, unsolved. From a metaphysical 
perspective, consciousness, language and memory have preoccupied philosophers 
for centuries; in neuroscience, the organic essence of selfhood remains a puzzle: 
how the brain processes qualia to generate consciousness is referred to as ‘the 
hard question’.30 Answering this question is fraught with conjecture and 
speculation, and characterised by both intra- and interdisciplinary divisions. 
Tougaw persuasively delineates the schism between neuroscientific and 
philosophical approaches to the dualism-monism dialectic.31 These, he proposes, 
are embodied by the ideas of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio and the philosopher 
Alva Noë. While Damasio examines ‘the experience of his patients through the 
lens of philosophical questions about consciousness, emotion and cognition’, Noë 
is adamant ‘that the neuroscience hype has taken the brain out of its context…to 
convince us that our brains contain the whole story of selfhood’.32 Consciousness 
                                                          
30 Oliver Burkeman, ‘Why can’t the world’s greatest minds solve the mystery of consciousness?’, Guardian 
(21 January 2015) <https://www.guardian.com/science/2015/jan/21/-sp-why-cant-worlds-greatest-minds-
solve-mystery-consciousness> [Accessed 3 April 2017].   
31 Hustvedt addresses this problematic paradigm in her essay, ‘The Delusions of Certainty’, from her latest 
collection A Woman Looking at Men Looking at Women (London: Sceptre, 2016). 
32 Tougaw, p. 178. 
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is either a ‘private, first-person phenomenon’,33 or ‘something we do or 
make…something we achieve’. As Tougaw points out, both positions 
‘complement each other’, with Damasio’s emphasis on brain and body physiology 
interlocking with the ‘environmental and social contexts of an organism’s brain 
and body’.34  
 In Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (2010) Damasio 
outlines a model of embodied consciousness which draws upon emotional 
memory and reasoning. Under this model, the self is organised into a hierarchy of 
three stages, all of which are governed by emotion: the first, the protoself, is a 
non-linguistic state shared by all organisms which detects and records responses 
to stimuli, or ‘feelings’, through neural patterns; core consciousness, which 
emerges from the emotional responses to these feelings logged by the protoself, 
thereby stimulating the recognition of selfhood by situating itself within the 
present; and the extended self, or autobiographical self, which senses movement 
away from the present into the past and future, and through which a linguistic 
sensibility and representational facility begin to emerge. Writing of the 
autobiographical self, Damasio observes that it ‘leads a double life’: 
On the one hand, it can be overt, making up the conscious mind at its 
grandest and most human; on the other, it can lie dormant, its myriad 
components waiting their turn to become active. That other life of the 
autobiographical self takes place off-screen, away from accessible 
                                                          
33 Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, p. 12 (qtd in Tougaw, p. 177). 
34 Tougaw, p. 179. 
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consciousness, and this is where and when the self matures, thanks to the 
gradual sedimentation and reworking of one’s memory.35 
For Alfred Hornung, Hustvedt’s affinity for Damasio’s work in particular makes 
explicit her complex literary-theoretical approach to narrativizing the 
autobiographical self.36 Hustvedt writes: ‘we organise the past as explicit 
autobiographical memory…fragments are linked in a narrative, which in turn 
shapes our expectations about the future. There can be no autobiographical self 
without language’. (Shaking 58)  
 Nevertheless, Hustvedt writes, ‘scientists in various fields would disagree 
with a reductionist formulation such as ‘you are a vast assembly of nerve cells’’. 
(Shaking 71) Implicit memory embraces both precognitive memory, and those 
repressed memories buried deep within the psyche. Noë argues that Damasio’s 
model fails to account for, or indeed locate, the organic processes that stimulate 
the Freudian-Lacanian unconscious. Our desires and drives are equally vital in 
explaining selfhood, according to Hustvedt: ‘around and beneath the island of the 
self-conscious storyteller is a vast sea of unconsciousness…There is much in us 
we don’t control or will but that doesn’t mean that making a narrative for 
ourselves is unimportant’. (Shaking 198) The art of autobiographical storytelling 
                                                          
35 Antonio Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain, p. 210 (qtd in Alfred Hornung, 
‘The Shaking Woman in the Media: Life Writing and Neuroscience’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity in Siri 
Hustvedt’s Works, ed. by Hartmann, Marks and Zapf  pp. 67-82 [p. 75]). 
36 Hornung in Zones of Focused Ambiguity in Siri Hustvedt’s Works, ed. by Hartmann, Marks and Zapf, p. 75. 
Likewise, Tougaw draws our attention to Hustvedt’s use of Damasio’s ideas alongside those of William 
James, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jaak Panksepp. 
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involves the representation of those implicit memories and feelings which shape 
us, alongside more revelatory experiential phenomena. As Tougaw observes, 
‘brain memoirs are already asking the more nuanced questions’, something which 
recalls Auster’s reference in The Invention of Solitude to ‘the anecdote as a form 
of knowledge’:37 an aesthetic negotiation of the schism between body and mind in 
pursuit of an authentic sense of selfhood. This quest for autobiographical 
authenticity is guided by the authorial personas Hustvedt and Auster assume.  
 This negotiation between body and mind, conscious thought and 
unconscious feeling, guides Hustvedt and Auster’s narrativisation of their 
autobiographical selves. Further, Hustvedt and Auster’s apprehension of these 
memories enacts the concretisation of authorial selfhood. In an early essay, 
‘Yonder’, Hustvedt recalls her first memory, aged three: ‘I am walking through 
the door towards my mother, who is in the bath. I can see the bubbles’.38 This 
representation of core consciousness in infancy continues: ‘the bubbles fascinate 
me, and the presence of my mother fills me with strong, simple pleasure’.39 Early 
memories, according to Hustvedt, ‘float’ outside of the ‘greater narrative’ of our 
autobiographical self, and consequently ‘have more purity’.40 This ‘purity’ is vital 
to the establishment of nascent selfhood, which effects a negotiation between 
these formative events and the more mundane moments which define our later 
lives: ‘when dailiness enters memory, repetition fixes places in the mind, but it 
                                                          
37 Paul Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, pp. 1-150 (p. 54). 
38 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 23. 
39 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 23. 
40 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 23.  
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also burdens them with a wealth of experience that is often difficult to untangle’.41 
This ‘dailiness’ is largely absent from early autobiographical essays such as 
‘Yonder’ and ‘Leaving Your Mother’, where Hustvedt’s urge to construct a strong 
authorial identity is stronger. In those essays, Hustvedt’s sense of self is chiefly 
constituted of retrospective moments of revelation and emotional resonance. More 
mundane moments are retained by the conscious self through the implied presence 
of implicit memory: the things we ignore or overlook, or encounter 
unconsciously, can still be recalled from the mind’s compendium of 
remembrances.42  
 Auster’s narratives of autobiographical selfhood similarly traverse the 
ambiguous divide between the revelatory and mundane. Having attempted to 
write the biography of his body in Winter Journal, for Report from the Interior 
Auster dedicates himself to recovering the inception of his core consciousness. In 
his move to represent the formation of core consciousness, Auster oscillates 
between joyous recollection - ‘in the beginning, everything was alive’ – and a 
solipsistic elegy for his lost youth. These observations reverberate in a 
deliberately dialogical fashion both between and within Auster’s twin 
                                                          
41 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 24. 
42 These are revealed by Hustvedt through the experiential essays of Living, Thinking, Looking, which explore 
reading (‘On Reading’), perception (‘Notes on Seeing’), insomnia (‘Sleeping/Not Sleeping’), headaches (‘My 
Strange Head: Notes on Migraine’) or empathy (‘Flowers’). Here one can detect shared affinity for the 
essayistic tradition established by Michel de Montaigne, of whom Auster has said: ‘There is no more honest 
writer...he set out to discover himself. And he discovered the human race’. (Chris Peachment, ‘Give the man 
a cigar’, Independent (7 March 1996), <http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/give-the-man-a-
cigar-1340694.html> [Accessed 28 June 2017].)  
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autobiographical meditations. They are equal parts revelatory and mundane, 
something reflected in the elegiac language and ambulatory syntactical structure, 
and reinforced by the fragmentary nature of the narrative. Both books are arranged 
as a random collection of recollections which criss-cross the temporal-spatial 
horizon of experience, circumnavigating and cleaving to present and past:  
Your earliest thoughts, remnants of how you lived inside yourself as a 
small boy. You can remember only some of it, isolated bits and pieces, 
brief flashes of recognition that surge in you unexpectedly at random 
moments – brought on by the smell of something, or the touch of 
something, or the way the light falls on something in the here and now of 
adulthood. You think you can remember, you believe you can remember, 
but perhaps you are not remembering at all, or remembering only a later 
remembrance of what you think you thought in that distant time which is 
all but lost to you now. (Report 4) 
Like Hustvedt, Auster addresses the knotty question of how reconsolidation 
affects the construction of an autobiographical self. It also reveals in microcosm 
the purpose behind Auster’s autobiographical project: to depict the multiple, 
mobile nature of selfhood. 
 The decision to separate body and mind into two parallel texts is not 
altogether successful, yet this seems to be precisely the point Auster is making: 
‘an attempt to capture the strange doubleness of being alive’. (Report 192) The 
process recalls the impact Merleau-Ponty’s vision of embodied selfhood had on 
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the young Auster: ‘the world is in my head. My body is in the world’.43 (Report 
192) Two particular moments stand out. In Winter Journal, Auster writes: ‘Your 
bare feet on the cold floor as you climb out of bed and walk to the window. You 
are six years old. Outside snow is falling and the branches of the trees in the 
backyard are turning white’. (Journal 1) No further comment upon this temporal 
telescoping, with the winter snow embodying the familiar metonym of advancing 
age and mortality. In Report from the Interior, he describes experiencing at the 
same age of six years old ‘a feeling of happiness, an ecstatic, unbridled sense of 
well-being and joy’ after having dressed and tied his shoes, a moment ‘still 
blazing inside you fifty-nine years after that morning, undiminished in its clarity’, 
which he ascribes to ‘the birth of self-consciousness, that thing that happens to 
children at around the age of six, when the inner voice awakens and the ability to 
think a thought and tell yourself you are thinking that thought begins’:  
Our lives enter a new dimension at that point, for that is the moment when 
we acquire the ability to tell our stories to ourselves, to begin the 
uninterrupted narrative that continues to the day we die. Until that morning 
you just were. Now you knew that you were. (Report 13) 
                                                          
43 ‘1966-67. A year of much reading, perhaps more reading that at any other time in your life. Not just the 
poets but the philosophers as well. Berkeley and Hume…Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty…You can see 
traces of all four thinkers in those words of yours, but in the end it was Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology that 
said the most to you.’ (Report 192-93) For a detailed discussion of Hustvedt and Auster’s dialogical 
deployment of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in their work, see Chapter four.  
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In these two temporally-aligned passages, Auster acknowledges the embodied 
nature of consciousness, the intrusive otherness of the unconscious, and the 
moments when we lapse into an anhedonic state:  
Every now and then…you would suddenly lose track of who you were. It 
was as if the being who inhabited your body had turned into an imposter, 
or, more precisely, into no one at all. And as you felt your selfhood dribble 
out of you, you would walk around in a state of stunned dissociation, not 
sure if it was yesterday or tomorrow, not sure if the world in front of you 
was real or a figment of someone else’s imagination. (Report 44) 
From time to time we all fall into these ‘dream-like interludes’ and lose the 
narrative thread of our autobiographical selfhood.  
As if you were slipping into another dimension, a new configuration of 
time and space, looking at your own life with blank, indifferent eyes – or 
else rehearsing your death, learning what happens to you when you 
disappear. (Report 45) 
At these moments, Auster suggests, our extended consciousness becomes 
suspended or disrupted, and our temporal-spatial orientation momentarily 
obliterated. Our conscious acknowledgement of this fact both problematizes and 
restores our sense of authentic selfhood. 
 In his 2010 novel Sunset Park, Auster refers to this condition as ‘the 
strangeness of being alive’, a term which he acknowledges he borrowed from 
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Hustvedt.44 This strangeness, or sense of estrangement from one’s own body, is 
possessed of both benign and malign characteristics. While lacking the negating 
nihilism of Auster’s recollection above, Hustvedt similarly reads the concept of 
autobiographical self-narration as reflective of the otherness of the self:  
We tell our memories and link them together, and these disparate 
memories gain an owner: ‘the ‘I of autobiography, who is no one without a 
‘you’. For whom do we narrate after all? Even when alone in our heads, 
there is a presumed other’. (Shaking 198)  
The self’s material and psychical otherness interact dialogically through a 
temporal-spatial mise en abyme of subjectivity which situates the subjective self 
within a zone of interstitiality, or betweenness. For the possessor of an authorial 
identity, apprehending this zone informs not only the ongoing narrative of the 
autobiographical self, but concurrently the concretisation of selfhood through the 
writing process. With their codified autobiographical narratives, Hustvedt and 
Auster signal their commitment to exploring the dialectical realms of 
consciousness and unconsciousness. This conceptualisation of selfhood is 
extended through the notion of a genealogically-grounded self, which is guided by 
Damasio’s belief that autobiographical selfhood is guided by the ability of our 
core consciousness to situate itself within a spatio-temporal horizon. For Damasio, 
this process generates what he identifies as the self’s extended consciousness; 
                                                          
44 Paul Auster, Sunset Park (London: Faber, 2010), p. 309. Auster directly referenced his incorporation of 
Hustvedt’s phraseology during our December 2016 interview. See Appendix 1. 
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extended consciousness enables the self to recognise its temporal situatedness.45 
This is illustrated by Auster’s observation that ‘becoming a parent connects you to 
a world beyond yourself, to the continuum of generations, to the inevitability of 
your own death. You understand that you exist in time’.46 Parental space, and the 
genealogical constitution of selfhood, will come under consideration in the next 
section.  
  
  
                                                          
45 It is worth noting again that Damasio’s neurological model of self-other relations is distinctive to that of 
Freud and Lacan, though perhaps closer to that of Buber. While Hustvedt and Auster profess knowledge of 
Freud and Lacan, the usefulness of deploying a developed psychoanalytic reading to self-other relations as 
represented through the autobiographical writing of Hustvedt and Auster is negligible due to its virtual 
absence from these particular texts, save for sections of Hustvedt’s The Shaking Woman.  
46 Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected Prose, p. 553. 
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Maternal and paternal spatiality 
In the autobiographical narratives of Hustvedt and Auster, self-identity is 
concretised through a nexus of biologically-determined intersubjective ontologies. 
‘I’ coexists alongside a retinue of other ‘I’s: mother, father, siblings, grandparents, 
aunts and uncles, cousins and distant relatives; beyond them, a network of 
ancestral communities, countries and nations. There is no self without the other, 
and identity formation is reinforced through this dialectical, transferential process 
between subjectivities, particularly between parents and children. For Hustvedt, ‘a 
child’s true independence is the product of a strong, reassuring parental 
presence’.47 Her parents ‘were like the ground beneath my feet’.48 Through her 
recollections of place and family, Hustvedt reflects upon the establishment of 
nascent selfhood, observing the biological differentiation between the maternal 
spaces and paternal spaces which came to define her early life:   
By its very nature, original space, maternal space, is nonsense; human 
experience there is undifferentiated and so can’t be put into words. It lives 
on in our bodies, however, when we curl up to sleep, when we eat, when 
some of us bathe or swim. And surely it leaves its traces in our physical 
desire for another. Paternal space in an ideal sense is different. Although 
we are ‘of’ our fathers, just as we are ‘of’ our mothers, we were never ‘in’ 
our fathers. Their separateness is obvious.49  
                                                          
47 Siri Hustvedt, ‘Leaving Your Mother’ in A Plea for Eros, pp. 105-112 (p. 109). 
48 Hustvedt, ‘Leaving Your Mother’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 109. 
49 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 9. 
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This is exemplified by an anecdote in ‘Yonder’, in which Hustvedt retraces the 
source of her enduring fascination with this Buberian concept of betweenness to a 
childhood conversation with her father: 
My father once asked me if I knew where yonder was. I said I thought 
yonder was another word for there. He smiled and said, ‘No, yonder is 
between here and there.’ This little story has stayed with me for years as 
an example of linguistic magic: it identified a new space – a middle region 
that was neither here nor there – a place that simply didn’t exist for me 
until it was given a name.50 
For Hustvedt, the indistinct, interchangeable defining qualities of these binary 
positions – here and there – stimulates an early understanding of the mutability of 
place, the fluid constitution of consciousness, and the inconsistencies inherent 
within language and memory:   
What fascinates me is not so much being in a place as not being there: how 
places live in the mind once you have left them, how they are imagined 
before you arrive, or how they are simply called out of nothing to illustrate 
a thought or story…These mental spaces map our inner lives more fully 
                                                          
50 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 1. Hustvedt’s interest in betweenness can even be seen in the 
etymology of her patronym, which is rooted in the geo-spatial specificity of Norway: ‘high above the 
mountains above the town of Voss, in western Norway, lies the farm that gave me my name: Hustveit. At 
some point, the tveit became tvedt, a different spelling for the same word, which means an opening or 
clearing’. (Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 14.) The phonetic similarity of Hustvedt and Auster 
similarly finds itself embroiled in the drama of otherness, and the spatiality of ‘the between’. 
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than any ‘real’ map, delineating the borders of here and there that also 
shape what we see in the present.51  
The geo-spatial grounding of her identity – the ‘real’ map which determines how 
she came to be here and not there – predetermines these maps of the imagination. 
Hustvedt proposes that the physical divide between her Norwegian and American 
families contributed to a complex and linguistically unique upbringing for her and 
her family:  
When I was a child, the map consisted of two regions only: Minnesota and 
Norway, my here and my there…The two places intermingled in language. 
I spoke Norwegian before I spoke English. Literally my mother’s tongue, 
Norwegian remains for me a language of childhood, of affection, of food, 
and of songs. I often feel its rhythms beneath my English thoughts and 
prose, and sometimes its vocabulary invades both.52 
As a child in Minnesota, under the care of her visiting Grandmother Hustvedt 
learned to speak Norwegian before she spoke English. On repeated visits to 
Norway, this latent linguistic comprehension is strengthened and deepened until 
she and her sisters ‘played, thought and dreamed in Norwegian’.53 Hustvedt later 
observes that ‘language is the most profound feature of any place’;54 yet it is also 
                                                          
51 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 2. 
52 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 2.  
53 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 3. 
54 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 4. 
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possessed of what she terms a ‘miraculous flexibility’,55 one which underpins her 
understanding of the arbitrary and alterable constituency of language: ‘my 
childhood history of forgetting and remembering enacts in miniature the dialectic 
of all immigrant experience: here and there are in a relation of constant strain that 
is chiefly determined by memory’.56  
Maternal space is ‘at the centre’ of Hustvedt’s experiences of Norway, 
linked to her grandmother, or ‘mormor’ (meaning ‘mother-mother’ in the native 
Norwegian), and her mother, who left Bergen for America when she was thirty 
years old.57 The word mormor elicits ‘an incantation of pregnancy and birth itself, 
of one person coming from another, and then its repetition in time’.58 When 
Hustvedt herself became pregnant, she felt it was ‘the only time I had been 
physically plural – two in one. But of course, it had happened before, when I was 
the one inside that first place’.59 Elsewhere she writes:  
Because mothers are our first loves, because it is through them that we 
begin to find ourselves as separate beings in a new world, they have, for 
better or worse, immense power.60  
                                                          
55 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 2. 
56 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 4.  
57 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 7. 
58 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 9. 
59 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 9. 
60 Hustvedt, ‘Leaving Your Mother’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 108. 
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If Hustvedt regards Norway as her ‘motherland’, the American Midwest – 
specifically Northfield, Minnesota – is an equivalent fatherland: a ‘little Norway’ 
founded in the nineteenth century by immigrant families ‘separated not only by 
miles but by culture’.61  Contrasting sharply with the initially idyllic childhood of 
her mother in Norway, the ‘primitive life on the prairie’ of Hustvedt’s paternal 
ancestors extends to their ‘antiquated diction and grammar’.62 This apparent 
antiquatedness is symbiotically equated to the hardships of Hustvedt’s father’s 
upbringing, particularly the effect of the Depression on her paternal grandparents 
and the community of little Norwegians. During the Second World War, 
Hustvedt’s father served in New Guinea and the Philippines, about which ‘he 
talked very little’.63 While her father ‘was very much there in my life, and the 
lives of my sisters’, 64 paternal space for Hustvedt is possessed of a more discrete, 
indefinable ontology: ‘he has many stories about the people he grew up with, but 
his inner life and the pictures he carries with him, in particular the most painful 
ones, are hidden to me’.65 Latent trauma is transferred across generations: while 
giving a talk in honour of her father at St. Olaf’s college in Minnesota, where he 
had been a professor for forty years, Hustvedt experiences a violent trembling 
episode:  
                                                          
61 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p.11. 
62 Hustvedt fictionalises these experiences in the narrative of her fourth novel, The Sorrows of an American, 
which includes verbatim transcripts from her late father’s journal and a dedication to him as co-author in the 
acknowledgements.  
63 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 18. 
64 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 9. 
65 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 13. 
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I looked out at the fifty or so friends and colleagues of my father who had 
gathered around the memorial Norway spruce, launched into my first 
sentence, and began to shudder violently from the neck down. My arms 
flapped. My knees knocked. I shook as if I were having a seizure. (Shaking 
3)    
At first Hustvedt assumes that she has suffered a hysterical episode following the 
trauma of her father’s death:66 ‘That could be it! I thought. My fit had been 
hysterical.’ (Shaking 10)  Later, Hustvedt describes a dissociative moment when 
she feels herself enter the body of her dying father:  
                                                          
66 In The Shaking Woman, Hustvedt describes how the etymology of hysteria is derived from the Greek word 
for ‘womb’, indicating a ‘purely female problem connected to reproductive organs’ which until the eighteenth 
century was ‘regarded as a convulsive illness that originated somewhere in the body’. (Shaking 10-11) 
Hysteria has undergone a number of redefinitions during this period, and is currently classified in the DSM as 
conversion disorder: a somatoform disorder which indicates ‘disturbances of the body and physical 
sensations’. Under this classification it is treated as a psychiatric, rather than neurological, disorder. However, 
this definition seems to runs counter to the Freudian psychoanalytic position that ‘hysteria was a psychic 
illness with no organic cause’. (Shaking 13) Additionally, for a period in the late Twentieth Century hysteria 
was grouped with dissociation disorders, which Hustvedt defines as ‘a very broad term used in different ways 
to indicate some form of distance from or disruption of ordinary selfhood’, such as ‘when a person has an out 
of body experience’ or ‘is plagued by a sense that he or the world isn’t real’. (Shaking 12) As Hustvedt points 
out, it was Joseph Breuer and Sigmund Freud who first used the term ‘conversion’ in Studies in Hysteria 
(1893): ‘We adopt the term ‘conversion’ to designate the transformation of psychical excitement into the 
chronic somatic symptoms, which is so characteristic of hysteria’. (Breuer and Freud qtd in Shaking p.16.) 
For a detailed discussion of Hustvedt and Auster’s dialogical approach to trauma theory in their literature, see 
Chapter five. 
56 
 
I felt the oxygen line in my nostrils and its discomfort, the heaviness of my 
lame leg, from which a tumor had been removed years before, the pressure 
in my tightened lungs, and a sudden panicked helplessness that I could not 
move from the bed on my own. (Shaking 124-25) 
Through this psychical transgression of the borders of embodied consciousness, 
she encounters a ‘sensation’ she finds ‘overwhelming and awful’:  
For however long it lasted, only minutes, I was my father…I felt the 
proximity of death, its inexorable pull, and I struggled to leap into my own 
body, to find myself again. (Shaking 125) 
Auster’s own depictions of dissociated selfhood are worthy of comparison with 
that of Hustvedt. In Winter Journal, Auster describes suffering his own 
dissociative seizure following his mother’s sudden death from a heart attack. 
Auster’s loss of two parents to the same condition triggers a panic attack, which 
he mistakenly assumes is a heart attack triggered by a rush of existential angst at 
his own imminent mortality: ‘You wait for your body to drown in the deep black 
waters of death’. (Journal 128-29) Unlike Hustvedt, he does not feel himself 
entering the maternal space of his deceased mother, but ascribes it to an inability 
to ‘grieve in the way people normally do […] Death freezes you and shuts you 
down, robbing you of all emotion, all affect, all connection to your own heart’. 
(Journal 129-30)  
It is paternal space which dominates ‘The Invisible Man’, the first part of 
Auster’s memoir, The Invention of Solitude, a philosophical treatise upon ‘the 
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irreducible fact of our own mortality’ triggered by the sudden death of his father: 
‘The news of my father’s death came to me three weeks ago. It was Sunday 
morning and I was in the kitchen preparing breakfast for my son Daniel. Upstairs 
my wife was in bed’.67 In contrast with the emotionally-charged presence of 
Hustvedt’s father, Auster’s immediate response to his father’s sudden death and 
very existence is one of emotional ambivalence, leading him to observe ‘my 
father had left no traces’:  
Even before his death he had been absent, and long ago the people closest 
to him had learned to accept this absence, to treat it as the fundamental 
quality of his being...In the deepest, most unalterable sense, he was an 
invisible man. Invisible to others, and most likely invisible to himself as 
well.68 
Initially Auster’s inability to see his deceased father occludes his own sense of 
self. By writing about their relationship Auster embarks on a process of self-
assessment as a means to address his apparent failings as a son, father and 
husband: 
                                                          
67 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 3. The passage continues: ‘Winter in the country: 
a world of silence, wood smoke, whiteness.’ The parallels with Winter Journal are obvious. 
68 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 4. The text contains an interesting intertextual 
moment with Hustvedt’s conceptualisation of betweenness. Auster says of his father: ‘It was never possible 
for him to be where he was. For as long as he lived, he was somewhere else, between here and there. But 
never really here. And never really there’. (Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 15.) 
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I realize now that I must have been a bad son. Or, if not precisely bad, then 
at least a disappointment, a source of confusion and sadness. It made no 
sense to him that he had produced a poet for a son. […] I must not have 
seemed very substantial to him, as if I were somehow a vapor or a person 
not wholly of this world. In his eyes, you became part of the world by 
working. By definition, work was something that brought in money. If it 
did not bring in money, it was not work. Writing, therefore, was not work, 
especially the writing of poetry.69  
This particular passage depicts a biography of mutual antipathy in miniature, an 
encapsulation of a fraught father-son dynamic characterised by intersubjective 
negation.70   
                                                          
69 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 53.  
70 This notion of being ‘part of the world by working’, and the concomitant use-value of art, haunts the 
second part of The Invention of Solitude, ‘The Book of Memory’ and Auster’s second autobiographical work, 
Hand to Mouth. Hand to Mouth is subtitled ‘a chronicle of early failure’ which documents Auster’s ‘late 
twenties and early thirties’, a time characterised by a ‘constant, grinding, almost suffocating lack of money’ 
only alleviated when he receives a significant sum of money after his father’s unexpected death, a fact he 
reflects upon in an interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory: ‘in some sense, all the novels I’ve 
written have come out of that money my father left me…It’s a terrible question, finally. To think that my 
father’s death saved my life.’ (Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected 
Prose, p.551.) In Hand to Mouth he writes, ‘most writers lead double lives. They earn good money at 
legitimate professions and carve out time for their writing as best they can […] My problem was I had no 
interest in leading a double life…the idea of punching a clock in some nine-to-five job left me cold, utterly 
devoid of enthusiasm’. Here Auster makes a conscious decision to represent his autobiographical authorial 
self as being crafted from a period of near-penury: the assumed persona of an existential hunger artist. See 
Paul Auster, ‘Hand to Mouth’ in Collected Prose, pp.151-242, (pp. 153-54.) 
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 The paternal space problematic continues in ‘The Book of Memory’, 
Auster’s meditation on masculinity and monadology through the framework of 
memoir.71 Auster references Gottfied Wilhelm Leibniz’s model of monadology in 
an instance of acute anomie:  
Each man, therefore, is the entire world, bearing within his genes a 
memory of all mankind. Or as Leibniz put it: ‘Every living substance is a 
perpetual living mirror of the universe’.72  
This invocation of Leibniz encourages Auster to consider ‘the furtive microscopic 
cell that has fought its way up through his wife’s [Lydia Davis] body, some three 
years earlier, to become his son’.73 We cannot speak of the universe without first 
speaking of the microcosmic, and inevitably this returns us to consciousness: To 
wander about in the world, then, is also to wander about in ourselves. That is to 
say, the moment we step into the space of memory, we walk into the world’.74  
                                                          
71 In Winter Journal, Auster describes the time when The Invention of Solitude was written as a ‘transitional 
period’: ‘beginning with the breakup of your marriage and your father’s death, the nine months on Varick 
Street and the first eleven months in Carroll Gardens, a time marked by nightmares and inner struggle, 
alternating between fits of hope and no hope, tumbling into the beds of various women, women you tried to 
love but couldn’t, certain you would never marry again, working on your book, on your translations of 
Joubert and Mallarme, on your mammoth anthology of twentieth century French poetry, taking care of your 
confused and sometimes embattled three-year-old son.’ (Journal 96-97) 
72 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 95. 
73 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 95. 
74 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 142. 
60 
 
Intertwined with Auster’s metaphysical concerns and intertextual 
engagements with the canon are a number of touching domestic moments with his 
young son, Daniel. These are freighted with the emotional implications of 
Auster’s domestic difficulties during this time.75 The book opens where ‘Portrait 
of an Invisible Man’ effectively closed: ‘an image of Daniel now, as he lies 
upstairs in his crib asleep. To end with this’.76 Auster’s fragmentary meditation 
begins on Christmas Eve in 1979, and finds Auster separated from his wife and 
son Daniel, living in a small apartment in Varick Street, New York: ‘He cannot 
call it home, but for the past nine months it is all he has had’. The financially and 
emotionally precarious predicament of Auster and his son is reflected in his 
musings on the transitory, inconsistent nature of memory. The philosophical 
considerations of Auster’s text reflect a wider concern with what Auster describes 
as ‘nostalgia for the present’, another instance of Auster recording the suspension 
of his core consciousness: 
                                                          
75 After their lengthy separation, Auster divorced his first wife Lydia Davis in 1982. In 1996, Daniel was 
alleged to have been present at the New York apartment where his friend Michael Alig murdered the drug 
dealer Andre ‘Angel’ Melendez. Daniel later admitted stealing $3,000 from the deceased Melendez. There’s 
no doubt that the Melendez affair would have been a painful period for Auster, and one he has, rightly, 
preferred not to discuss publicly. Hustvedt herself writes, ‘Although divorce is commonplace enough and 
often benign – without open rancour between parents – going from here to there can become a form of being 
nowhere. The child finds himself yonder in a land between father and mother…Two homes inevitably 
contradict each other…And what does it mean for that child’s relations to the symbolic world in general – to 
language itself as the expression of truth, of all meaning?’ (Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 38). In 
2002, Hustvedt received a critical mauling in The New York Observer for partially basing the narrative of her 
2002 novel What I Loved on elements of the Melendez murder.  
76 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 60. 
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His life no longer seemed to dwell in the present…Even as he stood in the 
present, he felt himself to be looking at it from the future, and this present-
as-past was so antiquated that even the horrors of the day, which ordinarily 
would have filled him with outrage, seemed remote to him, as if the voice 
in the radio were reading from a chronicle of some lost civilization.77 
In one regard, Auster is looking forward to the moment when his son ‘walks into 
the world’; in another, it terrifies him by signalling his hastening demise, like his 
father before him. The sense of loss presses in upon on Auster; yet it is self-
consciously generated by his apparent nostalgia for the present. Likewise, his 
ruminations in the passages of ‘Portrait of an Invisible Man’ suggest that he too 
views himself as a ‘LOST CHILD’.78 Lost children litter the textual landscape, 
‘the children who will vanish, the children who are dead’: Stéphane Mallarmé’s 
dying son Anatole, and the poem-as-memorial Mallarmé writes for him; Anne 
Frank, whose house in Amsterdam Auster visits, and whose birthday Daniel 
shares; Etan Patz, who vanishes from the streets of New York around the time that 
Auster and his wife separate. 
Then there is Daniel: another lost child.79 There are moments when ‘The 
Book of Memory’ enacts a moving reworking of the father-son dialectic. Further, 
these representations of nascent consciousness prefigure the explorations of 
                                                          
77 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 61. 
78 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 84. 
79 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 62. 
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Auster’s own interiority in Winter Journal and Report from the Interior. He 
writes:  
It is a lost world. And it strikes him to realise that it will be lost forever. 
The boy will forget everything that has happened to him so far. There will 
be nothing left but a kind of after-glow, and perhaps not even that. All the 
thousands of hours that A. has spent with him during the first three years 
of his life, all the millions of words he has spoken to him, the books he has 
read to him, the meals he has made for him, the tears he has wiped for him 
– all these things will vanish from the boy’s memory forever.80  
The process of coming into being through language is deployed in a mimetic and 
metonymic sense. Linguistic and physical play are conflated with Auster’s self-
construction as a writer co-existing with Daniels own emergence into the world of 
language: ‘it sometimes seems to A. that his son’s mental perambulations while at 
play are an exact image of his own progress through the labyrinth of a book’.81 
Much like Auster’s literary project, his son’s cognitive processes takes the form of 
a solitary pursuit that occurs within the internalised world of self-consciousness:  
Another time, the boy went into the bathroom, closed the door and did not 
come out. A. asked through the closed door: ‘What are you doing in 
there?’ ‘I’m thinking,’ the boy said. ‘I have to be alone to think.’82  
                                                          
80 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 142. 
81 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 142. 
82 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 110.  
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Citing Freud, Auster reflects that play and creativity are self-referential and 
fundamental to the development of the core and extended consciousness identified 
by Damasio: 
You will not forget that the stress laid on the writer’s memories of his 
childhood, which perhaps seem so strange, is ultimately derived from the 
hypothesis that imaginative creation, like day dreaming, is a continuation 
of and substitute for the play of childhood.83 
Despite the profession of ‘play’, there is much at stake in the book. The author 
asks himself at the close of ‘Portrait of an Invisible Man’: ‘To wonder what he 
will make of these pages when he is old enough to read them’.84  
 Auster’s anthropological depictions of Daniel are at times mannered and 
distanced, with Auster referring to himself throughout as A., distancing himself 
from his authentic identity, and that of his son. The otherness of children, and the 
nascent consciousness of childhood, is fundamental to Auster’s conception of 
autobiographical selfhood. Despite this, there remains a significant amount of 
emotional warmth in ‘The Book of Memory’. Book Eight describes Auster and 
his son reading Collodi’s Pinocchio together as a process of reconciliation: ‘little 
by little, they both began to gravitate toward one book […] For A. and his son, so 
often separated from each other during the past year, there was something deeply 
satisfying in this passage of reunion’.85 It is these resonant moments which lend 
                                                          
83 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 141. 
84 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 60. 
85 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, pp. 110-11. 
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meaning to ‘The Book of Memory’: the image of the son saving the father in 
Collodi’s version of Pinocchio ‘gives the story meaning’ to Daniel.86 For Auster, 
the excursions into Daniel’s imagination have saved him – and his book – from 
dissolute fragmentation:  
The son saves the father. This must be fully imagined from the perspective 
of the little boy. And this, in the mind of the father who was once a little 
boy, a son, that is, to his own father, must be fully imagined. Puer 
aeternus. The son saves the father.87  
In one sense, the reading of Pinocchio gives shape to the text, a reflection upon 
and record of preservation of their limited time together. They reference and 
refocus Auster’s representation of his father in ‘Portrait of an Invisible Man’. 
Similarly, they look to an exterior world beyond their own, inscribing ‘The Book 
of Memory’ with a transgenerational materiality:  
When the father dies, he writes, the son becomes his own father and his 
own son. He looks at his son and sees himself in the face of the boy. He 
imagines what the boy sees when he looks at him and finds himself 
becoming his own father. Inexplicably he is moved by this. It is not just 
the sight of the boy that moves him, nor even the thought of standing 
inside his father, but what he sees in the boy of his own vanished 
past…Inexplicably, he finds himself shaking with both happiness and 
                                                          
86 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 113. 
87 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 113. 
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sorrow, if this is possible, as if he were going both forwards and 
backwards, into the future and into the past.88  
There are gradations of paternal helplessness here: from Auster’s relationship with 
his father, to the transferential encounters with Daniel, and his sorrow at his self-
perception as a ‘lost child’. However, the need by the writer-as-father to express 
this conflict between love, passivity and desolation is driven by an irresistible 
impulse to represent the truth of this transitional period: ‘He finds a fresh sheet of 
paper. He lays it out on the table before him and writes down these words with his 
pen. / It was. It will never be again. Remember’.89  
 In The Invention of Solitude, Auster’s recognition that he has to 
memorialise his late father triggers a process of self-preservation through an 
autobiographical aesthetic: ‘I thought: my father is gone. If I do not act quickly, 
his entire life will vanish with him’. By contrast, Hustvedt believes her ‘stories 
and pictures I make for the lives of the people closest to me are the forms of my 
empathy’. This sense of shared responsibility and ethos of mutuality extends to 
the spousal other. Hustvedt’s relationship to her parents, which she describes as 
being remarkable, is the polar opposite of Auster’s fraught relationship with his 
father. Both Hustvedt and Auster have described their relationship as a lifelong 
friendship or enduring conversation, thus emphasising the credo of empathic 
other-recognition that underpins the romanticised ideality of a marriage. Here one 
recalls Hustvedt’s description of the yonder-land between father and mother that 
                                                          
88 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 66. 
89 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 148. 
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the children of divorced parents enter into, and their concomitant response to 
language as a conveyor of truth, meaning and trust.  
 In turn, Hustvedt’s love releases Auster from a sense of isolation and loss 
‘so great, and so suffocating, that he thought it would never let go’.90 Auster pays 
his own homage to Hustvedt in Winter Journal, describing her as ‘The One’, 
(Journal 98), ‘subject, not object’, (Journal 198) and ‘a brilliant woman, one of 
the best minds you have ever met’, (Journal 198) while valorising her 
commitment to completing her PhD and rebuffing his offer to support her 
financially. Indeed, as we shall see in the next section, Hustvedt’s detachment 
from socially and culturally constructed gender distinctions and feminist readings 
of patriarchal power is drawn from the empathic mutuality of a marriage founded 
on respectful admiration for the mind, and the art, of the other. Further, perhaps 
this in some way accounts for the strength of Hustvedt and Auster’s mutual bond: 
acknowledgement of the highly charged emotional realm of the other, refracted 
through the narrative of autobiographical selfhood. 91  
  
                                                          
90 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 84. 
91 Hustvedt even suggests that she sees something of her father in her husband: ‘I like his voice, and I like the 
warmth, the tenderness…I didn’t think it then, but now I wonder if I wasn’t hearing something familiar. My 
father had that when he was alive. He was alive then. My father’s voice changed inflection when he spoke 
about someone he loved.’ (Hustvedt, ‘Extracts from a Story of the Wounded Self’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 226.) 
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Authorship, influence and the canon 
 The conceptualisation of Hustvedt and Auster’s consciously-constructed 
authorial identities posited in this thesis extends to the inflections of their 
intertextual dialogues with the Western canon.92 In the simplest sense, to become 
a writer one must first become a reader; to be a reader, one will inevitably 
encounter the literary canon; these encounters are frequently culturally structured 
and hierarchical; for some feminist thinkers, the canon perpetuates patriarchal 
power structures and gender inequality.93 The notion of a canon is patrolled by a 
range of competing cultural forces. This presents a problematic paradigm, which 
Hustvedt reflects upon with a note of irritation:  
There is this assumption that much of what I write is about my life and that 
simply is not true. I've wondered if there's some sort of sexual stereotyping 
because some academics have claimed that all of Paul's truly 
autobiographical books – The Invention of Solitude, Hand to Mouth – are 
invented. The man is so clever everything is a kind of Derridean 
deconstruction and everything a woman writes is confessional? The only 
                                                          
92 John Searle defines the Western canon as ‘an intellectual tradition that goes from, say, Socrates to 
Wittgenstein in philosophy, and from Homer to James Joyce in literature’; yet even within this narrow 
conception there lies ‘a certain set of tentative judgements about what had importance and quality’ which 
were ‘being constantly revised’. (John R. Searle, ‘The Storm Over the University’, New York Review of 
Books (6 December 1990) <http://www.nybooks/articles/1990/12/06/the-storm-over-the-university> 
[Accessed 22 November 2016]. 
93 See Pam Morris, Literature and Feminism: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1993), p. 8. 
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book I've written which could be construed as confessional was 10% about 
me and 90% disciplinary approaches to a diagnostic problem.94 
This narrowly-defined and frequently media-driven interpretation of Hustvedt and 
Auster’s relationship informs, complicates and at times undermines the 
intertextual reciprocity of their writing. However, what appears to be a simple, 
gendered reflection of the pursuit of an independent authorial identity discloses a 
collaborative working relationship underpinned by dialogic intertextuality. There 
are three formative elements to consider here: firstly, Hustvedt and Auster’s 
exposure to literature in early childhood and their development as readers; 
secondly, the theoretical grounding of their education at Columbia and their 
discursive appropriation of these elements; thirdly, their sharing of the ideas and 
concepts gleaned from reading in a domestic context. 
 Hustvedt and Auster’s autobiographical narratives carry frequent 
references to the role reading played in the establishment of their authorial 
identities. For Hustvedt, literature occupies a parental space which is possessed of 
both masculine and feminine characteristics. In ‘Yonder’, Hustvedt recounts 
visiting St Olaf college library with her father; elsewhere her mother brings her a 
number of texts from the library: the poems of Emily Dickinson, William Blake’s 
Songs of Innocence and Experience, Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland, David 
                                                          
94 Hadley Freeman, ‘Siri Hustvedt: my life and other fiction’ in Guardian (25 March 2011), 
<http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/mar/25/siri-hustvedt-life-fiction> [Accessed 22 November 
2016]. The ‘book’ she refers to is The Shaking Woman. The subheading reads as follows: ‘Siri Hustvedt’s 
new novel, The Summer Without Men, deals with many women’s worst fear: your husband leaving you in 
middle age. Just don’t ask her if she and Paul Auster are having marital problems’. 
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Copperfield, Jane Eyre and Wuthering Heights.95 The library, ergo literature as an 
art form, comes to embody a collaborative paternal and maternal space, a zone of 
intersubjective ambiguity and dialogue between those influences: 
The idea of literature belonged to both my father and my mother, and my 
literature, the English language books I had read at eleven, twelve, and 
thirteen, were my mother’s choices for me. I read under the auspices of 
two polestars, one paternal and remote, the other maternal and closer.96  
Auster’s literary upbringing could not be more different from that of Hustvedt. 
His engagement with the literary canon materialises from a largely autodidactic 
childhood. According to Auster, neither of his parents ‘had any interest in 
reading’, and consequently there were ‘few books’ at home. (Report 24) Like 
Hustvedt, he ‘acquired the habit of reading novels, for the most part mediocre 
ones’ from frequent trips to the library. (Report 24) A birthday gift from his 
grandmother, the works of Robert Louis Stevenson, grants him a ‘first glimpse 
into the hidden wheelworks of literary creation, the mystifying process by which a 
person can leap into a mind that is not his own’. (Report 26) The encounter with 
Stevenson in particular triggers the construction of a self-consciously poetic 
identity in the adolescent Auster:  
A pity that your rhymes were so impoverished, but what counted then was 
the impulse, the sense of who you were and how deeply you felt you 
                                                          
95 ‘It is fair to say that to this day I have not recovered from a single one of those novels’. (Hustvedt, 
‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 27.) 
96 Hustvedt, ‘My Father/Myself’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, pp. 82. 
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belonged to the world around you as your pencil inched across the page 
and you eked out your miserable verses. (Report 27)  
 In late adolescence, Hustvedt and Auster’s encounters with the canon, and 
their putative formation of authorial identities overlap with a period as students of 
literature at Columbia in New York. Separated in their studies by almost a decade, 
both responded to the city with a sense of awe-struck awakening.97 In Report from 
the Interior, Auster calls New York, ‘the centre of the world’, (Report 181) while 
Hustvedt describes the city as ‘another world’: 
New York City struck me as more brilliant and alive than anywhere else 
on earth…Columbia is in and of the city, and I can’t separate one from the 
other…both the city and the school were part of a new crazy rhythm of 
things.98  
Both view their younger selves with a degree of distanced amusement and mild 
disdain: Auster calls himself a ‘fledgling incarnation’, ‘a stranger’ and a 
‘floundering boy-man’; (RTFI 181-2) Hustvedt describes a ‘romantic heroine’ 
who as an undergraduate in Minnesota ‘walked around dreaming she was a 
                                                          
97 Auster attended from 1965-69, Hustvedt from 1978-86. Auster’s graduate thesis, titled ‘The Art of Hunger’ 
is reproduced in his Collected Prose, and consists of a close reading of Knut Hamsun’s Hunger and Franz 
Kafka’s A Hunger Artist notable for its absence of any methodological framework; Hustvedt’s PhD thesis, 
completed in 1986, was titled ‘Figures of Dust: A Reading of Our Mutual Friend’, and draws upon the ideas 
of Søren Kierkegaard, Emile Benveniste, Roman Jakobson, Mikhail Bakhtin, Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, 
Mary Douglas, Paul Ricoeur and Julia Kristeva.  
98 Hustvedt, ‘Extract from a Story of the Wounded Self’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 227 
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combination of George Eliot and Nora Charles in The Thin Man’.99 Both expect to 
be stimulated intellectually and emotionally by ‘the urban wilds of Manhattan’, as 
opposed to a ‘rural backwater’ of the Midwest. (Report 184) This is the ‘guiding 
fiction’ of their adolescent selves and their nascent authorial personas.100  
 In Hand to Mouth Auster records that by the time he arrived at Columbia, 
his ‘only ambition’ was to write.101 Describing 1966-67 as ‘a year of much 
reading, perhaps more reading than at any other moment in your life’, (Report 
192) by spring 1967 Auster had ‘started writing a novel’, but, like his great 
influence Samuel Beckett, ‘failed, failed again and again’. (Report 194) From 
those notebooks emerged ‘the nascent germs of three novels you would later 
manage to finish (City of Glass, In the Country of Last Things, Moon Palace).’ 
(Report 194) Remembering her second year at Columbia, Hustvedt describes 
writing ‘derivative’ or ‘weak’ poems that yield to prose in a frenzied night of 
automatic writing: ‘something had broken in me and I wrote like a person 
possessed’.102 Yet she appears to have begun writing seriously much earlier, at St 
Olaf college in Minnesota, during the mid-1970s: ‘I read and I wrote. I wrote 
                                                          
99 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 30. In another essay she writes: ‘I turned to look at myself in the 
small mirror over the sink. I knew the person I was looking at was myself, and yet there was an alien quality 
to myself, an otherness that brought with it feelings of exuberance and celebration. All at once, I was looking 
at a stranger’. (Hustvedt, ‘Extract from a Story of the Wounded Self’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 221.) 
100 Hustvedt, ‘Yonder’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 28. 
101 Auster, ‘Hand to Mouth’ in Collected Prose, p. 153 
102 Hustvedt, ‘Extract from a Story of the Wounded Self’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 227. 
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stories and poems…The college literary magazine rejected everything I had to 
offer.’103 
 ‘When I write’, Hustvedt states, ‘I am always moving towards the 
unarticulated, the dangerous, the place where the walls don’t hold. I don’t know 
what’s there, but I am pulled towards it’.104 Auster describes the process of 
writing ‘The Book of Memory’ in similar terms: ‘I felt as though I was looking 
down to the bottom of myself, and what I found there was more than just myself – 
I found the world’.105 Hustvedt and Auster’s deployment of the trope of 
movement (‘toward / down’) within the largely static process of writing elicits a 
process of self-surrender: from the stable spatiality of consciousness towards the 
unknown realms of the psyche; or, alternatively, a paradigm shift from the reality 
of quotidian existence towards an ideality of authorial selfhood. Auster has also 
stated that ‘the deeper I get into my work, the less engaging theoretical problems 
become’;106 he also suggests that ‘I haven’t had much of a scholarly approach to 
reading’.107 Passages of Report from the Interior illustrate the partially-
disingenuous nature of that claim. In the book he describes the Columbia 
Freshman Humanities reading list, which began with Homer and culminated with 
Dostoyevsky,108 as being ‘without question the most invigorating intellectual 
                                                          
103 Hustvedt, ‘Extract from a Story of the Wounded Self’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 216. 
104 Hustvedt, ‘Extract from a Story of the Wounded Self’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 229. 
105 Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 560. 
106 Auster, ‘Interview with Joseph Mallia’, BOMB, p. 27. 
107 Paul Auster, Michel Contat and Alyson Waters, ‘The Manuscript in the Book: A Conversation’, Yale 
French Studies (89, 1996), 160-87 (p 161). 
108 The reading list is described in Auster’s latest novel, 4321 (London: Faber, 2017). 
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challenge of your life so far, a high-dive plunge into a universe of marvels, 
revelations, and all-encompassing joy’. (Report 184-5)  
 It is possible to read Auster’s relationship to the canon through the 
framework of Harold Bloom’s The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry 
(1973), which outlines a poetic ancestry that literary practitioners are compelled to 
rewrite, or ‘misread’, ‘so as to clear imaginative space for themselves’.109 The 
creative act embodies this struggle with a ‘strong precursor’, symbiotically 
reflected in the extra-literary process of authorial-identity construction:110 what 
Bloom terms ‘the melancholy of the unified mind’s desperate insistence upon 
priority’.111 Bloom’s Freudian reading of the Oedipal relationship between poets 
and their precursors offers a partial rebuttal to what he terms ‘antithetical 
criticism’, as exemplified by T.S. Eliot’s essay, ‘Tradition and the Individual 
Talent’ (1919).112 Like Bloom, Eliot suggests that ‘no poet, no artist of any sort, 
has his complete meaning alone’ and the ‘significance’ of his artistry lies in the 
‘appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists’ of tradition; unlike 
Bloom, Eliot contends that ‘the progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice’ 
                                                          
109 Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 
5. 
110 Morris, p. 48.  
111 Bloom, p. 13. 
112 Graham Allen, Intertextuality (London: Routledge, 2000) p. 135 
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and ‘process of depersonalisation’ as he assumes the ‘consciousness of the 
past’.113  
 A number of Auster’s narratives appear to acknowledge this struggle.114 
However, unlike Bloom and Eliot’s models, Auster’s approach to the canon can 
be read not so much as one of wrestling with a strong precursor, nor genuflecting 
before his literary lineage, but of homage and acknowledgement of those myriad 
predecessors through active appropriation. ‘The Book of Memory’ in particular 
indicates the tangible otherness of its literary precursors, with Auster describing 
his text as a ‘collective work’ written by ‘dozens of authors’: 
I felt as though I was looking down to the bottom of myself, and what I 
found there was more than just myself – I found the world. That’s why that 
                                                          
113 T.S. Eliot, ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ in Debating Texts: A Reader in 20th Century Literary 
Theory and Method, ed. by Rick Rylance (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987), pp. 6-11 (p. 8). 
114 The parabolic deployment of the overlapping motifs of fatherhood and literary inheritance present in The 
Invention of Solitude could be said to exhibit some knowledge of Bloom’s Freudian approach. Dimovitz reads 
The New York Trilogy as Auster’s response to Beckett’s Trilogy, highlighting Auster’s self-confessed 
difficulty of writing after reading Beckett (see Scott A. Dimovitz, ‘Public Personae and the Private I: De-
compositional Ontology in Paul Auster's The New York Trilogy’, MFS Modern Fiction Studies [52: 3, 2006], 
613-33 [p. 629]). Brevity prevents a detailed reading of Auster’s texts in light of their alliterative materiality 
and canonical referentiality. Mark Ford in particular persuasively outlines Auster’s appreciation for the 
transcendent democratic poetics of the American Renaissance, particularly Auster’s reconfiguration of the 
solitude of Henry David Thoreau’s Walden in the second part of the Trilogy, ‘Ghosts’, while outlining a 
multitude of intertextual motifs. (Mark Ford, ‘Inventions of Solitude: Thoreau and Auster’, Journal of 
American Studies [33:2, 1999], 201-219.) 
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book is filled with so many references and quotations, in order to pay 
homage to all the others inside me.115 
Elsewhere Auster states that ‘you have to read everything, and forget everything’, 
prefiguring this position in a Paris Review interview with Michael Wood:  
At one time or another, I tried to write like each one of the novelists I was 
reading. Everything influences you when you’re young…You 
unconsciously imitate the writers you admire…Dozens of writers are 
inside me, but I don’t think my work sounds or feels like anyone else’s.116  
According to this Austerian model, final authority is retained by the author 
through the process of organising, choosing and inserting a given selection of 
predecessors into the body of his or her text.117 However, the overwhelming 
majority of these texts have been penned by male authors. 
                                                          
115 Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected Prose, p. 560. 
116 Auster, ‘Interview with Michael Wood’ in Collected Prose, p. 573. 
117 This is a problematic notion given Foucault’s position on the author function, and Kristeva and Roland 
Barthes’ approaches to intertextuality. The latter will come under discussion in the next section. However, the 
focus of the responses that Auster gives in his interviews with Joseph Mallia, Larry McCaffery and Sinda 
Gregory, Michael Wood, and Michel Contat indicate an individual author possessed of the utmost dedication 
to his personal process of aesthetic expression. The physical aspect of this process is particularly important to 
Auster, as he explains to Michael Wood: ‘I’ve always written by hand. Mostly with a fountain pen, but 
sometimes with a pencil…You feel the words are coming out of your body, and then you dig the words into 
the page. Writing has always had that tactile quality for me. It’s a physical experience.’ Auster, ‘Interview 
with Michael Wood’ in Collected Prose, p. 569. 
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 As a writer whose cultural reputation has been determined not only by her 
gender but her marital status, Hustvedt’s relationship to the canon is more 
complex, drawing upon both the male and female traditions of writing.118 In ‘My 
Father / Myself’, she writes: 
I read the canon, as I perceived it. Great books signified achievement and 
mastery, but also apprenticeship. I wanted to get a fat mind, and that mind, 
as it turns out, is mostly made of men.119  
A number of feminist writers contend that the male-centered canon reflects the 
‘acquired cultural gendered identity’ of patriarchal power-structures.120 Eliot and 
Bloom are particularly complicit in this: Eliot equates poetic tradition with 
masculinity, while Bloom divides literary lineage into fathers (‘precursors’) and 
sons (‘ephebe’). Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar in particular offer the following 
critique of the anxiety of influence paradigm:  
                                                          
118 Hustvedt, ‘Extract from a Story of the Wounded Self’ in A Plea for Eros, pp. 222-3. 
119 Hustvedt, ‘My Father / Myself’, in Living, Thinking, Looking, pp. 82-83. Perhaps this is this is what finally 
distinguishes her writing from that of Auster: while he positions himself as a writer in the masculine, Anglo-
European tradition, she positions herself as a ‘critical thinker’ in the post-feminist mode. However, these 
positions still carry a binary inference in relation to gender which in Hustvedt’s avowal of multiple selfhood 
would likely reject. 
120 Morris describes the patriarchy as a ‘pervasive systematic form’ of gender-based inequality, characterized 
by ‘institutionalized male dominance, operating through social structures like the law, education, 
employment, religion, the family and cultural practices’, while acknowledging the problematic nature of the 
term, and its overuse and oversimplification as a signifier of biological essentialism and passive victimhood 
(Morris, pp. 3-4). 
77 
 
The emergence of modern male literary discourse, exemplified by 
theoretical and canon-forming works…can be seen as an attempt to 
construct his story of a literary history in which women play no part.121 
In its attempt to establish an alternative canon, gynocriticism enacts a ‘mode of 
resistance’ and a means of ‘challenging traditional critical value judgements’.122 
This gynocritical approach focuses upon ‘appropriation in the sense of creative 
transformation’,123 or what Elaine Showalter describes as: 
The feminist study of women’s writing, including readings of women’s 
texts and analyses of the intertextual relations between women writers (a 
literary tradition), and between women and men.124  
Gilbert and Gubar propose that the absence of a gender-based tradition, coupled 
with their pursuit of an authorial identity, may have triggered feelings of 
unfemininity among many women writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century.125 Further, Gilbert and Gubar propose that rather than experiencing an 
anxiety of influence, women writers endure an alternative anxiety of influence: ‘a 
                                                          
121 Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, No Man’s Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the Twentieth 
Century, Volume 1: The War of the Words (London: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 154. 
122 Belsey and Moore, ‘Introduction’ in The Feminist Reader, ed. by Belsey and Moore, pp. 6-7. 
123 Toril Moi, ‘Feminist, Female, Feminine’ in The Feminist Reader, ed. by Belsey and Moore, pp. 104-16 (p. 
105). 
124 Elaine Showalter, ‘Feminism and Literary Theory’, p. 189 (qtd in Allen, p. 141). 
125 Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-
Century Literary Imagination (London: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 49. 
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radical fear that she cannot create, that because she can never become a 
‘precursor’ the act of writing will isolate and destroy her’.126  
 Hustvedt has her own precursor in the form of Auster, a more famous and 
commercially successful author. However, Hustvedt adopts an alternative 
perspective to that of Gilbert and Gubar. While acknowledging the Freudian 
influence upon ‘Bloom’s blanket declaration that literature is the domain of men 
duking it out’, she instead argues ‘it is too easy to say the canon is patriarchal, that 
casting out John Milton for George Sand is a solution to the problem, but that is to 
ignore quality in the name of parity’.127 For Hustvedt, the attempt to establish a 
tradition of women’s writing is no less problematic. Indeed, Hustvedt herself 
resists the easy classification of that particular definition: ‘I have discovered that 
out there in the world, “woman writer” is still a brand on a writer’s forehead, not 
easily erased’.128  
 While the intertextual presence of a tradition of women’s writing 
legitimates, facilitates and perpetuates authorship,129 the problematic 
oppositionality of alternative discourses complicates and frustrates it.130 
                                                          
126 Gilbert and Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic, p. 49. 
127 Hustvedt, ‘My Father/Myself’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 83. 
128 Hustvedt, ‘My Father/Myself’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 83. 
129 Allen, p. 146. 
130 This inability to adequately reconcile the aesthetics of empowerment with the aesthetics of suffering can 
be traced to poststructuralist discourse, particularly Derridean différance and Lacan’s reading of Freudian 
psychoanalysis. Diane Elam suggests that ‘theory, as we all know but are afraid to admit, is sexy’, arguing 
that postmodernism ‘reminds us that the one desire that knowledge cannot replace with a truth is the desire 
for knowledge itself: the seductions of theory’. (Diane Elam, ‘Feminism and the Postmodern: Theory’s 
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Hustvedt’s arguments imply the presence of an authorial identity steeped in 
feminist thought: we might conceive of Hustvedt as straddling the multiple 
positions outlined by Toril Moi.131 The Summer Without Men in particular 
playfully engages with the women’s literary tradition, along with the theories of 
Kristeva, Helene Cixous and Luce Irigary, in offering a critical apprehension of 
the ‘psychical, physical and intellectual’ otherness of women.132 Hustvedt 
similarly describes the writing self as ‘multiple and elastic’,133 while 
acknowledging the role of the unconscious in stimulating creativity. Hustvedt’s 
                                                          
Romance’ in The Feminist Reader: Essays in Gender and the Politics of Literary Criticism, ed. by Catherine 
Belsey and Jane Moore (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 182-200 (pp.182-83).) Not only are most 
poststructuralist theoreticians male, and therefore reading female identity through the prism of their 
masculine subjectivity, but, according to Catherine Belsey and Jane Moore, poststructuralism’s emphasis on 
the absence of knowledge beyond the patriarchal culture within which it is situated places feminist in a 
double bind. What they identify as the substitution of ‘culture for nature’, and the concomitant ‘politics of 
separatism’, is established upon a contradictory and unstable cultural foundation, one in which feminine 
identity is culturally constructed and therefore ‘unnatural’. (Catherine Belsey and Jane Moore, ‘Introduction: 
The Story so Far’ in The Feminist Reader, ed. by Belsey and Moore, pp 1-15 (pp. 7-8).) 
131 Moi highlights the conflation of ‘feminism’ (‘a political position’), ‘femaleness’ (‘a matter of biology’) 
and ‘femininity’ (‘a set of culturally defined characteristics’) within the broader church of women’s writing. 
Moi’s discussion of these three positions offers a critical reworking of Showalter’s identification of three 
equivalent historical phases of women’s writing in A Literature of Their Own (1977). While Moi dismisses 
femininity as a ‘cultural construct’ of limited authenticity, she describes how the pluralistic and political 
impulses of feminist discourses oppose and provoke the ‘politically naïve and theoretically unaware’ 
experiential narratives of women-centered writing (Moi, ‘Feminist, Female, Feminine’ in The Feminist 
Reader, ed. by Belsey and Moore, pp. 104-07). However, even pluralistic approaches like the subversive, 
non-gendered écriture feminine of Helene Cixous are implicated in the binary oppositionality and biological 
essentialism that defines discourse across the gender divide.  
132 Belsey and Moore, ‘Introduction’ in The Feminist Reader, ed. by Belsey and Moore, p. 10. 
133 Hustvedt, ‘Extract from a Story of the Wounded Self’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 228. 
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authorial persona is possessed of an emotional and erotic sensibility which 
Showalter or Moi might identify as feminine: 
When I am writing fiction, I am concerned with what feels right and feels 
wrong. I see images in my mind as I work, just as I do when I remember. I 
am directed by the story, by the creation of a narrative that resonates for 
me as emotionally, rather than literally, true. The novel develops an 
internal logic of its own, guided by my feelings.134 
Much of her fictional and autobiographical writing largely distances itself from 
Cixous and Irigaray’s stress upon the ‘irrationality and textual anarchy’ of 
women’s writing.135 Instead, Hustvedt pursues an aesthetic which is less 
‘reflectionist’, and perhaps more concerned with what Rita Felski describes as ‘a 
form of meaning production, a construction of gendered identity which draws 
upon intersubjective, cultural and ideological frameworks rather than more or less 
truthful representations of an unproblematically given female reality’.136 While 
Hustvedt states ‘I am the shaking woman’, (Shaking 199) she also observes ‘I 
have written as a woman, and as a man. I have written as a father. I have written 
                                                          
134 Hustvedt, ‘The Real Story’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 177. 
135 Belsey and Moore, ‘Introduction’ in The Feminist Reader, ed. by Belsey and Moore, p. 10. A notable 
exception to this strand of thought being her most recent novel The Blazing World, which presents the 
alphabeticised notebooks of the protagonist Harriet Burden as a study in ‘irrationality and textual 
anarchy…the ground where her conflicted anger and divided intellect could do battle on the page’. (Siri 
Hustvedt, The Blazing World [London: Sceptre, 2014], p. 7)  
136 Felski, p. 9. 
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as a son’.137 Through this approach, Hustvedt’s depoliticised écriture feminine 
enacts a highly personalised ‘mode of resistance’ to the patriarchy, but also to 
what she describes as ‘puritanical’ radical feminism and binary gender 
definitions.138  
 This qualified oppositionality draws upon her openness to a variety of 
theories and disciplines alongside the literary canon. Indeed, Hustvedt claims she 
is comfortable feeding her ‘fat mind’ with the masculinised discourse of hard 
science and empiricism: what Moi outlines as a ‘masculine rationality that has 
always privileged reason, order, unity and lucidity’ by ‘excluding the irrationality, 
chaos and fragmentation’ of radical feminism.139 In ‘Extract from a Story of the 
Wounded Self’ Hustvedt recalls arriving at Columbia in 1978, where ‘the 
graduate department I had come to study teemed with critical theory’:  
Foucault, Derrida, Althuser, Lacan, Deleuze, Guattari and Kristeva were 
authors I’d never heard of much less read […] The ideas were our weather. 
We lived in them and they lived in us.  
                                                          
137 Hustvedt, ‘My Father/Myself’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 84. By contrast, almost all of Auster’s 
narrators or protagonists have been men, with the exception of the female narrator of In the Country of Last 
Things (1987), and the (male) canine protagonist of Timbuktu (1999). However,  the multiple perspectives of 
later novels such as The Brooklyn Follies, Invisible (2009), Sunset Park and 4321 indicate Auster’s 
development literary aesthetic which is more closely aligned to the nuanced post-feminism of Hustvedt.  
138 ‘Feminism was good for me…but as I developed as a thinking person, the truisms and dogmas of every 
ideology became as worn as [a] book’s cover’. Hustvedt, ‘A Plea for Eros’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 46-7. 
139 Moi, ‘Feminist, Female, Feminine’ in The Feminist Reader, ed. by Belsey and Moore, p. 115. 
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Citing the writing of men such as Buber, Bakhtin, Winnicott and Freud, she states 
‘I will fall in love with the ideas that articulate what happens between us’.140 
Writing and reading for Hustvedt not only constitute a form of liberation from 
gendered spatiality, but also gendered temporality: a fluid movement from the 
gradations of power-politics ingrained in patriarchal past, present and future. Here 
one is reminded of Susan Sontag’s call for an ‘erotics of art’,141 against the 
‘perennial, never consummated project of interpretation’.142 As Hustvedt 
proposes:  
Every writer takes from the past […] Literary mingling. Sexual mingling. 
Language isn’t owned by anyone. It is inside and outside. It belongs to 
men and women.143  
Language and narrative enter us bodily through a dialogic exchange, where a text 
becomes the site of conflict, disagreement, collaboration and resolution. 
Ownership of the text outside of authorial influence will be considered in the next 
section on Hustvedt and Auster’s relationship to reader-response theories. 
  
                                                          
140 Hustvedt, ‘A Plea for Eros’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 223. This particular observation presages an account of 
the evening when she meets her future husband for the first time: ‘We eat, we talk. We walk in the streets and 
talk. We sit in a bar and talk…He is looking at me, listening to me. I can tell that he likes me’ (Hustvedt, ‘A 
Plea for Eros’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 226). 
141 Susan Sontag, ‘Against Interpretation’ in Against Interpretation (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 14. 
142 Sontag, p. 5. Sontag’s thesis will be covered in more detail in the next section. 
143 Hustvedt, ‘My Father/Myself’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, pp. 83-84. 
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Reader-writer collaboration 
 In the previous section I discussed Hustvedt and Auster’s apparent 
commitment to the resurrection of the author and their engagement with the 
canon. However, in this section I wish to address their complication of authorial 
identity through their espousal of a contract with the reader. As noted in the 
previous section, both view reading and writing as dialogical processes which 
implicate the presence of the other. Differentiated from canonical influence, 
reader-response theories implicate non-writerly readers in the construction of a 
text.144 The poststructuralist approaches of Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes 
reconfigure Eliot’s antithetical ‘tradition’ as ‘intertextuality’, whereby 
modernism’s identification of the presence of canonical influence upon (male) 
authors is reconceptualised as the material, rhetorical and ideological structures of 
a text.145 Kristeva’s approach to intertextuality, which informs that of Barthes, 
draws from Saussaurean linguistics and Bakhtinian dialogism. For Kristeva, a text 
is a ‘permutation of texts, an intertextuality in the space of a given text’ where 
                                                          
144 Jane Tompkins proposes that reader response theory destroys the objectivity of the text, installing in its 
place ‘a way of conceiving texts and readers that reorganizes the distinctions between them’. (Jane Tompkins, 
‘Introduction’ in Reader Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-structuralism, ed. by Jane Tompkins 
[London: John Hopkins University Press, 1980], pp. ix-xxvi [p. x]). 
145 Allen offers a succinct and useful definition of intertextuality, whereby literature consists of ‘the systems, 
codes and traditions established by previous works of literature’ and ‘other art forms and of culture in 
general…meaning becomes something which exists between a text and all the other texts to which it refers 
and relates’ (Allen, p. 1). Similarly, Allen believes that Barthes and Kristeva retain a residual commitment to 
a Modernist aesthetic of the ‘New’, thereby complicating their relationship to postmodernism, in addition to 
that of Hustvedt and Auster (Allen, p. 199).  
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‘several utterances, taken from other texts, intersect and neutralise one another’.146 
Under her model of intertextuality, literature is treated as a practice or 
productivity, where each word embodies a dialogic ‘intersection of textual 
surfaces’, not a point of fixed meaning or authorial intention.147 Following 
Kristeva, Barthes’ theory of textuality argues that authorial authority is stymied by 
the intertextual plurality of meanings; or, as Barthes writes, ‘the text is 
experienced only in an activity of production’.148 Both believe that the 
hierarchical and unidirectional flow of authorial influence can be undone through 
what Barthes terms ‘the stereographic plurality’ of the text.149 Equally, both 
approaches emphasise what Allen terms the ‘disruptive, unstabilizable, playful 
dimension of writing’, to which the reader approaches the work from his or her 
own disruptive, unstable, playful dimension.150 
 Barthesian intertextuality problematizes the reader-writer dichotomy: 
meaning is produced by interpretative jouissance of the reader rather than the 
identification of the author intention. Meaning is therefore multiple: this offers an 
alternative stance to the phenomenological process of reading described by 
Wolfgang Iser, who likewise notes the ‘inexhaustibility of the text’,151 but who 
believes meaning is concretised through the reader’s ‘entanglement’ with its 
                                                          
146 Julia Kristeva, ‘The Bounded Text’, p. 36 (qtd in Allen, p. 35). 
147 Julia Kristeva, ‘Word, Dialogue, Novel’, p. 65 (qtd in Allen, p. 38).  
148 Roland Barthes, ‘From Work to Text’ in Image – Music – Text, trans. by Stephen Heath (London: 
Fontana, 1977), p. 157.  
149 Roland Barthes, ‘From Work to Text’ in Image – Music – Text, p. 159. 
150 Allen, p. 66. 
151 Iser, ‘The Reading Process’ in Reader Response Criticism, ed. by Tompkins, p. 55.   
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virtuality.152 For Iser, it is the text’s very ‘incompleteness’ which lends it ‘its 
productive value’.153 The relationship between authors and readers is further 
complicated through Stanley Fish’s conception of culturally-embedded 
‘interpretive communities’. For Kristeva the ideological construction of a text 
stimulates a politically-motivated positioning and interpretation reflective of the 
patriarchal structure.154  
 For Hustvedt and Auster the question of interpretation is important, and 
holds significant implications for their construction of independent authorial 
identities. Both believe in the contract with the reader, but equally both are 
disdainful of misreadings of their work. Like Barthes, Sontag believes the process 
of interpretation presupposes a ‘discrepancy between the clear meaning of the text 
and the demands of (later) readers’, which it attempts to resolve through a 
destructive process of excavation ‘to find a sub-text which is the true one’.155 
Where Barthes views the text as a virtual palimpsest of latent textuality that resists 
                                                          
152 Stanley Fish, ‘Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics’ in Reader Response Criticism, ed. by 
Tompkins, pp. 70-100 (p. 74). 
153 Fish, ‘Literature in the Reader’ in Reader Response Criticism, ed. by Tompkins, p. 70. 
154 By logical extension, according to Moi, all readers and critics position texts along gender lines: ‘We 
produce texts as marginal by situating them in relation to other, dominant structures; we chose to read only 
texts by women as pre-feminist work; we decide to work on ‘female’ texts’ (Moi, ‘Feminist, Female, 
Feminine’ in The Feminist Reader, ed. by Belsey and Moore, p. 116). 
155 Sontag, p. 6. She continues: ‘Interpretation must itself be evaluated within a historical view of human 
consciousness…To interpret is to impoverish, to deplete the world – in order to set upon a shadow world of 
meanings. It is to turn the world into this world’ (Sontag, p. 7). This position appears to imply that feminist 
and poststructuralist theory deliberately misread the world: postmodernism, she believes, is motivated by this 
‘flight from interpretation’ into the parodic form (Sontag, p. 10).   
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meaning, Sontag describes the act of interpretation ‘as a radical strategy for 
conserving an old text’.156 This is a very different approach to the affective 
stylistics of Fish, which treat the text as ‘no longer an object, a thing in itself, but 
an event, something that happens to, and with the participation of, the reader’.157 
What these approaches appear to have in common is a debt to Roman Ingarden’s 
conception of textual konkretisation (‘realisation’), which Iser describes as ‘the 
artistic and esthetic: the artistic refers to the text created by the author, and the 
esthetic to the realization of the text’.158 Differentiation seemingly takes place 
when one school of thought treats the text as an object to be interpreted; the other 
as an affect, or event, which stimulates a response.159 In either case, according to 
                                                          
156 Sontag, p. 6. This sense of the conservation of an old text refers back to Eliot’s conception of the canon, 
while offering an inversion of Bloom’s later take on literary tradition: ‘the new poem’s achievement makes it 
seem to us, not as though the precursor were writing it, but as though the later poet himself had written the 
precursor’s characteristic work’ (Bloom, p. 16). Her approach to interpreting a work of art is more indebted to 
Husserlian phenomenology than Barthesian textuality, where ‘transparence is the highest, most liberating 
value’ involving ‘experiencing the luminousness of the thing in itself, of things being what they are’. 
Similarly, she is less concerned with Kristeva’s concept of positionality, instead arguing for the experience of 
art in phenomenological terms, where we ‘learn to see more, to hear more, to feel more’ (Sontag, p. 13). 
157 Fish in Tompkins, p. 72. Unlike Sontag, Fish believes that viewing the text as an object generates an 
illusory, ‘false and dangerously self-validating objectivity’ (Fish, ‘Literature in the Reader’ in Reader 
Response Criticism, ed. by Tompkins, p. 87). 
158 Iser, ‘The Reading Process’ in Reader Response Criticism, ed. by Tompkins, p. 50. 
159 As Allen points out, this is rendered more complex by Barthes’ distinction between lisible (readerly) and 
scriptable (writerly) texts. Readerly texts are ‘oriented towards representation’ and direct the passive reader 
towards ‘a meaning’ which is ‘presumed to lie behind the narrated events’. Readers thus become detectives 
sifting the text for clues to the narrative outcome: truth is therefore ‘delivered by an author to a reader’. By 
contrast, writerly texts hold a plurality of infinite meanings, where the reader’s interpretation is continually 
frustrated. This, for Barthes, is what installs the opposition between ‘work’ and ‘text’ (Allen, pp. 78-80).    
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Elisabeth Freund, the privileged position and authority of the literary work is 
challenged, and at times usurped.160 
 Unsurprisingly, given Hustvedt’s affinity for what she terms ‘zones of 
focused ambiguity’, her approach to the reading process transcends these 
alternatives in a typically interstitial fashion. She displays some alignment with 
Sontag’s ideas, albeit through the application of an embodied phenomenology 
which owes more to Merleau-Ponty than his predecessor Husserl. Reading, 
Hustvedt observes, is ‘perception as translation’, a transactive process 
underpinned by the intertwining of consciousness with imaginative thought:  
Reading is a particular human experience of collaboration with the words 
of another person, the writer…Books are literally animated by the people 
who read them because reading is an embodied act…When I read, I 
engage my capacity for inner speech. I assume the written words of the 
writer who, for the time being, becomes my own internal narrator, the 
voice in my head…The text is both inside me and outside me.161 
Echoing Sontag, for Hustvedt the act of reading involves an empathic 
intentionality towards the consciousness and imagination of the other through the 
                                                          
160 Elizabeth Freund, The Return of the Reader: Reader Response Criticism (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 2. 
According to Freund, reader response theory ‘challenges the privileged position of the work of art and seeks 
to undermine its priority and authority not only by displacing the work from the centre and substituting the 
reader in its place, but by putting in doubt the autonomy of the work and, in certain cases, even causing the 
work to ‘vanish’ altogether’.  
161 Siri Hustvedt, ‘On Reading’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, pp. 133-40 (p. 134). 
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givenness of the aesthetic object: ‘openness to a book is vital, and openness is 
simply a willingness to be changed by what we read’.162 The process of reading is 
inherently dialogical: as we read, something within us changes either consciously 
or unconsciously; this change is guided by the consciousness, and indeed the 
unconsciousness, of another. The book, in this sense, becomes an event under 
Fish’s model; under Iser’s approach, it enacts a transfer of subjectivities. Reading, 
she concludes, is ‘intersubjective’, the words of the absent writer part of the 
reader’s ‘inner dialogue’.163    
 Auster shares this belief in what Barthes terms ‘writerly texts’, and the 
creative capacity of the reader, stating in a 1988 interview: 
The one thing I try to do in all my books is to leave enough room in the 
prose for the reader to inhabit it. Because I finally believe that it’s the 
reader who writes the book and not the writer…I think this probably has a 
lot to do with one’s relation to language, how one responds to words 
printed on a page. Whether the words are just symbols or whether they are 
passageways into our unconscious.164 
                                                          
162 Hustvedt, ‘On Reading’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p.138. 
163 Hustvedt takes a similar view of visual art: ‘Producing art includes a drive to make something, an 
embodied intentionality…Art necessarily establishes a relationship between the artist and an imaginary 
reader, viewer or listener: it is inherently dialogical. Therefore, all visual art implies a spectator’ (Siri 
Hustvedt, ‘Embodied Visions: What Does it Mean to Look at a Work of Art?’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, 
pp. 336-54 (p. 342). 
164 Auster, ‘Interview with Joseph Mallia’, BOMB, p. 27. 
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In contrast with Hustvedt, Auster appears to situate the interpretive responsibility 
more firmly in the hands of the reader. His final sentence, moreover, implies an 
approach that combines the linguistic, intertextual and phenomenological. In one 
regard this implicates Fish’s textual model of affective stylistics, which argues 
that ‘the reader is the informed reader’, a ‘hybrid’ with experience of literary 
discourses, devices and genres.165 Auster’s position does not quite align with that 
of Iser, who suggests that the ‘identification’ of the reader with the text is ‘a 
stratagem by whichthe author stimulates attitudes in the reader’,166 unless of 
course this is a stratagem to elicit affinity with his literary project in order to 
develop an interpretive community of readers. While describing his metafictional 
approach to writing his first novel, Auster remarks that he had a ‘desire to 
implicate myself in the machinery of the book’: 
I don’t mean my autobiographical self, I mean my author self, the 
mysterious other who lives inside me and puts my name on the covers of 
books… I wanted to open up the process, to break down walls, to expose 
the plumbing. There’s a strange kind of trickery involved in the writing 
and reading of novels.167 
                                                          
165 Fish, ‘Literature in the Reader’ in Reader Response Criticism, ed. by Tompkins, pp. 86-7. Fish goes on to 
describe his theory as a ‘monism of effects, in which meaning is a (partial) product of the utterance object, 
but not to be identified with it’ (Fish, ‘Literature in the Reader’ in Reader Response Criticism, ed. by 
Tompkins, p. 97).  
166 Iser, ‘The Reading Process’ in Reader Response Criticism, ed. by Tompkins, p. 65. 
167 Auster continues: ‘It’s as though no one has really written the words you are reading. I find this ‘no one’ 
terribly fascinating – for there’s finally a profound truth to it. On the one hand it’s an illusion; on the other 
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As Fish writes, ‘an author hazards his projection…because of something he 
assumes to be in his reader. The very existence of the ‘marks’ is a function of an 
interpretive community’.168 For Iser, by contrast, the reader is left to create their 
own experience through a horizon of expectations derived from the ‘virtuality’ of 
the work, which lends it its ‘dynamic nature’ and acts as a ‘precondition’ for the 
effect of the work, which is released by the reading process in a sequence of 
‘schematised views’.169 The self-avowed absence of Auster’s authentic 
consciousness from the book his readers experience is such a precondition.  
Like Hustvedt, Auster views identity as multiple and mobile; he too is 
unconvinced by the Cartesian notion of a coherent, stable self. Hustvedt and 
Auster’s approach to the writer-reader relationship seems to run counter to their 
establishment of authorial identities. Their inscription of the narratives of their 
autobiographical selves through their autobiographical texts and essays further 
highlight its problematic ideality. The resistance to interpretation and meaning 
which runs through the thread of Hustvedt and Auster’s autobiographical and 
fictional narratives seems to reinforce this. Conversely, there is an awareness of 
                                                          
hand it has everything to do with how stories are written. For the author of a novel can never be sure where 
any of it comes from. The self that exists in the world – the self whose name appears on the covers of books – 
is finally not the same self who writes the book.’ Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda 
Gregory’ in Collected Prose, p. 555. 
168 Stanley Fish, ‘Interpreting the Variorum’ in Reader Response Criticism, ed. by Tompkins, pp. 164-184 (p. 
183).   
169 Iser, ‘The Reading Process’ in Reader Response Criticism, ed. by Tompkins, pp. 50-51. 
92 
 
the authoritative otherness of their authorial selves within their empathic 
acknowledgement of the role of the reader: 
A novel is the only place in the world where two strangers can meet on 
terms of absolute intimacy. The reader and the writer make the book 
together. No other art can do that. No other art can capture the essential 
inwardness of human life.170  
The nuanced differential between the positions of Hustvedt and Auster in respect 
of the reader function are both reaffirmed and complicated by the role each plays 
as the first reader of their respective texts. In a 1996 interview with Michel 
Contat, Auster observes: 
I trust her completely, her judgement, her sense of things. She understands 
what I’m trying to do. You can’t talk to someone who doesn’t share your 
ideas about the world, or who doesn’t at least try to understand what you 
are trying to do…She always has comments. Some of them are miniscule 
prose questions, and once in a while she asks a bigger question. But I don’t 
think I’ve ever taken her advice on a big question.171  
In an interview with Michael Wood published in Paris Review in 2003, Auster 
appears to revise this position:  
                                                          
170 Auster, ‘Interview with Michael Wood’ in Collected Prose, p. 587.  
171 Auster, Contat and Waters, ‘The Manuscript in the Book’, Yale French Studies, p. 175. 
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She’s my first reader, and I have total faith in her judgments. Each time I 
write a novel, I read to her from it every month or so…Then Siri makes 
her comments…I can’t think of a single instance when I haven’t followed 
her advice.172 
In the Paris Review interview Auster re-emphasises the reciprocal nature of their 
role as the other’s first reader: 
What she does for me, I try to do for her. Every writer needs a trusted 
reader – someone who has sympathy for what you are doing and wants the 
work to be as honest as it can possibly be. But you have to be honest.173 
By contrast, Hustvedt has rarely addressed the shared responsibilities of the 
reader-writer function, but in this 2012 interview for Full Stop offered the 
following: 
Paul and I rely on each other absolutely as first readers of each other’s 
work. We read each other’s books in progress and then when a book is 
finished, we each become an editor. Admittedly, these editorial 
suggestions are often tiny — on the level of the sentence, removing an 
adjective, noting an infelicitous repetition, etc. — but every once in a 
                                                          
172 Auster, ‘Interview with Michael Wood’ in Collected Prose, p. 586. 
173 Auster, ‘Interview with Michael Wood’ in Collected Prose, p. 586. It’s an illuminating moment of 
inconsistency, one which implies a lapse in judgment or miscommunication on Auster’s part in the earlier 
interview for BOMB. This is interesting not simply because it appears to present a shift in the gendered 
power-politics between writer husband and reader wife; by 2003 Hustvedt’s own reputation as a writer was 
gaining some critical and commercial recognition, and she had just published her third novel, What I Loved. 
94 
 
while one of us has made a substantive comment to the other, and we have 
always heeded the other’s advice.174  
By 2013 Hustvedt and Auster’s position on the importance of the reader function 
– and the editorial responsibility each performs upon the other’s work – are more 
closely aligned. When considering the collaborative relationship between 
Hustvedt and Auster, we might begin to conceive of the textual space each leaves 
the reader to occupy is, in the most immediate sense, a space for the spousal 
reader to occupy. With this in mind, Fish’s observation that ‘the structures of the 
reader’s experience’ are more important as the object of description than ‘any 
structures available on the page’ holds an implication for the relationship between 
Hustvedt and Auster.175 The inherently dialogical act of reading, or writing a text, 
becomes inherently collaborative: Hustvedt and Auster’s marriage becomes, in 
effect, a microcosmic, emotionally-guided interpretive community for each other. 
Fish defines an ‘interpretive community’ as constituted of ‘those who share 
interpretive strategies not for reading (in the conventional sense) but for writing 
texts, for constituting their properties and assigning their intentions’.176 
 In a letter to J.M. Coetzee, Auster restates his belief that ‘marriage is 
above all a conversation’, and married couples must ‘become friends’ for a 
marriage to survive; elsewhere he deploys the trope of marriage being a ‘continual 
work in progress’, where one must ‘reach down into one’s depths and reinvent 
                                                          
174 Hustvedt, ‘Interview with Tyler Malone’, Full Stop. 
175 Fish, ‘Interpreting the Variorum’ in Reader Response Criticism, ed. by Tompkins, p. 167. 
176 Fish, ‘Interpreting the Variorum’ in Reader Response Criticism, ed. by Tompkins, p. 182. 
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oneself in relation to the other’: observations that recall statements he and 
Hustvedt have made about the creative process. 177  Hustvedt similarly regards her 
thirty years plus marriage to Auster as a ‘literary friendship’, stating that ‘we’ve 
been talking about books and ideas for a long time, and I’ve never been bored… 
boredom ends conversations well before conflict’.178 In the case of Hustvedt and 
Auster, this conversation flows through the narratives of their autobiographical 
selves. They have located in each other the intended, or ideal, reader described by 
Fish: ‘the reader whose education, opinions, concerns, linguistic competences, 
etc., make him capable of having the experience the author wished to provide’.179 
The intersubjective nature of their writing relationship can be traced back to the 
early stages of their emotional relationship, to their education at Columbia, and 
beyond to their infancy and parental lineage. In Winter Journal Auster recalls how 
he and Hustvedt read fairy tales to each other during the early stages of their 
relationship, which culminated in her penning her long prose poem Reading to 
You. In the books, Auster quotes at length from the closing section of Hustvedt’s 
poem:  
I whisper like the birds in the stories I read to you, repetitions in the room 
where you took me. The parts are the same, but changing, always in 
movement, altering imperceptibly like the expression on your face from a 
                                                          
177 Paul Auster and J.M. Coetzee, Here and Now: Letters 2008-2011 (London: Vintage, 2014), pp. 8. 
178 Hustvedt, ‘Interview with Tyler Malone’, Full Stop. 
179 Fish, ‘Interpreting the Variorum’ in Reader Response Criticism, ed. by Tompkins, p. 174. 
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smile to seriousness leaning over me in the thin light. So I wish you a story 
in the reading of it, in the writing of it. (Journal 98-99) 
In this explicit yet discrete moment of intertextuality, both writers are, 
paradoxically, at once present and absent within Auster’s text. Here the notion of 
reader and writer sharing a spatial zone of consciousness embodies a metonymic 
moment of mutuality within the text, representing the collaborative nature of their 
literary partnership and marriage. 
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Conclusion 
 The non-fictional writings of Hustvedt and Auster offer an explicit 
condensation of the theoretical positions explored in their fiction. Through 
Hustvedt and Auster’s autobiographical writing it is possible to perceive the 
influence of various disciplines: philosophy, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, 
poststructural linguistics and, for Hustvedt in particular, neurobiology. Equally, 
this discipline can be still applied to interpretations of Auster’s autobiographical 
writing. Selfhood is fragile and tenuous. Consciousness represents the objective 
world to the subjective individual. Memory, or the processes of recording, 
recalling and interpreting past experiences, stimulate the process of meaning-
making and imbue within us a sense of temporal-spatial awareness. Nevertheless, 
memories can be misremembered or revised over time, through a process 
Hustvedt identifies as ‘reconsolidation’, which Auster also describes in Report 
from the Interior (Report 4). The conscious memories we hold comprise a mere 
fraction of the implicit and unconscious memories that lie dormant with us. As 
Hustvedt elsewhere writes, subjectivity ‘is not the story of a stable, absolute ‘I’’. 
(Shaking 79) Writing about selfhood marks an attempt to consolidate something 
that is plural and mobile, irrespective of gender distinctions. Yet despite their truth 
claims, Hustvedt and Auster’s autobiographical narratives are partial, and 
sometime inaccurate: inconsistencies, gaps or absences plague them from 
conception to conclusion. Autobiography is perhaps no more real, or indeed 
truthful, than fictional representation; yet the authenticity of an autobiography is 
not simply what the reader assumes to be ‘the real story’, but the multifaceted, 
98 
 
empathic transference from reader and writer through which we share the 
perception of another.   
 Both Auster and Hustvedt have taken a deliberately metalinguistic 
approach to representing the constructed self, one informed, to some degree, by 
the genealogy of experience, a youthful interest in writerly pursuits, and the 
theoretical condensation of their education. Their conscious disavowal of co-
authorial collaboration or intertextual influence upon the other can be partially 
traced to their scholarly cognition of theoretical responses to the literary canon, 
and gendered inflections of authorial power and ethical responsibility. Moreover, 
they are fundamental to our understanding of their respective conception of 
authorship and authorial identity, and the development not only of their careers as 
writers. However, while both are careful to disavow intramarital influence upon 
their respective texts, both act as the first reader of the other’s writing. Hustvedt 
also concedes, ‘I have discovered my own borrowings from texts through 
rereading books. These liftings, never exact, were always done unconsciously’.180 
Their collaboration in a literary sense can therefore be interpreted as consciously 
and unconsciously dialogical. This interpretation of their writing as a 
collaborative literary enterprise owes as much to reading as it does to writing. As 
Hustvedt puts it: ‘reading is internal action. It is the intimate ground where, as my 
husband says, ‘two consciousnesses meet’. I would add two unconsciousnesses as 
well’.181  
                                                          
180 Hustvedt, ‘My Father/Myself’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 82. 
181 Hustvedt, ‘My Father/Myself’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 82. 
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 In the mythologised autobiography of marriage, love conquers the losses 
and traumas of nascent selfhood. Nevertheless, the unrevealed, repressed or 
forgotten moments of Hustvedt and Auster’s shared narrative is partial precisely 
because there are unrevealed moments. Our autobiographical selves are as 
imaginative and fictive as they are credible and real.  
My husband and I, who have now been living together for almost thirty 
years, often recall the same event differently...A memory I am convinced 
belongs to me alone, is, according to my husband, his private mental 
property. He remembers it perfectly and is sure I must be mistaken. One of 
us is in error. What this anecdote clarifies about memory is that when we 
listen to a person tell a story, perhaps especially a person with whom we 
are intimate, that tale can spawn a mental image so vivid, it enters the 
mind as a subjective experience that originated outside the mind, not 
within it.182 
What we are able to discern of the interior worlds of Hustvedt and Auster from 
their autobiographical narrative are not the real story. The real story lies 
elsewhere, between them and beyond the boundaries of individual perception. 
  
                                                          
182 Hustvedt, ‘The Real Story’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, pp. 94-95. 
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Chapter two: Points of origin – postmodernism and beyond  
 
Introduction 
 Academic approaches to literature of the late Twentieth Century frequently 
focus upon its place within the postmodern cultural moment; the writing of 
Hustvedt and Auster is no exception: the temporal location and duration of their 
respective careers, coupled with the stylistic mode and linguistic register of their 
chosen aesthetic, has seen the application of postmodern critical frameworks to 
their work, albeit to varying degrees. Auster is treated as an exemplar of literary 
postmodernism, while Hustvedt is viewed as a more peripheral figure within the 
canon. Numerous approaches to Auster’s writing have focused upon the 
relationship of his fiction to postmodernist theory and poststructuralist discourse, 
either as a proponent or critic of those ideas. Brendan Martin believes Auster’s 
fixation with chance and contingency positions him as a ‘self-consciously 
postmodern author’, for whom the reception of his ‘most famous work…has 
formalized Auster’s reputation’, ensuring his subsequent novels fall into lockstep 
with its thematic and theoretical concerns.1 Auster’s association with 
poststructuralism, according to Scott A. Dimovitz, can be traced to an early 
critical appreciation by Alison Russell, which ‘exhaustively and compellingly 
                                                          
1 Brendan Martin, Paul Auster’s Postmodernity (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 99. Auster, however, takes 
issue with Martin’s delineation of his ‘postmodern autobiographies’ in this volume, particularly the assertion 
that Auster ‘invariably blurs elements of fact and fiction within his narratives, and the majority of his fictional 
protagonists appear to be versions of Auster’ (Martin, p. ix). See Appendix 1. 
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reads The New York Trilogy from an earnest poststructuralist paradigm’.2 The 
deconstructed narratives of The New York Trilogy are described by William G. 
Little as ‘postmodern potboilers’;3 while David Lodge holds that ‘these three 
stories subject the clichés and stereotypes of the gumshoe detective story to 
postmodernist scepticism about identity, causality and meaning’.4  
 By contrast, limited critical consideration has been given to Hustvedt’s 
relationship to postmodernism and poststructuralist discourse.5 This is partly due 
to the paucity of critical readings of her fiction, a fact exemplified by Kristiaan 
Versluys’ observation that her debut novel (The Blindfold, published in 1992) has 
undergone ‘critical neglect’.6 Versluys’ essay on The Blindfold, however, makes 
explicit the connection of her fiction to postmodernism, as does Christian 
                                                          
2 Dimovitz, p. 615. At the close of his persuasive article, Dimovitz concludes: ‘Though he misread Lacan, 
claims he never read a word of Derrida, and was only apparently familiar with structuralist-era Barthes, 
Auster nevertheless effects a critique of those theorists by his rejection of their inspirations’ (Dimovitz, p. 
629). 
3 William G. Little, ‘Nothing to Go On: Paul Auster’s City of Glass’ in Contemporary Literature (38, 1997), 
133-63 (p. 137). 
4 David Lodge, The Art of Fiction (London: Vintage, 1992), p. 38. 
5 Hustvedt’s exclusion from the postmodern canon could possibly be linked to the cultural distancing between 
feminist fiction and postmodernism identified by Patricia Waugh: ‘The relationship of women writers to 
postmodernism (and, indeed, to modernism) [is] ambivalent despite the fact that postmodernism is usually 
presented as an art of the marginal and oppositional […] Authors may, it seems, be male or female, but 
postmodernist authors are, actually or necessarily, male’ (Patricia Waugh, Feminine Fictions: Revisiting the 
Postmodern [London; Routledge, 1989], pp. 3-5). 
6 Kristiaan Versluys, ‘New York as a Maze: Siri Hustvedt’s The Blindfold’ in Postmodern New York City: 
Transfiguring Spaces – Raum – Transformationen, ed. by Gunter H. Lenz and Utz Reise (Heidelberg: 
Universitatsverlag Winter, 2003), pp. 99-108 (p. 99).  
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Knirsch’s study of chronology in her debut, which notes that appreciations of 
Hustvedt’s debut novel ‘focus exclusively on the question of gender and the 
problem of developing a female identity in a postmodern world’.7 As discussed in 
the opening chapter, Hustvedt has recorded her exposure to poststructuralist 
theory during her time as a student at Columbia in the late 1970s:  
The graduate department I had come to study teemed with critical theory. 
Foucault, Derrida, Althuser, Lacan, Deleuze, Guattari and Kristeva…By 
the time I arrived, structuralism had come and gone and the hipsters who 
populated the graduate schools in the humanities were deep into its 
postincarnation. The ideas were our weather. We lived in them and they 
lived in us.8  
It is therefore possible to conceive of Hustvedt’s approach to the process of 
aesthetic expression drawing upon some of these positions, as per the work of her 
husband Auster. 
 However, Hubert Zapf associates Hustvedt with what he terms an overtly-
ethical ‘after postmodernism’ period.9 Zapf, along with Christine Marks and 
Johanna Hartmann, reads Hustvedt’s work as a form of transdisciplinary 
                                                          
7 Christian Knirsch, ‘In a Time-Warp: The Issue of Chronology in Siri Hustvedt’s The Blindfold’, Current 
Objectives of Postgraduate American Studies (11: 2010) <http://copas.uni-
regensberg.de/article/viewArticle/122/146> [Accessed 12/05/2015]. 
8 Siri Hustvedt, ‘Extracts from a Story of the Wounded Self’ in A Plea for Eros, pp. 222-23. 
9 Hubert Zapf, ‘Narrative, Ethics, and Postmodern Art’ in Ethics in Culture, ed. by Erll, Grabes and Nünning, 
p. 171. 
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knowledge predicated upon intersubjectivity and intermediality.10 Elizabeth 
Kovac goes further, periodizing Hustvedt’s post-9/11 narratives within what 
Timothy Vermeleun and Robin van den Akker label ‘metamodernism’, a new 
temporality which in their view exhibits features of both modernist and 
postmodernist sentiment: a ‘structure of feeling’ oscillating between ‘modern 
commitment’ and ‘postmodern detachment’.11 The theoretical landscape has 
shifted where Auster is concerned. Little, Martin, Dimovitz and Barone,12 have 
already spoken of an ethical quality to Auster’s writing which transcends the self-
reflexivity of postmodernism. According to Madeleine Sorapure, his characters 
‘struggle within and against the postmodern condition. What fuels the struggle is 
an ethical imperative’.13 Auster’s more recent fiction, such as Invisible (2009), 
Sunset Park (2010) and 4321 (2017), deploys a multiplicity of empathic positions, 
bringing his work into closer alignment with that of his wife. The author himself, 
meanwhile, has distanced himself from poststructuralist thought and metafictional 
                                                          
10 Johanna Hartmann, Christine Marks and Hubert Zapf, ‘Introduction’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity Siri 
Hustvedt’s Works, ed. by Hartmann, Marks and Zapf (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter Gmbh, 2015), pp. 1-10 (p. 
1). 
11 Elizabeth Kovach, ‘Violated Securities: Symptoms of a post-9/11 Zeitgeist in Siri Hustvedt’s The Sorrows 
of an American’ in eTransfers: A Postgraduate eJournal for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies 
(Issue 2: 2012) <http://www.qmul.ac.uk/cagcr/etransfers/issues/current/86154.pdf> [Accessed 11 May 2015]. 
12 Barone in particular points to Auster’s synthesis of ‘postmodern subjectivities, explications of premodern 
moral causality and a sufficient realism’. Barone, ‘Introduction’ in Beyond the Red Notebook, ed. by Barone, 
pp. 5-6. 
13 Madeleine Sorapure, ‘Paul Auster’ in Postmodernism: The Key Figures, ed. by Hans Bertens and Joseph 
Natoli (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 19-24 (p. 24). 
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trickery, arguing ‘I consider myself a realist’,14 and rejecting Russell’s imposition 
of a deconstructive framework to his early fiction.15 As addressed in the first 
chapter, Auster’s exposure to various theoretical positions is partly the product of 
his construction of an authorial self during and following his formative years at 
Columbia, and latterly the partial product of dialogic interaction with Hustvedt. 
 This chapter will examine how the process of aesthetic expression utilised 
by Hustvedt and Auster have become intertwined with broader debates relating to 
the influence of poststructuralism on late Twentieth Century US fiction, coupled 
with the apparent fading of postmodernism as a ‘literary historical category’ into 
the ‘after postmodernism’ period.16 As Linda Hutcheon points out in the second 
edition of The Politics of Postmodernism (2002), the postmodern ‘moment has 
passed, even if its discursive strategies and ideological critiques have moved 
on’.17 This second chapter will consist of a detailed exploration of Hustvedt’s 
writing and its relationship to the discursive approaches of her husband as framed 
by these debates. I will first explore the poststructuralist discourses of Roland 
                                                          
14 Paul Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected Prose, p. 539. 
15 ‘I've never read a word of Jacques Derrida, I don't know his stuff at all. I know who he is and basically 
what he writes about, but it is of so little interest to me, and my work comes from a place so different, that I 
was just astonished. But that's what a lot of criticism is at the highest level. It's taking somebody's system and 
taking somebody's book and glomming that book onto that system to see if it works out. But it [Russell’s 
article] is more about Derrida than about me’ (Paul Auster, ‘Unpublished Interview’, 26 February 1993, 
<http://www.bluecricket.com/auster/links/secret.html> [Accessed 12/05/2015]). Dimovitz’s debunking of the 
Derrida connection seems to pivot upon this particular interview.  
16 Linda Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 181. 
17 Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism, p. 181. 
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Barthes, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, to establish the defining features 
of poststructuralism’s relationship to literature. I will then look at what Linda 
Hutcheon terms ‘the postmodern problematic’: the difficulties of concretely 
defining literary postmodernism as a paradoxical movement which is, according 
to Hutcheon, ‘critical and complicitous, outside and inside’ the cultural dominants 
of ‘liberal humanism and capitalist mass culture’.18 Thereafter, I will briefly 
consider the recent proliferation of ‘after postmodernism’ theories, and how these 
relate to the development and evolution of Hustvedt and Auster’s respective 
embodied process of aesthetic expression. My subsequent reading of Auster and 
Hustvedt’s debut novels, The New York Trilogy and The Blindfold, will seek to 
delineate not only the ways in which both novels exhibit the characteristics of 
postmodernist narrative and theoretical engagement with poststructuralism in their 
texts, but, most crucially for this particular piece of research, where we can begin 
to see moments of dialogic intertextuality between them. My contention is 
Hustvedt and Auster’s occupation of a shared literary, theoretical and emotional 
space emerges within this postmodernist context, which has an explicitly ethical 
grounding and is partially defined by intertextuality within and between their 
novels. The remainder of the thesis will seek to examine the extent to which their 
writing has moved beyond the postmodern moment towards a metamodernistic 
structure of feeling. 
  
                                                          
18 Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 
222-25. 
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Vive la différence: deconstructing poststructuralism 
 For a movement which stresses the absence of points of origin, that 
postmodern fiction can be traced back to poststructuralist approaches to literary 
theory simply re-emphasises the genre’s complexities. Poststructuralism can be 
read as what James A. Steintrager terms a ‘syncretism’, a body of thought in 
which ‘fields as diverse as phenomenology, linguistics, anthropology, and 
theoretical mathematics mingle with psychoanalysis, creating a complex and 
evolving amalgam’.19 Bertens and Natoli record:  
Postmodernism stresses other-determination, desire, contingency, change, 
difference, and absence (of self and meaning). The major sources of this 
theoretical postmodernism are to be found in French poststructuralism.20 
This depiction chimes with Fredric Jameson’s summation of what he identifies as 
‘contemporary theory’:  
Today, increasingly, we have a kind of writing simply called theory which 
is all or none of those things [academic disciplines] at once. This new kind 
                                                          
19 James A. Steintrager, ‘Jacques Lacan’ in Postmodernism: The Key Figures, ed. by Hans Bertens and 
Joseph Natoli (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 211-17 (p. 211). Here Steintrager refers directly to the discourse 
of poststructuralist psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (whose work will come under consideration in Chapter 
three), but the hybrid spatiality of Hustvedt and Auster’s fiction is possessed of an equivalent syncretic 
quality. 
20 Bertens and Natoli, ‘Introduction’ in Postmodernism: The Key Figures, ed. by Bertens and Natoli p. xii. 
Jeremy Green also argues that poststructuralist approaches to ‘history, language, desire and different’ helped 
to produce the ideology behind postmodernism (Jeremy Green, Late Postmodernism: American Fiction at the 
Millennium [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005], p. 1). 
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of discourse, generally associated with France and so-called French theory, 
is becoming widespread and marks the end of philosophy.21 
Fredric Jameson, like Bertens and Natoli, directly connects poststructuralist 
discourse to postmodernism – but unlike Bertens and Natoli, he deems it ‘among 
the manifestations of postmodernism’, blurring the distinction between causation 
and correlation.22 Much like postmodernism’s belated response to modernism, 
poststructuralism finds its basis in the intensification, extension and radicalization 
of the body of literature and theory from which it emerged: the structuralism of 
Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. According to Sturrock, Saussurean 
linguistics were appropriated, assimilated and reconfigured by five key 
proponents: Claude Levi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques 
Lacan and Jacques Derrida.23 John Sturrock’s description of structuralism as ‘a 
method of investigation’ holds true for poststructuralism: a heterogeneous, anti-
humanist dictum which continually questions textual a-symbolia, cultural 
structures and hierarchies of power. 
                                                          
21 Fredric Jameson, ‘Postmodernism and Consumer Society’, in The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the 
Postmodern, 1983-1998 (Verso: London, 1998), pp. 1-20 (p. 3). 
22 F. Jameson, ‘Postmodernism and Consumer Culture’ in The Cultural Turn, p. 3. 
23 John Sturrock, ‘Introduction’ in Structuralism and Since, ed. by John Sturrock (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1979), pp. 1-18 (p. 2). It is an irony of history that structuralism – and its ‘post-incarnation’ – came to 
be disavowed by those whose work established it as a ‘meaningful’ discourse. This development presents a 
similar problematic to that of postmodernism: how to locate the unifying precept behind a body of theory 
built upon resistance to meaning and critical distancing from the culturally-structured exegesis. 
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 Structuralism was first codified in Saussure’s Course in General 
Linguistics (1906) under the core principle that ‘in language there are only 
differences without positive terms’.24 According to Rick Rylance:  
Saussurean linguistics posits a ‘diacritical’ conception of meaning. 
Meaning is a function not of reference, but of the differential relationships 
in the language system. Meaning is thus not anchored in the ‘real world’ 
but is a product of the particular language or discursive structure of which 
its units are part.25 
Difference is fundamental to poststructuralism, providing the tautological 
grounding for the shifting and divergent discourses of a complex branch of 
philosophical scepticism. Under poststructuralism, the arbitrary relationship 
between signifier and signified identified by Saussure is further problematized, 
and the links between language, identity and meaning become increasingly 
insecure, unstable and relational. The linguistic differences which are believed to 
determine the structures of a society fold back in on themselves, and the 
epistemological basis of humanism and the history of knowledge are shown to be 
without teleological basis.26 
 A useful entry-point for understanding poststructuralism’s impact on the 
writing of Hustvedt and Auster is to focus not on its conflicting approaches to the 
disappearance of the stable subject, the impossibility of establishing meaning and 
                                                          
24 Catherine Belsey, Poststructuralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 8. 
25 Rick Rylance, ‘Developments after Structuralism’ in Debating Texts, ed. by Rylance, pp. 111-16 (p. 112).  
26 Belsey, p. 37. 
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the critiques of the hierarchies of knowledge and power – although, as Bertens 
and Natoli show above, these are crucial to postmodernist theory, and will come 
under discussion later in the chapter – but to centre upon poststructuralism’s 
relationship to writing as a creative act, and the impact of the concept of 
intertextuality upon postmodern literature. Previously addressed in Chapter one, 
intertextuality is critical to the poststructuralist project, redefining the relationship 
between authors, texts and readers. Rylance defines intertextuality as ‘the process 
whereby meaning is produced from text to text, rather than, as it were, between 
text and world’; a process in which ‘meaning is passed along indefinitely like the 
baton in a relay race that never ends’.27 Textual play within a text generates ‘an 
endlessly plural signifying practice which defeats analytic restatement or 
description’,28 while intertextuality between and throughout texts engenders the 
continual deferral of meaning from text to text. By granting greater critical and 
aesthetic responsibility to readers, the converse consequence of this intertextual 
deferral (alternatively labelled ‘différance’ by Derrida) is the problematization of 
the role, responsibility and authority of the author. In his essay ‘The Death of the 
Author’ (1968), Barthes outlines his belief that ‘it is language which speaks, not 
the author’:   
Writing is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin. Writing 
is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the 
                                                          
27 Rylance, ‘Developments after Structuralism’ in Debating Texts, ed. by Rylance, p. 113. 
28 Rylance, ‘Developments after Structuralism’ in Debating Texts, ed. by Rylance, p. 112. 
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negative where all identity is lost, starting with the identity of the body 
writing.29 
The author becomes a mere ‘scriptor’, stripped of ‘passions, humours, feelings, 
impressions’, with writing existing ‘only a tissue of signs, an imitation that is lost, 
infinitely deferred’.30 Barthes further develops this idea in subsequent writings. 
‘From Work to Text’ (1971) Barthes argues that ‘the text is plural…entirely 
woven of quotations, references, echoes: cultural languages…traverse it through 
and through’,31 while The Pleasure of the Text (1973) develops this approach to 
outline the unchallenging pleasure of what Barthes terms ‘readerly texts’ (scripte 
lisible) and the intersubjective jouissance (or ‘bliss’) of ‘writerly texts’ (texte 
scriptible).32 In both these texts, Barthes distinguishes between active and passive 
engagement with a given text, while proposing a degree of prior knowledge or 
interpretative cognition on the part of the reader.  
                                                          
29 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’ in Image – Music – Text, trans. by Stephen Heath (London: 
Fontana Press, 1977), pp. 142-48 (p. 147). More prosaically, the biographical details of an author become 
irrelevant when interpreting a text: a fact partially acknowledged by Auster’s referral to ‘the mysterious other 
who lives inside me and puts my name on the covers of books…It’s as though no one has written the words 
you are reading. I find this ‘no one’ terribly fascinating – for there’s finally a profound truth to it’ (Auster, 
‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected Prose, p. 555).   
30 Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’ in Image – Music – Text, p. 147. 
31 Roland Barthes, ‘From Work to Text’ in The Rustle of Language, trans. by Richard Howard (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1986), pp. 56-68 (p. 60). 
32 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. by Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975), p. 
14.   
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 Responding to Barthes, the nature of originality and the inevitability of 
meaninglessness were later reappraised by Foucault:  
The notion of writing, as currently employed, is concerned with neither the 
act of writing, nor the indication…of a meaning...The notion of writing 
seems to transpose the empirical characteristics of the author into a 
transcendental anonymity.33 
Foucault’s author performs no more than a functional role in the structural 
preparation of a text, while the interpretative process takes place without 
acknowledgement of the author’s original intention. Under the culturally-
structured system of signification, authorial authority is reduced to an invisible ‘I’, 
a voice without an identity, while the reader is elevated from interpreter to co-
creator.34 Derridean deconstruction pushes this role reversal to its ‘logical’ 
conclusion: the boundary between writer/reader, subject/object and work/text are 
blurred almost to extinction by a linguistic structure without centre. Instead there 
exists a language-based signifying space from which authorless texts emerge, 
where ‘the absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the 
play of signification indefinitely’.35 
                                                          
33 Michel Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’ in The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume Two: 
Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. by James D. Faubion, trans. by Richard Hurley (New York: The 
New Press, 1998), pp. 205-22 (p. 208). 
34 Belsey, p. 19. 
35 ‘It was necessary to begin thinking that there was no centre, that the centre had no natural site, that it was 
not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into 
play. This was the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the 
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 This dialogic exchange between Barthes, Foucault and Derrida in itself 
problematizes Foucault’s concept of ‘transcendental anonymity’ and the 
negotiation of definitive meaning: their discourses float free of authorial authority, 
but their dialogue – cultural, institutionalised, temporally-located – inadvertently 
restore and reconcile ‘text’ with ‘writer’. However, Sturrock emphasises 
poststructuralism’s affinity with writing and, in particular, imaginative writing: 
‘self-conscious about the form of what they write, and knowledgeable about the 
devices and effects of rhetoric…they refuse to be imprisoned within the narrower 
stylistic bounds of orthodox academic discourse’.36 The trope of transcendental 
absence Foucault and Derrida refer to explicitly (and Barthes implicitly) offers an 
opportunity to situate Hustvedt and Auster in closer critical alignment. For if 
poststructuralism denies the existence of binary, delineated opposites such as 
                                                          
absence of a centre of origin, everything became discourse…that is to say, a system in which the central 
signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences’ 
(Jacques Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences’ in Writing and 
Difference, trans. by Alan Bass [London: Routledge, 2001], pp. 278-94 [p. 280]).  
Much like Derrida, Jacques Lacan’s apparently impregnable texts challenge the authority of proscribed 
knowledge and traceable meanings. (Steintrager, ‘Jacques Lacan’ in Postmodernism: The Key Figures, ed. by 
Bertens and Natoli, p. 152.) Steintrager’s observation that ‘Lacan writes works which displace and 
deconstruct themselves as they are produced’ prefigures Russell’s application of Derridean deconstruction to 
Auster’s City of Glass. Steintrager also notes that despite Derrida’s critique of psychoanalysis as a discipline 
which ‘only sees itself’, Derrida and Lacan deploy linguistics to question notions of authority and autonomy 
while attempting to establish their own authoritative conceptual models of language.  
36 Sturrock, p. 17. Bice Benvenuto and Roger Kennedy also comment upon the ‘dual function’ of Lacan’s 
work, which enacts a ‘literary performance’ showcasing the ‘disintegration of language’ while conversely 
offering the ‘prospect of a solution to the ‘lack’ that it expresses’ (Bice Benvenuto and Roger Kennedy, The 
Works of Jacques Lacan: An Introduction [London: Free Association Books, 1986], p. 17). 
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writer/reader, subject/object and work/text (or husband/wife), instead favouring a 
proliferation of decentred plurality where the presence of otherness is inscribed on 
the subject by its absence,37 it is possible to conceive of their marriage not only as 
a discursive inter-relational exploration of these theories through their respective 
fictions, but also as a reflection of dialogic intertextuality, where the boundaries of 
reader-writer distinction collapse into coexistent textual coproduction. The next 
section of this chapter will address the postmodern problematic of cultural 
indeterminacy, which embodies Hutcheon’s belief that ‘postmodern differences, 
or rather differences, in the plural, are always multiple and provisional’.38   
 
  
                                                          
37 Belsey, p. 87. 
38 Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, p. 4. 
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Incredulity towards incredulity: the postmodern condition 
 Green describes postmodernism as ‘hyperbolic and conceptually fuzzy’, a 
nebulous concept whose very indeterminacy complicates and even frustrates 
attempts to delineate its defining characteristics.39 Brian McHale states, ‘nothing 
about this term [postmodernism] is unproblematic’,40 while Hutcheon concurs: 
‘the postmodern is a problematizing force in our culture: it raises questions about 
(or renders problematic) the common sensical’.41 Bertens and Natoli define 
postmodernism as a ‘wholly self-reflexive, anti-referential, and apolitical 
movement in literature and the arts’, a system whose capaciousness not only 
reflects and engenders ‘a wide and rather heterogeneous variety of phenomena’, 
and which makes isolating and unpicking its knotty defining characteristics 
difficult.42 The polymorphous nature of postmodernism can be traced to its self-
reflexivity: for the literary form, a proliferation of cultural phenomena provokes in 
authors a curious detachment from the aesthetics of commitment, and the embrace 
of the tropes of pastiche, irony and ambiguity. Furthermore, postmodernism’s 
centrifugality and differential relationality draw a multitude of theories, 
disciplines and ideas into its theoretical orbit, all of which serve to emphasise its 
slipperiness. 
                                                          
39 Green, p. 1. 
40 Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction (London; Methuen, 1987), p. xii. 
41 Hutcheon, p. xi. 
42 Bertens and Natoli, ‘Introduction’ in Postmodernism: The Key Figures, ed. by Bertens and Natoli, p. xi. 
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 This slipperiness extends to tracing the emergence of postmodernism as a 
cultural dominant. Bertens and Natoli, for example, trace the ‘point of origin’ of 
postmodernism to three sources: the anti-humanist tropology of French 
poststructural linguistics; the historical-political culture-shocks of the late 1960s; 
and the socio-cultural critiques of mass consumer capitalism which emerged in 
the 1980s.43  Vermeulen and van den Akker similarly argue that the theoretical 
response to postmodernism has been more critical to its proposed existence than 
those cultural-material characteristics that defined it:  
The initial heralds of postmodernism, broadly considered to be Charles 
Jencks, Jean- François Lyotard, Fredric Jameson and Ihab Hassan, each 
analysed a different cultural phenomenon – respectively a transformation 
in our material landscape; a distrust and the consequent desertion of 
metanarratives; the emergence of late capitalism, the fading of historicism 
and the waning of affect; and a new regime in the arts.44   
Both Fredric Jameson and Jean- François Lyotard highlight the culturally-
compromised aesthetic, theoretical and political paradigm under the cultural logic 
of late capitalism, within which ‘meaningful’ or ‘authentic’ art is produced and 
critiqued. Where Lyotard offered an ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ and the 
                                                          
43 Bertens and Natoli, ‘Introduction’ in Postmodernism: The Key Figures, ed. by Bertens and Natoli, p. ix. 
According to Green, Craig Calhoun identifies four ways of using the concept of postmodernism which centre 
upon poststructuralism, philosophical anti-foundationalism, social theory, and as a stylistic trend.   
44 Vermeulen and van den Akker, ‘Notes on Metamodernism’. 
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limits of historical knowledge, 45 Fredric Jameson’s work has been particularly 
important in two respects: firstly in attempting to establish postmodernism as a 
periodizing concept which correlates ‘the emergence of new formal features in 
culture with the emergence of a new type of social life and a new economic 
order’;46 and secondly in stressing the material conditions of postmodernism.47 
Under Fredric Jameson’s theoretical microscope, postmodernism deepens and 
intensifies the social and productive relationships of capitalism, while commodity 
production absorbs and assimilates postmodern culture through pluralistic 
proliferation and the aesthetics of imitation: ‘the transformation of reality into 
images, the fragmentation of time into a series of perpetual presents’.48 
 Most crucially, postmodernism – ergo postmodern literature – is defined 
by its relationship to modernism. As Jameson contends, ‘the unity of it 
[postmodernism] is given not in itself, but in the very modernism it seeks to 
                                                          
45 ‘I will use the term modern to designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to a 
metadiscourse…making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the 
hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth’ 
(Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by Geoff Bennington and 
Brian Massumi with foreword by Fredric Jameson [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984], p. 
xxiv). 
46 Fredric Jameson, ‘Postmodernism and Consumer Society’ in The Cultural Turn, p. 3. Reading 
postmodernism as a periodizing concept is no less problematic than postmodernism’s material and theoretical 
indeterminacy. This problematic will be addressed in the next section.   
47 Sean Homer, ‘Fredric Jameson’ in Bertens and Natoli, Postmodernism: The Key Figures, ed. by Hans 
Bertens and Joseph Natoli (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 180-88 (p. 188). 
48 F. Jameson, ‘Postmodernism and Consumer Culture’ in The Cultural Turn, p. 20. 
117 
 
displace’.49 Green similarly describes postmodernism as a ‘term of 
belatedness…succeeding or superseding the earlier formation’.50 Not only is it a 
periodizing concept linked to what Jameson believes to be clearly demarcated 
cultural crisis points within the history of Western humanism, but the creative 
responses to this ‘collapse’ of modernism in art are sited within a self-reflexive 
temporal-philosophical space. Contra Fredric Jameson, Hutcheon observes:  
There is no dialectic in the postmodern: the self-reflexive remains distinct 
from its traditionally accepted contrary – the historico-political context in 
which it is embedded. […] The postmodern is not ahistorical or 
dehistoricized, though it does question our (perhaps unacknowledged) 
assumptions about what constitutes historical knowledge.51 
For Hutcheon, postmodernism’s paradoxes ‘call to our attention both our 
continual postulation of that difference and also a newer epistemological doubt. 
(Do we know the difference?)’.52 Yet questions remain over the ideological basis 
and ethical possibilities and limitations of a movement inscribed by the cultural 
domination of mass consumer capitalism: one where we have ‘multiculturalism, 
pluralist sexual identities, minority rights and single issue politics’ operating 
within an ‘aggressive entrepreneurial capitalism and an intense and prolonged 
wave of self-examination’.53 What Hutcheon terms ‘dark postmodernism’, 
                                                          
49 F. Jameson, ‘Postmodernism and Consumer Culture’ in The Cultural Turn, p. 2. 
50 Green, p. 1. 
51 Hutcheon, p. x; p. xii. 
52 Hutcheon, p. 255. 
53 Bertens and Natoli, ‘Introduction’ in Postmodernism: The Key Figures, p. xv. 
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exemplified by the nihilistic simulacra described by Jean Baudrillard, threatens to 
flatten and obliterate these ethical prerogatives.54  
 In their respective studies of the poetic mode of production under the 
conditioning principle of postmodernity, Green, Hutcheon and McHale separately 
describe the difficulty for authors in resolving the postmodern problematic. For 
Green, postmodern fiction reflects ‘a process, a perpetual questioning’: an 
aesthetic mode of sceptical enquiry and narrative ambiguity,55 wherein motifs of 
endings, exhaustion, waste, entropy and used-upness’ recur in a variety of 
reconfigurations.56According to Bertens and Natoli, postmodernism reflects a 
rejection of Cartesian dualism and the Enlightenment values of empiricism, 
rationality and self-determination; and latterly by the extension and radicalization 
of modernism’s epistemological self-reflexive modes of enquiry.57 Hutcheon’s 
limited model isolates ‘historiographic metafiction’ as an exemplar of the 
postmodern literary project.58 These consist of novels ‘whose self-reflexivity 
works in conjunction with their seeming opposite (historical reference) in order to 
                                                          
54 Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, p. 224. Barone too separates Auster’s work from this ‘nihilistic 
view of the postmodern’, with its closed systems of simulation and hyperreality. Hustvedt similarly places 
little value on ‘simulacra, baby’ (Siri Hustvedt, The Sorrows of an American [London: Sceptre, 2006], p. 217.  
Hereafter referred to in the text as Sorrows with page number cited.) 
55 Green, p. 23. 
56 Green, p. 30. 
57 Bertens and Natoli, ‘Introduction’ in Postmodernism: The Key Figures, ed. by Bertens and Natoli p. xii. 
Hustvedt and Auster’s scepticism towards epistemological certainty derives from this position, but their 
ethically-grounded quests for other forms of imaginative knowledge have taken them beyond the problematic 
postmodern paradigm.  
58 Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, p. 223. 
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reveal both the limits and powers of historical knowledge’.59 The ideological 
subtexts which shape cultural practices also control the conditions of aesthetic 
meaning production.60 For McHale, postmodernist poetics shift from the 
modernist concern with epistemology to issues of ontology. Postmodernist 
literature embodies and reflects a cultural ‘dominant’ which questions ‘the 
ontology of the literary text itself or the ontology of the world within which it 
projects’.61 McHale calls postmodernist fiction ‘above all an illusion breaking art; 
it systematically disturbs the air of reality by foregrounding the ontological 
structure of texts and of fictional worlds’.62  
 This is the aesthetic, theoretical and temporal space into which Auster and 
Hustvedt began publishing fiction: Auster’s first part to The New York Trilogy, 
City of Glass, was published in 1984; Hustvedt’s, The Blindfold, in 1992. Auster’s 
links to the meta-textual deconstructions of postmodernism, as we have already 
                                                          
59 Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, p. 223. Hutcheon leans quite heavily on the work of Michel 
Foucault here, defining postmodernism as ‘not ahistorical or dehistoricized, though it does question our 
(perhaps unacknowledged) assumptions about what constitutes historical knowledge’. Hutcheon, p. xii. 
60 ‘Wilfully contradictory, then, postmodern culture uses and abuses the conventions of discourse. It knows it 
cannot escape implication in the economic (late capitalist) and ideological (liberal humanist) dominants of its 
time. There is no outside. All it can do is question from within’ (Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, pp. 
xii-xiii).  
61 McHale, p. 10. McHale’s model recalibrates the historiographic preoccupations of Hutcheon: ‘intractable 
epistemological certainty become at a certain point ontological plurality or instability; push epistemological 
questions far enough and they ‘tip over’ into ontological questions. By the same token, push ontological 
questions far enough and they tip over into epistemological questions – the system is not linear and 
unidirectional but bidirectional and reversible’ (McHale, p. 11). 
62 McHale, p. 221. 
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seen, are well-documented, but problematic. While Auster’s novels do not adhere 
strictly to the frameworks emphasised by Green, Hutcheon and McHale, they are 
implicated in the hybrid forms of postmodern culture. By contrast, while 
Hartmann, Marks and Zapf seek to usher Hustvedt’s writing into a new ‘after 
pomo’ period, it remains possible to read her fiction as a product of the 
postmodern cultural dominant. A further complication can to be found when 
considering in the ways in which Hustvedt and Auster’s writing has evolved not 
only in acknowledgement of a changing temporal-spatial, cultural and theoretical 
landscape, but also in reflection of personal, professional and political 
developments in their lives.  
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Illegibility and sincerity: beyond postmodernism 
 In the early Twenty-First Century, writers like Hustvedt and Auster find 
themselves writing within and responding to cultural conditions to which the term 
‘postmodern’ no longer appears appropriate. Nealon in particular outlines what he 
terms the ‘changed cultural and economic situation’ of ‘just-in-time capitalism’,63 
revisiting Jameson’s earlier writings on postmodernism to isolate the intensified 
‘speed and penetration’ of late capitalist praxis in contemporary culture.64 For 
Boxall, the material conditions of the early Twenty-First Century retain the 
‘disjunct quality’,65 or ‘illegibility of the present’, which defined aesthetic 
responses to earlier modern/postmodern periods;66 what differentiates our 
contemporary present is a sense of gathering speed, intensified by the 
‘instantaneity’ of electronic communication.67 This foregrounds the acute sense of 
untimeliness, or ‘belatedness’, intertwined within our responses to contemporary 
cultural phenomena, and the difficulty of unpicking the temporal fabric of this 
                                                          
63 Nealon, p. xi-xii. 
64 Nealon, p. 150. 
65 Boxall, p. 3. 
66 Boxall, p. 2. 
67 Boxall, p. 11. Roger Luckhurst and Peter Marks, by contrast, distinguish between a ‘forever accelerating’ 
modernity, with its concomitant belief that ‘the contemporary world is bereft of time or history’, and what 
they perceive to be the ‘‘thickness’ of time and temporality in the contemporary world’ (Roger Luckhurst and 
Peter Marks, ‘Hurry Up Please Its Time: Introducing the Contemporary’ in Literature and the Contemporary: 
Fictions and Theories of the Present, ed. by Roger Luckhurst and Peter Marks [Harlow: Longman, 1999], pp 
1-10 [p. 1; p. 10]).  
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epoch from the texture of the last.68 For Boxall, our cultural experience is 
possessed of ‘a peculiar double vision’, being ‘extraordinarily old, and impossibly 
young’.69 Accordingly, one finds ‘this absence from the present, this estrangement 
from a time that seems to pass’. According to Boxall, in narrative terms the 
‘shifted temporality’ and ‘texture of the contemporary present’ are intertwined 
with a ‘preoccupation with embodiment’ and a sense of self-estrangement.70 
 For Green, these new cultural conditions ‘shape the readership, the literary 
and political ideologies, the self-understanding, and the aesthetic choices available 
to writers’.71 Literature’s uncertain future, and the existential crisis facing 
contemporary authors such as Hustvedt and Auster, foregrounds what Boxall and 
                                                          
68 ‘The history of the later Twentieth Century came to being under the sign of a general lateness or 
belatedness, a vast historical gloaming, a gathering agedness’ (Boxall, p. 22). 
69 Boxall, p. 23.     
70 Boxall, pp. 10-11. This estrangement can perhaps be linked with the dissociative strangeness described by 
Hustvedt and Auster in their non-fiction and discussed in Chapter one, although they seem to link this to a 
universal problematic, rather than a temporal condition. It is equally possible to contend that temporality, and 
the critical frameworks imposed by postmodernity and its later incarnations, have stimulated Hustvedt and 
Auster’s perception of the essentially disordered ontology of the human subject. Of course, this is a chicken-
and-egg scenario worthy of an entire thesis.   
71 Green, p. 3. Green also points to the how the shift from reading to viewing has become culturally 
embedded, and seems to presage a ‘future without books’ (Green, p. 5). According to Green, ‘with the 
shaping of audiences in the media age, the growth of knowledge and information processing as an integral 
part of advanced capitalism, and the redistribution of symbolic forms of value, literature’s place has become 
increasingly uncertain’ (Green p. 7). Here one recalls Barthes’ observation in ‘From Work to Text’ that ‘the 
reduction of reading to consumption is obviously responsible for the ‘boredom’ many feel in the presence of 
the modern (‘unreadable’) text, the avant-garde film or painting: to be bored means one cannot produce the 
text, release it, make it go’ (Barthes, ‘From Work to Text’ in The Rustle of Language, p. 63). 
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Green both identify as a ‘fin de siècle’ moment in cultural history.72 The 
challenge to literature cannot be overstated: as Green persuasively argues ‘the 
legitimating function of culture has been overtaken by the uses of culture as 
commodity. Capital has to an increasing extent penetrated the cultural realm, 
making it over in its own image’.73 The ‘perceived marginality’ of writers, and the 
notion of writing ‘as a form of resistance’ to cultural commodification and 
political philistinism,74 are thrown into sharp relief next to the ‘superficiality, 
passivity and information overload that undermine the reflective capacities of the 
citizen subject’.75  
 It is therefore interesting that Hustvedt and Auster have chosen this 
moment to simultaneously publish books which require considerable commitment 
from the reader: a 560 page collection of interdisciplinary essays, including a 200 
page critique of Cartesian dualism titled ‘The Delusions of Certainty’ (Hustvedt’s 
A Woman Looking at Men Looking at Women [2016]), and a 890 page variation 
on the bildungsroman which draws upon multiple intersubjective positions 
(Auster’s 4321 [2017]).76 Both texts rely upon an amalgamation of hybrid 
spatiality, temporal liminality and intersubjective reciprocity. In this regard, 
neither can be classified as overtly postmodern: indeed, the prosaic density of 
Auster’s 4321 in particular gestures towards a ‘realism reinvigorated and newly 
                                                          
72 Boxall, p. 4; Green, p. 13. 
73 Green, p. 34. 
74 Green, pp. 8-9. 
75 Green, p. 9. 
76 Negative reviews of both books complained of their ‘longwindedness’, ‘verbosity’ and ‘difficulty’. 
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relevant to these confessional times’.77 While, as Vermeulen and van den Akker 
point out, ‘literary historical categories like modernism and postmodernism are, 
after all, only heuristic labels that we create in our attempts to chart cultural 
changes and continuities’,78 numerous cultural theorists have attempted to find a 
new ‘heuristic label’ to classify and characterise our contemporary epoch.79  
 Metamodernism, the model Vermeulen and van den Akker propose, is 
particularly useful when considering Hustvedt and Auster’s work, as it identifies 
                                                          
77 Green, p. 28. Auster’s latest novel, which returns to the territory of his earlier novel, Moon Palace, and the 
meditative autobiographical diptych of Winter Journal and Report from the Interior, reflects what Boxall 
describes as a ‘new historicity’. In 4321 Auster depicts four ‘identical but different’ lives of the same 
protagonist, Archie Ferguson, detailing the microcosmic and quotidian experiential structure of the four 
variations alongside the macrocosmic socio-cultural narratives of American post-war history (Paul Auster, 
4321 [London: Faber, 2017], p. 863. Hereafter referred to in the text as 4321 with page number cited). 
Frequently, 4321 seems to negotiate what Boxall terms ‘historical persistence’ and ‘the mutability of the 
past’, gesturing towards a ‘new sense of responsibility to material historical forces that constrain or shape the 
fictional imagination’ (Boxall, pp. 40-42). As Auster writes, ‘the real also consisted of what could have 
happened but didn’t…God was nowhere, he said to himself, but life was everywhere, and death was 
everywhere, and the living and the dead were joined’. (4321 863)  
78 Vermeulen and van den Akker, ‘Notes on Metamodernism’. 
79 No small irony that there is a proliferation of potential cultural terms to define this era: an aftermath of 
postmodernism’s pursuit of heterogeneity. Alongside their own term, ‘metamodernism’, Vermeulen and van 
den Akker also list Gilles Lipovetsky’s ‘hypermodern’, Alan Kirby’s ‘digimodernism’ or 
‘pseudomodernism’, Robert Samuels’ ‘automodernism’. To these we may also add Green’s ‘late 
postmodernism’, Nealon’s ‘postpostmodernism’, Zygmunt Bauman’s ‘liquid modernity’ or Adam Curtis’ 
‘hypernormality’. What distinguishes these from Vermeulen and van den Akker’s own model is their 
intensification and radicalisation of postmodernism to focus on ‘cultural and (inter)textual hybridity, 
‘coincidentality’ consumer (enabled) identities, hedonism’ and a ‘focus on spatiality rather than temporality’. 
Vermeulen and van den Akker, ‘Notes on Metamodernism’. 
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an oscillation between modernism and postmodernism which enfolds the 
dialectical quality of the epistemological-ontological divide identified by 
Hutcheon and McHale, without giving predominance to either. Critical to 
Vermeulen and van den Akker’s model is the German philosopher Eric Voeglin’s 
concept of metaxis, or ‘betweenness’, which establishes a politically-charged 
philosophical model which ‘consciously commits itself to an impossible 
possibility’: ‘as if’ there is a positivistic teleological outcome in the history of 
humanity, despite its implausibility.80 Here Vermeulen and van den Akker draw 
upon what they term ‘Kantian negative idealism’ to propose that ‘both the 
metamodern epistemology (as if) and its ontology (Between) should thus be 
conceived of as a ‘both-neither’ dynamic’.81 While this implies a degree of 
philosophical negation or latent nihilism, Vermeulen and van den Akker believe 
metamodernism manifests itself through an aesthetic approach which oscillates 
between the certainties of modernism and the scepticism of postmodernism, 
                                                          
80 Vermeulen and van den Akker, ‘Notes on Metamodernism’. Voegelin’s conception of betweenness is quite 
different to that of the German philosopher Martin Buber, a major influence on Hustvedt and Auster’s 
approach to self-other dialectics. Buber’s notion of the ‘between’ is founded on dialogism, intersubjectivity 
and mutuality, while Voegelin’s metataxis is more closely positioned to the existentialist positions of Jean-
Paul Sartre and Albert Camus: ‘Existence has the structure of the In-Between, of the Platonic Metaxy, and if 
anything is constant in the history of mankind it is the language of tension between life and death, 
immortality and mortality, perfection and imperfection, time and timelessness, between order and disorder, 
truth and untruth, sense and senselessness of existence’ (Eric Voegelin, ‘Equivalences of Experience and 
Symbolization in History’ in The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin: Volume 12, ed. by E. Sandoz [Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989], pp. 119-20, [qtd in Vermeulen and van den Akker, ‘Notes on 
Metamodernism’]).    
81 Vermeulen and van den Akker, ‘Notes on Metamodernism’. 
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thereby establishing a ‘narrative of longing’ characterised by ‘pragmatic 
idealism’:82 
Ontologically metamodernism oscillates between the modern and the 
postmodern…between hope and melancholy, between naïveté and 
knowingness, empathy and apathy, unity and plurality, totality and 
fragmentation, purity and ambiguity…One should be careful not to think 
this oscillation as a balance, however; rather it is a pendulum swinging 
between 2, 3, 5, 10, innumerable poles.83 
It is tempting to think that Vermeulen and van den Akker’s pendulum hinges upon 
the indeterminacy of our recent postmodern past, and that metamodernism is little 
more than a logical extension of the cultural inflections of late capitalism. Indeed, 
given the brevity of their essay Vermeulen and van den Akker’s model inevitably 
relies upon reductive representations of two complex cultural movements, while 
insisting on a separation between the two which is contentious and possibly 
misleading. 
                                                          
82 Vermeulen and van den Akker, ‘Notes on Metamodernism’. 
83 Vermeulen and van den Akker, ‘Notes on Metamodernism’. These binary distinctions are more than a little 
reductive and not entirely unproblematic. However, this sense of oscillation and negotiation between 
modernism and postmodernist positions chimes with Boxall’s description of the ‘peculiar double vision’ of 
contemporary cultural life (Boxall, p. 23). Metamodernism also aligns with Luckhurst and Marks’ 
observations about the accelerated and thickened constitution of our contemporary epoch, that in order ‘to 
think the contemporary, it is necessary to think remembering and forgetting together, rather than sliding into 
simple assertions of dystopian loss’ (Luckhurst and Marks, ‘Hurry Up Please It’s Time’ in Literature and the 
Contemporary, ed. by Luckhurst and Marks, p. 6). 
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 Nevertheless, we might conceive of the metamodernistic mode of 
investigation as reflecting an oscillation from negating ambivalence towards a 
more positivistic ambiguity, both of which are present in the writing of Hustvedt 
and Auster. In another regard, the development of Hustvedt and Auster’s writing 
careers reflect the ‘return to transparency and representation’ that Green argues is 
required to move beyond the ‘decadence and decline’ of postmodernism.84 Both 
are conceivably present in the ‘postmodernist’ Austerian observation that ‘I’m not 
exactly sure why I write. It’s not simply to create beautiful objects or entertaining 
stories. It’s an activity I seem to need in order to stay alive’;85 or Hustvedt’s 
empathic reflection that ‘openness to a book is vital, and openness is simply a 
willingness to be changed by what we read’.86 This bidirectional movement from 
commitment to scepticism, certainty to doubt, modernist tropes to postmodernist 
tropes, more consistently defines Hustvedt and Auster’s early narratives than 
more overtly deconstructive approaches would have us believe. The next section 
will attempt to address the narrative complexity of their early novels, and this 
oscillation between commitment and irony to forge new forms of knowledge. 
  
  
                                                          
84 Green, p. 25; Green, p. 22. 
85 Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected Prose, p. 539.   
86 Hustvedt, ‘On Reading’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p.138. 
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Narrativising the (post)modern: intertextual strategies 
 With their localised, contingent and indeterminate narratives, the surface 
textures of Hustvedt and Auster’s early fiction appears to embrace postmodernist 
critiques. The explicitly ethical approaches to plot, structure and characterisation 
present in their later novels are implicitly expressed in their more overtly 
ambivalent postmodern debut novels. This differentiates the self-reflexive 
paradoxes of the deconstructive opening to The New York Trilogy, and the 
temporally-disordered power-dynamics of The Blindfold, from the empathic 
multiple-perspective narrative of Auster’s 4321 and Hustvedt’s polyphonic The 
Blazing World (2014). In their early novels, Hustvedt and Auster utilise unreliable 
narrators, shifting perspectives and intersubjective identities as a means of 
critically appraising the postmodern condition. These narratives partially adhere to 
the postmodern poetics outlined by Hutcheon and McHale, while illuminating 
Hustvedt and Auster’s nascent commitment to an alternative epistemology of the 
present founded on dialogism and mutuality. The limited possibility of 
establishing definitive meanings through Auster’s text is derived from his 
treatment of linguistic instability, the blurring of identities and the disruption of 
linear time; Hustvedt similarly engages in this narrativised play. For the rest of 
this chapter, I will seek to identify moments of intertextual synchronicity within 
Hustvedt and Auster’s examinations of identity, liminality and authority in the 
fragmented and self-reflexive postmodern epoch. 
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1. Identity and language 
 Hustvedt and Auster’s early writing appears to examine the ‘death of the 
subject’ by problematizing the identities of their protagonists. Delineating what he 
terms ‘the poststructuralist position’ in relation to identity, Fredric Jameson 
proposes that postmodernism is predicated upon the death of the subject:  
Not only is the bourgeois individual subject a thing of the past, it is also a 
myth; it never existed in the first place; there have never been autonomous 
subjects of that type. Rather, this construct is merely a philosophical and 
cultural mystification which sought to persuade people that they ‘had’ 
individual subjects and possessed some unique personal identity.87 
This, according to Jameson, presents artists with an ‘aesthetic dilemma’: ‘one of 
its essential messages will involve the necessary failure of art and the aesthetic, 
the failure of the new, the imprisonment of the past’.88 For Jameson, postmodern 
art – in all forms – enacts a kind of collapse, an aesthetic implosion. Under this 
rubric, representation moves away from modernism’s epistemological and 
psychological constructions, towards the irony, pastiche and historiographic 
metafiction identified by Hutcheon, and the ontologically-focused cultural 
                                                          
87 F. Jameson, p. 6. Jameson’s reading of postmodern culture allows little room for the dialogism of Martin 
Buber (see Chapter three), and the intersubjective phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (see Chapter four). Given Hustvedt and Auster’s interest in these theories, this indicates a major 
discrepancy in postmodern approaches to their work. Contra the imploding aesthetics of postmodernism, the 
hybrid spatiality of their texts gesture towards an aesthetic of ethical commitment, foregrounded by an 
imaginative epistemology, or transdisciplinary knowledge.  
88 F. Jameson, p. 7. 
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dominant cited by McHale. Barone writes: ‘in postmodern investigations of 
human subjectivities, the self can be split into selves to probe into the peculiarities 
of self’.89 Sorapure writes that for Auster: 
A question of identity is repeatedly the site of profound struggle for 
characters whose postmodern sense of themselves and of their place in the 
world shifts, multiplies, disintegrates, and must be reconstituted, if only 
provisionally.90 
Sorapure, like Alison Russell, applies a Derridean reading to Auster’s debut 
novel: her observation that characters ‘search for patterns and meanings in the 
signs they encounter and events they experience’,91 only to be thwarted by ‘the 
postmodern overload of potentially significant information and by the force of 
chance, coincidence, the arbitrary and the implausible’ recalls Derrida’s 
deconstructed, centreless systems of signification: ‘the entire history of structure 
[meaning] must be thought of as a series of substitutions of centre for centre’.92  
 These ‘forces of chance, coincidence, the arbitrary and the implausible’ 
frame the narrative and frustrate the linearity of The New York Trilogy and The 
Blindfold. Both novels open with a central mystery: a case of misplaced identity 
and a chance encounter which are foregrounded by ambivalence, implausibility 
and the ambiguity of the narratives’ barely glimpsed prolepses. A feminist 
                                                          
89 Barone, p. 14. 
90 Sorapure, ‘Paul Auster’ in Postmodernism: The Key Figures, ed. by Bertens and Natoli, p. 20. 
91 Sorapure, ‘Paul Auster’ in Postmodernism: The Key Figures, ed. by Bertens and Natoli, p. 22. 
92 Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign and Play’ in Writing and Difference, p. 279. 
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narrative, The Blindfold interrogatively dissects the representative possibilities of 
realism, the epistemological possibilities of modernism and the ontological 
possibilities of postmodernism. Alise Jameson proposes that Hustvedt 
‘problematizes straightforward interpretation’ in her narrative, isolating the 
‘ambiguity of power and its relation to notions of speech/silence and 
seeing/blindness’.93 Hustvedt’s narrative opens upon a moment of uncanny 
misrecognition: 
Sometimes even now I think I see him in the street or standing in a 
window or bent over a book in a coffee shop. And in that instant, before I 
understand that it's someone else, my lungs tighten and I lose my breath.94 
Within this short paragraph, the structural shape of Hustvedt’s novel opens up: 
revelatory, affirmative, embodied. The repeated ‘I’s push the reader towards a 
psychological and phenomenological reading of the narrative, but they also 
suggest identity exists in Voegelin’s between-space of affirmation and negation. 
Hustvedt’s narrator is a Columbia graduate named Iris Vegan, whom Versluys 
and Alise Jameson propose undergoes a series of identity crises throughout the 
narrative.95 This crisis also applies to the identity of the ‘him’ Iris believes she 
                                                          
93 Alise Jameson ‘Pleasure and Peril: Dynamic Forces of Power and Desire in Siri Hustvedt’s The Blindfold’, 
Studies in the Novel (42: 4, 2010), 421-442 (p. 422). 
94 Siri Hustvedt, The Blindfold (Picador: New York, 1992), p. 1. Hereafter referred to in the text as Blindfold 
with page numbers cited. 
95 Versluys, p. 100; A. Jameson, p. 440. 
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sees, which remains unresolved throughout the narrative.96 Iris’ erotically-charged 
and phenomenologically-grounded preoccupation with masculine identities 
unfolds as the narrative progresses:  
Through my barred window, across the narrow airshaft, I looked into the 
apartment opposite mine and saw the two men who lived there wander 
from one room to another, half dressed in the sultry weather. On a day in 
July, not long before I met Mr. Morning, one of the men came naked to the 
window. It was dusk and he stood there for a long time, his body lit from 
behind by a yellow lamp. I hid in the darkness of my bedroom and he 
never knew I was there. That was two months after Stephen left me, and I 
thought of him incessantly, stirring in the humid sheets, never comfortable, 
never relieved. (Blindfold 1) 
Iris’ language is determined by lust, love, loss, absence and possible betrayal: the 
adjectives ‘comfortable’, ‘sultry’ and ‘relieved’ palpably loaded with erotic 
tension. She vicariously involves herself in the embodied narratives of the two 
men living opposite her apartment by secretly observing them; yet she maintains 
her distance, and her invisibility is reaffirmed by its denial of linguistic exchange. 
                                                          
96 Knirsch contends that, ‘the signifier ‘him’ is what Derrida calls an ‘empty signifier’, eluding any fixed 
meaning and therefore representing the opposite of the ‘full signified’ which is restricted to one fixed 
meaning or definition’ (Knirsch, ‘In a Time-Warp: The Issue of Chronology in Siri Hustvedt’s The 
Blindfold’). 
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She is caught between the binary and the plural: active and passive, absent and 
present; each state of being inscribed upon the other.97  
 The first section of Hustvedt’s beguiling and bewildering gothic-romance 
brings Iris into a chance encounter with the enigmatic Mr. Morning, a bachelor 
writer possessed of what Iris describes as a ‘beautiful voice’. (Blindfold 10) Upon 
arriving at his apartment for the first time, Iris recounts:  
I can still see his intent face in the doorway. He was a very pale man with 
a large, handsome nose. He breathed loudly as he opened the door and let 
me into a tiny, stifling room that smelled of cat. The walls were lined with 
stuffed bookshelves, and more books were piled in leaning towers all over 
the room. (Blindfold 10)  
Like that of Auster, Iris’ narration deploys language in a scrupulous, precise 
manner: ‘intent face’, ‘very pale man’, ‘smelled of cat’ suggest Iris’s linguistic 
limitations, possibly owing to her lack of emotional development. Conversely, 
these descriptions signal her control of form and putative feminist apprehension of 
patriarchal modes of existence. By contrast, Mr. Morning’s plenitudinous writings 
                                                          
97 There is also an overt intertextuality here: an echo of Auster’s Ghosts, the second part of The New York 
Trilogy, in which a character named Blue is confined to a room to observe and write down the actions of his 
ontological double, Black. Iris recalls: ‘I would read, write, and smoke into the morning, but on some nights 
when the heat made me too listless to work, I watched the neighbors from my bed’. (Blindfold 9) Unlike 
Auster’s characters, Iris’s ecriture is not the surface paraphrasing of observable action: in her world intent is 
latent, concealed and psychological – like a strangulated plea for eros lodged against the thanatic impulses of 
Auster’s Ghosts. 
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have appeared in a number of magazines, indicating the multivocal ability of 
patriarchal linguistics to dominate a range of genres, theories and identities: 
I write about everything for every taste,’ he said. ‘I’ve written for Field 
and Stream, House and Garden, True Confessions, True Detective, 
Reader's Digest. I've written stories, one spy novel, poems, essays, reviews 
– I even did an art catalog once. (Blindfold 12)  
Hustvedt deploys Mr. Morning as a Barthesian blank, a Derridean mass without 
centre, a mess of linguistic contradictions, who, nevertheless, declares to Iris 
without apparent irony: ‘I am behind everything I write, Miss Davidsen’. 
(Blindfold 12)  
 Mr. Morning invites Iris to record, in ‘painstaking description’, a series of 
objects which belonged to a dead young woman: ‘I need an ear and an eye, a 
scribe and a voice…I’m in the process of prying open the essence of the inanimate 
world. You might say it’s an anthropology of the present’.98 (Blindfold 13) Mr. 
Morning’s project produces within the narrative an exploration of poststructural 
linguistics, patriarchal power and the constriction of the feminine voice: 
I imagined my descriptions as pithy, elegant compositions, small literary 
exercises based on a kind of belated nineteenth-century positivism. Just for 
                                                          
98 The phrase ‘anthropology of the present’ not only recalls the structuralist writings of Claude Levi-Strauss, 
but it is eerily similar to a phrase Auster uses in the second part of The Invention of Solitude – The Book of 
Memory – where he ascribes his predicament of financial penury, emotional isolation and temporal 
dislocation to a personal sense of anomie: a ‘nostalgia for the present’ (Paul Auster, ‘The Invention of 
Solitude’ in Collected Prose, p. 61). 
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the moment, I decided to pretend that the thing really can be captured by 
the word. I drank coffee, ate a glazed doughnut, and was happy.99 
(Blindfold 15) 
While attempting to describe the first object in a formally linguistic fashion, much 
like the Barthesian author-figure Iris finds herself once again linguistically 
powerless, unable to accurately render its defining characteristics:  
The more I wrote, the more specific I was about the glove's characteristics, 
the more remote it became. Rather than fixing it in the light of scientific 
exactitude, the abundance of detail made the glove disappear. In fact, my 
minute description of its discolorations, snags, and pills, its loosened 
threads and stretched palm seemed alien to the sad little thing before me. 
(Blindfold 11)  
Hustvedt’s narrator perceives the glove, but, much like the personal history of the 
woman who wore it, remains indeterminate and unavailable to perception. In this 
short exposition Hustvedt apprehends and interrogates linguistic paralysis and the 
unknowability of language, a deconstructive critique of the limitations of 
Saussurean logocentrism. We might equally contend that the difficulties of 
depiction under poststructuralism’s proliferation of pluralities cause it to 
disappear; equally, we can perceive a critical appraisal of the imaginary 
                                                          
99 Hustvedt’s inclusion of the disposable commodities ‘coffee’ and ‘glazed doughnut’ – signifiers of a 
disposable, consumerist, postmodern society – align with the surface emotional response their consumption 
incurs – ‘was happy’ – stimulates a playful engagement with an early structuralist text, Barthes’ Mythologies, 
alongside Fredric Jameson’s critiques of consumer capitalism. 
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possibilities and limitations of formalism. Yet within Hustvedt’s narrative of 
focused ambiguity the object is simply and repeatedly referred to as a ‘glove’, 
thereby complicating its essential linguistic knowability.  
 The difficulties of depiction deepen when Iris is confronted with the 
second of Mr. Morning’s boxed objects, a cotton ball: 
I held the cotton ball with a pair of tweezers up to the light, trying to find 
words that would express it, but the thing was lost to language; it resisted 
it even more than the glove. And when I tried metaphors, the object sank 
so completely into the other thing that I abandoned making comparisons. 
(Blindfold 25) 
Iris’ observation that ‘the thing was lost to language’ recalls the comment she 
made before eating her donut and drinking her coffee: ‘I decided to pretend that 
the thing really can be captured by the word’. Patriarchal linguistics – 
institutionalised, formalist, masculine - have made it almost impossible for her to 
adequately describe what she sees before her: ‘the object sank so completely into 
the other thing’. These limitations are structurally, culturally and existentially 
located within Iris: perhaps it is her identity which is sinking into Mr. Morning’s 
objects, while attributing these ‘ownerless’ objects to him confers an ownership 
embedded in power. Iris’ investigations into the nature of objects and otherness 
under the tutelage of Mr. Morning offer a comment on the interlocking structure 
of linguistics and phenomenology, a condensation of the varying approaches to 
literary classification and critique. Iris’ apparent inability to describe what she 
sees – even with the discursive and apt deployment of ‘discolorations’, ‘snags’ 
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and ‘pills’ – connotes a sense of disorder under system of signification imposed 
by Mr. Morning and thereafter controlled by him in absentia. 
 As a multivocal genre writer and patriarchal trope, Mr. Morning deploys a 
number of pseudonyms, emblematic of the slippery, sinister and controlling 
individual Hustvedt constructs for Iris to encounter. When she first meets Mr. 
Morning, Iris’ unease at his ‘lecherous or merely curious’ gaze compels her to 
change her own name, adopting an alternative pseudonym:  
When he asked me my name, I lied. I did it quickly, without hesitation, 
inventing a new patronym: Davidsen. I became Iris Davidsen. It was a 
defensive act, a way of protecting myself from some amorphous danger, 
but later that false name haunted me; it seemed to move me elsewhere, 
shifting me off course and strangely altering my whole world for a time. 
(Blindfold 12)  
Iris’ tenuous grip on her own sense of feminine identity is further effaced and 
desexualised by the random letters Mr. Morning doodles on a notepad at their next 
meeting: 
There were several letters written on the paper—what looked like an I, a 
Y, a B, an O, an M, and a D. He had circled the M. If those markings were 
intended to form some kind of order, it was impossible to make it out, but 
even then, before I suspected anything, those letters had a strange effect on 
me. They stayed with me like the small but persistent aches of a mild 
illness. (Blindfold 22)  
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For Iris, the key to uncovering the ‘biography’ Mr. Morning claims to be writing 
is to discover who the objects belong to without his knowledge. This biographical 
approach, too, is doomed to failure: we perceive through Iris’ narration her 
linguistic, psychological and philosophical inferiority to Mr. Morning. To all 
intents and purposes the objects ‘belong’ to him: dialogically (in their 
conversations), and differentially (through the descriptive process), Iris is 
continually confronted by his power over language:  
‘You enjoy hiding behind masks?’ 
‘I revel in it. It gives my life a certain color and danger.’ 
‘Isn't danger overstating it a bit?’ 
‘I don't think so. Nothing is beyond me as long as I adopt the correct name 
for each project. It isn't arbitrary. It requires a gift, a genius, if I may say so 
myself, for hitting on the alias that will unleash the right man or woman 
for the job.’ (Blindfold 12)  
Mr. Morning is a creature of exegesis: his explanation about the formalistic-
hermeneutic reasoning behind his descriptive task reaffirms his existence as a 
cypher of theoretical exposition:  
I hired you precisely because you know nothing. I hired you to see what I 
cannot see, because you are who you are. I don't pretend that you're a 
blank slate. You bring your life with you, your nineteenth-century novels, 
your Minnesota, the fullness of your existence in every respect, but you 
didn't know her. When you look at the things I give you, when you write 
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and then speak about them, your words and voice may be the catalysts of 
some undiscovered being. Knowledge of her will only distract you from 
your work. (Blindfold 25)  
Alise Jameson persuasively argues that Iris and Mr. Morning can be read as a 
gendered refraction of Foucault’s critiques of structured power and knowledge, 
masculine dominance and feminine masochism. Further, it gestures towards an 
antagonistic father-daughter relationship, which may hold implications for Iris’ 
attempt to establish a feminist aesthetic beyond the boundaries of her gendered 
identity, and the patriarchal confines of Mr. Morning’s apartment.  
 Like Hustvedt’s treatment of Mr. Morning’s task for Iris in The Blindfold, 
Auster appears to examine the conflict between Saussaurean linguistics and its 
poststructuralist offspring in his debut novel. In The New York Trilogy, the father-
son relationship between Peter Stillman Jnr and Snr is not simply a literary 
appropriation of child abuse narratives, but it can also be perceived as a critical 
investigation by Auster into the cultural-societal root of linguistically-defined 
identity. Stillman Snr can be conceived as embodying structuralism’s 
anthropological explorations of meaning within a given language structure. 
Stillman Snr’s project is to discover a prelapsarian, pure language where the 
arbitrary link between name and thing are restored. Stillman Jnr, the product of 
this investigation, embodies the poststructuralist proliferation of plurality, where 
the link between sign and signified has been fractured to the point of dissolution. 
Auster’s protagonist – a writer by the name of Daniel Quinn – meets Stillman Jnr 
early in the narrative. During this meeting, the young man launches into a stream-
of-consciousness monologue which teeters on the brink of self-reflexive collapse: 
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This is what is called speaking. I believe that is the term. When words 
come out, fly into the air, live for a moment, and die. Strange is it not? I 
myself have no opinion. No and no again. But still, there are words you 
will need to have. There are many of them. Millions I think. Perhaps only 
three or four…If I can give you the words you need to have, it will be a 
great victory.100 
Self-generated language systems provide the epistemological basis for the 
ontologically-decentered identity of Stillman Jnr’s identity, giving function to his 
dehumanised form: ‘I am only poor Peter Stillman, the boy who can’t remember. 
Boo hoo. Willy nilly. Nincompoop. Excuse me’. (Trilogy 16) Stillman Jnr’s 
linguistic development as a child, and his exposure to the structures governing 
language, has been interrupted by his father but rescued by his speech therapist 
wife, Virginia. As the subject of two different linguistic systems, Peter now 
speaks in accordance with his own unique linguistic system – a kind of inverse 
monadology, or pluralistic univocalism – but one which is rendered meaningless 
to those, like Quinn, who are situated outside its system of signification. Stillman 
Jnr’s liquid enunciations continually shift, like Auster’s text, from impregnable 
abstraction to fleeting meaning: ‘Wimble click crumblechaw beloo. Clack clack 
bedrack. Numb noise, flacklemunch, chewmanna. Ya, ya, ya. Excuse me. I am the 
only one who understands these words’. (Trilogy 17) Despite his early years 
outside the culturally-structured system of signification, when he speaks it is 
                                                          
100 Paul Auster, The New York Trilogy (London: Faber, 1987), p. 16. Hereafter referred to in the text as 
Trilogy with page numbers cited. Here one can see the influence of linguistic circularity and negation in the 
Beckettian mode identified by Dimovitz, and discussed in Chapter one.   
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within his own arbitrary linguistic structure. In a passage which presages Iris’ 
difficulties of description in The Blindfold, Stillman Jnr recalls his father’s 
experiment upon him:  
There was this. Dark. Very dark. As dark as very dark. They say: that was 
the room. As if I could talk about it. The dark, I mean. / Dark, dark. They 
say for nine years. Not even a window. Poor Peter Stillman. And the 
boom, boom, boom. The caca piles. The pipi lakes. The swoons. Excuse 
me. Numb and naked. (Trilogy 16) 
Stillman’s existence recalls Derrida’s absent centre, ‘a sort of nonlocus in which 
an infinite number of sign-submissions came into play’.101 Nevertheless, 
irrespective of his disordered ontology and fractured selhood, Stillman Jnr 
remains a man. 
 Within Hustvedt and Auster’s debut novels, the individual can be read as a 
linguistic unit – a phoneme – embodying the syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes, 
and subject to the changing meanings and contexts within a linguistically-
structured world. At the opening of The Blindfold Iris describes her lungs 
tightening, causing her to lose her breath. Breathlessness has two outcomes: an 
inability to communicate, to speak, to tell; and death, the end of one’s life. 
Hustvedt, like Auster, seeks to locate words – the point of origin – within the 
corporeal body of the writer. Speechlessness in The Blindfold constitutes a proto-
death, while multivocal logocentric verbosity in City of Glass represents a form of 
annihilation by multiple-signification: in the case of Peter Stillman Jnr, who 
                                                          
101 Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign and Play’ in Writing and Difference, p. 280. 
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exhausts himself verbally before disappearing from the narrative, while Quinn’s 
thanatic inscribing appears to write himself out of existence: ‘The last sentence of 
the red notebook reads ‘What will happen when there are no more pages in the red 
notebook’. (Trilogy 132) It is true that the death of the writer closes the book in 
City of Glass, but the narrative endures in the mind of the nameless narrator: ‘my 
thoughts remain with Quinn. He will be with me always. And wherever he may 
have disappeared to, I wish him luck’. (Trilogy 133)  
 In the early fiction of Hustvedt and Auster, identities and relationships are 
constituted and reconstituted by language in self-reflexive exchange within spatio-
temporal zone of stasis and flux. The boundaries between self and other are 
transgressed, and subjective identities shift and blur. This indicates not only 
Hustvedt and Auster’s narrativisation of poststructuralist theory and 
postmodernist tropes, but also points towards the hybrid spatiality of Hustvedt and 
Auster’s later fiction, which is more explicitly oriented around self-other 
dialectics (see Chapter three), phenomenologically-grounded transcendent 
subjectivity (see Chapter four) and traumatic affect (see Chapter five). It is further 
reified through the dialogic discursivity between the novels discussed here. The 
teleological link between temporality, epistemology and language in The New 
York Trilogy and The Blindfold will be considered in the next section. 
 
2. Temporality and liminality 
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 According to Hutcheon, postmodernism can be read as an ‘ahistorical’ 
movement.102 Sean Homer has described what he terms postmodernism’s 
‘pervasive flattening of space and displacement of diachronic time with 
synchronic immanence’.103 For Marxist theorists such as Fredric Jameson, this 
‘displacement of diachronic time’ is the ‘major theme’ of postmodernism:  
 The disappearance of a sense of history, the way in which our entire 
contemporary social system has little by little begun to lose its capacity to 
retain its own past, has begun to live in a perpetual present and in a 
perpetual change that obliterates traditions.104 
Hutcheon counters Jameson’s anti-postmodernist position with the observation 
that postmodernism – and poststructuralism – teaches us that ‘history and fiction 
are discourses, that both constitute systems of signification by which we make 
sense of the past’; the meaning and shape of events and facts are structurally 
determined, ‘an acknowledgement of the meaning-making function of human 
constructs’.105 Hutcheon describes how postmodernism ‘reinstalls historical 
contexts as significant and even determining, but in so doing, it problematizes the 
entire notion of historical knowledge’.106 In this sense, postmodern literature 
acknowledges the Foucaultian paradigm that ‘writing has freed itself from the 
theme of expression, but without being restricted to the confines of its interiority, 
                                                          
102 Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, p. 87. 
103 Sean Homer, ‘Fredric Jameson’ in Postmodernism: The Key Figures, ed. by Bertens and Natoli, p. 183. 
104 F. Jameson, p. 20. 
105 Hutcheon, p. 89. 
106 Hutcheon, p. 89. 
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writing is identified with its own unfolded exteriority’.107 Postmodern narratives 
often appear to plunge into a vortex of atemporality, where the linear storytelling 
of realism combines with the fragmentary liminality of modernism to create an 
anti-teleological mise en abyme.108 By contrast, Barthes construes the ‘Author’ as 
being ‘always conceived of as the past of his book: book and author stand 
automatically on a single line divided into a before and after’.109 Rather than 
embarking on a linear journey through a text, we instead descend into a cascade of 
images, surfaces, labyrinths and dead ends: progress is impeded by a paradoxical 
paradigm, but the narrative is propelled by a hermeneutic compulsion to unpick 
and resolve the paradox. 
 This structured play between language and temporality are intrinsic to the 
shape and form of Hustvedt and Auster’s debut novels, whose temporal and 
spatial linearity is conspicuously disrupted.110 Auster’s treatment of time in his 
debut novel inspired Russell to insist upon its denial of ‘linear movement, realistic 
                                                          
107 Foucault, p. 206. 
108 The liminal structures of postmodern literature are equally reflective of the Barthesian concept of ‘the 
modern scriptor’ who, shorn of all defining characteristics, is ‘born simultaneously with the text, is in no way 
equipped with a being preceding or exceeding the writing’, and that there is ‘no other time than that of the 
enunciation and every text is externally written here and now’ (Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’ in Image – 
Music – Text, p. 145). 
109 Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’ in Image – Music – Text, p. 145.  
110 This disruption constitutes an exploration of the disjunct between the Foucault’s apprehension of 
historically-constructed selfhood, with the Barthesian conception of writer and text being born 
simultaneously. 
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representation and closure’,111 depicting it instead as a Derridean deconstruction 
of logocentrism: a principal concern of Derrida's, for whom spoken 
‘deconstructive discourses’ are ‘trapped in a kind of circle’,112 and from which 
writing seems to offer a semblance of escape: ‘language bears within itself the 
necessity of its own critique’.113 Referencing Beckettian negation, Little records 
that ‘nothing happens again and again’, and that the novel ‘subverts the 
teleological notion of progress’.114 Lavender similarly suggests City of Glass 
‘deconstructs the form of the novel, the canons of criticism, theory and tradition, 
and it deconstructs itself, as it literally falls apart in its progression’ before going 
on to observe ‘it clears a space where representation can once again close with 
politics and society’.115  
 This postmodern instability is exemplified in Auster’s existential opening 
to City of Glass, a narrativised descent into a decentred, decontextualized and 
destabilised world:  
It was a wrong number that started it, the telephone ringing three times in 
the dead of night, and the voice on the other end asking for someone he 
was not. Much later, when he was able to think about the things that had 
                                                          
111 Alison Russell, ‘Deconstructing The New York Trilogy: Paul Auster's Anti-Detective Fiction’, Critique 
(31: 2, 1990), 71-83 (p. 72).  
112 Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign and Play’ in Writing and Difference, p. 280. 
113 Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign and Play’ in Writing and Difference, p. 284. 
114 Little, p. 133. 
115 William Lavender, ‘The Novel of Critical Engagement: Paul Auster’s City of Glass’, Contemporary 
Literature (34:2, 1993), 219-39 (p. 220, 235). 
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happened to him, he would conclude that nothing was real except chance. 
But that was much later. In the beginning, there was simply the event and 
its consequences. Whether it might have turned out differently, or whether 
it was all predetermined with the first word that came from the stranger’s 
mouth, is not the question. The question is the story itself, and whether or 
not it means something is not for the story to tell. (Trilogy 3) 
The texture of the paragraph elicits negation and negotiation, delimited 
possibilities and lost causes, and negligible cause and effect. The telephone’s 
noise piercing ‘the dead of night’ perhaps exempifying the crisis of representation 
which predicates Lyotard’s postmodernity,116 and Derrida’s ‘rupture and 
redoubling’ which predicates deconstructive discourse.117 A vestige of atemporal 
location remains: ‘dead of night’, ‘in the beginning’ and ‘much later’ imply that 
time exists and will pass in this narrative, but nothing further is offered in the way 
of temporal specifity. Auster’s protagonist, Quinn, is a man without a past whose 
scant existence is barely inscribed within the frame of the novel: ‘As for Quinn, 
there is little that need detain us. Who he was, where he came from, and what he 
did are of no great importance’. (Trilogy 3) ‘Nothing was real except chance’, 
records the narrator, positioning contingency, happenstance and the randomness 
of existence as empirical and ontological obstacles to teleological epistemology, 
                                                          
116 ‘Capitalism inherently possesses the power to derealize familiar objects, social roles, and institutions to 
such a degree that the so-called realistic representations can no longer evoke reality except as nostalgia or 
mockery’ (Jean-François Lyotard ‘Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?’, trans. by Regis 
Durand, in The Postmodern Condition, pp71-82 [p. 74]). 
117 Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign and Play’ in Writing and Difference, p. 278. 
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by impeding linear thought, self-determination and movement through the 
temporal-spatial landscape.  
 Nevertheless, as the narrator observes, ‘the question was the story itself’: 
the story being the individual’s quest for authentic selfhood in the wake of 
personal tragedy. Auster’s Trilogy thus proceeds inexorably from one section to 
the next, with prescient and retrospective intertextual tensions. The plot of each 
part concludes in the loosest possible sense, with a final, enfolding closure of sorts 
offered in the destruction (or deconstruction) of Fanshawe’s red notebook at the 
climax of The Locked Room, the final part of the Trilogy. The narrative therefore 
deploys a degree of foreshadowing and backshadowing, while at its centre rests a 
continual deferral of progress. Yet the anti-teleological ‘close’ to City of Glass 
leaves the frame of that particular narrative open, with the enduring mystery of 
what happened to the protagonist left agonisingly unresolved: ‘it is impossible for 
me to say where he is now’. (Trilogy 133)  The location of the subsequent parts to 
the Trilogy within different temporal zones serves to deepen the structural and 
thematic mise en abyme constructed by Auster.118 
 Hustvedt deploys a similarly disordered textual strategy for The Blindfold: 
four temporally reconstituted sections which act as episodic narratives-in-
miniature, but within which are embedded references to the others. According to 
Knirsch, ‘The Blindfold’s narrative structure is comprised of four loosely 
                                                          
118 Quinn and Iris emerge from and disappear into the textual fabric of these apparently deconstructive novels, 
yet both ‘reappear’ in later fictions: Quinn in Auster’s In the Country of Last Things and 4321; Iris in 
Hustvedt’s The Blazing World  (as I.V Hess) and Auster’s Leviathan.  
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connected episodes which are ordered anachronically, almost as in a time warp’, 
while the time structure of the novel ‘remains open’, without two clearly 
identifiable moments of inception or closure.119 Upon first reading, the first 
episode performs as a prologue for the remainder, with Iris’ linguistic power play 
with Mr. Morning casting a narrative shadow over everything that follows. 
Consequently, according to Alise Jameson, Iris experiences ‘nothing less than a 
self-shattering, a dangerous destabilization of any sense of personal identity’;120 
this destabilisation is signalled by the air of ambivalence towards her earlier 
descriptive difficulties under the control of patriarchal linguistics, and the 
submissive hope of encountering her tormentor once more: ‘Mr. Morning had my 
telephone number, after all, and there was nothing to prevent him from finding 
me. I waited for months, but I never heard from him. When the telephone rang, it 
was always someone else’. (Blindfold 38) The ‘Stephen’ fleetingly referred to in 
Iris’ opening narration reappears as a major character in a later section, a 
reflection of Hustvedt’s exploration of the preoccupation of postmodern fiction 
with its own unfolded exteriority. Antje Dalmann attempts to restore linear time to 
the novel’s ‘unchronological representation’,121 concluding:  
                                                          
119 Christian Knirsch, ‘In a Time-Warp: The Issue of Chronology in Siri Hustvedt’s The Blindfold’. 
120 A. Jameson, p. 422. 
121 Antje Dallman, ‘ConspiraCities and Creative Paranoia: Ellis’s Glamorama, Hustvedt’s The Blindfold, and 
Whitehead’s The Intuitist’, Anglophonia (19: 2006), 67-87 (p. 73). 
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The narrative time (thought scrambled) is neatly restorable. The narrated 
time is exactly three academic years, while the time of narration is eight 
years after Iris’s second summer at Columbia.122 
Knirsch links the ‘migrane-induced scotomas’ Iris undergoes throughout the 
course of the narrative to Derridean poststructuralism, with ‘form and content 
becoming one’: each section refers to the other, without offering causational or 
correlative points of origin or closure.123  
 Hustvedt and Auster’s narratives acknowledge McHale’s ontological 
dominant and Hutcheon’s ‘historiographic metafiction’ – writing which signals a 
break with the epistemologically-grounded, humanistic ‘truths’ of realism and 
modernism by ‘rethinking and reworking the forms of the past...in order to 
subvert them’ – 124 but Hustvedt and Auster’s engagement with canonical 
literature, and social and cultural history, proliferates through the prism of 
temporal disordering and immanence within their narratives. This idea of the 
present state of language in relation to its development over time is critical to 
Auster’s narrative, and his depiction of Stillman Snr’s linguistic crusade. Smith 
perceptively argues that Stillman Snr’s restorative quest overlooks the ‘slippages 
and ambiguities of language that give it life’; that language is ‘conventional, 
arbitrary and culturally entrained’.125 In City of Glass, following his encounter 
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with the disintegrated Stillman Jnr, Quinn is tasked by Virginia Stillman with 
tracking down Stillman Snr. This quest is framed and mediated by his reading and 
interpretation of the historian Stillman Snr’s academic tract, The Garden and The 
Tower: Early Visions of the New World, a distillation and condensation of the 
history of Western thought ‘in two parts of approximately equal length, ‘The 
Myth of Paradise’ and ‘The Myth of Babel’’. (Trilogy 41) Stillman’s historical-
theocratic investigation into the mythology of language – linguistic collapse 
(Eden/Tower of Babel) presaging prelapsarian restoration (the New World/The 
New Babel) – refers obliquely to Foucault’s identification of the structured nature 
of language, knowledge and history: 
 Later in the Book of Genesis there is another story about language. 
According to Stillman, the Tower of Babel episode was an exact 
recapitulation of what happened in the Garden, only expanded, made 
general in its significance for all mankind…This is the very last incident of 
prehistory in the Bible…The Tower of Babel stands as the last image 
before the true beginning of the world. (Trilogy 43)  
Stillman Snr’s divided text – as with Auster’s Trilogy – is ironically unified under 
the rubric of its materiality (as a written critique of structuralism, and a published 
object), recontextualised by deconstruction’s fragmentary pluralism and 
postmodernism’s provisionality:  
After the fall, this was no longer true. Names became detached from 
things; words devolved into a collection of arbitrary signs; language had 
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been severed from God. The story of the Garden, therefore, not only 
records the fall of man, but the fall of language. (Trilogy 43)  
Stillman Snr has been driven ‘crazy, absolutely insane’ by his ambition to restore 
the referential binary connections which determine linguistic meaning. Hazel 
Smith depicts Stillman Snr’s book as ‘a parody of the structuralist idea that 
language makes the world’,126 and his historical-theological preoccupation with 
Edenic-linguistic essentialism – when ‘a thing and its name were interchangeable’ 
– is mirrored in the mythology of the Tower of Babel: ‘And the whole earth was 
of one language, and of one speech’. Stillman Snr seeks to ressurect the utopian 
quest for a prelapsarian language from the ruins of the deconstructed present: 
You see the world is in fragments, sir. Not only have we lost our sense of 
purpose, we have lost the language whereby we can speak of it. These are 
no doubt spiritual matters, but they have their analogue in the material 
world. My brilliant stroke has been to confine myself to physical things, to 
the immediate and tangible. My motives are lofty, but my work now takes 
place in the realm of the everyday. (Trilogy 76)  
 Stillman Snr’s theological dissection of the problematized nature of 
epistemological and ontological existence mirror’s Auster’s own examination of 
co-dependence and conflict between arbitrary systems of signification: the 
diachronic (the evolution of language over time) and synchronic (the condition of 
language in the present); langue (the language system) and parole (the speaking 
of that system); the syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes; the spatio-temporal and 
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the socio-historical; the epistemological and ontological. Auster’s fiction 
investigates how these systems evolve and what happens when they disintegrate, 
as evidenced by the extreme destabilisation of Stillman Jnr as a consequence of 
his father’s abusive treatment:  
The body acted almost exactly as the voice had: machine-like, fitful, 
alternating between slow and rapid gestures, rigid and yet expressive, as if 
the operation were out of control, not quite corresponding to the will that 
lay behind it. (Trilogy 15)  
When Quinn finally catches up with Stillman at New York’s Riverside Park, 
Auster uses their meeting to further dissect the way in which formalist, structural 
and poststructural theoretical positions encircle each other within the postmodern 
problematic. Deploying labyrinthine language and a sequence of paradoxical 
paradigms, Auster invites a hermeneutic response to these dialogic negations 
(‘I’m sorry, but it won’t be possible for me to talk to you’) and negotiations (‘I 
could tell you were a man of sense right away, Mr. Quinn. If you only knew how 
many people have misunderstood me’), (Trilogy 73; 75) before revisiting and 
reconfiguring Stillman’s theocratic search for linguistic truth: 
A new language that will at last say what we have to say. For our words no 
longer correspond to the world. When things were whole, we felt 
confident that our words could express them. But little by little these 
things have broken apart, shattered, collapsed into chaos. And yet our 
words have remained the same. They have not adapted themselves to the 
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new reality. Hence, every time we try to speak of what we see, we speak 
falsely, distorting the very thing we are trying to represent. (Trilogy 77)  
Stillman Snr’s linguistic quest doubles as a geo-spatial traversal: physically 
transporting him across the city ‘the most forlorn of places, the most abject’, 
while he painstakingly shuffles over the surface of the streets in search of ‘broken 
objects…the chipped to the smashed, from the dented to the squashed, from the 
pulverised to the putrid’, (Trilogy 78) objects severed from their meaningful place 
within history and through which he will erect his postlapsarian utopia. 
 Versluys’ reading of Hustvedt’s depiction of New York City as a maze in 
The Blindfold is equally true for Auster’s novel. The experiences of Quinn and Iris 
take place in a landscape which verges on the dystopian: their identities are 
subjected to the postmodern contingencies of surviving within vertiginous, 
dehumanizing cities of glass, while their responses to this predicament are 
primarily ambivalent. Smith believes that Quinn’s trailing of Stillman Snr on his 
unconscious urban perambulations and conscious re-naming of things enacts the 
performative process of writing, whereby:  
Body and city continuously transform each other, because neither body nor 
city is a unified, autonomous object. The hyperscape [a site characterised 
by multiple oppositions] is activated by the process of walking, and the 
dynamic relationship it creates between body and city.127 
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The maps of Stillman Snr’s peripatetic wanderings which Quinn cribs in his red 
notebook flatten the perplexity of these hyperscapes, revealing shapes which seem 
to spell ‘OWER OF BAB’, hieroglyphs that prophesise the arrival of Stillman 
Snr’s postlapsarian utopia. Much like the seemingly random markings Mr. 
Morning makes in his notepad in The Blindfold, their actual meaning is 
inscrutable and unattributable to the symbols Quinn has scribed:  
The letters continued to horrify Quinn. The whole thing was so oblique, so 
fiendish in its circumlocutions, that he did not want to accept it. Then 
doubts came, as if on command…he had imagined the whole thing. The 
letters were not letters at all. He had seen them only because he had 
wanted to see them. And even if the diagrams did form letters, it was only 
a fluke. Stillman had nothing to do with it. It was all an accident, a hoax he 
had perpetrated on himself. (Trilogy 71)  
 Motifs of perception, and representations of seeing and assimilating visual 
objects, frequently slow the narratives of Hustvedt and Auster’s fiction. Much like 
Auster’s narrative, The Blindfold contains instances of time being manipulated, 
sped up or slowed down, or compressed, so that events which should endure 
happen in the space of a sentence (‘I waited for months’), while events which 
occur instantaneously move at a crawl. Here Hustvedt compares Iris’ 
apprehension of the exterior urban landscape with the stultifying, antiquated 
interior world of Mr. Morning’s apartment: 
I ran into the street and began to walk toward Broadway. When I reached 
the corner, I paused. It had stopped raining and the sky was breaking into 
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vast, blank holes of blue. I watched the clouds move and then looked into 
the street. The sidewalk, buildings, and people had been given a fierce 
clarity in the new light; each thing was radically distinct, as though my 
eyesight had suddenly been sharpened. (Blindfold 38) 
Elsewhere Iris recalls her first visit to Mr. Morning’s den of antiquity: ‘The 
walls were lined with stuffed bookshelves, and more books were piled in leaning 
towers all over the room’. (Blindfold 10) The ‘leaning towers of books’ in Mr. 
Morning’s apartment proliferate with hermeneutic connotations, suggesting the 
patriarchal formalism of literary tradition, Foucault’s hierarchies of structured 
knowledge, Stillman’s Tower of Babel – the fall of Adamic language detailed in 
City of Glass – and the spatial structure of the city of New York, the skyscrapers 
of Manhattan. Hustvedt’s Mr. Morning acts as the Peter Stillman Snr to Auster’s 
Quinn, a man who asserts his control over language through the patriarchal 
structures of language and knowledge embedded in history: 
‘What does that mean?’ 
‘It means exactly what the words denote.’ 
‘Those words, Mr. Morning,’ I said, ‘are liturgical. You've gone into a 
religious mode all of a sudden. What am I to think? You seem to have a 
talent for saying nothing with style.’ 
‘Be patient, and I think you'll begin to understand me.’ He was smiling. 
(Blindfold 23)  
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Iris’s recollection of the space in which their first meeting was held (‘a narrow ray 
of light that had escaped through a broken blind fell to the floor between us, and 
when I looked at it, I saw a haze of dust’) (Blindfold 11) metonymically 
constitutes a reflection of her relationship with Mr. Morning, an allegorical 
embodiment of institutionalised literary antiquity and canonical patriarchy: a 
single sentence in which time, movement and space are momentarily inscribed – 
much as they are in the single name ‘Mr. Morning’.  
In The Blindfold and The New York Trilogy, Hustvedt and Auster address 
the teleological limitations of temporally-grounded epistemology within an 
ontologically-disordered paradigm. The possibility of narrative progress is 
problematized through the fragmentary constitution of the text, and negation of 
self-determination through the dissolution of boundaries between self and other. 
Hustvedt’s narrative resolution, like that of Auster, remains open, but unlike that 
of Auster it displays an ambivalence which, according to Alise Jameson, shows 
‘that Hustvedt’s work does not express a definitive stance on power relations’ or 
hierarchies of historical knowledge.128  
 
 
 
3. Authorial authority  
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 Postmodernism and poststructuralism critique authorial authority, and the 
possibility of establishing stable meanings within texts. The ability of the writer to 
pen an original piece of work is compromised by intertextuality (Barthes), the 
cultural-historical exchange between knowledge and power (Foucault) and the 
unrestricted play of signification (Derrida). Barthes believes that ‘it is language 
which speaks and not the author’, and critiques criticism which seeks to assert 
meaning and authorial intent by focusing on biographical-historical 
considerations: 
The explanation of a work is always sought in the man or woman who 
produced it, as if it were always, in the end, through the more or less 
transparent allegory of fiction, the voice of a single person, the author 
‘confiding’ in us […] The Author, when believed in, is always conceived 
of as the past of his own book: book and author stand automatically on a 
single line divided into a before and after.129  
For Barthes, textual engagement necessitates the recognition and reconfiguration 
of ‘the relations of scriptor, reader and observer’, and that writers are born and die 
with their books.130 Foucault shares this view: ‘The author does not precede the 
works; he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, 
excludes and chooses’; for Foucault, indifference to authorial intention ‘is one of 
the fundamental ethical principles of contemporary writing’.131 Derrida contends 
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that linguistic play impedes the ability of writers to write responsibly, but instead 
encourages them to embrace the ethical possibilities of writing joyously: 
Play is the disruption of presence […] The joyous affirmation of the play 
of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world 
of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to 
an active interpretation.132 
Reading and writing, for Barthes and Derrida, exist within a mutually-reaffirming 
signifying system of continual exchange where the ‘pleasures of the text’, or 
rather, the difficulties of meaningful apprehension, are crucial to this dialogue 
between reader and writer (and critic): these are what ‘produce the text, play it, 
release it, make it go’.133 Foucault, by contrast, situates explicit and latent textual 
meanings within the body of the author as a ‘variable and complex function of 
discourse’,134 but observes: 
The author is not an indefinite source of significations that fill a work; the 
author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle by 
which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which 
one impedes the free circulation, the free circulation, the free 
manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, recomposition of 
fiction.135   
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For Foucault, the author is little more than an ‘ideological product’, a means of 
marking our ‘fear of the proliferation of meaning’.136 Yet while postmodernist and 
poststructuralist theory problematize definitive meaning-making and authorial 
authority, novels – and debut novels in particular – can often be read as a 
discursive declarations of intent with a manifesto-like quality: an expression of 
intellectual will to power, or meaning-making. The fragmentary nature of 
temporality, space and signification within socio-cultural structure of 
postmodernism, and the epistemological and ontological implications for the 
individual’s existence constitute the postmodern frame within which Hustvedt and 
Auster attempt to critique and subvert these competing contexts. Their embrace 
and repudiation of Lyotard’s crisis of representation, while seeking to find a way 
out of the postmodern problematic, both stimulates and inhibits their apprehension 
and expression of its textures. Hutcheon reminds us, ‘difference is multiple and 
provisional’, while Barthes notes that ‘the text is plural’: 
It can be text only in its difference…its reading is semelfactive…and yet 
entirely woven of quotations, references, echoes: cultural 
languages…traverse it through and through, in a vast stereophony.137 
The debut novels of Hustvedt and Auster are distinguished by a mode of 
presentation, or ‘production’ under the Marxist dictum: both reflect and respond 
to the tropological conditions, contradictions and contradistinctions of 
                                                          
136 Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’ in The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, p. 221. 
137 Barthes, ‘From Work to Text’ in The Rustle of Language, p. 60. 
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postmodernism, attempting to restore the authorial voice through the conscious 
deployment of metafictional and metaphysical tropes.  
 Brian McHale defines metafiction, the ironic foregrounding of the process 
of writing, as a central technique of postmodern fiction: ‘No longer content with 
invisibly exercising his freedom to create worlds, the artist now makes his 
freedom visible by thrusting himself to the foreground of his work’.138 Lavender’s 
detailed reworking of Seymour Chatman’s model of narrative structure identifies 
three ‘Paul Austers’ at play in City of Glass, suggesting ‘allegorically, a 
hopelessly complex, paradoxical, self-referential system of geneses’.139 And yet, 
Auster’s characters subvert the poststructuralist concept of the ‘dead author’, 
presenting an alternative, performative rendering of authorial immanence, one in 
which it is Auster pulling the strings:  
The artist represented in the act of creation or destruction is himself 
inevitably a fiction. The real artist always occupies an ontological level 
superior to that of his projected fictional self, and therefore doubly superior 
to the fictional world.140 
                                                          
138 McHale, p. 30. 
139 Lavender, p. 224. 
140 McHale, p. 30. Auster’s own analysis of his self-insertion into the narrative frame of The New York 
Trilogy corresponds with McHale’s diagnosis: ‘It stemmed from a desire to implicate myself in the machinery 
of the book. I don’t mean my autobiographical self, I mean my author self, the mysterious other who lives 
inside me and puts my name on the covers of books…I wanted to open up the process, to break down walls, 
to expose the plumbing. There’s a strange kind of trickery involved in the writing and reading of novels’ 
(Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected Prose, p. 555). 
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Like the spectral Mr. Morning in The Blindfold, Auster’s decentred protagonist is 
a writer: Daniel Quinn, a man whose identity has been shorn of definition and 
physicality in the wake of the death of his wife and son: ‘Who he was, where he 
came from and what he did are of no great importance’. (Trilogy 3) Quinn’s 
writer-identity provides the basis for his subjugation to the textures of the 
postmodern condition and the shifting identities of a number of alter egos and 
hypothetical doubles: his literary pseudonym William Wilson, Wilson’s private 
eye protagonist Max Work, and the narrativised embodiment of Paul Auster, the 
‘author’ of the book. The continual tension between realism’s compositionality, 
Saussurean referentiality and deconstructive multiplicity are metonymically 
embodied in the spectral Quinn and his ghostly confrères. As Lavender records, 
this constellation of narrative identities is further complicated by the revealing, 
near the close of City of Glass, of a disembodied, nameless narrator: the 
omniscient God-like author the entire narrative discourse has hitherto 
overlooked.141 What we are presented with, much like the narrative of The 
Blindfold, is another first person narrative by an unreliable narrator. However, 
unlike Hustvedt’s distillation of Iris Vegan’s psychological terrain through a 
system of first person narration, Auster’s narrator speaks for the writer-
protagonist Quinn on a number of occasions. In particular, the narrator records 
Quinn’s enjoyment of mystery novels due to their economy of language and 
linguistic ‘truth’: 
 
                                                          
141 Lavender, p. 221. 
162 
 
What he liked about these books was their strict sense of plenitude and 
economy. In the good mystery there is nothing wasted, no sentence, no 
word that is not significant. And even if it is not significant, it has the 
potential to be so – which amounts to the same thing. (Trilogy 8) 
 
Here, the mask slips slightly: the narrator’s refraction of the psychological 
attitudes of his protagonist, Daniel Quinn, depicts Auster’s ambivalence towards 
totalizing language structures. One facet of the postmodern canon is exemplified 
in an act of ventriloquism, of God-like assertion, under the pretence of 
metafiction. The narrator’s subsequent reflection that ‘the centre, then, is 
everywhere, and no circumference can be drawn until the book has come to its 
end’ (Trilogy 8) ironically delineates poststructuralism’s negation of narrative 
linearity, a concession to the possibilities, limitations and contradictions contained 
within deconstructive discourse: ‘The centre is at the centre of the totality, and 
yet, since the centre does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the 
totality has its centre elsewhere. The centre is not the centre’.142 However, 
Auster’s disavowal of Derridean discourse negates this interpretation, 
alternatively offering an affirmation of the linguistic power of the writer in 
determining the narrative. For in spite of this supposed lack of centre, Quinn, the 
writer character, is the individual around whom the circumference of Auster’s 
narrative encircles, a multiplicity of alternative identities circulate, and 
narrativised rival individuals oppose diametrically.  
                                                          
142 Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign and Play’ in Writing and Difference, p. 279. 
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 Hustvedt and Auster’s novels indicate their appropriation of Beckett’s 
technique for granting characters cratyllic names that allude to meaning without 
wholly granting it (Watt, Moran, Malone, Clov, Hamm and so on), reflecting the 
structural implication of William H. Gass’s statement that ‘characters are those 
primary substances to which everything else is attached’.143 Like those of Beckett, 
Hustvedt and Auster’s protagonists struggle to establish single and unified selves 
within a sphere of signification characterised by confusing, intrusive and 
fragmentary spatiality. Derridean logocentrism posits that the ‘history of 
metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these metaphors and 
metonymies’, whereby language, names and identity progress ever onwards in a 
chain of reflexive signification.144 In The Blindfold, Iris recounts working for a 
medical historian indexing recognisable diseases such as ‘bubonic plague, 
leprosy, influenza, syphilis, tuberculosis’ in addition to ‘more obscure afflictions 
that I remember now only because of their names – yaws, milk leg, greensickness, 
ragsorter’s disease, housemaid’s knee, and dandy fever’ (Blindfold 10). The 
specificity of each implicates the others in their progression; the obscurity of the 
diseases suggests their unknowability: they have become dislocated from their 
point of origin. However, while these arbitrary binary links between names and 
                                                          
143 William H. Gass, ‘The Concept of Character in Fiction’ in Essentials of the Theory of Fiction: Third 
Edition, ed. by Michael J. Hoffman and Patrick D. Murphy (London: Duke University Press, 2005) pp. 113-
120 (p. 116). 
144 ‘All the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the centre have always designated an invariable 
presence – eidos, arch, telos, energia, ousa (essence, existence, substance, subject), alethia, transcendiality, 
consciousness, God, man, and so forth’ (Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign and Play’ in Writing and Difference, p. 
279-80. 
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things is fundamental to Saussurean linguistics, and the dissolution of the link 
equally critical to Derridean deconstruction, Hustvedt and Auster seem instead to 
subvert the idea of names being completely dislocated from the object that they 
represent.  
 Quinn’s patronym is scrutinised by Stillman Snr, who pushes the linguistic 
possibilities of his name into abstraction and absurdity in a passage which recalls 
the dialogue of his damaged son:  
I see many possibilities for this word, this Quinn, this…quintessence…of 
quiddity. Quick for example. And quill. And quack. And quirk. Hmmm. 
Rhymes with grin. Not to speak of kin. Hmmm. Very interesting. And win. 
And fin. And din. And gin. And pin. And tin. And bin. Even rhymes with 
djinn. Hmmm. And if you say it right, with been. Hmmm. Yes, very 
interesting. I like your name enormously, Mr. Quinn. It flies off in so 
many little directions at once. (Trilogy 74)  
As Stillman notes, there is logocentric logic to Quinn’s essentially arbitrary name, 
even as it engenders a number of increasingly absurd referents: ‘Rhymes with 
twin, does it not?’ (Trilogy 74) Iris Vegan’s name is a hybridization of Hustvedt’s 
first name reversed (or mirrored), and her mother’s maiden name. Intentional or 
otherwise, the surname Vegan suggests to this particularly omnivorous reader on 
the one hand a degree of fragility, weakness, submissiveness; ethical assuredness 
and moral superiority; or paradigmatic cypher, an authorial mouthpiece, a 
ventriloquist’s dummy. Pushing the linguistic possibilities of Iris’ patronym in 
this Austerian way, we might argue that it rhymes with began, the past tense to 
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begin – which is precisely what Hustvedt is doing with her debut novel: 
beginning. 
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Conclusion 
 While Auster in particular resists this interpretation, it is nevertheless 
possible to argue that Hustvedt and Auster engage with postmodernism and 
poststructuralist discourse in their debut novels. These early texts address the end 
of essentialism under the postmodern problematic identified by Hutcheon, and 
attempt to explore and subvert the postmodern frame from within. Equally, their 
texts reflect the complexity of existence and limitations of discursive possibility in 
the postmodern epoch. While clearly distinctive in terms of style, narrative and 
rate of productivity, their novels share moments of commonality in a structural, 
thematic and ethical sense, and their deployment of dialogic intertextuality can be 
perceived early in their writing relationship. The closing line to the first part of 
The Blindfold – ‘When the telephone rang, it was always someone else’ – offers a 
tantalising hermeneutic connection to the first line of The New York Trilogy: ‘It 
was a wrong number that started it, the telephone ringing three times in the dead 
of night, and the voice on the other end asking for someone he was not’. Iris’ 
experiences in The Blindfold seem at times to speak back to Auster’s earlier novel, 
and the two coexist in subtle dialogue.  
 The influence of postmodern theory and poststructuralist discourse – 
conscious or otherwise – on their fiction provides the basis to begin thinking of 
their writing as a collaborative project. For outside the confines of the 
postmodernist schema of self-reflexivity, theoretical loops and puzzling 
contradictions, self-other dialectics find a more stable home within the common 
literary project of Auster and Hustvedt, as married writers whose texts constitute 
an intertextual matrix which transcends the metalinguistic frameworks of 
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postmodern fiction. This notion of dialogue between self and other, and the 
theoretical basis thereof, is predicated upon their relationship as married writers 
and the discursive exchange of ideas engendered by sharing their life together. In 
Chapters three and four I will examine the effect of empathic and emotional 
relationality through depictions of self-other dialectics and intersubjectivity in 
their work, an interdisciplinary interrogation which moves beyond the 
deconstructive theoretical frameworks of postmodernism towards a new ‘after 
postmodernism’ moment.  
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Chapter three: Structures of subjectivity – self-other dialectics 
 
Introduction 
 The previous chapter considered the relationship of Hustvedt and Auster’s 
narratives to the postmodern paradigm, with particular reference to Hustvedt and 
Auster’s apprehension and critique of poststructuralist theory. I looked at 
Hustvedt and Auster’s responses to Barthes, Foucault and Derrida’s critiques of 
the textual and cultural constitution of the subject: how language, history and 
knowledge-power structures shape individual consciousness. There I also 
mentioned what Steinrager identified as the syncretic nature of Jacques Lacan’s 
theory: how the psychoanalyst’s re-reading of Sigmund Freud’s work is critical to 
understanding the poststructuralist – ergo literary postmodernist – preoccupation 
with the fragmentary nature of identity and the instability of the self. To 
understand the unconscious and social structuring of selfhood, an appraisal of 
Lacan’s influence on their writing is useful. This chapter will therefore delve 
deeper into Lacan’s conception of the ‘mirror stage’, which has informed a 
number of early critical interpretations of Auster’s novels, in particular The New 
York Trilogy.  
 In an early interview, Auster reflects upon the effect of Lacanian 
linguistics on self-other dialectics: 
Everything we are comes from the fact that we have been made by others. 
I’m not just referring to biology – mother, father, uterine birth, and so on. 
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I’m thinking about psychology and the formation of the human 
personality. The infant feeding at his mother’s breast looks up into the 
mother’s eyes and sees her looking at him, and from that experience of 
being seen, the baby begins to learn that he is separate from his mother, 
that he is a person in his own right. We literally acquire a self from this 
process. Lacan calls it the ‘mirror stage’…we can only see ourselves 
because someone else has seen us first.1 
Auster’s interpretative description of the mirror stage, which Scott A. Dimovitz 
believes misreads Lacan’s concept,2 is drawn from Hustvedt’s own personal 
interest in psychoanalysis, an interest which pre-exists their relationship:  
I have repeatedly been informed by all and sundry about Paul’s expertise 
on the work of Jacques Lacan. Paul has read exactly one work by Lacan, 
‘The Purloined Letter’, which he came across sometime in the late Sixties. 
That was it. I, on the other hand, have had an abiding interest in 
psychoanalysis since I was in high school and worked hard at 
understanding Lacan, who is often difficult and maddening, and for whom 
I have respect but also profound disagreements, and yet, I know well that 
whatever Paul knows about Lacan has come via his wife.3  
                                                          
1 Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected Prose, p. 560.  
2 ‘The repeated ontological motif of identity as a function of the other’s gaze arises from Auster’s Sartrean 
misreading of Lacan […] Auster’s misreading (deliberate or otherwise) problematizes all of the imagery 
arising in the texts’ (Dimovitz, p.  624). 
3 Siri Hustvedt, ‘Interview with Tyler Malone’, Full Stop. 
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While this does not undermine the veracity of pre-existing readings of Auster’s 
work through the prism of Lacanian theory, it strongly indicates his adoption and 
adaptation of Hustvedt’s philosophical interests, something which has, to date, 
been overlooked or ignored. Nevertheless, it does suggest that Auster’s cognition 
of Lacanian psychoanalysis has been overstated by the critical community. 
 More apposite is how Hustvedt and Auster interpret the Hegelian drama of 
self and other through the framework of Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogism.4 
Marks in particular traces Hustvedt’s investigation of self-other dialectics back to 
the master-slave dichotomy outlined in Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit 
(1807), with the Other posited as the ‘formative and necessary element of identity 
formation’.5 Buber, like Hegel before him, focuses on the dialogical interaction 
between consciousnesses; unlike Hegel, according to Marks, Buber’s philosophy 
is more explicitly oriented around encounters of ‘mutual completion’ than the 
relation of domination commonly applied to Hegel’s dialectic.6 In I and Thou 
(1923), Buber formulates a philosophy of dialogue possessed of positive and 
negative registers which overlap with the linguistics of Lacan and the discourse of 
Russian formalist Mikhail Bakhtin. Buber’s philosophy circulates around two 
positions: I-Thou, where two subjectivities meet under the conditions of 
reciprocity and mutuality; or the I-It position, where the encounter is determined 
                                                          
4 Marks, p. 22. In a personal interview with Marks conducted on 9 December 2005, Hustvedt also confirmed 
her dedication to Hegel’s philosophy: ‘You can go back to the Greeks and talk about dialogue, but I think the 
modern foundation of this for me is Hegel and self-consciousness.’ 
5 Marks, p. 22. 
6 Marks, p. 17. 
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by concealment, objectification or control.7 While Auster has since disavowed 
any direct exposure to Lacan’s ideas, he has professed an admiration for Buber, 
stating in a 2001 interview ‘I read Buber constantly’.8 Similarly, in The Shaking 
Woman, Hustvedt expands Buber’s observation that ‘You has no borders’:9 
‘I’ exists only in relation to ‘you’. Language takes place between people, 
and it is acquired through others, even though we have the biological 
equipment necessary to learn it. If you lock a child in a closet, he will not 
learn to speak. Language is outside us and inside us, part of a complex 
dialectical reality between people. Words cross the borders of our bodies 
in two directions, outside in and inside out, and therefore the minimal 
requirement for a living language is two people.10 (Shaking 55) 
                                                          
7 Marks, p. 33. 
8 Paul Auster, ‘Personal interview 2001’ (qtd in Andreas Hau, The Implosion of Negativity: The Poetry and 
Early Prose of Paul Auster [Norderstedt: Books on Demand and GmbH, 2010], p. 63). Hau connects Auster’s 
poem ‘Unearth’ to Buber’s theory of mutuality, proposing that Auster seeks to establish an ‘I-Thou relation 
between humans’ (Hau, p. 70). Auster says of his poem ‘it’s about establishing an other…it works out of the 
imprisonment; the enclosure is a kind of solitary confinement. And this poetic voice, whatever it is trying to 
achieve, is looking for an other to address. And a very important influence on me in that was Martin Buber, I 
and Thou’ (Hau, p. 63). Elsewhere Lily Corwin persuasively applies Buber’s model of mutuality to ‘The 
Book of Memory’. See Lily Corwin, ‘Is That All There Is?: Martin Buber, Sufficiency, and Paul Auster’s 
‘The Book of Memory’, Studies in American Jewish Literature (30, 2011), 68-79. 
9 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Scribners, 1970), p. 55 (qtd in Marks, p. 
31).  
10 Hustvedt’s comment about ‘locking a child in a closet’ recalls to Auster’s invention of the curious case of 
Peter Stillman Jnr, whose decentred enunciations were addressed in the previous chapter. 
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Buber and Bakhtin identify this dialectical relation between self and other as ‘the 
smallest unit of life – identity without relation and dialogue is basically 
impossible’.11 According to Sue Vice, ‘Bakhtin detects an ‘other’ in language, 
Lacan in the psyche…Bakhtin’s other is social, Lacan’s is psychological’.12 For 
Bakhtin, language is a ‘concrete living totality’ and not ‘the specific object of 
linguistics’.13 Buberian otherness, as a philosophy of interhuman interaction, 
appears to offer a hybrid of these two positions. Language, according to Marks, is 
positioned by Hustvedt on the ‘threshold of self and other relations’,14 with the 
Buberian between offering a space ‘where the limits of subjectivity are 
dismantled’.15  
 The ‘both/and’ poetics of postmodern literary production detailed by 
Hutcheon, and the both/neither aesthetics of metamodernism, envelop 
poststructuralism’s differential modelling alongside Buberian betweenness and the 
social aspects of Bakhtin’s dialogic heteroglossia.16 According to Galin Tihanov, 
for example, Bakhtin’s theories were first incorporated within the postmodern 
                                                          
11 Marks, p. 18. 
12 Sue Vice, Introducing Bakhtin (Manchester; Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 4. 
13 Mikhail Bakhtin, ‘Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics’, p. 181 (qtd in Vice, p.55).  
14 Marks, p. 10. As Marks’ extensive work on Hustvedt denotes, these questions have implications for the 
phenomenological grounding of intersubjectivity, something I will look to develop further in Chapter three. 
15 Marks, p. 34. 
16 ‘What postmodern aesthetic practice shares with much contemporary theory (psychoanalytic, linguistic, 
analytic philosophical, hermeneutic, poststructuralist, historiographical, discourse analytic, semiotic) is an 
interest in interpretative strategies and in the situating of verbal utterances in social action’ (Hutcheon, A 
Poetics of Postmodernism, p. 53). 
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theoretical camp through critical interpretations by Julia Kristeva, and thereafter 
critiqued by Paul de Man.17 McHale argues that postmodern fiction draws on 
Bakhtin’s ideas by ‘heightening the polyphonic structure and sharpening the 
dialogue’, thereby elevating ‘the ontological dimension among discourses’.18 
Auster has offered the following comment on Bakhtin: ‘Of all the theories of the 
novel, Bakhtin’s strikes me as the most brilliant, the one that comes closest to 
understanding the complexity and the magic of the form’;19 however, Auster has 
also admitted to not reading Bakhtin beyond the translator’s note.20 By contrast, 
the first written evidence of Hustvedt’s interest in Bakhtin can be traced back to 
Hustvedt’s PhD dissertation on Charles Dickens’ Our Mutual Friend.21 It was 
Hustvedt who introduced Auster to Bakhtin’s ideas, and consequently we may 
surmise that Auster’s admiration for Bakhtin stems chiefly from Hustvedt’s 
influence.  
                                                          
17 Galin Tihanov, ‘Mikhail Bakhtin’ in Postmodernism: The Key Figures, ed. by Bertens and Natoli, pp. 25-
31 (pp. 26-27). 
18 McHale, p. 166. Vice appears to counter this proposition with the observation that dialogism is the 
‘‘characteristic epistemological mode’ of our mode, in an especially concentrated form within a literary text 
and the reader’s understanding of it’ (Vice, p. 49). Of course, McHale may well respond that the 
epistemological concentration is contingent upon the ontologically dominated culture of our postmodern 
epoch.   
19 Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’, in Collected Prose, p. 552. 
20 See Appendix. 
21 ‘She names Jacques Lacan’s concept of the mirror stage and M. M. Bakhtin’s The Dialogical Imagination 
as two of the major influences in her interpretation of Dickens—both thinkers have continued to influence 
Hustvedt in her later writings’ (Marks, p. 5). Hustvedt also cites Bakhtin as a major influence in the Full Stop 
interview of 25 October 2012.  
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 This third chapter will develop the notion of Auster and Hustvedt’s literary 
marriage reflecting the embodiment and representation of the discursive 
relationship between self and other through the interplay of intersubjective 
positions. This representation finds its basis partially in the poststructuralist 
theories explored in Chapter two, partially in the tension between the 
philosophical positions of Buber/Bakhtin and Lacan, and finally by being 
underpinned by the ‘real world’ experience of the authors as married writers. The 
chapter will open with a brief description of the principal foundations of social 
and psychological otherness, situating their work against that of the wider 
poststructuralist canon. Subsequently, I will look at two early novels – Auster’s 
Moon Palace (1990) and Hustvedt’s The Enchantment of Lily Dahl (1993) – to 
examine the ways in which both novelists cleave a limited apprehension of these 
ideas through their fiction. As highlighted above, Hustvedt takes a different 
critical approach to Auster, but both writers seek to move beyond the confines of 
the postmodern paradigm. It is possible to speculate that this discursiveness finds 
its symbiotic basis in the actuality of being married writers who share the same 
existential, theoretical and ethical impulses, if not a commitment to a precisely-
matching aesthetic mode of production. 
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Dialogue and mutuality  
 Marks proposes that Buber and Bakhtin ‘share a positive approach to the 
presence of the other, both addressing possibilities of complementation and 
reconfirmation’.22 In I and Thou, Buber’s conception of selfhood is predicated 
upon a dialogical relation with the world. Under the positivistic I-Thou position, 
this ‘unmediated’ relation takes place in a zone of ‘hybrid spatiality’, where two 
subjects engage dialogically with a tacit, unspoken affirmation of respective 
otherness.23 For Buber, ‘nothing conceptual intervenes between I and You, no 
prior knowledge and no imagination, and memory itself is changed as it plunges 
from particularity to wholeness’.24 Buber’s co-existent and intersubjective 
framework rests upon the sharing of utterances between subject and subject, 
‘where meaning is to be found neither in one of the partners, nor in both together; 
but only in the dialogue itself, in this ‘between’ where they live together.25 
 Buber’s model of mutual contribution informs Bakhtin’s distinctive 
approach to dialogism, which treats dialogue as ‘both a universal property of 
language and a specific property to be found only in certain instances of 
                                                          
22 Marks, p. 23. 
23 Marks, p. 33. 
24 Buber, I and Thou, p. 62. 
25 Martin Buber, The Knowledge of Man: A Philosophy of the Interhuman, trans. by Maurice Friedman and 
Ronald Gregor Smith, ed. by Maurice Friedman (London: Allen & Unwin, 1965), p. 75 (qtd in Marks, p. 31). 
The dialogue between the young Hustvedt and her father described in her essay ‘Yonder’, addressed in the 
Chapter one of this thesis, perfectly outlines Buber’s ideality. It similarly aligns itself with Voegelin’s 
position. 
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language’.26 Bakhtin’s concept refers to the ‘ceaselessly shifting power-relations 
between words, their sensitivity to each other, and the relativizing force of their 
historically motivated clashes and temporary resolutions’.27 It is, in one regard, 
the means through which heteroglossia – the ‘differentiated speech’, or 
multiplicity of voices, of social life – enters literary texts.28 Bakhtin identifies 
dialogism as the organising principle of heteroglossia, engendering polyphonic 
texts relativized through the chronotope: the layers of history, memory and 
narrative chronology embedded in a literary text.29 Supporting Vice, Lodge 
describes Bakhtin’s language system as a ‘linguistics of parole’,30 foregrounding 
the ‘ideologically saturated’ language of culture against the unitary, arbitrary and 
differential signifying structure erected by Saussure and thereafter critiqued by 
poststructuralism. In Bakhtin’s cultural theory, the Saussurean formula of signifier 
over signified is compressed into a singular system of signification which stresses 
the socio-ideological awareness of language:31 
The words we use come to us already imprinted with the meanings, 
intentions and accents of previous users, and every utterance we make is 
directed towards some real or hypothetical other.32  
                                                          
26 Vice, p. 5. 
27 Vice, p. 5. 
28 Vice, p. 5.  
29 Vice, p 45. In the chronotope we see the grounding for Kristeva’s model of intertextuality discussed in 
Chapter one.  
30 Lodge, p. 21. 
31 Vice, p. 11. 
32 Lodge, p.21. 
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 Vice perceives an ambiguity in Bakhtinian dialogism, where its 
appreciation of ‘popular instances of language, perceptible in novels and popular 
speech’ shrouds its establishment of ‘a defining quality of language itself, and in 
its most fundamental sense-making capacities’.33 Like Vice, Hirschkop identifies 
the complex and contradictory nature of Bakhtin’s theories, which describe 
culture as ‘an activity with political and moral ends and objectives’.34 This is 
because dialogism materialises only at ‘very specific textual moments, when 
linguistic structures – syntactical, lexical, or generic – appear as the expression of 
particular, delimited ‘points of view’’:35  
When heteroglossia enters the novel it becomes subject to an artistic 
reawakening. The social and historical voices populating language, in all 
its words and forms […] are organised into a structured stylistic system 
that expresses the differentiated socio-ideological position of the author 
amid the heteroglossia of his epoch.36  
Moreover, while Bakhtin’s dialogism may imply an ethically-charged democratic 
exchange within and between heterogeneous cultures, it remains subject to the 
rules which oversee the hierarchical structures of those cultures: 
                                                          
33 Vice, p. 45. 
34 Ken Hirschkop, ‘Introduction: Bakhtin and Cultural Theory’ in Bakhtin and Cultural Theory, ed. by Ken 
Hirschkop and David Shepherd (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), pp. 1-38 (p. 5). 
35 Hirschkop, ‘Introduction’ in Bakhtin and Cultural Theory, ed. by Hirschkop and Shepherd, p. 5. 
36 Mikhail Bakhtin, ‘Discourse in the Novel’ in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, trans. by Caryl 
Emerson and Michael Holquist, ed. by Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 300. 
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The living utterance, having taken on meaning and shape at a particular 
historical moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush 
up against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-
ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance; it 
cannot fail to become an active participant in social dialogue.37 
Bakhtin’s theory ‘of language in use’ is embedded in the concrete condition of 
structured, conscious social discourse, delimited by a cascade of specific cultural-
historical contexts.38 While Bice Benvenuto and Roger Kennedy’s assessment that 
‘the [Lacanian] subject is a slave to the authority of language [langue] rather than 
to society’ points to Lacan’s antithetical positioning against the many-voicedness 
of Bakhtinian theory, it also isolates and elevates one possible moment of 
reconciliation between the two theorists.39 Writing on Bakhtin, McHale describes 
the Formalist’s reality as ‘first and foremost linguistic and discursive… 
experienced in and through discourse’.40 Hirschkop also records:  
The concrete meaning of an utterance, intonation and all, is said to depend 
on a context which is first of all composed of an immediate speaker and an 
                                                          
37 Bakhtin, ‘Discourse in the Novel’ in The Dialogic Imagination, p. 276. 
38 In this sense, it is possible to argue that it anticipates an ideological and rhetorical enfolding of 
poststructuralist thought, particularly Foucault’s knowledge-power structures, Derridean différance, Kristeva 
and Barthes’ approaches to intertextuality and Lacan’s model of the structured unconscious. 
39 Benvenuto and Kennedy, p. 109. 
40 McHale, p. 165. 
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immediate listener; dialogue in a rather everyday sense is offered as a 
paradigm for all discourse.41  
Bakhtinian aesthetics, under Hirschkop’s reading, is less a mode of experience 
than a form of activity and therefore more concerned ‘with the production and 
reproduction of literary works’, something supported by Bakhtin’s own 
description of literary production, which insists upon a dialogic accord between 
self and other:42  
For the prose artist the world is full of other people’s words, among which 
he must orient himself and whose speech characteristics he must be able to 
perceive with a very keen ear. He must introduce them into the plane of his 
own discourse, but in such a way that this plane is not destroyed.43 
By writing a novel, Bakhtin argues, the author ‘speaks not about a character, but 
with him’,44 participating in the dialogue ‘without retaining for himself the final 
word’.45 Like Lacan, Bakhtin identifies a double-voicedness in discourse which 
gestures towards the utterances of the other alongside and within those of the 
subject – what Vice describes as ‘the presence of two distinct voices in one 
utterance…the mixing of intentions of speaker and listener, and the constant need 
                                                          
41 Hirschkop, ‘Introduction’ in Bakhtin and Cultural Theory, ed. by Hirschkop and Shepherd, p. 15. 
42 Hirschkop, ‘Introduction’ in Bakhtin and Cultural Theory, ed. by Hirschkop and Shepherd, p. 10. 
43 Bakhtin, ‘Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics’, pp. 200-01 (qtd in Lodge, p. 91). Bakhtin’s balanced 
approach to the canon seems to align more closely with Hustvedt and Auster’s response to the anxiety of 
influence paradigm than the master-slave dichotomies of Eliot and Bloom. 
44 Bakhtin, ‘Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics’, p. 63 (qtd in Vice, p. 56). 
45 Bakhtin, ‘Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics’, p. 72 (qtd in Vice, p. 113). 
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for utterances to position themselves in relation to one another’;46 and yet, unlike 
Lacan – and Foucault, to whom Bakhtin’s theories have been compared by Allon 
White – 47 subject and other are not engaged in a zero-sum signifying game which 
divests each of their identity, but are instead engaged in a culturally and 
linguistically structured exchange of imaginary discursiveness. Otherness, under 
the Lacanian conception, continues to suggest an (absent) unitary form and an 
(absent) unitary structure of linguistics. By contrast, Bakhtinian otherness is a 
celebration of otherness in all its forms, critically prefiguring Lacan’s mirror 
stage:  
Languages of heteroglossia, like mirrors that face each other, each 
reflecting in its own way a piece, a tiny corner of the world, force us to 
guess at and grasp for a world behind their mutually reflecting aspects that 
is broader, more multi-levelled, containing more and varied horizons than 
would be available for a single language or a single mirror.48 
Bakhtin favours a heteroglot language which stimulates mobile, multiple and 
mutual selfhood as the cornerstones of identity.  
 This is a position shared not only with Buber, but with additionally 
Hustvedt and Auster, as their polysemantic approach to narrativizing selfhood 
                                                          
46 Vice, p. 45. 
47 ‘Heteroglossia implies dialogic interaction in which the prestige languages try to extend their control and 
subordinated languages try to avoid, negotiate, or subvert that control.’ Allon White, ‘Bakhtin, 
Sociolinguistics, Deconstruction’ in Carnival, Hysteria and Writing: Collected Essays and an Autobiography 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 137.  
48 Bakhtin, ‘Discourse in the Novel’ in The Dialogic Imagination, p. 414. 
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highlights. Similarly, the authorial autonomy of Hustvedt and Auster, which 
Chapters one and two attempt to isolate, dovetail in part with Bakhtin’s theories of 
the novel. Ann Jefferson’s reading of Bakhtin’s essay ‘Author and Hero in 
Aesthetic Activity’ (1920-24) leads her to conclude that ‘Bakhtin sees life largely 
in terms of the literary metaphors of ‘author’ and ‘hero’’, with self-other relations 
defined by the subject’s visualisation of himself as an object (or ‘hero’) and the 
other cast as ‘author’. Vice concurs, suggesting that Bakhtin views the author ‘as 
the centre of intention and achievement behind even the freeing up of characters’ 
voices’.49 Lodge believes Bakhtin’s theory has restored the imaginative autonomy 
of writers, by reaffirming ‘the writer’s creative and communicative power’ against 
Saussurean structuralism’s quest for a unified structure of linguistics and the 
destabilising, decentered anti-subjectivity of poststructuralist thought:50 
Instead of trying desperately to defend the notion that individual 
utterances, or texts, have a fixed, original meaning which it is the business 
of criticism to discover, we can locate meaning in the dialogic process of 
                                                          
49 Vice, p. 126. 
50 David Lodge, After Bakhtin – Essays on Fiction and Criticism (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 7. As both 
novelist and critic, Lodge’s appraisal of the appeal of Bakhtin’s theory to writers of fiction is supported by a 
useful critique of postmodernism: ‘Novelists are and always have been split between, on the one hand, a 
desire to claim an imaginative and representative truth for their stories, and on the other a wish to guarantee 
and defend that truth-claim by reference to empirical facts: a contradiction they seek to disguise by elaborate 
mystifications and metafictional plays such as framing narratives, parody and other kinds of intertextuality 
and self-reflexivity’ (Lodge, p. 18). 
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interaction between speaking subjects, between texts and readers, between 
texts themselves.51 
Contra Barthes, the role of speaker and listener (ergo writer and reader) is 
reoriented around an ongoing process of ‘dialogic friction’ where communication 
and interpretation sustain the discursive equilibrium and generate meaning.52 
Lodge describes Barthes’ ideas as being ‘very similar to that of Bakhtin and 
antithetical to him’: 
Barthes says: because the author does not coincide with the language of 
the text, he does not exist. Bakhtin says: it is precisely because he does not 
so coincide that we must posit his existence.53 
Under Lodge’s argument, the Lacanian ‘lack’ within the existential identity of the 
decentered subject is applied to authorship in more positivist terms, with the 
presence of the author assured by his very absence. This counters Jefferson’s 
conception of a unidirectional flow of influence (from Author to Hero), where the 
superiority and supremacy of otherness points to an erroneous proximity between 
Bakhtin and Lacan’s ideas. In the novel, meaning is derived from dialogic 
interplay, not from the identification of authorial intention or the satisfaction of 
the reader’s response. This chapter will further show how Auster and Hustvedt 
utilise Bakhtinian dialogism in combination with poststructuralist theory (in 
                                                          
51 Lodge, p. 86. 
52 Vice, p. 49. 
53 Lodge, p. 99.  
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particular Barthesian intertextuality and Lacanian self-identification) to facilitate a 
discursive exchange within their narratives and between their texts.   
Otherness and objectification 
 Auster and Hustvedt’s critical engagement with Buber and Bakhtin’s 
theories of dialogism is counterpointed by an apparent interest in the 
psychoanalytic approach of Lacan, with Hustvedt’s interest stronger and more 
long-standing than that of Auster. Lacan and Buber’s modelling of self-other 
relations are possessed of a degree of theoretical equivalence. Like Lacan, the 
negative aspect of Buber’s philosophy, which he refers to as I-It, considers the 
separation between subjectivities. Under the I-It condition, Buber’s I-Thou model 
of reciprocal mutuality gives way to a tendency towards objectification or 
alienation in self-other relations. The self no longer participates within the world 
but experiences it; the individual constructs a protective psychological barrier to 
guard itself against the objectifying gaze of the other.54 For Buber, positive self-
other reciprocity is transitory and exists in a position of permanent flux, but 
equilibrium between two consciousnesses remains achievable through the process 
of movement from an I-It position to I-Thou: 
Consider man with man, and you see human life, dynamic, twofold, the 
giver and the receiver, he who does and he who ensures, the attacking 
force and the defending force, the nature which investigates and the nature 
which supplies information, the request begged and granted – and always 
                                                          
54 Marks, p. 35. 
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both together, completing one another in mutual contribution, showing 
forth man.55  
Lacan presents a more pessimistic picture of selfhood, focusing on the 
unconscious alongside the linguistic structures governing subjectivity to propose 
that the subject is continually denied a reconciliation of its identity with that of the 
other. According to Lacan, ‘the recognition of desire is bound up with the desire 
for recognition’,56 a predicament elucidated by Steintrager:  
Lacan’s subject thus comes into being as the subject of language – 
subjected to language – and then only as a split subject – finding the 
direction of its desire only in language and yet separated even further from 
language by the original and now repressed quest for unity.57 
Otherness is inscribed on the subject’s identity from birth; post-infancy, our 
fleeting imagined unity rapidly cedes to a pre-existing linguistic structure, the 
Symbolic order, which governs nature, society and culture: ‘language and its 
structure exist prior to the moment at which each subject at a certain point in his 
mental development makes his entry into it’.58 Our desire to return to what Lacan 
terms ‘the Real’ is thwarted by this ‘extrinsic and alien’ system of signification 
which underpins the Symbolic (defined by difference, disjunction and 
                                                          
55 Martin Buber, Between Man and Man. trans. by. Ronald Gregor Smith. (London: Kegan Paul, 1947), p. 
205 (qtd in Marks, p. 32). 
56 Lacan, p. 172. 
57 Steintrager, p. 214. 
58 Lacan, p. 148. 
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displacement), and subsumes and subverts the Imaginary (defined by identity, 
resemblance, and unification).59  
 Lacan’s conception of otherness as determined by the Real is defined in 
his 1960 essay, ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the 
Freudian Unconscious’.60 The Real constitutes what Benvenuto and Kennedy 
aptly term the ‘domain of the inexpressible’.61 Contra Buber and Bakhtin’s 
philosophies of dialogism, Lacan’s subject is unable to truly speak, for 
enunciation, identification and self-determination rest within this domain of 
otherness. In the Real, the mother figure is the absolute embodiment of the 
unattainable and unknowable Other-space which prefigures birth and 
signification: the space, according to Benvenuto and Kennedy, ‘where the subject 
is born, not only as a biological entity, but as a subject with a human existence’.62 
Lacanian psychoanalysis attempts to negotiate a rapprochement with the Real by 
slipping between a given subject and its subjective knowledge in those instances 
when its behaviour unconsciously channels the Real through confused thought 
and expression. These blips, glitches or slips in signification constitute ‘La 
Linguisterie’: moments of ‘méconnaissance’ (misunderstanding, or 
misrecognition) when the subject unknowingly speaks using the words of the 
                                                          
59 Malcom Bowie, ‘Jacques Lacan’ in Structuralism and Since, ed. by Sturrock, pp. 116-53 (p. 133).  
60 Lacan’s application of Saussurean linguistics to remodel Freudian psychoanalysis radically reshaped how 
the unconscious was perceived, while creating a unique branch of poststructuralist thought which carried 
significant implications for linguistics. The flexible quality of Freudian psychoanalytic theory, and the 
alternative interpretations of Freud’s work, will come under further consideration in Chapter five.  
61 Benvenuto and Kennedy, p. 166. 
62 Benvenuto and Kennedy, p. 174. 
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absolute Other. Lacan’s own writing, filled with ‘puns, jokes, metaphors, ironies 
and contradictions’, aspires towards the automatism of the unconscious:63 
The contents of the unconscious with all their disappointing ambiguities 
give us no reality in the subject more consistent than the immediate; their 
virtue derives from the truth and in the dimension of being.64  
‘The unconscious’ Lacan summarises, ‘is the discourse of the Other’.65 Discourse 
is conducted through the ‘inter-said’ (inter-dit) and ‘intra-said’ (intra-dit) between 
subjects: ‘what comes out between the words…in speech, or between the lines, in 
the connections between words’.66 While Lacan believes that this inter-subjective 
zone constitutes ‘the very space in which the transparency of the classical subject 
is divided and passes through the effects of ‘fading’’, the discursive possibilities 
of this gap stimulate this poststructuralist thinking.67 Much like Derrida’s notion 
of ‘différance’, it is this irretrievable and indefinable separation which points to 
the origin of subjectivity.  
 Reinforcing Foucault’s identification of the anti-positivist relationship 
between subject and knowledge, Lacan’s subject is created by a desire which 
remains unknown to him. Knowledge lies neither within nor without the subject, 
nor within the objects of the biological world. Human beings are separated from 
the biological world as speaking subjects. Self-other relations are determined by a 
                                                          
63 Benvenuto and Kennedy, p. 12. 
64 Lacan, p. 166. 
65 Lacan, p. 16. 
66 Benvenuto and Kennedy, p. 13. 
67 Lacan, p. 299. 
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‘signifying game’ between the ‘refusal of the signifier and a lack of being’.68 This 
signifying game is fruitlessly pyrrhic: the subject comes to recognise its own lack 
in the lack of the Other. Consequently, the subject’s moment of self-recognition as 
being a ‘lacking object’ inculcates further objectification, alienation, narcissism 
and aggression: 
The Other cannot be fulfilling and will never exhaust the subject’s appeal 
for being. The Other, who is supposedly giving the subject everything, is 
deceiving him, and this produces anguish in him.69 
Both subject and Other are absented from this empty centre – or centre without 
concreteness – resulting in the creation of what Lacan terms, ‘the barred Other’: 
the oppositional entity rejected by the subject as a ‘lacking object’.70 
Consequently, the absent body of the Other comes to represent nothing more than 
the body of a lost object, and language exists solely as the margin beyond life 
where the individual is ‘only represented’ in the most limited sense:71  
Desire takes shape in the margin in which demand is torn apart from need: 
this margin being that which is opened up by demand, the appeal of which 
can be unconditional only in regard to the other, under the form of a 
                                                          
68 Lacan, p. 166. 
69 Benvenuto and Kennedy, p. 175. 
70 Benvenuto and Kennedy, p. 176. 
71 Benvenuto and Kennedy, p. 171. 
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possible defect, which need may introduce to it, of having no universal 
satisfaction.72  
Fundamental to Lacan’s notion of the ‘lacking’ subject is the concept of the 
‘mirror stage’. This refers to an ‘identification’ by the subject in infancy of an 
assumed ‘image’ of unitary, embodied selfhood in the reflection of a mirror; a 
total form (‘Gestalt’) or ‘exteriority’ which ‘symbolizes the mental permanence of 
the I, at the same time as it prefigures its alienation’:73 
This form situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in 
a fictional direction, which will always remain irreducible for the 
individual alone, or rather, which will only re-join the coming into being 
(le devenir) of the subject asymptomatically, whatever the success of the 
dialectical synthesis with his own reality.74 
This imagined ideal ego, according to Malcom Bowie, constitutes a ‘surrogacy’, 
or otherness, for the ‘lack (manqué), absence and incompleteness in human 
living’:75 what Lacan records as the psychological reconstruction of a ‘fragmented 
body-image…to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity’.76 The 
subject, in other words, can only recognise their own identity as an object, or 
                                                          
72 Jacques Lacan, Écrits (Paris: Editions Du Seuil), p. 311 (qtd in Benvenuto and Kennedy, p. 174). 
73 Jacques Lacan, Écrits (London; Tavistock Publications, 1971), p. 2. 
74 Lacan, p. 2. There is an interesting distinction here between the unconscious structures of selfhood outlined 
by Lacan, and the core and extended consciousness of Damasio’s autobiographical self. 
75 Bowie, ‘Jacques Lacan’ in Structuralism and Since, ed. by Sturrock, p. 122. 
76 Lacan, p. 2. 
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projection, not only to the other, but to themselves.77 As Marks succinctly asserts, 
‘in its focus on the child’s wish to fill the hole of perception gaping in its own 
visual field, Lacan’s theory stresses intersubjective identification as the motor of 
the imaginary register’.78 Moreover, from birth the subject’s existence is bound up 
and implicated in the reaffirmation of a signifying structure (Symbolic order) 
which positions objectification, alienation, narcissism and aggression as the 
psychological cornerstones of self-identification. Escaping the mirror stage 
prompts what Paul Jahshan paraphrases as a ‘mis en abyme’ of spatial 
significations,79 which can only be closed when the subject comes to identify with 
the other in the form of a ‘dialectic that will henceforth link the I to socially 
elaborated situations’.80  
 Auster and Hustvedt’s appropriation of Lacanian poststructuralism can be 
perceived in their discursive approach to their narrativisation of negative, or 
intrusively objectifying, self-other relations. Auster’s pronouncements on the 
mirror stage theory, coupled with Hustvedt’s interest in other philosophical 
approaches and disciplines, highlight that Lacanian poststructuralism constitutes 
but a minor element of Hustvedt and Auster’s respective aesthetic mode of 
production. The collapsing narratives of The New York Trilogy and the lacking 
                                                          
77 Lacan, p. 3. 
78 Marks, p. 62. In Hustvedt’s novel What I Loved, Leo Hertzberg similarly identifies selfhood as a ‘hole in 
perception’ (see Chapter four). 
79 ‘The mirrors facing each other can only produce a mise en abyme, a virtual kaleidescoping of signification, 
where no substantial signified can be pinpointed’ (Paul Jahshan, ‘Paul Auster’s Spectres’, Journal of 
American Studies [37: 3, 2003], 389-405 [p. 400]).  
80 Lacan, p. 5.  
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objects of The Blindfold (as discussed in the last chapter) are indebted to Lacanian 
theory. As we shall see, other novels seek to explore the ‘tension between 
mutuality and objectification’ embodied by the different theoretical approaches of 
Buber, Bakhtin and Lacan.81   
  
                                                          
81 Marks, p. 35. 
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Narrativising self and other  
 Hustvedt and Auster’s early novels appear to pursue the discursive 
relationship between self and other through their deployment of Buberian, 
Bakhtinian and Lacanian approaches to discourse. Dimovitz delineates the de-
compositional ontology of Auster’s The New York Trilogy, observing that ‘three 
major ontological dimensions operate, each of which is offered as the origin of the 
others at one point of another: consciousness, subjectivity for itself, and 
subjectivity for others. Auster constantly works the boundaries between these 
aspects’.82 As discussed above, Marks traces Hustvedt’s investigation of self-other 
dialectics back to Hegel’s identification of self-consciousness.83 This part of the 
chapter will seek to identify moments of apparent engagement with Bakhtin and 
Lacan’s ideas in Auster’s Moon Palace (1989) and Hustvedt’s The Enchantment 
of Lily Dahl (1993). In so doing, I hope to show how the oscillation between 
social and psychical otherness operates as a structuring framework to plot, 
characterisation and dialogue within their narratives. This critical approach will 
reveal the ways in which both writers have moved their fiction beyond the 
confines of the postmodern paradigm towards a new discursive mode, and will 
anticipate the next chapter on phenomenology and intersubjectivity (see Chapter 
four). I will contend that these representations gesture towards a co-productive 
approach to their fiction which draws upon mutual recognition, emotional 
                                                          
82 Dimovitz, p. 626. 
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192 
 
dependence and critical receptivity to poststructuralism and dialogism, alongside 
other theoretical paradigms. 
 
1. Objectification and affirmation 
 Marks believes that ‘defiance of the Cartesian self lies at the centre of 
Hustvedt’s writing project, as she consistently discloses the self’s relatedness to 
the world and others’.84 This ‘negotiation of relational identity and the boundaries 
of the self’ Marks illustrates is equally evident in Auster’s early fiction.85 The 
narrative of Moon Palace (1989), Auster’s third novel, demonstrates his critical 
interpretation of the problematic self and other dialectic. A deconstruction of the 
bildungsroman set in the late 1960s, Auster’s novel loosely centres on the early 
life of Marco Stanley Fogg, a ‘bookish man, an intellectual’, an orphan, and a 
socially isolated subject whose quest for self-knowledge ironically recalls Charles 
Dickens’ novels Oliver Twist and Great Expectations.86 The narrative offers an 
extended meditation on ‘the follies of adolescence’, memory and melancholia: in 
an interview of 1989, Auster explains that Fogg is ‘telling the story of youth from 
the distance of middle age’; a first person narrative initially, the novel, according 
to Auster, ‘veers off into the third person. There are long passages in that book 
                                                          
84 Marks, p. 6. 
85 Marks, p. 6. 
86 Paul Auster, Moon Palace (London: Faber, 1989), p. 282. Hereafter referred to as Palace with page 
numbers cited in the text. Moon Palace also includes references to Bleak House and Our Mutual Friend. 
Auster returns to the psychic territory of this period for the novel 4321.  
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where Fogg literally disappears’.87 As it unfolds, Auster’s narrative engages in a 
dialogical exploration of the Lacanian unconscious in relation to Buberian and 
Bakhtinian dialogism, with the travails of the Fogg persona metonymically 
representing the subject in search of the other.88   
 Evidence of these theories take their metaphorical cue from Fogg’s orphan 
status and precarious existence, which, much like Dickens’ hero Pip, propel him 
into a series of encounters which trigger the process of self-recognition. Fogg’s 
point of origin is questionable: his mother – before her violent death in an 
automobile accident – tells him his father is dead, and is prone to dissociative 
bouts of melancholia:  
She was capable of telling jokes that sent me into fits of raucous 
giggling…More often than not she was dreamy, given to mild sulks, and 
there were times when I felt a true sadness from her, a sense that she was 
battling against some vast and internal disarray. (Palace 4)  
Her death, and the enduring absence – described as a ‘blank’, or lack – of his 
father catalyses Fogg’s search for self-recognition in the eyes of the Other. Fogg’s 
very name further gestures to a sense of psychic confinement within the Symbolic 
order: the metonymic quality of the word ‘fog’ implies insubstantiality and 
indefinability, an identity shrouded and imperceptible. Fogg’s Uncle Victor 
concocts an ‘elaborate, nonsensical’ theory about his nephew’s name: 
                                                          
87 Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected Prose, pp. 565-66. 
88 Bowie, ‘Jacques Lacan’ in Structuralism and Since, ed. by Sturrock, p. 143. 
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Marco naturally enough was for Marco Polo, the first European to visit 
China; Stanley was for the American journalist who had tracked down Dr 
Livingstone ‘in the heart of darkest Africa’; and Fogg was for Phileas, the 
man who had stormed around the globe in less than three months. It didn’t 
matter that my mother had chosen Marco simply because she liked it, or 
that Stanley had been my grandfather’s name, or that Fogg was a 
misnomer, the whim of some half-literate American functionary [as a 
substitution for ‘Fogelman’]. (Palace 6) 
 Fogg’s physical and psychological existence seems to be perpetually under 
threat from the forces of friction, oscillation and centrifugality that impede and 
interrupt what is presumed to be a linear process of self-development. However, 
much like Bakhtin’s heteroglossia, otherness is shown to be multiple and 
encircling, rooted in the social. The individuals Fogg encounters during the course 
of the narrative trigger a process of mirroring and mixing, where the boundaries of 
his identity are blurred or reaffirmed. According to Kanae Uchiyama, Fogg’s 
narrative is determined by ‘an inescapable and ethical response to the other’,89 and 
his early life under the care of his clarinettist Uncle Victor proves to be defining. 
According to Fogg, ‘Uncle Victor found meanings where no one else would have 
                                                          
89 Kanae Uchiyama, ‘The Death of the Other: A Levinasian Reading of Paul Auster’s Moon Palace’, MFS 
Modern Fiction Studies (54:1, 2008), 115-139 (p. 129). Uchiyama’s application of Emmanuel Levinas’ 
notion of alterity to Auster’s novel views Fogg’s narrative as a form of ‘ethical pursuit’ of the other (p. 129). 
Brevity prevents a detailed comparison of Levinasian alterity with Buberian mutuality here; suffice to say 
Buber and Levinas were friends and associates, and their relationship can be construed as implicitly 
dialogical, despite their differences. See Peter Atterton, Matthew Calarco and Maurice S Friedman, Levinas 
and Buber: Dialogue and Difference (Dusquesne: Dusquesne University Press, 2004). 
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found them’, (Palace 6) and these meanings are often expressed dialogically. 
Uncle Victor attempts to restore Fogg’s sense of self-identity by first grounding 
his destiny within that of American history, then latterly by donating his 
possessions to him. Prior to his death, in anticipation of a tour with his band The 
Moon Men, Uncle Victor presciently transfers his possessions to Fogg: ‘the 
books, the chess set, the autographs, the miscellaneous, the suit’. (Palace 13) 
Uncle Victor’s identity literally becomes embedded within that of Fogg, 
reconfiguring his interior terrain and physical appearance. After Uncle Victor’s 
disappearance from the narrative, Fogg’s wearing of his suit enables him ‘to stay 
in spiritual contact’ with him; (Palace 14) after Uncle Victor dies, the suit 
gradually disintegrates, until it becomes impossible to wear. His sudden death 
severs Fogg from the Imaginary order: ‘He was my only relative, my one link to 
something larger than myself. Without him, I felt bereft, utterly scorched by 
fate…At that point, my life began to change, I began to vanish into another 
world’. (Palace 2-3) Fogg’s initial impulse is one of negation and total self-
objectification:  
With all the fervour and idealism of a young man who had thought too 
much and read too many books, I decided that the thing I should do was 
nothing: my action would consist of a militant refusal to do anything at all. 
This was nihilism raised to the level of an aesthetic proposition. I would 
turn my life into a work of art. (Palace 20)  
This passive-aggressive frustration of desire, with its ‘exquisite’ paradox of 
making an artwork of his identity-less invisibility and isolation, proves fruitless: it 
is only through the ethical and empathic embrace of otherness that Fogg is able to 
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regain his subjective identity. Fogg attempts to initiate this process by reading the 
books his uncle left for him: ‘That was how I chose to mourn Uncle Victor…Each 
time I opened a box, I was able to enter another segment of my uncle’s life’. 
(Palace 21) By entering the shared psychic space of his uncle’s mind through his 
library, Fogg is initially able to retain spiritual contact with his nurturing 
otherness even after his death. However, his drive for self-actualisation is both 
frustrated and exacerbated by his lack of fiscal security. Faced with a financial 
impoverishment to match his growing social isolation and psychological 
disintegration, Fogg’s sale of his uncle’s books metaphorically gestures to the 
developing instability of his psyche and his near-total subjugation into the 
Symbolic order:  
My life had become a gathering zero, and it was a thing I could actually 
see: a palpable, burgeoning emptiness. Each time I ventured into my 
uncle’s past, it produced a physical result, an effect in the real world…I 
was both perpetrator and witness, both actor and audience in a theatre of 
one. I could follow the progress of my own dismemberment. Piece by 
piece, I could watch myself disappear. (Palace 24) 
 Fogg’s relationship with Uncle Victor can be partially read as Austerian 
critique of Lacanian thought, one where the inconsistencies and contradictory 
nature of Fogg’s behaviour reflect the author’s interpretation of the mirror stage 
and the hero’s thwarted desire to return to the Other. After Uncle Victor’s 
permanent departure, Fogg’s life is eventually saved by the nurturing otherness of 
his friend David Zimmer and lover Kitty Wu. Again, the names Auster deploys 
are metonymically important: Zimmer, the German word for ‘room’, also 
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connotes a medical walking frame for the elderly, infirm or physically disabled; 
while Kitty’s surname, Wu, connotes Oriental otherness and shamanism. Fogg 
says of Zimmer, ‘he literally kept me on my feet’, (Palace 74) while Kitty is 
referred to as his ‘twin sister’, who at the first meeting feeds him and reintegrates 
him into society: ‘Kitty came to the rescue, gesturing for me to sit between her 
and the person on her right. I promptly wedged myself to the spot, planting one 
buttock on each chair’. (Palace 35) Their appearance in the narrative offers a 
moment of restorative possibility; yet despite their interventions Fogg continues 
his descent into the unconscious Real, triggering an ontological and 
epistemological disordering to the point of self-abasement. Both Zimmer and 
Kitty Wu vanish into the texture of the narrative: Kitty Wu temporarily, Zimmer 
permanently when Fogg begins his life in the service of Thomas Effing.90 
 Thomas Effing’s arrival in the narrative is no less fundamental or 
transformative than the departure of Uncle Victor, which effectively facilitates a 
transferral of responsibility for Fogg from his uncle to Effing. The assumed name 
of a former artist called Julian Barber (‘A sissy name…I’ve always detested it’) 
Effing is a mentally sharp, physically withered and apparently blind invalid (‘the 
frailest person I had ever seen’) who recruits Fogg as his assistant and 
                                                          
90 A chance encounter with Zimmer later in the narrative prompts this observation from Fogg: ‘The important 
thing, quite simply, was that I had seen him’ (Palace 103). A transgressive character from Auster’s earlier 
novel, In the Country of Last Things, Zimmer reappears as the protagonist of Auster’s The Book of Illusions  
and Travels in the Scriptorium (2006). Like Fogg, Zimmer has a cameo in Auster’s recent novel 4321. 
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amanuensis.91 (Palace 96) Effing is barely a man: a specular subject surrounded 
by a world of things: ‘All bones and trembling flesh, he sat in his wheelchair 
covered in plaid blankets, his body slumped to one side like some miniscule 
broken bird’. (Palace 96) His physical ‘lack’ is both countered and reinforced by 
the ‘dense, Victorian clutter’ and ‘plenitude of objects’ in his ‘enormous West 
Side’ apartment. (Palace 96) Fogg’s response to Effing’s behaviour is one of 
objectification, with the old man’s caustic interrogation (‘Emmett Fogg…what 
kind of a sissy name is that?’) compelling Fogg to confront the ‘lacking’ centre of 
his self-identity: ‘My name and I have been through a lot together, and I’ve grown 
rather fond of it over the years’. (Palace 98) Effing’s psychological constituency 
is as slippery and indefinable as a Lacanian signifier: despite his apparent physical 
weakness, his enigmatic possession of an antagonistic and narcissistic persona 
challenges and reaffirms Fogg’s commitment to self-identification: 
He was no longer a comatose semi-corpse lost in a twilight reverie; he had 
become all sinew and attention, a seething little mass of resurrected 
strength. As I eventually learned, this was the real Effing, if real is a word 
that can be used in talking about him. So much of his character was built 
on falsehood and deception, it was nearly impossible to know when he was 
                                                          
91 There is a degree of mixing between Effing’s identity and that of Mr. Morning in Hustvedt’s The Blindfold, 
from Effing’s method of recruitment to his demand that Fogg describes everything he sees down to the finest 
detail on their daytime perambulations. Effing’s persona also recalls Hamm from Samuel Beckett’s 1957 play 
Endgame, with Fogg in the role of Clov, his servant. According to Sandra Raponi, Endgame can also be read 
through the prism of psychoanalytic theory (See Sandra Raponi, ‘Meaning and Melancholia in Beckett's 
Endgame’, Journal of Social and Political Thought [1:4, 2003], 1-22) 
<http://www.yorku.ca/jspot/4/beckett.html> [Accessed 05 September 2003]).  
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telling the truth. He loved to trick the world with his sudden experiments 
and inspirations, and of all the stunts he pulled, the one he liked best was 
playing dead. (Palace 98) 
 Effing, like Fogg, is brought to life – both within the texture of the novel 
and via Auster’s Bakhtinian authorship – by discourse. In Fogg’s case, it is only 
through the process of self-other dialogue that he begins to recognise an empathic 
need in Effing, his spectral, oppositional Other-figure; alternately, Effing enters 
the objectifying gaze of Fogg by inviting him to give an empirical explanation for 
his blindness and paralysis. This process of observation and explication leads 
Fogg to observe that ‘such a man is more dependent on others than he would like 
to be’. (Palace 100) The complex and contradictory nature of Effing’s identity 
eludes Fogg under the pre-existing system of signification. It is only through 
dialogue – through observation, reception and enunciation – that Fogg and Effing 
develop some level of mutual understanding of their shared inconsistency and 
dependency, leading Fogg to observe:  
Effing was a difficult case, but it would be wrong to define him in terms of 
difficulty alone…The old man was too elusive for that. If he was difficult, 
it was largely because he was not difficult all the time, and for that reason 
he managed to keep one in a constant state of disequilibrium. Entire days 
would go by when nothing but bitterness and sarcasm poured from his 
mouth, but just when I was persuaded there was not a particle of kindness 
or human sympathy left in him, he would come out with a remark of such 
devastating compassion, a phrase that revealed such a deep understanding 
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and knowledge of others, that I would be forced to admit I had misjudged 
him. (Palace 113)  
In an inverted echo of Fogg’s relationship with his Uncle Victor, Effing insists 
that Fogg read to him from his extensive library of books, in a process recalling 
Uncle Victor’s earlier reading to Fogg, and his nephew’s subsequent sale of those 
books to stay alive. It is as if they have been phantasmagorically transferred into 
the possession of Effing, Fogg recalls: 
These reading sessions were probably when I felt in greatest harmony with 
him […] There were times when I became so engrossed in what I was 
reading that I hardly knew where I was anymore, that I felt I was no longer 
sitting in my own skin. (Palace 108)  
Auster encourages us to imaginatively render Effing’s body, hear his dialogic 
voice and interpret his actions through the inscribed otherness of Fogg’s first 
person narration. Later in the narrative, Effing decides that Fogg will write his 
obituary, initiating a major shift – what Auster refers to as Fogg’s disappearance – 
in the narrative with a dialogic switch from Fogg’s narration to that of Effing. 
Comprised of twenty pages of near-continual narrative. Effing’s story describes 
his life as the artist Julian Barber, the collapse of his marriage, his voyage into the 
American wilderness and entombment in a cave, and the son – the historian 
Solomon Barber – he abandoned. For Fogg, this amanuensis identity constitutes a 
further development in the process of frustrated self-recognition: transcribing and 
editing what he terms ‘Effing’s story as told by himself’ is a process as 
interpretative and relational as it is deterministic: 
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It was a tricky and difficult process, I learned, and in many instances I had 
to reconstruct passages almost entirely in order to remain faithful to their 
original meaning. I didn’t know what use Effing was intending to make of 
this autobiography…he pushed me hard on the revisions, scolding and 
shouting whenever I read him a sentence he did not like…it was a draining 
experience for us (two stubborn souls locked in mortal combat). (Palace 
187) 
 Relationality is the principle guiding precept to the narrative of The 
Enchantment of Lily Dahl, ‘an uncanny mystery embedded in town folklore’, 
which ‘interrogates identity, representation in art, the voyeuristic look, the 
meaning of language and life in a community’.92 Hustvedt’s second novel, like 
her debut, draws upon the negative aspects of Lacanian theory and mirror stage 
relationality; like Auster’s Moon Palace, it grounds this within a more positivistic 
framework of self-other discourse. Recalling Marco Stanley Fogg, Lily Dahl’s 
name is heavy with metonymic intent: the word ‘Lily’ conjuring personal and 
natural growth, aesthetic beauty and vulnerability; while the Norwegian patronym 
‘Dahl’ phonetically connotes ‘doll’, a noun suggestive of imaginative play, 
uncanniness and the substitutive otherness of objects. Marks believes that identity 
formation in Hustvedt’s novel is determined by the ‘dynamics of looking and 
being looked at, between the identity endangering powers of the other’s look, and 
its simultaneously invigorating effects’.93 This reading complements and 
                                                          
92 Siri Hustvedt, The Enchantment of Lily Dahl (London: Sceptre, 1996), pp. 11-12. Hereafter referred to in 
the text as Dahl with page number cited. 
93 Marks, p. 98.  
202 
 
complicates Hustvedt’s earlier problematization of the dynamics of looking in The 
Blindfold, in which Alise Jameson’s exploration of power, play and desire stresses 
the masochistic, misogynistic and monopolising domination of the male gaze (see 
Chapter one). In The Enchantment of Lily Dahl, according to Marks, this 
voyeurism is not dominating but pleasurable, and engenders a jouissance of 
looking and being looked at:   
This analysis of the voyeuristic setting resonates with the Lacanian 
panorama of the mirror stage: the voyeur acts as a mirror in which the self 
feels reflected in its totality, which can be disinhibiting and stimulating in 
its suggestion of power; yet at the same time, the dependence of the voyeur 
leads to a loss of self-determination.94 
 In Hustvedt’s novel, Lily’s relationship with three men can be read 
through the self-other relationality Marks identifies: Hank Farmer, her soon-to-be-
former fiancé and local police officer; Ed Shapiro, a mysterious artist whose room 
at the seedy Stuart Hotel looks into Lily’s apartment; and Martin Petersen, a 
stammer-sufferer and regular diner at the Ideal Café where she works as a 
waitress.  Hank’s relationship with Lily, supposedly close, is defined by a 
distancing and binary positioning: his long nights at the police station; his chaste, 
chivalrous affection (‘he gave Lily a quick kiss on the cheek’); and his physical 
flaws which imply a deeper, more irresolvable imperfection and incompatibility 
(‘he was so close she could see the faint scars of adolescent acne’). (Dahl 22-23) 
Hank’s otherness stimulates and is stimulated by Lily’s voyeuristic gaze, and by 
                                                          
94 Marks, p. 100. 
203 
 
her own objectifying subjectivity: ‘Hank nodded and kissed her again. She 
watched him bound out the door and across the street. He moved beautifully, and 
she thought to herself that he looked better from a distance’. (Dahl  23) Hank and 
Lily’s relationship breaks down in the first chapter of Hustvedt’s novel: what Lily 
believes to be a liberating moment of self-identification serves to fix her within 
the Lacanian panorama of self-other relations Marks describes. In one particular 
scene, Hustvedt offers the reader this mimetic yet metonymic rendering of the 
psychically invasive, aggressive other, where the boundaries between subject and 
other are transgressed: 
He clutched her upper arms to hold her up. If he let go, she knew she 
would fall. I don’t care, she thought again, and she looked up at him with a 
dead expression…I’m bad, she said to herself, and with that thought she 
smiled. Before she knew what she was doing, she was smiling like an idiot 
into Hank’s enraged face. He started to shake her. Lily’s head flew 
backward, then whipped it forward again. She lost her footing and 
stumbled forward into Hank, who continued to shake her. His fury amazed 
Lily, and she heard herself cry out in surprise. (Dahl 44) 
Lily’s ambivalent, possibly sexual response to Hank’s violent otherness is 
transposed into an erotically-charged exchange with the artist Edward Shapiro. 
Lily’s striptease for Shapiro – on the evening before she breaks her engagement to 
Hank – deploys a discursive visual language which precedes their first face-to-
face encounter. Lily’s presentation of herself to Shapiro as a silhouetted nude 
plays with the Lacanian conception of the ‘lacking’ individual, while concurrently 
recalling her earlier narcissistic observation:  
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I’m bad, she thought, and at that moment she knew what she was going to 
do. Lily turned on every light in her apartment and yanked open her 
window so violently that she saw Shapiro turn his head and look at her. 
Good, she thought, good. (Dahl 44)  
Shapiro’s face, like that of Lily’s, is ‘hidden in shadow’; (Dahl 38) his 
objectifying gaze confirms his desire for the erotic otherness of her projected 
identity: 
This is wonderful she said to herself, and unbuttoned her cutoff jeans. She 
turned to one side and wriggled out of the tight shorts. She could feel the 
stiff material slide down her buttocks, and that sensation, along with the 
fact that he was looking at her, prompted an image of herself as someone 
else. (Dahl 38)  
Lily’s pleasure also comes from the ‘borrowed gestures’: a pre-existing visual 
language of the striptease that has been lodged in her unconscious, the realm of 
the other. The scene closes with a final moment of intersubjective exchange, with 
Shapiro playing a burst of Mozart’s Don Giovanni which recalls the social 
discourse of Bakhtin in, firstly, its mutually reflexive exchange, but also in its 
polyglot nature: 
That was when Lily heard the music. A man started singing in a language 
Lily didn’t know, and after a short time a woman answered him. Edward 
Shapiro came back to the window, and Lily looked at him…Listening to 
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the voices of those two people, she imagined that the real adventure of her 
life was beginning now.95 (Dahl 40) 
 Like Fogg with Effing in Moon Palace, Lily’s subsequent erotic 
relationship with Shapiro is critical to this ongoing process of self-realisation. By 
contrast, Hustvedt presents Martin Peterson’s relationship with Lily in a more 
psychologically unsettling way, aligning him with Hank as someone who moves 
from being intimate and nurturing to an elusive and intrusive other. A regular at 
the Ideal Café, Martin ‘always studied her calmly and deliberately as if it was his 
job to look at her’, but his eyes ‘made her a little uncomfortable’. (Dahl 8) 
Nevertheless, Lily professes herself ‘oddly drawn to him’ as a mysterious 
individual who was rumoured to have been ‘born both’, and whose otherness is as 
intriguing as it is unsettling: 
The secret of Martin wasn’t his body, but it wasn’t his mind. He gave off 
something peculiar – an air of hidden knowledge or intuition that 
sometimes made Lily feel he was looking at her from a great distance even 
though he was only inches away. (Dahl 9)  
Many of Lily’s relationships are defined by some form of distancing, a tension 
between openness, intimacy and alienation which encircles Hustvedt’s protagonist 
and those she comes into contact with. Unique to Martin’s identity is his ability to 
differentiate between the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real, which has 
inexorably tragic consequences: ‘It’s like there’s a skin over everything, and if 
                                                          
95 ‘I wanted to live dangerously, to push myself as far as I could go…I remember those days well, I remember 
them as the beginning of my life’ (Palace 3). 
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you could just get under it, you’d, you’d get to what was real, but you never can, 
so you’ve got to look for a way to cut through it. You see?’ (Dahl 64)  Suffering 
from a speech impediment so debilitating it compels him to keep his counsel in 
social situations, at the Ideal Café Martin communicates with Lily through a series 
of taps to his table: 
Martin always wanted the same breakfast – poached eggs on toast – but 
unlike Lily’s other customers, he had never been happy in silence…He 
wanted an exchange, so instead of Martin stammering out an order and 
getting flustered, he tapped out a little rhythm on the tabletop with his 
fingers, rat-tat-a-tat-tat, and Lily answered him with two, tat-tat…No-one 
else was in on it. The beats were a language all of their own.96 (Dahl  10) 
These exchanges between Martin and Lily exemplify Bowie’s observation that 
Lacanian linguistics reflect the subject’s displacement of desire,97 while 
intimating empathic otherness underpinning Bakhtinian dialogism. Martin’s 
stammer can be read in several ways: a moment of méconnaissance where the 
Real slips into the Symbolic order, a polyphonic utterance in the Bakhtinian 
mode, or a symptom of some unspoken trauma which stimulates an empathic 
response. Later, Martin asks Lily to say the word ‘mouth’ because ‘the two come 
                                                          
96 Hustvedt’s oblique reference to ‘poached eggs on toast’ can be construed as a metaphorical nod to Lacan’s 
‘Hommelette’, and finds its symbiotic other in Auster’s deconstructive depiction of Lewis Carroll’s Humpty 
Dumpty in the first part of The New York Trilogy, City of Glass. (Auster’s fiction al alter ego also serves 
Quinn an omelette during their first encounter in his apartment.) In Moon Palace, the obese son of Thomas 
Effing, Solomon Barber, can be conceived of as another Humpty Dumpty. 
97 Bowie, ‘Jacques Lacan’ in Structuralism and Since, ed. by Sturrock , p. 148. 
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together perfectly, the word and what it means’, a further indication of Hustvedt’s 
critical engagement with structuralist and poststructuralist theory in this particular 
text.   
 In Moon Palace and The Enchantment of Lily Dahl, Auster and Hustvedt 
present a subtle and complex interrogation of self-other discourse through the 
prismatic first-person narration of their protagonists. Through their frequently-
thwarted quests for concrete selfhood, Marco and Lily’s encounters with other 
characters foreground this discursive exchange between Lacanian and Bakhtinian 
discourse within the shifting modalities of these richly allusive texts. How Auster 
and Hustvedt further problematize the idea of self-subjectivity by presenting 
multiple selves in their narratives will come under consideration in the next 
section. 
     
2. Multiple selves and mixing 
 In The Dialogic Imagination, Bakhtin states ‘language, for the individual 
consciousness, lies on the borderline between oneself and the other. The word in 
language is half someone else’s’.98 Bakhtin describes this as multicenteredness, 
where, according to Marks, ‘no individual voice shall be muted or suffocated by a 
dominating, deafening and monologic discourse’.99 Auster and Hustvedt’s writing 
is populated with multiple selves who share constituent elements of their identity, 
                                                          
98 Bakhtin, p. 294. 
99 Marks, p. 37. 
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reflected by a commitment to mutually-reflexive recognition. This sharing of 
identity is metonymically rendered in physical-psychical terms, thereby 
delineating the reconfigured ontologies of Lacan’s alienating mirror stage and the 
empathic response to otherness implicit in Bakhtinian heteroglossia. 
 Early in the narrative of The Enchantment of Lily Dahl, when her older 
neighbour Mabel joins Lily one morning, we see Hustvedt’s narrativised 
exploration of the tension between other-objectivisation and multiple-selfhood: 
Lily stared at their faces in the mirror and at Marilyn’s between them,100 
and she thought that the three of them felt strange together…There was 
something too perfect about the way the three of them were framed 
together in the mirror, and it bothered Lily. It created an annoying stillness 
that made her think suddenly of things that were alive and things that were 
dead, and she shrugged her shoulders to release herself from Mabel’s 
touch. (Dahl 6)  
Much like the male individuals delineated above, her relationship with Mabel 
constitutes one self-other relationship in a socially-structured panorama of 
otherness. Mabel is helping Lily to learn her lines in the role of Hermia for a 
performance of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, a play the older woman admires 
because, in her words, ‘I’ve always liked the idea of changelings…the older I get, 
the more certain I am that you can’t know who’s who or what’s what’. (Dahl 34) 
Both women read Hermia’s lines: Mabel’s knowledge of the play enables her to 
recite it from memory; further, it changes her voice: ‘She didn’t sound young 
                                                          
100 Lily has pinned to her wall a poster of Marilyn Monroe, the American actor, sex symbol and cultural icon. 
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exactly, but she didn’t sound like herself either, and Lily could almost feel the 
presence of a third person in the room.’ (Dahl 35) When Lily comes to read the 
lines, she has the revelatory experience of speaking with Mabel’s voice: 
Until then, Hermia’s voice had been as remote to Lily as a song in another 
language she could memorize but not understand. But that afternoon, she 
discovered that by watching Mabel closely, by adopting her tone and 
posture, she felt more when she spoke the lines. In fact, it seemed to Lily 
that the emotion came from Mabel’s voice and gestures rather than from 
inside herself, and this made her a little uneasy. Mabel barked orders at 
Lily, corrected and scolded, and then, all at once, Lily discovered what she 
was saying. She meant it as much as she meant anything.101 (Dahl 36) 
Reciting her lines, the boundaries of Lily’s identity are almost completely 
macerated, and in multiple directions: under Hustvedt’s absent narration, acting as 
Mabel, speaking as Hermia, speaking words written by a male Elizabethan 
playwright, William Shakespeare. It emphasises Lily’s identity as a heroine-actor, 
                                                          
101 Conscious or not, this particular scene seems to revisit the scene in Moon Palace where Fogg reads back 
to Effing the typescript of his spoken autobiography, particularly Auster and Hustvedt’s sharing of the noun 
‘scolding’ in an eerily similar context. A metalinguistic link, or temporal-spatial wormhole, between the two 
novels, the coincidence is reinforced by Lily’s reference to Mabel’s birdlike ‘sharp little bones’: ‘She’s just a 
stick, Lily thought, no flesh at all’. That the etymology of ‘scold’ is Old Norse – derived from ‘skald’ – is, 
perhaps, doubly ironic, and a hermeneutic counter on Hustvedt’s part to poststructuralism’s preoccupation 
with the differential and slippery constituency of language. Another indication of how Auster and Hustvedt 
speak to each other – and reader – through their fiction.    
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of being in control and out of control of events in the narrative, and of having 
masculine and feminine otherness intruding upon and nurturing her identity.  
 Unlike their uncomfortable encounter under the illusory gaze of Marilyn 
Monroe, here Lily willingly submits to the other-determination of Mabel as a 
prototypical surrogate mother. However, it is another absent mother that 
dominates the narrative of The Enchantment of Lily Dahl: the mysterious 
disappearance of Mrs. Bodler, a local farmer’s wife, and the subsequent 
disinterment of her corpse, casts a spectral shadow over Hustvedt’s novel. 
Discovered by her male twin years after her disappearance, Helen Bodler’s body 
is described as being ‘frozen in a position of panic, a position that showed she had 
tried to claw her way out of the grave’. (Dahl 16) Later, Lily cycles towards the 
Bodler’s farm, where she finds a suitcase filled ‘with neatly packed clothes, as if 
someone had planned a trip, never taken it and then forgotten about the suitcase 
altogether. The clothes inside had belonged to one woman’. (Dahl  29) Finding a 
pair of white shoes, she tries them on: ‘When her fingers touched the laces, she 
was struck by the thought that these were Helen Bodler’s shoes…With a shiver of 
excitement, Lily removed the shoes and in that same instant decided to take 
them’. (Dahl 30-31) By keeping the shoes, she not only makes an empathic 
gesture towards the tragic otherness of Helen Bodler, but it blurs her ontologically 
with the dead woman, a conscious gesture following her unconscious decision to 
journey there. Lily’s discovery of the suitcase, and her effective theft of the shoes, 
stimulates a supernatural otherness within Hustvedt’s narrative which prefigures a 
later scene where Martin suggests he once shut Lily in a refrigerator as a child, 
whereupon she died.   
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 In Moon Palace, Auster’s treatment of multiple selfhood finds a natural 
home in his exploration of father and son relationality. Uchiyama concurs, noting 
that the novel ‘pursues the intersection of subjectivity and time through the father-
son relationship’.102 Fogg’s singular identity is further subjected to psychic and 
emotional disordering via the triangulated ontology of his personal connection to 
Effing and Solomon Barber. This forms a genealogical mise en abyme of 
objectification, where the temporal-spatial definition of Fogg’s identity 
unexpectedly collapses into and cascades through that of his long-lost grandfather 
and father. Effing and Barber are presented as physical polar opposites, with 
Effing’s frailty indirectly contrasted with the gargantuan proportions of his son, 
Barber. Where Effing is ‘all bones and trembling flesh’, Barber is described as a 
‘pandemonium of flesh upon flesh’:  
The word ‘big’ hardly did justice to him…He was one of those monstrous 
fat men you sometimes pass in a crowd: no matter how hard you struggle 
to avert your eyes, you can’t help gawking at him. He was titanic in his 
obesity, a person of such bulging, protrusive roundness that you could not 
look at him without feeling yourself shrink. It was as though his three-
dimensionality was more pronounced than that of other men. Not only did 
he occupy more space than they did, but he seemed to overflow it, to ooze 
out from the edges of himself and inhabit areas where he was not. (Palace 
110-11)  
                                                          
102 Uchiyama, p. 125. 
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Fogg even calls into question Barber’s legitimacy, claiming: ‘It was not possible 
that the spare and diminutive Effing had produced such a son: he was a genetic 
mishap, a renegade seed that had run wild, blossoming beyond all measure’. 
(Palace 111) This questioning of Barber’s ancestry is a disavowal of what 
Uchiyama terms ‘the enigma of his [Fogg’s] own origin’, a subversion of 
Lacanian narcissism into a negation of the intrusive Other, which subsequently 
ruptures the self-other dialectic in a transgressive explosion of violent 
aggression.103  
 Near the close of the narrative, Fogg and Barber visit the grave of the 
former’s mother and uncle. Auster’s metaphorical rendering of the subject’s 
attempt to return to the Other triggers a further psychic decentering of Fogg’s 
identity: 
I suddenly found myself fighting back tears. I had not been expecting such 
a violent response, but once it hit me that the two of them were actually 
lying there under my feet, I couldn’t stop myself from shaking…I can’t see 
more than a blur, a few isolated gestures in the fog of recollection. (Palace 
282-83)  
Barber’s revelation of his love for Fogg’s dead mother prompts a furious reaction 
in Fogg, who likens the sensation to ‘anger, a demonic surge of nausea and 
disgust’. (Palace 283-84) The Symbolic order reconfigures itself around Fogg’s 
powerlessness: his shifting identity once more in the objective influence of an 
unstable signifying system of boundless unknowability: ‘Barber had loved my 
                                                          
103 Uchiyama, p. 127. 
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mother. From this single, incontestable fact, everything else began to move, to 
totter, to fall apart – the whole world began to rearrange itself before my eyes’. 
(Palace 283) In an allegorical gesture towards Lacan’s recasting of Freud’s 
Oedipus complex, at the point of reunification Fogg disavows his ancestry and 
chases his father towards an empty grave, whereupon Solomon falls and breaks 
his back: ‘He began to lose his balance…He must have stumbled…It all happened 
so fast…’ (Palace 284) Fogg’s remembrance, as he himself admits, is hazy. 
Solomon Barber finds himself, like his own father, Thomas Effing, physically 
disabled – unconsciously and consciously, physically and emotionally – through 
the actions of his other, Fogg; while he lies in hospital, Barber appears to floats 
free of the objectifying system of signification into the empathic gaze of Fogg: 
‘Girdled in a huge plaster cast that was suspended from pulleys, Barber hovered in 
midair as though defying the laws of physics’. (Palace 285) As Fogg’s father 
loses weight, his curious observation of his father, exhibiting the signs of ‘a secret 
self that had been locked inside him for years’ resolves into the perception of a 
developing resemblance to Effing, something grounded in the latter’s patriarchal 
possession: 
I looked at him and saw something familiar, and before I could identify the 
thing I had seen, it was gone. Two days later, something similar occurred, 
but this time it lasted long enough for me to sense that the area of 
recognition was located somewhere around Barber’s eyes, perhaps even in 
the eyes themselves. I wondered if I hadn’t noticed a family resemblance 
with Effing, if something about the way Barber glanced at me just then had 
not reminded me of his father. Whatever it was, this brief moment was 
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disturbing, and I was unable to shake free of it for the rest of the day. 
(Palace 287-8)   
As Barber’s ontology moves closer to that of Effing, so Fogg’s becomes realigned 
within the patriarchal chain, the genealogical mise en abyme:  
All of a sudden I realised I was looking at myself. Barber had the same 
eyes I did…We looked like each other, and the similarity was 
unmistakeable. Once I became aware of this, once the truth of it was 
finally thrown up against me, I had no choice but to accept it. I was 
Barber’s son, and I knew it beyond a shadow of a doubt. (Palace 288)  
Fogg experiences a moment of hitherto unparalleled self-recognition instigated 
and negated by his father’s slow death: ‘I understood how fragile my world had 
become. The egg was slipping through my fingers, and sooner or later it was 
bound to drop’. (Palace 289) Under Lacan’s model, Fogg’s identity is displaced, 
embedded and reaffirmed by the death of the barred Other, represented by his 
father, Solomon Barber, and his grandfather, Thomas Effing, and given a further 
metonymic gloss by the absence of a common patronym. 
 Hustvedt and Auster’s narrativised investigations into multiple otherness 
through these two particular novels reifies their mutual apprehension of self-other 
discourse. Doubles, according to Dimovitz, ‘underscore the notion that these 
characters each reflect different ontological dimensions of the self’.104 Having 
already identified incidences of self-other transgression in Moon Palace and The 
                                                          
104 Dimovitz, p. 625. 
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Enchantment of Lily Dahl, the physically and psychically-porous boundaries of 
the self similarly allow for an accumulation of other-identities in a mise en abyme 
of selfhood: Fogg identifies echoes of his identity in those of Effing and Barber, 
while Lily actively assimilates Mabel and Mrs. Bodler’s self-subjectivity into her 
own. This layering of identities by Hustvedt and Auster recalibrates Lacanian 
mirroring through the social discourse of Bakhtin to present an ambiguous model 
of multiple selfhood, one which effects reconciliation with the Other as a means 
of ameliorating the negating aspects of objectivisation.  
 
 
3. Outsiders, solitude and society 
 The moments when interior or exterior worlds collide, shattering, blurring 
or reshaping the self invasively, is crucial for understanding how Auster and 
Hustvedt appropriate and interrogate different facets of the self-other dialectic. 
For Lacan, otherness is psychically determined; for Bakhtin, it is socially 
determined; Buber’s model offers a hybrid of the two. Internal and external spaces 
exist in a continual dialogue where neither can be said to fully inhibit the other, 
nor exhibit the defining characteristics that provide the etymological grounding 
for either term. This questioning of binary conditions is exemplary of postmodern 
literary praxis:  
Postmodernism does not move the marginal to the centre. It does not invert 
the valuing of centres into that of peripheries and borders, as much as use 
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that paradoxical doubled positioning to critique the outside from both the 
outside and inside.105  
While depicted as marginal individuals within their given societies who are 
struggling to come to terms with a central structurally-determined mystery, as the 
fictive constructs of Auster and Hustvedt, Marco and Lily remain at the centre of 
their respective narratives. The objective world encircles them in a panorama of 
socially- and psychically-determined otherness. Both live in apartments which can 
be, initially at least, viewed as a metonymic representation of their psychic 
interior; despite its apparent absence, the external world is ever-present in that 
interior world – an exemplary exploration of postmodernism’s negotiation 
between centre and ex-centric. Moreover, their entrance into the internal spaces of 
others further shapes this interior world, while objects conjured within these 
other-spaces colour their personal-psychical experiences and the direction of their 
process of self-actualisation.   
 At the opening of The Enchantment of Lily Dahl, Lily is in her apartment, 
observing the artist Edward Shapiro through her window: ‘She had been watching 
him for three weeks’. (Dahl 1) The interior detail of Lily’s apartment is largely 
ignored by Hustvedt, save for the mirror and the poster of Marilyn Monroe 
mentioned earlier. The focus of the narrative is on Lily’s interior world, rendered 
through third person narration and free indirect discourse. Through the enclosed, 
raised space of her apartment, she is able to see out onto the streets of Webster (a 
word as suggestive of social interconnectedness as it is entrapment, entanglement 
                                                          
105 Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, p. 69. 
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and death in the jaws of an arachnid-like Other). The window, as a symbolic 
object, constitutes the place where interior and exterior meet:106  
Every morning since the beginning of May, she had gone to the window to 
look at him […] On this particular morning, however, it was raining hard 
and Lily couldn’t quite see him. She stuck her head out the window and 
squinted in his direction…all she could make out was a blurred, waving 
body behind the glass. (Dahl 1)  
The ‘blurred’ connotes an identity not easily objectified; the ‘waving’ acts as an 
enticement to Lily to keep looking, to look harder: the ontological exteriority of 
Edward Shapiro’s inner world (the hotel room where he paints) initially both 
stimulates and resists Lily’s attempts to apprehend it: ‘The front of the canvas had 
always been hidden from her’. (Dahl 2) What becomes necessary is for Lily to 
cross the physical, psychological divide and verbalize her hitherto unidirectional 
attempt at constructing a dialogue with him.  
 Hustvedt facilitates a comparison between Lily’s interior space and that of 
her neighbour Mabel which emphasises the older woman’s subjective fascination 
with the objective world, while noting the permeable spatial boundaries between 
their interior and exteriority. Hustvedt describes Lily hearing Mabel in her own 
apartment, physically absent but aurally present: 
                                                          
106 Alexandra Harris notes that the etymology of ‘window’ in its present usage is – like ‘scold’ – from the Old 
Norse ‘vindauga’, meaning ‘wind-eye’ and signifying ‘what came in, rather than seeing out’ (Alexandra 
Harris, ‘Making the weather’, Guardian, 12 September 2015, p. 7).  
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Day after day, she listened to the old woman walk, rustle papers, open and 
close cupboards and drawers, clink dishes, cough, mumble, flush her toilet, 
and all afternoon and far into the night, she listened to Mabel type. (Dahl 
4)   
This delineation presents Mabel as the occupant of a room, or realm, where 
objects are granted superior status to the lives of those who produced them – a 
trait not entirely dissimilar to that of The Blindfold’s Mr. Morning: 
Mabel’s room smelled of dust, perfume and the paper of old books. She 
owned hundreds of them, and they crowded the apartment, bulging from 
shelves that lined several walls in the living room, bedroom and even the 
bathroom. Lily breathed in that odour again when Mabel opened the door 
for her…Stale and dry, Lily thought, like dead bugs. (Dahl 34)  
Here Hustvedt collapses the gendered and psychological distinctions that orient 
themselves around these two characters: the gothic, masochistic overtones of the 
earlier novel are dissolved, and in their place something equally mysterious, but 
ultimately more symbiotically nurturing and empathic, is expressed:  
Mabel poured Lily a cup of tea, her hands trembling as she held the pot in 
the air. The woman always looked cold. But the room was warm, and Lily 
had gotten used to Mabel’s tremors and quakes and her constantly moving 
hands. She wasn’t sick. She was nervous, so tightly strung that Lily half 
expected the woman’s body to hum from the strain. (Dahl 34)  
In this scene, it is quite possible – albeit overly simplistic – to conceive of Lily 
and Mabel’s spaces as zones of focused feminine ambiguity: where the binary 
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structure of self-other discourse is flattened and fragmented, situating both women 
within an equable interior world of shared gender-subjectivity. This overlooks the 
subtlety of Hustvedt’s writing, which insists upon relational complexity through 
the sharing of subjective characteristics between individuals irrespective of age, 
class or gender.107 While in Mabel’s room, Lily notices a small Japanese drawing 
of an erotic scene, prompting a reaction which is part prudishness, part arousal: 
‘How could Mabel have such a thing out in the open for people to see? An old 
lady like her? Lily stared at her knees. The picture reminded her of one of those 
distorted sexual dreams…In spite of herself, the Japanese lovers aroused her’. 
(Dahl 35)  
 A similar picture presents itself in the overly patriarchal Ideal Café. As a 
social hub for Webster’s working men, the Ideal Café is rendered by Hustvedt as 
the heteroglot social centre in a linguistically Bakhtinian mode. The two marginal, 
subversive voices are female, but one of those voices belongs to Lily’s fellow 
waitress and friend, Bert. By giving a female character an explicitly male name, 
Hustvedt reaffirms a critique of the binary nature of traditional gender distinctions 
codified in The Blindfold, where she uses Iris’ transvestitism to revisit issues 
related to gender, power and the male gaze.108 Moreover, Lily’s awareness of and 
                                                          
107 The oblique blurring of Mabel’s identity with that of Mr. Morning, and or Lily Dahl’s with Iris Vegan’s, 
gives a strong indication of this: identities which transgress the boundaries of the narrative framework within 
which they find themselves. This is a trait consciously shared with Auster, whose characters disappear from 
and reappear in his novels in an overtly intertextual way.  
108 See Alise Jameson. 
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fascination with the rumours surrounding the mysterious Edward Shapiro emerge 
from the gossipy discourse dished out by its male patrons:  
She had heard his wife left him because he gambled, and she had heard she 
left him because, as Lester Underberg put it not a week ago in the café, ‘he 
couldn’t keep his pecker at home.’ Lester had it ‘on good authority’ that 
Shapiro had ‘nailed’ a beautiful redheaded student in his office while 
playing Verdi at full tilt. (Dahl 3)  
Hustvedt generates the sense that these are not Lily’s words; nor are they Siri 
Hustvedt’s: they’re Lester Underberg. In an extended scene, Lily and Vince, the 
chef-patron, converse in the kitchen in an authentically polyphonic mode:  
The fat man leaned over the stove and said, ‘Where’s the funeral? It’s so 
quiet in there, you’d think I was cooking for a bunch of stiffs.’ 
Lily grinned and shook her head. ‘You say that every morning, Vince. It 
gets noisier in an hour. You know that.’ 
‘This is one dead little burg, baby doll. Its big-time excitement round here 
when one of them old Lutherans lets out a fart.’ (Dahl 11) 
Bakhtin might suggest that the interior world of the Ideal Café – the social centre 
of Webster’s conjured world – is both singular and multiple: homogeneously 
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male, yet heterglot; author-controlled, yet imaginatively discursive; a closed 
environment, yet subject to incursions from outside.109 
 In Auster’s Moon Palace, space is similarly characterised by the bisecting 
of interior and exterior, disordering the progression of Fogg’s narration.110 A 
decentered individual seeking the lack in his identity, Fogg straddles these 
boundaries: as with Lily Dahl, or indeed Daniel Quinn or Iris Vegan, the 
apartment he comes to inhabit is elevated in stature to the room of the mind, a 
psychic interior shorn of detail and the physical presence of the Other: ‘little by 
little I came to understand that I had come to the right place, that this small 
apartment was indeed where I was meant to live’. (Palace 17) The eponymous 
Moon Palace appears as a neon restaurant sign seen by Fogg through his window, 
a chance sighting which induces Fogg to journey further into the wilderness of his 
psychological terrain: 
The force with which those words assaulted me drowned out every 
practical reference and association. They were magic letters, and they hung 
                                                          
109 Vince’s use of an ‘EITHER/OR’ sign for the Ideal Café’s bathroom offers a metaphorical summation of 
Hustvedt’s philosophical and thematic considerations in this particular text. Hustvedt also cites Kierkegaard’s 
text as one of her major philosophical inspirations, and a Kierkegaardian  interplay of indeterminacy, 
ambiguity and ambivalence underscores Hustvedt’s second novel. 
110 Mark Brown in particular focuses on how Auster’s characters ‘locate themselves in the world through a 
matrix of situated and relational coordinates’ in order to ‘establish stable relationships with others and a 
coherent sense of themselves’. What Brown terms ‘the metropolitan conditions’ necessary for the 
establishment of this stable ‘I’ demand a ‘satisfactory and supportive’ correspondence between the 
‘subjective inner terrain and their physical, invariably metropolitan one’ (Mark Brown, Paul Auster 
[Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007], pp. 1-2). 
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there in the darkness like a message from the sky itself. MOON PALACE. 
I immediately thought of Uncle Victor and his band, and in that first, 
irrational moment, my fears lost my hold on me. I had never experienced 
anything so sudden and absolute. A bare and grubby room had been 
transformed into a site of inwardness, an intersection point of strange 
omens and mysterious, arbitrary events. (Palace 16)  
Like Lily’s window opening out onto Edward Shapiro’s hotel room, Fogg’s 
allows the leakage and slippage of interior into exterior, and vice versa: the 
apartment becomes a site of reversed self-objectification, the departure point for 
Fogg’s achieving restorative self-identification. A sequence of unforeseen events 
disrupts the linearity of Fogg’s journey inward: his Uncle Victor’s death, the 
disappearance of his inheritance, Fogg’s growing physical and psychic 
disintegration and social isolation. This is further affirmed by his gradual sale of 
the library of books bequeathed to him by his Uncle Victor, his last link to his old 
family. Before selling them, Fogg reads the books, transferring the contents of his 
apartment to his interior space: ‘As I sold off the books, my apartment went 
through many changes […] The room was a machine that measured my condition: 
how much of me remained, how much was no longer there’. (Palace 24)  
 After Fogg is evicted from the apartment he sleeps rough in Central Park, 
eventually taking refuge in a small cave. Auster’s deployment and treatment of 
both park and cave reaffirm his commitment to exploring and critiquing the 
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perceived binary link between outside and inside.111 This portion of the novel 
describes Fogg’s descent into the depths of his unconscious, his futile and 
dangerous journey away from the Imaginary order and towards the Real.112 At this 
point in the narrative, the ontological and epistemological traits which make him 
human have all but vanished, Fogg having rejected social discourse and plunged 
himself into the desperate hermetic confinement of his interior terrain:  
I slept in the park every night after that. It became a sanctuary for me, a 
refuge of inwardness against the grinding demands of the streets. There 
were eight hundred and forty acres to roam in, and unlike the massive 
gridwork of buildings and towers that loomed outside the perimeter, the 
park offered me the possibility of solitude, of separating myself from the 
rest of the world. In the streets, everything is bodies and commotion, and 
like it or not, you cannot enter them without adhering to a rigid protocol of 
behaviour. (Palace 55)  
Fogg’s attempt to renounce the confines of the Symbolic order imposes a new 
conditionality of existence upon him. As he states, ‘you cannot live without 
                                                          
111 We might also be able to identify an exploration of Descartes identification of a split between mind and 
body, foundation of Husserlian phenomenology. For a detailed examination of Auster’s interest in 
Cartesianism and the phenomenological method of investigation, see Chapter three.  
112 Auster deepens the genealogical mise en abyme of Fogg’s solitude by inserting his grandfather, Thomas 
Effing, in a cave later in the narrative. Effing’s cave, unlike that of Fogg, is a vast subterranean space; Fogg’s 
cave is a small refuge in an urban park. The identity of both men is made by their being reduced to a primitive 
existence outside of the eyes of society. Solomon Barber’s fall into a grave at the close of the book 
symbolically signifies his own enforced attempt to return to the point of origin – the Real – which in its 
failure authenticates his identity as Fogg’s father.  
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establishing an equilibrium between the inner and outer. The park did that for 
me’. (Palace 55) Lacan’s influence is evident here, with Auster problematizing 
the spatiality of interior and exterior as parabolic representatives of consciousness 
and unconsciousness:  
In the park I did not have to carry around this burden of self-
consciousness. It gave me a boundary, a threshold, a boundary…a chance 
to return to my inner life, to hold onto myself purely in terms of what was 
happening inside of me. (Palace 56)  
Each time Fogg visits an interior space other than the cave – a theatre, a reading 
room, a hash house – Fogg encounters further disequilibrium under the gaze of the 
Other: ‘I’m starting to shrink, I said to myself, and suddenly I found myself 
talking out loud to the face in the mirror. ‘Don’t be afraid’, the voice said’. 
(Palace 66) Yet when he shelters in the park’s cave of the Real, Fogg severs all 
contact with the outside world, losing himself in the realm of the prelapsarian 
psyche: ‘Most of the time I was barely conscious, and even when I seemed to be 
awake, I was so bound up in the tribulations of my body that I lost all sense of 
where I was’. (Palace 68) In one final allusion to Lacan, consciousness threatens 
to lapse into unconsciousness, or death, with Fogg experiencing a period of 
protracted vomiting – the purging of his interior – and the final hallucinatory 
collapse of language: 
Nothing could hold its shape in me. Once I remember, I saw the Moon 
Palace sign in front of me…The letters disappeared, and only the two os 
from the word Moon were left. I saw myself dangling from one of them, 
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struggling to hang on like an acrobat…Then I was slithering around on 
them, and then I wasn’t there anymore. The two os had turned into eyes, 
gigantic human eyes that were looking down at me with scorn and 
impatience. They kept on staring at me, and after a while I became 
convinced they were the eyes of God. (Palace 66)  
The ‘two os’ invite an interpretative statement above and beyond that offered by 
Fogg (ergo Auster), one which is essentially Lacanian: they metonymically 
suggest the panoply of inescapable otherness which guides Fogg’s struggle for 
self-identification; Fogg’s orphan identity, and the absent mother and father 
figures to which Fogg clings to stabilise his subjectivity; consciousness and 
unconsciousness, two separate existential spheres; or self and Other, locked in 
continual discourse, mutually-dependent for self-definition. The plethora of 
possible meanings reaffirms the absence of teleological meaning: the meaning is 
contained in the totalizing process of imagination (writer), apprehension (reader), 
and reflection and reification (critic), a process which occurs consciously and 
unconsciously.  
 For Auster and Hustvedt, what matters most is between the os – the split 
between subjectivities and theoretical frameworks which permit a proliferation of 
meanings. Rooms and enclosed spaces operate as domains of self-subjectivity: 
Fogg’s time in the cave can be read as a vertiginous plunge into the depths of his 
psyche, an attempt to return to the Real. Lily’s and the Ideal Café, acknowledge 
Lacan’s Symbolic and Imaginary, while exhibiting the social heteroglossia of 
Bakhtinian discourse. Neither author presents the meaning of these spaces in a 
definitive, deterministic way. Rather, the very spatiality of these two texts, with 
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their complex nexus of interior/exterior, self/other and conscious/unconscious, 
constructs a space anterior to the texture of their novels where the reader’s critical 
imagination receives them.   
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Conclusion 
 Auster and Hustvedt’s appropriation of elements of Buber, Bakhtin and 
Lacan’s approaches to the self-other dialectic further confirms a commonality to 
their respective process of aesthetic expression, one which seeks to incorporate 
alternative philosophical aspects within the hybrid spatiality of their texts. By 
situating their protagonist-subjects against and within a shifting panorama of 
otherness, Auster and Hustvedt show how identity construction is both differential 
and relational: in each narrative self-other distinctions yield to blurred 
exteriorities, transgressed individuality and the fracturing of the unitary self-
image. However, for the decentered subjects presented in their fiction, respectful 
recognition of the transgressive other forms a fundamental step on the road to 
self-knowledge: as Marks puts it, ‘through the cracks in the Cartesian shell, from 
the very core of the self, emerges the other’.113 Perception, particularly how 
narrativised aesthetic and ethical responses to visual art constitute an 
intersubjective framework in their novels, will come under consideration in the 
next chapter. 
 Hustvedt’s own interest in what she terms ‘zones of focused ambiguity’, 
permit the complex and critical interplay of these theories and methods. It is 
possible to argue with some credibility that Auster’s receptivity to these ideas is 
drawn from Hustvedt’s a priori personal interest in them. Further, Hustvedt and 
Auster’s writing relationship can be viewed as an embodiment of Buber’s 
                                                          
113 Marks, p. 2. 
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conception of silence, whereby during an absence of verbal, or indeed textual, 
dialogue, the relation of reciprocity still endures: 
Not only is the shared silence of two such persons such a dialogue, but 
their dialogical life continues, even when they are separated in space, as 
the continual potential presence of the one to the other, as unexpressed 
intercourse.114 
Within a novel, much like a marriage, we see how different identities, theoretical 
ideas and spatio-temporal contexts shape the texture of a particular narrative, 
whether autobiographical or fictional. The instances of intertextual play between 
the novels of Auster and Hustvedt are illustrative of the ways in which the two 
writers consciously, and unconsciously, cross the boundaries of the novelist-
identity of the other. These dialogic exchanges signify, on an emotional level as 
well as a technical one, a means of ongoing homage to their respective authorial 
identities, and their enduring marriage. 
  
                                                          
114 Buber, Between Man and Man, p. 97. 
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Chapter four: Literary visuality – phenomenology and ekphrasis 
 
Introduction 
 The previous chapter examined Hustvedt and Auster’s narrativisation of 
self-other dialectics through psychically-structured and socially-constructed 
otherness, in tacit acknowledgement of the ideas of Martin Buber, Mikhail 
Bakhtin and Jacques Lacan. This chapter will turn to Hustvedt and Auster’s 
assimilation of the different modes of phenomenological investigation described 
by Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, focusing principally upon how 
Hustvedt and Auster have narrativised aesthetic and ethical responses to visual art 
through intersubjective frameworks in their fiction. Hustvedt and Auster’s fictive 
representations of visual art – painting, sculpture and film in Hustvedt’s What I 
Loved; silent film in Auster’s The Book of Illusions – will provide a useful case 
study to illuminate Hustvedt’s proposition that ‘the experience of looking at visual 
art always involves a form of mirroring […] we are witnessing what remains of 
another person’s creative act, and through the artistic object we find ourselves 
embroiled in the drama of self and other’.1 This particular facet of Hustvedt and 
Auster’s embodied process of aesthetic expression, often deployed in tandem with 
other theories of self-other discourse (see Chapter three), moves their work 
                                                          
1 Siri Hustvedt, ‘Embodied Visions’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, pp. 338-9.  
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beyond postmodern ambivalence towards an ambiguity which implicates and 
engages the reader in a reciprocal dialogue.  
 Hustvedt’s fictional representations of the embodied response to 
phenomena both real and imagined – in a narrative sense – indicate a nuanced and 
highly idiosyncratic aesthetic response to phenomenological investigation. For 
Astrid Bolger, ‘few authors have tackled the complex relationship between 
looking and seeing, remembering and feeling’ with equal aesthetic and ethical 
power as Hustvedt, whose engagement with visual art through her fiction and 
non-fiction is ‘multi-layered and open-ended’ and ‘profoundly subjective and 
dialogical’.2 According to Carla Schulz-Hoffmann, Hustvedt makes a ‘vital 
contribution’ to the ‘contemporary debate about visual arts’ through her rigorous 
application of this postulate of ‘intersubjectivity’, of an open discourse between 
the artwork as an individual utterance of the artist and a responding viewer’.3 
Critical for Schultz-Hoffmann is Hustvedt’s ‘commitment to the emotionality of 
perception’ through these ekphrastic intersubjective frameworks, establishing a 
‘multiplicity of different participants’ which extend beyond the boundaries of the 
text.4  
                                                          
2 Astrid Böger, ‘‘I look and sometimes I see’: The Art of Perception in Siri Hustvedt’s Novels’ in Zones of 
Focused Ambiguity in Siri Hustvedt’s Works, ed. by Hartmann, Marks and Zapf (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 
Gmbh, 2016), pp. 281-95 (p. 281).  
3 Carla Schulz-Hoffmann, ‘‘What fascinate me are the journeys that begin with looking and only looking: Siri 
Hustvedt’s Visual Imagination’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity in Siri Hustvedt’s Works, ed. by Hartmann, 
Marks and Zapf (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter Gmbh, 2016), pp. 265-81 (p. 267). 
4 Schulz-Hoffman ‘Siri Hustvedt’s Visual Imagination’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity, ed. by Hartmann, 
Marks and Zapf, pp. 267-68. 
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 As addressed in the second chapter of this thesis, Auster’s work is 
commonly associated with the deconstructive strategies of postmodern fiction. His 
fictional depiction of the separation of action from meaning and language from 
the things it represents are often ascribed to the anti-logocentrist preoccupations 
of deconstruction. However, Auster’s largely unacknowledged interest in 
Buberian dialogism and phenomenology points towards a move from what many 
critics commonly identify as a postmodern literary mode of production, towards 
the ‘after postmodernism’ moment associated with his wife.5 This may partially 
be a product of his own philosophical investigations into solipsistic Cartesianism, 
or a deeper receptivity to phenomenology which corresponds with Hustvedt’s own 
appreciation of the discipline. As outlined elsewhere in this thesis, this receptivity 
can be seen as being drawn from the bond between two married writers, 
developed psychically through mutual recognition of their embodied relationship, 
and exhibited through emotionally-grounded empathy, verbal communication, 
their shared role as the other’s first reader and the dialogic intertextuality of their 
fiction.  
 Phenomenology is described by Robert C. Solomon as ‘the study of human 
consciousness; it is an attempt to define the ‘structures’ that are essential to any 
                                                          
5 Zapf’s identification of ‘a new attention to the relationship of texts to concrete, biographically-embedded 
subjects and to the wider context of the intersubjective life-world’ offers an alternative interpretive position to 
the ekphrastic techniques deployed by Auster in The Book of Illusions (see Zapf, ‘Narrative, Ethics and 
Postmodern Art in Siri Hustvedt’s What I Loved’ in Ethics in Culture, ed. by Erll, Grabes and Nünning, p. 
171). 
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and every possible existence’.6 The blurring of structuralist and phenomenological 
modes of representation identified by Simon During serves to remind us of the 
fluid nature of Hustvedt and Auster’s fiction.7 In an early interview Auster 
observes:  
It [my fiction] has to do with perception, the connection between seeing 
the world and speaking the world, what happens in that gap between the 
two. It is about trying to come to grips in language with things that elude 
understanding.8 
                                                          
6 Robert C. Solomon, ‘General Introduction: What is Phenomenology?’ in Phenomenology and 
Existentialism, ed. by Robert C. Solomon (Savage: Littlefield Adams Quality Paperbacks, 1980), pp. 1-39 (p. 
1). 
7 According to Simon During, ‘the movement [poststructuralism] did not simply move beyond structuralism: 
its deepest roots lay elsewhere – in the French reception of phenomenology’. What is ostensibly 
postmodernist perhaps reflects poststructuralism’s concerns with ‘ideal forms, finished, spatialized and 
totalized objects, objects that exist without an origin.’ For During, and many other commentators, notably 
Gayatri Spivak, Derrida’s decentered linguistics and logocentric crises are directly influenced by 
Heideggerian Dasein (or Being-in-the-world): an ‘existential analytic’ constituted by ‘anxiety at the 
instability and chanciness of its own being, by an experience of nullity and meaninglessness most intensely 
expressed in death’s simultaneous necessity and arbitrariness’ (Simon During, Foucault and Literature: 
Towards a Genealogy of Writing [London: Routledge, 1992], pp. 15-16; p. 20). Notwithstanding his 
disavowal of Derrida (see Chapter two), Auster’s enduring interest in European existentialism, particularly 
the texts of Franz Kafka, Knut Hamsun and Samuel Beckett, and his commitment to exploring the corollaries 
of chance and fate – albeit under the guise of a commitment to realism – are consciously, or unconsciously, 
indebted to Heidegger. Hustvedt, meanwhile, has highlighted Heidegger and Sartre’s debt to Soren 
Kierkegaard, who she contends ‘is so strong that other philosophers, Heidegger and Sartre especially, robbed 
the man blind’. Susanne Becker, ‘Deceiving the reader into truth’: A Conversation with Siri Hustvedt about 
The Blazing World’, Zones of Focused Ambiguity, ed. by Hartmann, Marks and Zapf, pp. 409-22 (p. 414).   
8 Auster, ‘Interview with Joseph Mallia’, BOMB, p. 25. 
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In another interview, Auster restates this interest in perception, Cartesianism and 
the elusive nature of epistemological knowledge, concepts attributable to Husserl:  
What it boils down to is the old mind-body problem. Descartes. Solipsism. 
Self and other, all the old philosophical questions. In the end, we know 
who we are because we can think about who we are. Our sense of self is 
formed by the pulse of consciousness within us – the endless monologue, 
the lifelong conversation with ourselves. And this takes place in absolute 
solitude.9  
Auster’s insistence on the ‘absolute solitude’ of self-consciousness might overlap 
with elements of Husserl’s transcendental reduction, sometimes referred to as the 
epoché or suspension: a distancing from daily life through which an intuitive 
understanding about consciousness and the essential nature of objects is arrived 
at.10 Certainly, Husserl’s philosophy and career were guided by a lifelong 
commitment to Cartesianism, with Husserl determining that ‘no philosopher of 
the past has affected the sense of phenomenology as decisively as Rene Descartes, 
France’s greatest thinker’.11 More importantly, Auster has already described his 
affinity for Merleau-Ponty’s model of embodied subjectivity, notably condensing 
                                                          
9 Auster, ‘Interview with Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory’ in Collected Prose, p. 559. In their basic 
formulations there appears to be overlap between Husserl’s model of subjectivity and Damasio’s 
autobiographical self; however, this extent of this overlap warrants more developed scrutiny than is possible 
or appropriate here. 
10 Edmund Husserl, The Paris Lectures, trans. by Peter Koestenbaum (Lancaster: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1985), p. 10; Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 2003), 
p. 45. 
11 Husserl, p. 3. 
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Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological model into the following observation: ‘The 
world is in my head. My body is in the world’.12 (Report 192) 
 Hustvedt’s own interest in phenomenology reflects an intuitive and 
complex understanding of embodied intersubjectivity drawn from Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty’s work, whereby ‘the world forms itself around me and begins to 
exist for me’.13  
The older I get, the more I realise that I’m a phenomenologist. I’ve been 
re-reading Merleau-Ponty and trying to get something out of the very 
difficult Husserl. I do know what interests me is human experience, always 
lived from a first-person point of view. Reality does not consist of things 
in themselves seen from a suprahuman perspective, but our shared 
intersubjective universe.14 
Her approach to phenomenological theory is wide-ranging, detailed and 
painstakingly rendered not just through her fiction, but in a number of non-
fictional texts, and is reinforced, according to Marks, by her interest in the 
                                                          
12 ‘1966-67. A year of much reading, perhaps more reading that at any other time in your life. Not just the 
poets but the philosophers as well. Berkeley and Hume…Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty…You can see 
traces of all four thinkers in those words of yours, but in the end it was Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology that 
said the most to you.’ (Report 192-93) In another example of the dialogical and collaborative nature of their 
literary marriage, it was Auster who introduced Hustvedt to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. See Appendix.  
13 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 
2002), p. ix. 
14 Siri Hustvedt, ‘Interview with Sean P. Carroll’, Bookslut (May 2008) < 
http://www.bookslut.com/features/2008_05_012791.php> [Accessed 27 January 2016]. Auster has said of 
Hustvedt ‘she reads Husserl on planes’. See Appendix. 
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dialogism of Mikhail Bakhtin and Martin Buber, who ‘defend the credo of 
mutuality and communication against the idealized sense of individuality and 
autonomy’ (see Chapter three).15 Hustvedt herself writes:  
The mutability that happens between people is indisputably real, and it 
cannot develop in isolation. What becomes an I is embedded in a you. We 
are inherently social beings and our brains and bodies grow through others 
in the early dynamics between a child and his parents, but also within a 
given language and culture as a whole.16 
The ‘pulse of consciousness’, the ambiguous phrase Auster deploys to describe 
subjectivity, points to the problematic nature of phenomenological inquiry. On the 
one hand hermetically self-contained, on the other dialogically-informed, there is 
a perpetual conundrum surrounding subjectivity. The nuanced differentiation 
between Hustvedt and Auster’s respective expressions of phenomenological 
interest gestures towards the enduring contradictions underpinning I-centeredness. 
 The very nature of this problematic paradigm is formulated around 
differing interpretations of the essence of consciousness, aided in no small part by 
the lack of concrete definitions to Husserl’s original investigations, as Christopher 
McCann records: ‘even if one turns to Husserl one cannot find any such set of 
[defining] principles, since Husserl kept on redefining what he meant by 
                                                          
15 Marks, p. 23. 
16 Hustvedt, ‘Embodied Visions’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, pp. 337-354; p. 338. 
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phenomenology’.17 Solomon isolates the split between Husserl’s attempts to 
reconcile epistemological, transcendental and ontological phenomenology, and 
the existential-ontological focus of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul 
Sartre, for whom consciousness is not viewed merely as ‘a knowing 
consciousness but as an acting, ‘willing’, deciding consciousness’.18 The split 
between these two branches of phenomenology is reiterated by Marks:  
While Husserl’s phenomenology reconfirms the existence of a Cartesian 
cogito and attempts to make sense of the presence of independent others 
from the point of view of a monadic existence, Merleau-Ponty moves the 
self beyond the safe limits of subjectivity and throws it into the world, in a 
state of symbiosis between self and other.19 
 As the founding father of phenomenology, a number of critical studies treat 
Husserl as a unifying figure whose work moved from epistemological philosophy 
(intentionality), via transcendental philosophy, to ontological philosophy 
(intersubjectivity).20 The key concepts underpinning his theories – intentionality, 
epoché and intersubjectivity – will come under consideration in the first section of 
this chapter. In the second section I will move onto Merleau-Ponty’s reading of 
Husserlian intersubjectivity, in order to introduce how Hustvedt and Auster have 
attempted to narrativise his ideas of embodied intersubjectivity: what Marks 
                                                          
17 Christopher McCann, Four Phenomenological Philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty 
(London: Routledge, 1993), p. 207. 
18 Solomon, p. 2. 
19 Marks, p. 41. 
20 Zahavi, p. 3; McCann, p. 205. 
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identifies as ‘an ontology of embodied connectedness’.21 The third and closing 
section will then turn to depictions of visual art in the fiction of Hustvedt and 
Auster. Particular focus will be given to their practice of ekphrasis, what James 
Heffernan labels ‘the verbal representation of graphic representation’.22  
 Ekphrasis can be treated as an exemplary model of phenomenological 
representation, and creative co-production which depends upon multiple 
subjectivities for its realisation and operates inside and outside of a text. Notable 
ekphrastic treatments of Hustvedt’s writings include a study of the text of What I 
Loved by Asbjørn Grønstad, for whom the novel ‘configures subjectivity, 
perspective and the logistics of looking in densely inflected and rather complex 
ways’.23 To date, very few critical studies link Auster’s work with the ekphrastic 
genre. Timothy Bewes and James Peacock respectively isolate the 
cinematographic and allegorical purposes of Auster’s filmic representations 
without pursuing the purpose of his ekphrastic motifs.24 Yet his novel The Book of 
Illusions includes extensive descriptions of imaginary silent movies, which are 
possessed of an ekphrastic power equivalent to that of Hustvedt’s imaginative 
rendering of artist Bill Weschler’s paintings and sculptures in her own novel, 
                                                          
21 Marks, p. 48. 
22 James A. Heffernan, ‘Ekphrasis and Representation’, New Literary History (22: 2, 1991), 297-316 (p. 299).  
23 Asbjørn Grønstad, ‘Ekphrasis Refigured – Writing Seeing in Siri Hustvedt’s What I Loved’, Mosaic (45: 3, 
2012), 33-48 (p. 41). 
24 Timothy Bewes, ‘Against the Ontology of the Present: Paul Auster’s Cinematographic Fictions’, Twentieth 
Century Literature (53: 3, 2007), 273-97; Jim Peacock, ‘Carrying the Burden of Representation: Paul 
Auster’s The Book of Illusions’, Journal of American Studies (40:1, 2006), 53-69.  
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What I Loved.25 This presents a unique opportunity to situate Auster’s ekphrastic 
techniques alongside those of Hustvedt.  
  
                                                          
25 Auster also deploys ekphrastic techniques in Moon Palace, Man in the Dark, Sunset Park, and the 
autobiographical diptych Winter Journal and Report from the Interior, with the latter including photographs 
and stills from films in a mode reminiscent of Roland Barthes’ Camera Lucida (1980) and the intermedial 
memoir-fiction of German writer and academic W.G. Sebald. 
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Husserlian intentionality 
 The origins of phenomenology have been invariably traced back to 
Cartesian epistemology, Kantian objectivism and Hegelian dialectics. Solomon in 
particular emphasises Husserl’s ‘Cartesian attention to the primacy of first-person 
experience’, in addition to his focus on ‘the Kantian search for basic ‘a priori’ 
principles’.26 For Marks, Husserl’s approach to intersubjectivity effects a 
reconciliation with Hegel’s investigations of self-other dynamics, particularly his 
desire to ‘sublate the difference between self and other into a unity of absolute 
spirit’ within a prototypical ‘system of identity’.27 The very hybridity of Husserl’s 
ideas, coupled with his diurnal reinterpretation of his own theories, inevitably 
generated conflicting interpretations of his ideas, resulting in the division between 
epistemological and ontological phenomenology delineated by Solomon and 
McCann. For Solomon, the central irony of Husserlian phenomenology is that the 
presuppositionless epistemology Husserl espoused created a circular theory 
favouring intuition over empiricism, description over interpretation, and a 
philosophy lacking in distinction between ‘method and result’.28 
 Despite these contradictions, Husserl’s major achievement was the 
establishment of a mode of investigation which effected a ‘radical conversion [of 
philosophy] from naïve objectivism to transcendental subjectivism’:29 
                                                          
26 Solomon, p. 1. 
27 Marks, p. 25. 
28 Solomon, p. 4-7. 
29 Husserl, p. 5. 
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It is the methodology through which I come to understand myself as that 
ego and life of consciousness in which and through which the entire 
objective world exists for, and is for me precisely as it is. Everything in the 
world, all spatio-temporal being, exists for me because I experience it, 
because I perceive it, remember it, think of it, judge it, value it, desire it.30  
According to Zahavi, all subsequent phenomenological approaches emerge from 
Husserl’s early investigations into intentionality, what Zahavi summarises as the 
‘object-directedness of consciousness’; for Husserl, this represents ‘the essence of 
consciousness, in which I live as my own self’.31 Consciousness, in Husserl’s 
world, ‘is always consciousness of something’;32 or rather, ‘nothing other than 
what I am aware of and what appears valid in such cogitations. The whole 
meaning and reality of the world rests exclusively on such cogitations’.33 The 
individual ego is structured by these cogitations, which in turn structure reality: 
the immanent world only exists through consciousness; objects only exist through 
our intention towards them. What creates meaning, or transcendence, within the 
immanent world is the intended act of perception within what Zahavi refers to as 
an experiential ‘mode of givenness’: without an object of intention upon which to 
fix, self-subjectivity cannot exist. Objects need not physically exist within the 
                                                          
30 Husserl, p.8. Again, here it is possible to discern a degree of theoretical overlap with Damasio’s 
neurobiological model of selfhood, moving from protoself to core and extended consciousness through one’s 
awareness of its temporal-spatial situatedness. 
31 Zahavi, p.3; Husserl, p. 12. 
32 Zahavi, p. 14. 
33 Husserl, p. 8. 
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perceptive field: they remain present within the ‘existence of an experience with 
the appropriate internal structure of object-directedness’:34  
Regardless of whether we are talking of a perception, thought, judgement, 
fantasy, doubt, expectation or a recollection, all of these diverse forms of 
consciousness are characterised by intending objects and cannot be 
perceived without a look at their objective correlate, that is, the perceived, 
doubted, expected object.35  
Teleologically-engendered subject-object relations are refocused within 
continually-evolving spatio-temporal contexts: that which we experience today 
may not be what we experience tomorrow.36 ‘True being’, Husserl surmises, 
‘whether real or ideal, has significance only as a particular correlate of my own 
intentionality, actual or potential’.37  
 Understanding perception within our worldly experience is guided by the 
intuition of a universal ideality of human consciousness ‘with a view toward 
disclosing certain special intuitions that yield necessary truths’:38 
                                                          
34 Zahavi, p. 21. Here one can discern a phenomenological inflection to the deconstructed textual strategies of 
The New York Trilogy and The Blindfold (see Chapter two). Equally, one can divine a Buberian structuring of 
self-other relations to those and other novels by Hustvedt and Auster, further reflecting the hybrid spatiality 
of their narratives.  
35 Zahavi, p. 14. 
36 Zahavi, p. 10. 
37 Husserl, p. 23. 
38 Solomon, p. 15-16. 
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These special intuitions are called ‘eidetic’ or ‘essential’ intuitions. 
Essential intuition is identified as intuition of the universal, which 
empirical intuition is sometimes called individual intuition.39 
Pure (transcendental) consciousness of the universal ideality can only be achieved 
through the epoché, which involves the suspension of ‘the reality of the objective 
world in general and the sciences of the world’:40  
Epoché eliminates as worldly facts from my field of judgement both the 
reality of the objective world in general and the sciences of the world. 
Consequently for me there exists no ‘I’ and there are no psychic actions, 
that is, psychic phenomena in the psychological sense.41 
From this psychic-decluttering, which enables us to see the ego cogito as one 
object within a nexus of immanent intentionality, Husserl insisted upon a pure 
epistemology untainted by philosophical, psychological or theoretical 
interpretation or commentary:  
Phenomenological experience as reflection must avoid all interpretative 
constructions. Its descriptions must reflect accurately the concrete contents 
of experience, precisely as they are experienced.42  
The epoché reduces the individual human ego to a transcendental ego capable of 
identifying and making sense of the transcendental ‘being of the world’, a world 
                                                          
39 Solomon, p. 15-16. 
40 Husserl, p. 10. 
41 Husserl, p. 10. 
42 Husserl, p. 13. 
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which consists solely of ‘pure phenomena of experience of pure cogitata’, 
concretely experienced or otherwise.43 This potentiality of experiential object-
directedness transgresses ‘the immediately and actually given events of the 
immediate sphere’ to ‘bring out manifold aspects of new experiences’.44 The 
transcendent ego shares in and forms a constituent part of ‘a universe of possible 
experiences’.45 All theories of knowledge must therefore fall under the aegis of 
subjectivity: objective meaning is only possible through ‘an infinite cohesion of 
synthetically connected acts’ drawn from our own ‘sensory creations’, as part of 
an ‘inexhaustibly infinite a priori’ experiential spatio-temporality.46   
 Husserl’s concept of ‘transcendent subjectivity’ presages and directly 
influences the ontologically-ordered intersubjectivity of Merleau-Ponty without 
disavowing the principal beliefs of his phenomenological investigations, I-
centeredness:  
To say, in my natural existence, ‘I am, I think, I live’ means that I am one 
human being among others in the world, that I am related to nature through 
my physical body, and that in this body my cogitations, perceptions, 
memories, judgements, are incorporated as psycho-physical facts.47 
Triggered by the epoché, the ego’s heightened epistemological sensibility firstly 
enables the individual to form ‘systems of intentionality, as well as to possess 
                                                          
43 Husserl, p. 14. 
44 Husserl, p. 19. 
45 Husserl, p. 25. 
46 Husserl, p. 29. 
47 Husserl, p. 9-10. 
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systems already formed’;48 secondly, what Husserl describes as the ‘spatial 
reality’ of existence, or the recognition of the concrete and potential presence of 
other objects, points towards the recognition and affirmation of other subjective 
entities:49 
I experience other minds in a unique manner. Not only do I experience 
them as spatial presentations psychologically interlaced with the realm of 
nature, but I also experience them as experiencing this self-same world 
which I experience…I experience the world not as my own private world 
but as an intersubjective world, one that is given to all human beings and 
which contains objects accessible to all.50 
In a quotidian sense, the individual ego remains isolated from the realm of the 
transcendental. Contra alterity, for Husserl sharing the perceptions or reading the 
views of others is a psycho-physical impossibility: we can only acknowledge the 
other as another self-conscious entity. However, empathic other-recognition can 
be arrived at through the acceptance of co-existence and co-experiential 
intentionality: 
I experience my own conscious existence directly and truly as it itself. 
This is not true of the consciousness of others, such as their sensations, 
perceptions, thinking, feeling, desiring. In my own self, however, these 
                                                          
48 Husserl, p. 23. 
49 Husserl, p. 32. 
50 Husserl, p. 34. 
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experiences of others appear in a secondary sense, as ‘co-experienced’ in 
the mode of a unique perception of similarity.51  
By establishing an alter-ego, the subjective individual is able to share in the world 
experience of the other, rather than recognising within that alter-ego a 
verisimilitude of otherness: what Zahavi terms a ‘congruity between one’s own 
experience and the other’s experience’.52  Preservation of Husserl’s favoured first-
person perspective determines our experience of, and experience through, the 
other, and a means of seeing one’s own self, as Marks concurs: ‘Self’s perception 
of other is a mere transfer, an intentional imagination, an inner process which 
preserves a distinct boundary’.53 
 As a perception-focused alternative approach to self-other dialectics, 
Husserlian phenomenology finds fertile ground within the hybrid spatiality of 
Hustvedt and Auster’s narratives. Moreover, within the three core principles of 
Husserlian phenomenology identified by Zahavi – intentionality, 
transcendentalism and intersubjectivity – it is possible to identify characteristics 
shared with the self-other dialectics of Lacanian poststructuralism and Buberian 
positionality (as discussed in Chapter three). Zahavi also comments upon the link 
between Husserlian intentionality and Lacanian objectification, being determined 
by the essential nature of consciousness, the role of the eidetic reduction in 
establishing object differentiality, and the distinction between the formal ontology 
                                                          
51 Husserl, p. 34-35. 
52 Zahavi, p. 117. 
53 Marks, p. 46. 
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of phenomenology (what it means to be an object) and the material ontology of 
linguistics (its essential structures and characteristics).54 There are, moreover, no 
specific references to the unconscious in Husserl’s writing, as to Husserl the 
unconscious exists within the horizon of transcendental subjectivity. Unlike 
Buber’s model of mutuality, Husserlian subjectivity is not directly disclosed 
through dialogue with the other. Bakhtin’s socially-constructed subject falls into 
the embodied system of object-focused intentionality established by Husserl and 
reconfigured by Merleau-Ponty.55 However, as Marks’ study into relationality in 
Hustvedt’s work shows, Hustvedt’s deployment of intersubjective frameworks 
within her fiction necessitates the utilisation of multiple subjective positions; 
positions established and patrolled by sometimes conflicting theories. The 
ambiguity of Hustvedt’s fiction frees up spatial territory for these expressions of 
subjectivity, while inviting another subjective entity – the reader – to engage with 
and interpret them. To understand how both Hustvedt and Auster’s respective 
approaches to intersubjectivity have developed, it is necessary to look at the 
phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty.  
 
  
                                                          
54 Zahavi, pp. 29, 37.  
55 According to Michael Holquist, Bakhtin viewed perception as ‘an act of authoring’, with the gap between 
mind and world establishing a model of consciousness ‘based on otherness’. For Bakhtin, ‘existence, like 
language, is a shared event’ framed by the symbiotic simultaneity of dialogism (Michael Holquist, 
Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World [London: Routledge, 1990], p. 7; p. 18; p. 28). Buber’s position on 
perception aligns with that of Bakhtin. 
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Merleau-Ponty’s embodied subjectivity 
 At the close of Paris Lectures, Husserl suggests that ‘transcendental 
phenomenology is ipso facto the true and genuine universal ontology…the path of 
universal self- knowledge, first in a monadic then in an intermonadic sense’.56 
Husserl’s establishment of intentionality, transcendentalism and intersubjectivity 
as the bases of phenomenology were subsequently developed by a number of 
philosophers, most notably Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty’s key text, The 
Phenomenology of Perception, opens with a lengthy reading of Husserl’s work. 
While many practitioners of what Solomon identifies as ‘existential 
phenomenology’ consciously broke with Husserl’s transcendent epistemology in 
favour of a conditional ontology more closely aligned to the philosophies of 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Soren Kierkegaard,57 according to McCann Merleau-
                                                          
56 Husserl, p. 38. 
57 Any study into Hustvedt’s work which declines to mention the influence of the Danish philosopher Soren 
Kierkegaard finds itself on dangerous ground. Hustvedt borrows from the central structural conceit of 
Either/Or: A Fragment of Life (1843) for her novel The Blazing World, whose narrative is freighted with 
Kierkegaard’s philosophical principles. (Husserl is also referred to in the text). In an interview with Susanne 
Becker, Hustvedt describes Harry as a ‘Kierkegaardian figure…Like S.K. she is too clever, too ironic, too 
brilliant for her own good and she suffers because others cannot understand what she is up to’ (Becker, 
‘Deceiving the reader into truth’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity, ed. by Hartmann, Marks and Zapf, p. 414). 
Hustvedt’s latest essay collection A Woman Looking at Men Looking at Women contains ‘Kierkegaard’s 
Pseudonymns and the Truths of Fiction’, which was delivered as a keynote lecture at the University of 
Copenhagen in 2013. While Hustvedt’s is the stronger interest, there is a shared affinity for Kierkegaard: 
close to the conclusion of Portrait of an Invisible Man Auster includes a quote from Fear and Trembling 
(1843): ‘he who is prepared to work gives birth to his own father’ (Auster, ‘The Invention of Solitude’ in 
Collected Prose, p. 60). One can perhaps perceive this affinity in the ambiguous interplay of commitment and 
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Ponty’s retracing of Husserl’s steps through the epistemological, transcendental 
and ontological planes produces a stronger affinity to his predecessor.58 
 Phenomenology, according to Merleau-Ponty, offers ‘…a philosophy 
which puts essences back into existence, and does not expect to arrive at an 
understanding of man and the world from any starting point other than that of 
their ‘facticity’’.59 Like Husserl, Merleau-Ponty views phenomenology as ‘the 
study of essences…the essence of perception, or the essence of consciousness’,60 
and his development of an experiential phenomenology is largely founded upon 
the object-directed principles of Husserlian intentionality: 
Our perception ends in objects […] To see an object is either to have it on 
the fringe of the visual field, and be able to concentrate on it, or else 
respond to this summons by actually concentrating upon it. When I do 
concentrate my eye on it, I become anchored in it, but this coming to rest 
of the gaze is merely a modality of its movement: I confirm inside one 
object the exploration which earlier hovered over them all, and in one 
movement I close up the landscape and open up the object.61 
                                                          
ambivalence in their respective narratives, while the motif of shaking, trembling or ontological estrangement 
is one that frequently recurs throughout their writing.   
58 McCann, p. 206. 
59 Merleau-Ponty, p. vii. Merleau-Ponty’s use of the term ‘facticity’ remains problematic, as Solomon 
records: ‘one can never ascertain with confidence which features of our ‘situation’ are given to us and fixed 
from without (facticity) and which features of our situation are created by us (transcendence or possibility)’ 
(Solomon, p. 36).  
60 Merleau-Ponty, p. vii. 
61 Merleau-Ponty, p. 77-78. 
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Perception, for Merleau-Ponty, is ‘the background from which all acts stand out, 
and is presupposed by them’; the world ‘the natural setting of, and field for, all 
my thoughts and my explicit perceptions’; the body, ‘my point of view upon the 
world, as one of the objects of that world’; society is ‘coexistence involving an 
indefinite number of consciousnesses’.62 ‘The world’, Merleau-Ponty offers in 
summary, ‘is not what I think, but what I live through’.63 
 This is particularly critical for Hustvedt, for whom perception is a 
‘dynamic process’ which oversees a ‘mutual collapsing of subject and object’.64 It 
is principally Merleau-Ponty’s focus on the embodied essence of consciousness 
which challenges the Cartesian foundations of Husserlian phenomenology, 
situating his own investigations firmly in the ontological field rather than the 
epistemological. Contra Husserl, Merleau-Ponty insists upon the embodied nature 
of being, underpinned by the concept of embodied consciousness: ‘To see is to 
enter a universe of beings which display themselves […] Any seeing of an object 
by me is instantaneously reiterated among all those objects in the world which are 
apprehended as coexistent’.65 We only know that which is given to us through the 
physically-constituted field of perception. Consciousness and existence are of 
                                                          
62 Merleau-Ponty, p. xi; p. 81 ; p. 406.. 
63 Merleau-Ponty, p. xviii. 
64 Schulz-Hoffman, ‘Siri Hustvedt’s Visual Imagination’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity, ed. by Hartmann, 
Marks and Zapf, p. 277. 
65 Merleau-Ponty, p. 79. 
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equal constituency, and ‘the thing, and the world, are given to me along with the 
parts of my body’:66  
The theory of the body schema is, implicitly, a theory of perception. We 
have relearned to feel our body; we have found underneath the objective 
and detached knowledge of the body that other knowledge which we have 
of it by virtue of its always being with us and of the fact that we are our 
body.67 
What Marks parses as ‘an ontology of embodied connectedness’ generates 
symbiotic systems of subjective simultaneity; a nexus of otherness which is 
physically defined, socially interconnected, and psychologically intersubjective:68     
The Cogito must reveal me in a situation, and it is on this condition alone 
that transcendental subjectivity can, as Husserl puts it, be an 
intersubjectivity…The world, which I distinguished from myself as the 
totality of things or of processes linked by causal relationships, I 
rediscover ‘in me’ as the permanent horizon of all my cogitations and as a 
dimension in relation to which I am constantly situating myself.69 
                                                          
66 Merleau-Ponty, p. 237. 
67 Merleau-Ponty, p. 239. 
68 Marks, p. 48. 
69 Merleau-Ponty, p. xiv. 
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 As with Heidegger and Sartre, according to Solomon Merleau-Ponty’s 
departure from Husserl pivots upon the rejection of the epoché.70 For Merleau-
Ponty, ‘the most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the 
impossibility of a complete reduction’,71 as it is guided by the spatio-temporal 
constraints of self-subjectivity: 
We cannot subject our perception of the world to philosophical scrutiny 
without ceasing to be identified with that act of positing the world, with 
that interest in it which delimits us, without drawing back from our 
commitment which is itself thus made to appear as a spectacle, without 
passing from the fact of our existence to its nature, from the Dasein to the 
Wesen.72 
Reconfiguring the phenomenological reduction as ‘reflection’, Merleau-Ponty 
illustrates his greater pleasure through the discovery of ‘vision, not as ‘thinking 
about seeing’, to use Descartes’ expression, but as a gaze at grips with a visible 
world’.73 The visible world becomes that which is known to us through our bodily 
orientation; therefore acknowledgement of one’s own gaze constitutes a tacit 
recognition of the gaze of the other: 
                                                          
70 Solomon, p. 21. Solomon describes the epoché as a process which ‘forces us to describe consciousness and 
its objects rather than the world and its objects’: a position which the existentialists, notably Sartre with his 
famous declaration that ‘existence comes before essence’, continually challenged (Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Existentialism and Humanism, trans. Philip Mairet [London: Methuen, 1989], p. 26).  
71 Merleau-Ponty, p.  xv. 
72 Merleau-Ponty, p. xvi. 
73 Merleau-Ponty, p. 409. 
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The other can be evident to me because I am not transparent for myself, 
and because my subjectivity draws its body in its wake. […] The other is 
not shut up inside my perspective of the world, because this perspective 
itself has no definite limits, because it slips spontaneously into the other’s, 
and because both are brought together in the one single world in which we 
are all participants as anonymous subjects of perception.74  
Marks contends that Hustvedt and Merleau-Ponty ‘share their emphasis on the 
dialogue between body and world, and on the inseparability of the self from its 
environment’.75 Auster, as we have seen, also shares this emphasis. Without 
interacting with and being penetrated by a world of otherness, the self remains 
incomplete:76 
The positioning of the object…makes us go beyond the limits of our actual 
experience which is brought up against and halted by an alien being, with 
the result that finally experience believes that it extracts all its own 
teaching from the object. It is this ek-stase [ekstasis] of experience which 
causes all perception to be perception of something.77 
                                                          
74 Merleau-Ponty, p. 411. 
75 Marks, p. 50. 
76 Marks, p. 49. 
77 Merleau-Ponty, p. 81. There is a curious similarity between Merleau-Ponty’s language (‘alien being’) and 
that of Lacan (the ‘alienating exteriority’ described in the mirror stage): a quirk of translation perhaps, or 
further evidence of their utilisation of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic; Marks notes that Lacan and Merleau-
Ponty both attended the French philosopher Alexandre Kojève’s lectures on Hegel in the mid-1940s (Marks, 
p. 58).  
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In this sense, Merleau-Ponty seeks to break with the hermetic paradigm of 
Husserl’s Cartesian transcendental subjectivity, reconstitutes Kant’s a priori 
principles with a focus on the existential nature of being, and reconfigures Hegel’s 
master-slave discourse as the basis of intersubjective engagement.  
 Moreover, like Husserl, his phenomenology effects a partial reconciliation 
with Buber’s philosophy of dialogism, Bakhtin’s socially-constructed 
consciousness and Lacan’s psychically-structured unconscious (see Chapter 
three). Language, aesthetics and meaning are the products of experiential being: 
‘because we are in the world, we are condemned to meaning’.78 The production of 
meaning through language is triggered by our apprehension of the dialogical role 
of the other: 
There is one particular object which is destined to play a crucial role in the 
perception of other: language. In the experience of dialogue there is 
constituted between the other person and myself a common ground…We 
have here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of 
behaviour in my transcendental field; we are collaborators for each other 
in consummate reciprocity.79 
The essential characteristic of transcendental subjectivity is not found in the 
tautologically-limited epoché, but the intersubjectively-coexistent domain of 
perspective. Hustvedt in particular utilises Merleau-Ponty’s concept of embodied 
perception to interrogate how and why human beings produce and respond to the 
                                                          
78 Merleau-Ponty, p. xxii. 
79 Merleau-Ponty, p. 412. 
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visual language of particular artworks: ‘Producing art includes a drive to make 
something, an embodied intentionality. […] Art necessarily establishes a 
relationship between the artist and an imaginary reader, viewer or listener: it is 
inherently dialogical’.80 The ekphrastic technique is predicated upon this notion of 
dialogue between subject and object, viewer and viewed, and writer and reader, an 
indeterminate spatio-temporal zone where ‘our perspectives merge into each other 
and we co-exist through a common world’.81 Marks states: 
In her conceptualization of vision and visual art, Siri Hustvedt accentuates 
this ambivalence of the other’s presence […] Hustvedt highlights how the 
perception of other people, as well as the perception of artworks, reflects 
identity constellations governed either by intersubjective exchange or 
subject-object domination.82 
In Marks’ reading of Hustvedt’s novels, the gaze of the other can be objectifying 
or affirmative, reflective or invasive. Perception is a process of intersubjective 
exchange or subject-object domination, underscored by the idea of seeing or being 
seen. Art constitutes part of an ‘interactive field’ within a ‘field of intertextuality’. 
Yet, one aspect of intersubjectivity that Marks’ otherwise excellent study leaves 
unaddressed is how this shared perception is achieved through a dialogic 
aesthetics of co-production, ekphrasis being the exemplary aesthetic practice in 
                                                          
80 Hustvedt, ‘Embodied Visions’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 342 
81 Merleau-Ponty, pp. 412-13. 
82 Marks, pp. 54-55. 
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the linguistic-phenomenological field. To understand how Hustvedt and Auster 
approach intersubjectivity in their art, we must look at the ekphrastic method.  
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Narrativising seeing 
 Ekphrasis is the means by which visual objects are rendered linguistically 
in a particular text: what has been invariably referred to as a ‘literary mode’,83 a 
‘technique of persuasion’,84 and an ‘intertextual, intermedial genre: loose; shifting 
over time; merging…into the discourses of art history and the textuality of 
anthropology and cultural studies’.85 Heffernan traces the emergence of ekphrasis 
as a literary principle back to a 1967 essay by Murray Kreiger, which identified 
poetic ekphrasis as a means of slowing and stilling what he terms the ‘plastic 
spatiality of objects’ within a text.86 More recent studies of ekphrasis delineate a 
multiplicity of practical applications and interpretative possibilities:  
Ekphrasis now seems to present countless opportunities for the discovery 
of meaning: it has been variously treated as a mirror of the text, a mirror in 
the text, a mode of specular inversion, a further voice that disrupts or 
extends the message of the narrative, a prefiguration for that narrative 
(whether false or true) in its suggestions.87  
Shadi Bartsch and Jas Eisner note that ‘the moment of ekphrasis can be and has 
been characterised as gendered, spatial, ephiphanic, mute, appealing to the 
audience in the text or outside the text, or to no one but its speaker in the text – 
                                                          
83 Heffernan, p. 298. 
84 Frank J. D’Angelo, ‘The Rhetoric of Ekphrasis’ , JAC (18:3, 1998), 439-497 (p. 440).  
85 Valerie Cunningham, ‘Why Ekphrasis?’, Classical Philology (102: 1, 2007), 57-71 (p. 60). 
86 Heffernan, p. 298. 
87 Shadi Bartsch and Jas Eisner, ‘Introduction: Eight Ways of Looking at an Ekphrasis’, Classical Philology 
(102: 1, 2007), i-iv (p. i). 
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and even as closing off the possibility of interpretation’.88 Elsewhere, Frank D. 
Angelo emphasises the rhetorical role of ‘narration and praising and blaming’ in 
the classical conception of ekphrasis (prosopoeia).89 Critical to either mode of 
ekphrastic praxis is a concomitant commitment to ‘clarity and vividness’: ‘the 
means by which the speaker or writer enables the audience to absorb the work of 
art into the mind. Clarity and vividness help the speaker to create an illusion that 
elicits an imaginative response from the viewer’.90 Ekphrasis is therefore best 
conceived as a dialogic co-production: an intersubjective exchange between 
author and reader. 
 According to Valerie Cunningham, the ekphrastic technique is inherently 
phenomenological, ‘pointing at an allegedly touchable, fingerable, thisness. It lays 
claim to the absolute thereness of an aesthetic object’.91 In postmodernist and 
metamodernist fiction, ekphrasis ironically engages with the poststructuralist 
suspicion of linguistic certainty, where ‘writing is always tormented by the 
question of real presence, by challenges of knowability, by the problematics of 
truth and validity’, while offering the reader something authentic, concretised, and 
tangibly ‘real’ within the framework of the narrative.92 Ekphrasis explores the 
‘tension between the realist, presencing, logocentric desire and the counter-
                                                          
88 Bartsch and Eisner, p. i. 
89 D’Angelo, p. 441. 
90 D’Angelo, pp. 441-12. 
91 Cunningham, p. 61. 
92 Cunningham, p. 61. 
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pressure of absence’.93 Under the conditions of ekphrasis, the object-directed 
consciousness of Husserlian phenomenology merges with the embodied 
connectedness of Merleau-Ponty, thereby triggering within the text a proliferation 
of meaning-framing functions:  
The enactment of multiple views within the space of ekphrasis and the 
parallelism of those views with the multiple viewings…suggest that 
ekphrasis itself may function as a space in which to challenge and rethink 
one’s viewings, to refashion one’s subjectivity.94 
Hustvedt and Auster use ekphrastic techniques to illustrate how 
phenomenological investigation, like selfhood, is embodied, mobile and mutable.  
 If consciousness and perception constitute a dialogic co-production 
predicated upon the pre-cognitive coexistence of embodied individuals, then texts 
and artworks are also produced in this way: as Hustvedt writes, ‘all visual art 
implies a spectator’.95 Describing the meaning-making possibilities of ekphrasis, 
Bartsch and Eisner refer to the importance of the intersubjective split, or ‘gap’, 
which makes imaginative co-production possible: ‘the gap between images and 
                                                          
93 Cunningham, p. 71. 
94 Bartsch and Eisner, p. iii. 
95 Hustvedt, ‘Embodied Visions’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 342. In a 1975 essay on the work of the 
painter David Reed, Auster similarly comments upon the physical nature of the artworks: ‘By allowing us to 
imagine his hand, by allowing us to see his hand, he has exposed us to the serious task of seeing…It pushes 
the artist out from the shadows, leaving him with nowhere to stand but in the painting itself. And in order for 
us to look at one of these works, we have no choice but to go in there with him’ (Paul Auster, ‘Black on 
White: Recent paintings by David Reed’ in Collected Prose, pp. 400-402 [p. 402]).   
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the words that evoke them is a space to reflect upon or point to other gaps, 
especially the undefined space beyond the materiality of art and the textuality’.96 
The separation recalls Freud’s Tummelplatz, Buber’s betweenness, or Voegelin’s 
metataxis. It also implies Hustvedt and Auster’s acknowledgement of the co-
productive relationship between reader and writer (see Chapter one). Hustvedt and 
Auster’s deployment of ekphrastic techniques explore the ambiguous boundaries 
between subject and object, viewer and viewed and writer and reader, while 
giving further indication of the collaborative qualities of their dialogic, and indeed 
intermedial, fiction. 
 Hustvedt’s observation that all artworks presuppose a viewer 
problematizes the continued critical and commercial preoccupation with artistic 
integrity and independence of aesthetic spirit. The process of artistic production is 
frequently initiated psychically and physically by one individual purposefully 
moving from intentionality of consciousness toward the conscious act of aesthetic 
intention. The contradistinctions within the field of phenomenology complicate 
the artistic act further: Husserl may argue that art emerges from self-
consciousness to enter the realm of intentionality and transcendent subjectivity; 
under Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological methodology, aesthetic intention 
constitutes a concretised expression of ontological givenness. We see an 
                                                          
96 Bartsch and Eisner, p. iv. Marks similarly identifies this gap, drawing on a quote from Victor Burgin which 
describes the Barthesian text as a ‘‘space’ between the object and the reader/viewer – a space made up of 
endlessly proliferating meanings which have no stable points of origin, nor of closure’ (Victor Burgin, The 
End of Art Theory: Criticism and Postmodernity [Houndsmiths; Macmillan, 1986], p. 73, [qtd. in Marks, p. 
61]. Buber and Voegelin’s theories are similarly intertwined within this hybrid spatiality. 
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indication of this problematic in Auster’s avocation of the ‘power of restraint’ in 
art:  
This is where the tension in art comes from. And that’s where all the real 
feeling comes from. The sense that there is a whole life behind every 
statement made, that there is a whole world echoing behind the words that 
are spoken. If you try to say everything, you don’t wind up saying very 
much at all.97  
The artistic act must by necessity be an expression of being in the world; it is an 
embodied process through which the artist establishes and retains independence, 
intention and originality within the intersubjective universality.  
 Notwithstanding collaborative artworks which are produced by a number 
of artists, the intention to commit to the aesthetic act is always decisively taken.98 
Moreover, after being triggered by the psychical impulses within a given 
individual, art requires the coordination of motor-sensory functions, acquisition of 
materials, establishment of procedures and certain spatio-temporal conditions to 
enable its production. This is reflected not simply in the very detailed rendering of 
an artist’s life and work through their subjective narratives; nor in the highly 
idiosyncratic artists and artworks depicted in their texts; but, more pertinently, in 
                                                          
97 Auster, Contat and Waters, ‘The Manuscript in the Book’, p. 187. 
98 There are, of course, exceptions: the cut up techniques of William Burroughs and Bryon Gysin, the 
automatic writing of Gertrude Stein or the Imagist poetry of William Carlos Williams; the art brut of Marcel 
Duchamp, the abstract figurations of Jackson Pollock; the improvised free jazz of Ornette Coleman. Even 
these adhere to a given form and method of production which has been arrived at intentionally through the 
phenomenological field. 
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the fact that Hustvedt and Auster opted to write (and publish) novels which 
meditate upon the nature of art and visual representation: The Book of Illusions in 
2002, and What I Loved in 2003.99 Whether this process was initiated consciously 
or unconsciously, it remains an arresting coincidence. Both writers have been 
keen to differentiate their own work from that of the other. If the purpose of this 
thesis is to indicate how their work connects in a dialogic, collaborative and 
intersubjective way, the counter-argument necessarily stresses the absence of any 
felt connection. In the following three sections I will explore this idea of 
subjective aesthetics within a phenomenological framework: first addressing 
Husserlian intentionality and I-centeredness, then moving on to Merleau-Ponty’s 
approach to intersubjectivity, before looking at how Hustvedt and Auster use 
ekphrastic techniques to delineate and problematize the tropes of identity, 
relationality and aesthetic valorisation within their fiction.  
 
1: Intentionality and aesthetics 
 As an exploration of the emotionally-intertwined lives of two New York 
families in the 1970s, Hustvedt’s What I Loved is an inherently phenomenological 
text. Characters, events and artworks are described through the first-person 
narration of art historian and academic Leo Hertzberg. Leo’s life changes 
irrevocably after buying a painting by New York artist Bill Weschler, whom he 
subsequently arranges to meet:  
                                                          
99 A defining characteristic of Hustvedt’s authorial persona is the engagement with visual art through writing.  
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Even on that first day, I felt Bill’s asceticism, his almost brutal desire for 
purity and his resistance to compromise. The feeling came from both what 
he said and his physical presence. He was calm, soft-spoken, a little 
retrained in his movements, and yet an intensity of purpose emanated from 
him and seemed to fill up the room. Unlike other large personalities, Bill 
wasn’t loud or arrogant or uncommonly charming. Nevertheless, when I 
stood next to him and looked at the paintings, I felt like a dwarf who had 
just been introduced to a giant. (Loved 10) 
In this first meeting, Hustvedt plays upon the Hegelian tension between self-
determination and other-transgression, while Leo’s unfolding portrait of Bill 
valorises his artistic ‘intensity of purpose’. He notices Bill’s physical 
dishevelment, a state of disorder echoed by the chaotic plenitude of objects, 
particularly books, in his loft apartment.100 For Leo, these signify ‘not only Bill’s 
poverty but his obliviousness to the objects of domestic life…He remained 
curiously unattached to the places where he lived and blind to the details of their 
arrangements’. (Loved 10) Bill’s apparent blindness to the objective order of 
things contrasts sharply with his perceptivity as an artist, a trait underscored by 
Leo’s comment that ‘I decided that his almost magical appeal had something to do 
with his eyes’: his physical presence belies his ability to intuitively perceive the 
essential value of certain objects and individuals. Leo contrasts the power of Bill’s 
gaze with what he perceives to be his elusive nature: ‘When he looked at me, he 
                                                          
100 The towers of books described by Iris in Hustvedt’s earlier novel, The Blindfold, are represented here for 
an alternative, more overtly phenomenological purpose. 
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did so directly and without embarrassment, but at the same time I sensed his 
inwardness, his distraction…Bill gave off an air of autonomy so complete, it was 
irresistible’.101 Bill’s consciously-constructed hermetic identity is reiterated by his 
anecdotal recollection of dispensing with a significant sum of money as an act of 
‘independence’. (Loved 14)  Finally, commenting upon Leo’s purchase of his 
painting, Bill says: ‘I’ve been working for ten years. Dealers have rejected the 
work hundreds of times…I don’t ask that anyone be interested. Why should they 
be interested? I’m wondering why you are interested’. (Loved 12)  
 By depicting their encounter in this way, Hustvedt suggests that mutability 
and mutuality are intrinsic characteristics of artist and artwork: Leo is ‘reading’ 
Bill as Bill is ‘reading’ Leo. Each emerges through the flux of perception and 
transcendent subjectivity as the intended object for the other. Their dialogue 
catalyses and concretises the intersubjective basis of their relationship as it 
unfolds. Discussing ‘skin in paintings’, (Loved 11) Leo and Bill exchange 
interests and influences: a metonymically-rendered, gendered deconstruction by 
Hustvedt of masculine power dynamics, and an ironic comment upon the 
ambivalence and occasional antipathy between artist and critic (and reader and 
writer). Conversely, the conceptual artist Bill constitutes as a symbiotic other for 
the art historian Leo: Leo enters Bill’s loft – the spatio-temporal zone of his self-
consciousness made concrete – in much the same way as he enters his figurative 
art. When Leo explains how he likes ‘ambiguity…not knowing where to look on 
                                                          
101 Siri Hustvedt, What I Loved (London: Sceptre, 2003), p. 9. Hereafter referred to in the text as WIL with 
page numbers cited. 
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his canvases’, (Loved 12) it seems to empathically echo an earlier remark by Bill: 
‘That’s the problem with seeing things. Nothing is clear. Feelings, ideas shape 
what is in front of you. In my work I wanted to create doubt…because that’s what 
we are sure of’ (Loved 12): 
‘‘Seeing is flux,’’ he said. I mentioned the hidden narratives in his work 
and he said that for him stories were like blood running through a body – 
paths of a life. It was a revealing metaphor and I never forgot it. As an 
artist, Bill was hunting the unseen in the seen. The paradox was that he had 
chosen to present this invisible movement in figurative painting, which is 
nothing if not a frozen apparition – a surface. (Loved 13)      
The strength of Bill’s monadic identity gradually yields to the affirmative power 
of Leo’s penetrative gaze and empathic aestheticism: the meeting becomes the 
moment ‘when a meandering conversation between two men took an irrevocable 
turn toward friendship’. (Loved 15) Bill’s commitment to independence is evident 
– yet it is provisional and problematized by Leo’s verbal portrait of him. Leo’s 
recording of Bill’s ‘inwardness…distraction…autonomy’ both counters and 
reinforces Marks’ identification of Hustvedt’s emphasis of ‘boundary subversions 
that exhibit the monadic shell of individual existence as a porous, stable and 
illusory construct’.102 In this short passage, Hustvedt both establishes and 
collapses the boundaries of subjectivity between the two men, generating future 
opportunities to apprehend interconnectedness within her narrative.  
                                                          
102 Marks, p. 47. 
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 The artist-critic dichotomy is configured differently in The Book of 
Illusions, although its very presence further serves to reiterate the dialogically 
intertextual nature of Hustvedt and Auster’s fiction. Auster’s novel is similarly 
composed of a series of self-reflexive first-person recollections, whilst being 
‘haunted by theological and eschatological questions’ that are more implicitly 
rendered in Hustvedt’s text.103 The Book of Illusions foregrounds Auster’s 
apprehension of what Zimmer refers to as ‘the burden of representation’: a 
problematic nexus of seen and unseen, real and imagined, within which myriad 
conflicting subjective responses are stimulated. Peacock’s observation that 
Auster’s novel interrogates ‘whether art enhances life, precludes life or is in fact 
the only life we have’ effectively delineates the phenomenological grounding of 
the novel.104 His apposite summation could equally be applied to the narrative 
framing of What I Loved; but, unlike the neo-realist linearity of that text, Auster’s 
narrative unfolds within what Peacock terms a ‘rhizomatic structure’, which 
‘disallows, even as it seems to invite, a spiritual trajectory, which culminates in 
death, salvation and resurrection’.105 
 In The Book of Illusions, Auster’s artist, the spectral silent film actor, 
producer and director Hector Mann, comprises an elusive, illusory other-presence 
to his amanuensis biographer and critical advocate, David Zimmer. The narrative 
opens with a typically Austerian declaratory statement: ‘everyone thought he was 
                                                          
103 Peacock, ‘Carrying the Burden of Representation’, p. 54 
104 Peacock, ‘Carrying the Burden of Representation’, p. 54.  
105 Peacock, ‘Carrying the Burden of Representation’, p. 68. 
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dead’.106 For much of the novel Mann exists tantalisingly outside of Zimmer’s 
immediate perceptive field, only presenting himself as an actor in a silent movie: a 
simulacrum of his embodied identity. The mysterious Mann crafts a multiple-
identity mythos that covers his true self like a cloak of invisibility, an act of 
artistic self-deconstruction which Zimmer’s critical monograph, The Silent World 
of Hector Mann, tacitly acknowledges: ‘When my book about his films was 
published in 1988, Hector Mann had not been heard from in almost sixty years’. 
(Illusions 1) Mann’s very disappearance from ‘the world of things’ metonymically 
reconfigures Husserlian I-centeredness, inviting the continually-thwarted object-
directedness of Zimmer’s gaze, who repeatedly attempts to glean a glimmer of 
Mann’s givenness from the transcendent, translucent celluloid that framed his 
existence: ‘I wanted to share my enthusiasm for Hector’s work. The story of his 
life was secondary to me’. (Illusions 3) According to Peacock, the ungraspable 
slipperiness of Mann’s life and films ‘embody the deliquescence of the real 
through the proliferation of representations’; his life ‘a series of disguises, of 
shifting identities’; his films reflecting and enacting ‘the permeable and 
amorphous frames through which every person and every action is viewed’.107 
However, Zimmer’s fixation with Mann’s silent movies focuses on their objective 
quality; representational immanence seems to elevate them above the temporal-
spatial concreteness of Zimmer’s quotidian existence:  
                                                          
106 Paul Auster, The Book of Illusions (London: Faber, 2002), p. 1. Hereafter referred to in the text as Illusions 
with page number cited. 
107 Peacock, ‘Carrying the Burden of Representation’, pp. 63-5. 
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I was witnessing a dead art, a wholly defunct genre that would never be 
practiced again. And yet, for all the changes that had occurred since then, 
their work was as fresh and invigorating as it had been when it was first 
shown. That was because they had understood the language they were 
speaking. They had invented a syntax of the eye, a grammar of pure 
kinesis…It was thought translated into action, human will expressing itself 
through the human body, and therefore it was for all time. (Illusions 15) 
Zimmer’s highly subjective ‘close reading’ of Mann’s art derives from a period of 
near-monastic, psychical solitude following the sudden death of his wife and 
children. Mann’s films trigger within Zimmer an attempt at abreacting this earlier 
trauma, an ultimately fruitless act which deepens the irresolute teleological basis 
of Mann’s disappearance, and Zimmer’s own defeated sense of nihilism.108 His 
obsessional absorption in Mann’s films, a vanishing act of his own, is shadowed 
by a visit to the doctor to demand ‘oblivion’, sensory separation from the world of 
things: ‘I had never lost track of myself so thoroughly’. (Illusions 25)  
 In an inversion of the narrative trajectory of Hustvedt’s novel, Auster 
sustains the physical split between critic and artist for much of the narrative, while 
allowing an inference of psychical overlap. Each man comes to perform the 
intended object function for the other. However, like Hustvedt’s depiction of the 
Weschler-Hertzberg relationship, as the narrative progresses the physical-
                                                          
108 Auster’s treatment of the latency of traumatic affect deploys a degree of ‘backshadowing’ with that of 
Quinn in The New York Trilogy. A detailed exploration of Hustvedt and Auster’s approach to trauma will 
follow in the next chapter. 
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psychical boundaries separating Zimmer and Mann inexorably begin to close. 
This reification of Mann’s existence ought to signify an attempt by Auster’s to 
resolve the contradistinction between the epistemological and ontological basis of 
consciousness. Instead, the parabolic nature of the narrative structure transmutes 
into a deeper, more impregnable paradox. When Mann and Zimmer finally meet, 
it is part of a carefully orchestrated encounter managed by Mann’s biographer, 
Alma Grund. The meeting is limned by a number of intertextual gestures towards 
Hustvedt’s novel. Zimmer describes entering a poorly lit room, contrasting with 
the natural light of Bill’s studio: ‘the illumination was sufficient for me to see 
Hector’s face, to look into his eyes. A pale glow hovered over the bed, a yellowish 
air mixed with shadows and dark’. (Illusions 224)  Despite the dark, both Zimmer 
and Mann are able to visually observe the other, with the reference to Mann’s 
eyes metonymically referencing perception as the site of self-consciousness. 
Moreover, Zimmer can scarcely believe his eyes, expressing surprise at Mann’s 
corporeality:  
What astonished me most, I think, was the simple fact that he had a body. 
Until I saw him lying there in the bed, I’m not sure that I ever believed in 
him. Not as an authentic person, at any rate…It stunned me to 
acknowledge that Hector had hands and eyes, fingers and shoulders, a 
neck and a left ear – that he was tangible, that he wasn’t an imaginary 
being. He had been inside my head for so long, it seemed doubtful that he 
could exist anywhere else. (Illusions 224)  
Echoing Bill’s comment to Leo in What I Loved, Mann comments: ‘You wrote a 
book. Again and again I have read that book, and again and again I have asked 
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myself: why did you choose me? What was your purpose, Zimmer?’ (Illusions 
224) Auster closes the circle of intersubjective connectedness by making Mann 
reach out for Zimmer at the end of their meeting, transgressing the physical-
psychical boundary between the two men: ‘As I stood up from the chair, he 
reached out and grabbed my arm…I remember the cold, clawlike feel of his hand, 
and I remember thinking to myself: this is happening. Hector Mann is alive and 
his hand is touching me now’. (Illusions 226) In What I Loved, at the end of their 
first meeting, according to Leo’s recollection, Bill ‘gripped my lower arm with his 
hand and shook it. This sudden gesture of camaraderie, even affection, made me 
unusually happy’. (Loved 15)  
 Both What I Loved and The Book of Illusions establish an allegorical 
structure framed around aesthetic autonomy and independent perception to 
address Husserlian I-centeredness and transcendent intentionality, and the 
exchange between the subjective identities of self and other. As their novels 
indicate, the problematic nature of Husserl’s hermetic monadology is subjected to 
subtle critique by Hustvedt and Auster, thereby revealing the ontological essence 
of existence. 
  
2: Embodied subjectivity 
 What I Loved and The Book of Illusions effect a detailed examination of 
the embodied nature of consciousness, using visual art as a means of commenting 
upon other-subjectivity. As outlined in the section above, relational aesthetics are 
determined by a collision between artistic and interpretative subjectivities. 
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Perceptivity, exemplified by the production and reception of artworks, is an 
embodied process, dependent upon a physical-psychical network of relations, 
responsive to the dialogue between artist and spectator, and mediated by the 
artwork. By looking at specific pieces by Bill Weschler and Hector Mann, I hope 
to be able to illustrate below how Leo Hertzberg’s and David Zimmer’s responses 
to their art are framed around the tension between Husserl’s transcendent 
phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty’s ontological intersubjectivity.  
 The first painting by Bill that Leo sees is a work which, on first inspection, 
appears to depict ‘a young woman lying on the floor in an empty room’, holding a 
little yellow taxi in a hand that rests on her pubic bone. Counterintuitively titled 
Self-Portrait, under further scrutiny the painting reveals to Leo a complex tableau 
which implicates both artist and viewer within a nexus of perceptive relationality: 
It took me about a minute to understand that there were actually three 
people in the painting. Far to my right, on the dark side of the canvas, I 
noticed that a woman was leaving the picture. Only her foot and ankle 
could be seen inside the frame, but the loafer she was wearing had been 
rendered with excruciating care, and once I had seen it, I kept looking back 
at it. The invisible woman became as important as the one who dominated 
the canvas. The third person was only a shadow. For a moment I mistook 
the shadow for my own, but then I understood that the artist had included 
it in the work. The beautiful woman, who was wearing only a man’s T-
shirt, was being looked at by someone outside the painting, a spectator 
who seemed to be standing just where I was standing when I noticed the 
darkness that fell over her belly and her thighs. (Loved 4) 
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Leo concludes that ‘the hand that had painted the picture hid itself in some parts 
of the painting and made itself known in others’. (Loved 4-5) In a subsequent 
passage, the bodily presence of its creator is acknowledged through vaguely-
gendered references to the artist’s technique: ‘rendered with excruciating care’, ‘a 
tangle of heavy paint’, ‘forceful dabs’, and more conclusively, ‘marks left by a 
man’s thumb. It looked as if his gesture had been sudden, even violent’. (Loved 5) 
Here Hustvedt makes explicit the uncompromising intensity of Bill’s aesthetic 
vision through his physical presence on the canvas. This engages the attention of 
the viewer, and forces Leo to consider the painting with equivalent intensity of 
perception. 
 Grønstad determines that Leo’s first encounter with Self-Portrait is both 
‘catalytic and catastrophic…a decisive, fortuitously constitutive aesthetic 
experience’ freighted with ‘the pregnancy of the gaze’.109 The painting is 
subsequently experienced by numerous others, not least the artist and model, and 
its meaning morphs and transmutes under these shifting spatial, temporal and even 
emotional contexts, heightening and deepening its latent eroticism. After hanging 
the painting in his apartment, Leo looks at it again with his wife Erica: ‘She 
examined it calmly and said, ‘It’s like looking at another person’s dream, isn’t it?’ 
                                                          
109 Grønstad, p. 40. Böger proposes that Bill’s Self-Portrait establishes the narrative’s central themes of 
hidden realities, distorted perceptions and the general instability of human relations’, while Caroline 
Rosenthal describes the portrait as a ‘palimpsest’ which embodies the multiple plot layers and ‘figurative 
constellations of the novel’ (Böger, ‘I look and I sometimes see’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity,  ed. by 
Hartmann, Marks and Zapf, p. 287; Caroline Rosenthal, New York and Toronto Novels after Postmodernism: 
Explorations of the Urban [Rochester: Camden House, 2011], p. 75, [qtd. in Böger, p. 287]).   
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(Loved 5) In contrast with Leo’s florid and detailed ekphrasis, Erica’s ‘simple, 
direct and penetrating’ comment invites Leo to look more closely at the painting, 
identifying other motifs hitherto unseen: (Loved 8) 
When I turned to the picture after Erica spoke, I saw that its mixed styles 
and shifting focus did remind me of the distortions in dreams…It was then 
that I noticed a bruise just below her knee. I had seen it before, but at that 
moment its purple cast, which was green at one edge, pulled my eyes 
towards it, as if this little wound were really the subject of the painting. I 
walked over, put my finger on the canvas, and traced the outline of the 
bruise. The gesture aroused me. (Loved 5) 
The sensuous, sexual overtones of Bill’s painting – distilling what are later 
revealed to be its unconsciously-rendered, aesthetic expression of the model 
Violet Blom’s desire for the man who is painting her – catalyses an erotic reaction 
of equal power in Leo: ‘We made love because of the painting. I have often 
wondered since why the image of a sore on a woman’s body should have been 
erotic to me’. (Loved 6) Much later, Leo’s adolescent son encounters Bill’s 
painting of Violet: 
The growing body has its own language, and solitude is its first teacher. 
On several occasions in the spring, I found Matt standing in front of the 
Self-Portrait that had hung on our wall for thirteen years. His eyes 
travelled over the plump young Violet and onto the little taxi that rested 
near her pudendum, and I saw the canvas again as though for the first time 
– with its full erotic force. (Loved 123) 
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Due to its physical materiality and erotic ambiguity, Bill’s painting invites tactile 
contact while denying possession. Even though Leo owns the painting, he never 
refers to it as his. It remains Bill’s, even after the latter’s death: a portrait which 
vividly represents the ontological basis of transcendental subjectivity, while 
effecting an abstruse expression of the aesthetics of intentionality.   
 In The Book of Illusions, Zimmer’s highly subjective aesthetic response to 
the ‘visual language’ of Mann’s films is foregrounded by the tragic circumstances 
of his initial venture into their world. There he discovers, paradoxically, an 
authenticity of ambiguity in their representation which contrasts to the mediated 
simulacra of modern movies, whose ‘sound and colour had weakened the 
language they were supposed to enhance’. (Illusions 14) Zimmer equates the films 
of the silent era to ‘poems, like some intricate choreography of the spirit, and 
because they were dead, they probably spoke more deeply to us than they had to 
the audience of their time’. Mann’s improvised, low budget exploration of the 
form is described as having ‘an intimacy to it that held your attention and forced 
you to respond to it’. (Illusions 20) Mann’s silent movies embody both an 
otherworldliness and universality that issues a challenge to the humanistic 
essentialism of perception: silence, according to Peacock, ‘holds both an attraction 
and an atavistic fear’.110 In contrast with the material texture and erotic charge of 
Bill’s painting, the paradoxical appeal of these films to Zimmer lies in their 
tangible otherness and spatio-temporal unreality: 
                                                          
110 Peacock, ‘Carrying the Burden of Representation’, p. 57. 
274 
 
The very things that separated them from us were in fact what made them 
arresting: their muteness, their absence of colour, their fitful, speeded-up 
rhythms. These were obstacles…but they also relieved the images of the 
burden of representation. They stood between us and the film, and 
therefore we no longer had to pretend that we were looking at the real 
world. The flat screen was the world, and it existed in two dimensions. The 
third dimension was in our head. (Illusions 15)  
Zimmer describes the relationship between the camera and Mann’s face as an 
‘intervention’, one reliant on the self-signifying, self-negating presence of Mann’s 
moustache: ‘In motion, it is a tool for expressing the thoughts of all men. In 
repose it is little more than an ornament...Such is the code of images’. (Illusions 
30) 
 In Mr. Nobody, the final film Mann makes before his disappearance, 
Auster makes a deliberate reference to the problematic ontological-existential 
paradigm.111 Mr. Nobody has been called by Peacock ‘an allegory of the 
commodification and subsequent effacement of the self under the postmodern 
capitalist system’.112 It can also be considered that Mr. Nobody occupies a space 
equivalent to Bill’s Self-Portrait in What I Loved, as a metonymic representation 
of subjectivity, embodied ontology and the power of the gaze, catalysed by 
Mann’s disintegrating relationship with his financier and de facto manager, the 
laconically-named Seymour Hunt. The avaricious Hunt is recast as C. Lester 
                                                          
111 Mr. Nobody is the name of Mia Fredricksen’s anonymous tormentor in The Summer Without Men. 
112 Peacock, ‘Carrying the Burden of Representation’, p. 65. 
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Chase, a villain ‘out to destroy Hector and rob him of his identity’ by tricking him 
into drinking a potion that renders him invisible:  
He is still there before our eyes, but the other characters in the film are 
blind to his presence…He is a specter made of flesh and blood, a man who 
is no longer a man. He still lives in the world, and yet the world has no 
room for him anymore…He has simply been erased. (Illusions 40) 
In line with Peacock’s perceptive observation, Auster uses Mr. Nobody to offer an 
allegorical commentary on artistic independence, and the surrendering of identity 
and self-subjectivity to the pressures of commercial success and financial greed: 
in other words, the gaze of the other. Mann’s disappearance in the narrative of the 
film prefigures his disappearance from the world of film and the immanent world: 
‘It is a meditation on his own disappearance…a film about the anguish of 
selfhood. Hector is looking for a way to say goodbye to us…and in order to do 
this he must eradicate himself in his own eyes. He becomes invisible.’ (Illusions 
53) The film ends with Hector Mann transfigured in the body of another man, 
with only his moustache, ‘the link to his inner self, a metonym for his urges, 
cogitations and mental storms’ remaining as a reminder of his previous identity: 
(Illusions 30)  
He is someone else now, and however much he might resemble the person 
he used to be, he has been reinvented, turned inside out and spat forth as a 
new man. The smile grows larger, more radiant, more satisfied with the 
face that has been found in the mirror. A circle begins to close around it, 
and soon we can see nothing but that smiling mouth, the mouth and the 
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mustache above it. The mustache twitches for a few seconds, and then the 
circle grows smaller, then smaller still. When it finally shuts, the film is 
over. (Illusions 52) 
In this sequence Mann is reduced to a vanishing point, a pinprick in the screen, 
then eventually a nothing: an ironic acknowledgement by Auster of I-centered 
subjectivity and ontological constituency. Tired of being ‘framed by others’, to 
paraphrase Peacock, Mann attempts to make himself invisible to the world of 
things.113 Zimmer’s quest to sustain Mann’s identity renders this impossible: he 
remains an object in the transcendent zone of intentionality, and within the 
authentic ‘aesthetic artefact’ of Auster’s narrative.114 It is an irony of the form that 
through Auster’s ekphrastic treatment of Mr Nobody, Hector Mann’s film – like 
Bill’s painting – is reconstituted as an aesthetic artefact in the embodied 
subjectivity of the reader. 
 
3: Ekphrasis as co-production 
 The narratives of What I Loved and The Book of Illusions discursively 
deploy ekphrastic techniques as a means of describing perception while 
preserving ambiguity within the text. According to Grønstad, ‘writing about 
ekphrasis becomes a means of perception, not an act of possession…the object is 
                                                          
113 Peacock, ‘Carrying the Burden of Representation’, p. 64. 
114 Peacock, ‘Carrying the Burden of Representation’, p. 69. 
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presented as malleable, unfinished and constantly transmuting into something 
else’:115 
The ekphrastic relation is one defined by intertextuality, the visual work 
acting as a supplement to the literary text. The image of a tangible text in 
What I Loved makes the moment of vision that ekphrasis performs more of 
a creative than a responsive act of seeing.116  
In Self-Portrait, both viewer and reader enter a figurative universe of flattened 
surfaces; the large sculptures by Bill, such as O’s Journey and The Changeling, 
literally invite the spectator to enter their three-dimensional worlds, further 
illustrating Hustvedt’s interest in the “back-and-forth dialectic between spectator 
and artwork’.117 In this sense, it revisits the thematic and theoretical paradigms of 
Hustvedt’s earlier novels, which drew upon the psychical and social discourses of 
Lacan and Bakhtin, now marrying them with an intertextual ekphrastic aesthetic 
which reaffirms the visual possibilities of representation. Indeed, we can argue 
that Hustvedt’s earlier novels look forward to this more overtly phenomenological 
approach, particularly the difficulties of description Iris Vegan experiences in The 
Blindfold (see Chapter two). Further, it reconfigures the hermeneutic foundations 
of the reader-writer relationship in a literary form which is ‘vertiginously 
                                                          
115 Grønstad, p. 46. 
116 Grønstad, p. 45. 
117 Hustvedt, ‘Embodied Visions’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 339. 
278 
 
intersubjective’,118 and reliant on a nexus of betweenness to bring forth the 
artwork’s aesthetic statement. 
 Like Zimmer’s critical appreciation of Mann’s penultimate film Mr 
Nobody, Leo’s depiction of Bill’s final sculptures, a ‘series of autonomous pieces 
about numbers’, show an artist ‘at the top of his form’. The number pieces effect a 
meditation on totalization, utilising myriad sources and marrying the mythical and 
popular culture to create its own mythos:  
It was rambunctious art, thick with allusion – to voids, blanks, holes, to 
monotheism and the individual, to the dialectic and yin-yang, to the 
Trinity, the three fates, and three wishes, to the golden rectangle, to seven 
heavens, the seven lower orders of the sepithroth, the nine Muses, the nine 
circles of Hell, the nine worlds of Norse mythology. (Loved 168)  
Through a narratively-engendered form of ekstasis, we share Leo’s perception 
psychically and physically, by entering the sculptures through the pages of the 
novel: 
In cube three, a tiny man wearing the black-and-white prison garb of 
cartoons and dragging a leg iron has opened the door to his cell. The 
hidden rhyme is ‘free’. Looking closely through the walls of the cube, one 
can see the parallel rhyme in another language: the German word drei is 
scratched into one glass wall. Lying at the bottom of that same box is a 
                                                          
118 Grønstad, p. 41. 
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tiny black-and-white photography cut from a book that shows the entrance 
to Auschwitz: ARBEIT MACHT FREI. (Loved 169) 
These works, on first glance ambiguous and abstract in extremis, are deeply 
personal, partially rooted in Bill’s slowly fracturing relationship with his son 
Mark:  
In several pieces Bill alluded to the often tedious business of acquiring the 
signs we need for comprehension – a fragment of Mark’s math homework, 
a chewed pencil eraser, and my favourite in cube nine: the figure of a boy 
fast asleep at a desk…It turned out that these pictures of boredom were 
more personal than I thought. (Loved 169) 
Throughout What I Loved, Hustvedt supplements her ekphrastic aesthetic with 
explicit references to the intersubjective framework which effectively co-produces 
Bill’s work:  
An organic extension of everything Bill had done before, these knots of 
symbols had an explosive effect. The longer I looked at them, the more the 
miniature constructions seemed on the brink of bursting from internal 
pressure. They were tightly orchestrated semantic bombs through which 
Bill laid bare the arbitrary roots of meaning itself. (Loved 169) 
Hustvedt’s ekphrastic technique depicts artworks which are not easily assimilated 
into the imagination, and demand an engaged reader. Her approach to ekphrasis is 
complex and, like the work she describes, densely allusive. Her narratives 
continually engage with the reader and inculcate an intersubjective complicity in 
the linguistic creation of visual imagery.   
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 In contrast to Leo’s brief, subjective overview of Bill’s number pieces, Mr 
Nobody is described by Zimmer in a lengthy passage of ekphrasis which runs to 
over a dozen pages in length, and includes stage directions, camera angles and 
truncated dialogue. Ekphrasis is the means by which Auster problematizes 
representation, effecting a detailed description of an imaginary film within this 
imaginary text, while critiquing the problematic ontology of what Peacock terms 
‘aesthetic creation in splendid isolation’, which threatens ‘actual or metaphorical 
death’.119 Auster pushes the spatio-temporal possibilities of ekphrasis with 
Zimmer’s detailed description of the illusory Mann’s last films, The Inner Life of 
Martin Frost. Peacock views Auster’s treatment of The Inner Life of Martin Frost 
as equating ‘representation with erasure’, and suggests that our reading of the 
preceding portion of Auster’s text prepares us for the ‘deconstruction of the ‘naïve 
polarities of ‘art’ versus ‘life’’.120 Bewes, by contrast, proposes that Auster ‘looks 
longingly towards cinema as a symbol of everything that writing is unable to 
achieve’, before offering the qualifying observation that ‘cinema in Auster 
functions to bind his work even more firmly to the novel’.121 
 Zimmer’s depiction of the film bridges the gap between Husserl’s concept 
of the objective reduction, by stripping consciously-perceived objects to their 
essential characteristics, and Merleau-Ponty’s ontological consciousness, the 
objects being reframed by Zimmer’s existential spatio-temporality. As with Mr 
                                                          
119 Peacock, ‘Carrying the Burden of Representation’, p. 66. 
120 Peacock, ‘Carrying the Burden of Representation’, p. 66. 
121 Bewes, p. 291. 
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Nobody, the film effects an allegorical investigation into the realm of subjectivity, 
reconfigured by Zimmer’s reflective interpretation: 
I understood that I had it wrong…the setting of the film was not Tierra del 
Sueno or the grounds of the Blue Stone Ranch. It was the inside of a man’s 
head – and the woman who had walked into that head was not a real 
woman. She was a spirit, a figure born of the man’s imagination, an 
ephemeral being sent to become his muse. (Illusions 243) 
Martin, a writer, has retreated to bucolic solitude to recover from writing a novel. 
Nevertheless, he begins writing again almost immediately, and that night he is 
joined by the ‘spirit’ Claire, a young woman who metonymically embodies the 
supposedly binary distinction between objective reality and subjective 
consciousness. In a subtle reference to Husserlian intentionality and the illusory 
nature of reality, Auster has Claire read a small section of Kantian philosophy to 
Martin:  
In a mock-serious voice, she is reading a passage of Kant out loud to 
Martin:…things which we see are not by themselves what they see…so 
that, if we drop our subject or the subjective form of our senses, all 
qualities, all relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time 
themselves. (Illusions 264) 
Whether Claire actually reads this text at all is a matter of conjecture: in The Inner 
Life of Martin Frost all other italicised text signifies Martin’s interior monologue, 
or voice-over narration; yet other instances of Claire, and indeed Martin, engaging 
in dialogue are rendered in plain text.  
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 Martin’s text both sustains and commits their love affair to disaster: the 
more he writes, the closer to death Claire moves. These moments are relayed in a 
phenomenologically reductive manner as pure description without presupposition 
or ethical-moral judgement, relayed as in a bullet-pointed treatment for a film 
script 
1. Claire is writhing around on the bed, in acute pain, struggling not to call 
out for help. 
2. Martin comes to the bottom of the page, pulls it out of the machine, and 
rolls in another. He begins typing again. 
3. We see the fireplace. The fire has nearly gone out. 
4. A close-up of Martin’s fingers, typing. 
5. A close up of Claire’s face. She is weaker than before, no longer 
struggling. (Illusions 266) 
However, the audience’s collective reading of the film is determined by Zimmer’s 
own embodied interpretation: ‘We go from Martin back to Claire, from Claire 
back to Martin, and in the space of ten simple shots, we finally get it, we finally 
understand what has been happening’. (Illusions 266) Eventually, in a scene of 
artistic self-destruction (and self-deconstruction) that ironically recalls Mann’s Mr 
Nobody, Martin destroys his manuscript to save Claire’s life, thereby committing 
both their lives to an existential void, drawing a final observation from Zimmer:  
Martin burned his story in order to rescue Claire from the dead, but it was 
also Hector rescuing Brigid O’Fallon, also Hector burning his own movies, 
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and the more things had doubled back on themselves, the more deeply I 
had entered the film. (Illusions 272) 
At such intertextual moments, it is possible to perceive the merging subjectivities 
of Martin, Mann and Zimmer. The physical impact upon Zimmer is a form of self-
shattering, as he observes ‘the words and images had insinuated themselves inside 
me’. (Illusions 272)  
 Auster’s use of ekphrasis marks a departure from the logocentric 
preoccupations of his earlier fiction. In The Inner Life of Martin Frost, Auster 
constructs a mise en abyme of transcendent phenomenological deduction, 
refracted by multiple intersubjective positions: Mann’s script and direction, 
Zimmer’s narrative interpretation, the reader’s response, all orchestrated by a 
pointillist ekphrastic technique. In Zimmer’s depiction of The Inner Life of Martin 
Frost, the mediating function of the screen is subverted: the burden of 
representation falls to the page, the author-reader function, and the zone in 
between two subjectivities. For Auster, it is a risky undertaking: describing a film 
in minute detail, slowing narrative time in the pursuit of allegorical ambiguity, 
while trying to build and sustain narrative tension. By contrast, Hustvedt’s 
deliberate and painstaking ekprases are more luminous and apposite for the 
sensory perception she seeks to convey. In ekphrastic terms, therefore, visual art 
perhaps lends itself more readily to the genre than film, but Auster similarly 
places certain demands upon the reader to those of Hustvedt, which emphasises 
their shared discursive approach to transcendent phenomenology.  
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Conclusion   
In the narratives of What I Loved and The Book of Illusions, Hustvedt and Auster 
establish a network of embodied identities which discursively addresses the 
epistemological and ontological nature of consciousness. Self-subjectivity is 
exemplified by the artist identities of Bill Weschler and Hector Mann, and 
thereafter apprehended via the solipsistic interpretations of their alter egos, Leo 
Hertzberg and David Zimmer. This layering of densely allusive artworks and 
impressionistic critical self-reflexivity within the narrative generates a mise en 
abyme of intersubjective perception, where multiple perspectives and destabilised 
identities interact. At the opening of these novels, the two narrators Leo Hertzberg 
and David Zimmer are barely able to glimpse the psychical depths of their artist 
alter egos. As the narratives develop, Hustvedt and Auster reaffirm the 
intersubjective basis of self-other dialectics and phenomenological investigation.  
 In these two particular novels, Hustvedt and Auster further illustrate their 
narrative oscillation between the poles of postmodern irony and modern 
commitment. Self and other emerge intertwined from the ideality of transcendent 
subjectivity into a concretised world of intersubjective perceptivity. In their 
apprehension of the I-centeredness of consciousness, object-directedness and the 
psychical ability to apprehend the givenness of things, Hustvedt and Auster texts 
unconsciously gesture towards foundations of Husserlian phenomenology, while 
correspondingly framing their fiction around the ‘vertiginous intersubjectivity’ of 
Merleau-Ponty’s nexus of embodied ontology, and the co-productive possibilities 
of ekphrastic technique. Yet while they challenge Husserl’s conception of an 
interdependent monadology, one psychically defined and consciously patrolled, 
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they fail to effectively reconstitute it, establishing a tentative equilibrium with the 
boundary subversions of Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology. By 
acknowledging the empathic value of self-conscious coexistence and perceptive 
intersubjectivity, they illustrate and emphasise the ethical prerogatives of fiction’s 
newly-calibrated metamodernistic moment. This is further reified by Hustvedt and 
Auster’s respective approach to narrativising trauma, which will come under 
discussion in the next chapter.  
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Chapter five: Troping trauma – 9/11, America and the family 
 
Introduction 
 The last chapter examined the theoretical basis to Hustvedt and Auster’s 
establishment of embodied intentionality and transcendent subjectivity within 
their fiction. Hustvedt and Auster’s embrace of a range of theoretical positions 
through the hybrid spatiality of their aesthetic mode of production has engendered 
a highly complex, nuanced and idiosyncratic approach to self-other relations. In 
this next chapter, I will extend these intersubjective frameworks to their critical 
engagement with trauma theory, using their narrativised response to the 
September 11 terror attacks as a case study. As long-standing residents of New 
York, Hustvedt and Auster witnessed the destruction of the World Trade Centre in 
Lower Manhattan that morning, and both felt compelled to pen novels which 
address what Judith Butler describes as the mood of ‘national melancholia’ and 
‘disavowal of mourning’ that gripped not just the city of New York, but the nation 
itself.1 Hustvedt’s The Sorrows of an American (2005) is a family drama staged in 
a New York still coming to terms with the local and national trauma of 9/11. In 
The Brooklyn Follies (2006), Auster records the adventures of a loosely-affiliated 
community of Brooklynites in a rambling and episodic narrative temporally-
located prior to the attacks.  
                                                          
1 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004), p. xiv. 
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 Both novels contribute to the growing body of 9/11 literature which has 
been absorbed into the problematic paradigm that notably Mark Seltzer termed 
‘wound culture’.2  What Martin Modlinger and Philip Sonntag describe as the 
literary-cultural interest in ‘other people’s pain’ has, in the twenty-first century, 
transmuted into a transnational and transcultural ‘global condition’ according to 
Sabine Sielke;3 while Anne Kaplan notes that ‘most people encounter trauma 
through the media’,4 contributing to a subset of ‘vicarious or secondary trauma’ 
which is ‘experienced globally’.5 For Seltzer in particular, ‘the public fascination 
with torn and opened bodies and torn and opened persons’ constitutes ‘a collective 
gathering around shock, trauma and the wound’.6 Our contemporary culture’s 
craving for ‘addictive violence’ demands ‘a public spectacle’, thereby delineating 
‘one of the crucial sites where private desire and public space cross’.7 No trauma 
spectacle has been more widely disseminated than the attacks on the Twin Towers 
on the morning of September 11; the attacks themselves triggered a range of 
narrative responses across a multiplicity of media. Troping trauma is now a major 
                                                          
2 Mark Seltzer, ‘Wound Culture: Trauma in the Pathological Public Sphere’, October (Vol 80: Spring 1997), 
3-26 (p. 3).   
3 Martin Modlinger and Philipp Sonntag, ‘Introduction: Other People’s Pain – Narratives of Trauma and the 
Question of Ethics’ in Other People's Pain: Narratives of Trauma and the Question of Ethics, ed. by Martin 
Modlinger and Philipp Sonntag (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 1-18 (p. 1); Sabine Sielke, ‘Why ‘9/11 is not 
Unique’, or: Troping Trauma’, Amerikastudien (55:3, 2010), 385-408 (p. 387). 
4 Ann E. Kaplan, Trauma Culture: The Politics of Terror and Loss in Media and Literature (New York: 
Rutgers University Press, 2005), p. 2. 
5 Kaplan, p. 39; p. 2. 
6 Seltzer, p. 3. 
7 Seltzer, p. 3. 
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concern of contemporary fiction, generating what Roger Luckhurst describes as a 
‘repertoire of compelling stories about the enigmas of identity, memory and 
selfhood’.8 Trauma’s intertwining of history, culture, politics and subjectivity 
prompted Gert Buelens, Sam Durrant and Robert Eaglestone to perceive its 
theoretical framework as a ‘knot’, tying together representation, the past, the self 
and suffering’.9 James Berger proposes that trauma culture lies at the intersection 
of the ‘psychoanalytic concept of trauma’ with ‘literature, literary theory, 
historiography, and contemporary culture’,10 while Susannah Radstone highlights 
the link to poststructuralism, commenting that trauma theory enables ‘the 
Humanities to move beyond the impasses and crises in knowledge posed by these 
theories, without abandoning their insights’.11 For Sabine Sielke, trauma studies 
‘oscillate between theorizing the ‘unrepresentability’ of trauma and spelling out 
its narratives’, while enacting the ‘fundamental force of the interdependent 
practices of memory and forgetting’.12 Further, this can be viewed as aligning 
with what Boxall identifies as the sense of bodily estrangement which has 
coloured a number of narrative responses to traumatic affect and the ‘illegibility 
of the present’ in the early Twenty-First Century.  
                                                          
8 Roger Luckhurst, The Trauma Question (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 80. 
9 Gert Buelens, Sam Durrant and Robert Eaglestone, ‘Introduction’ in The Future of Trauma Theory: 
Contemporary Literary and Cultural Theory, ed by Gert Buelens, Sam Durrant and Robert Eaglestone 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), pp. 1-10 (p. 4). 
10 James Berger, ‘Trauma and Literary Theory’, Contemporary Literature (38:3, 1997), 569-582 (p. 569). 
11 Susannah Radstone, ‘Trauma Theory: Contexts, Politics, Ethics’, Paragraph (30:1, 2007), 9-29 (pp. 10-
11). 
12 Sielke, p. 385.  
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 Sigmund Freud’s pioneering work in the field of psychoanalysis at the end 
of the nineteenth century continues to guide contemporary literary-cultural 
responses to trauma. As Berger notes, Freud’s revisions to his early ‘trauma, 
repression and symptom formation’ – as summarised with the observation that 
‘hysterics suffer reminiscences’ – engendered the concept of ‘latency’, where the 
experience of a traumatic event is unavailable to consciousness and remains 
buried in the psyche. For Berger, traumatic experience is possessed of a 
transgenerational quality, whereby ‘history becomes a complex entanglement of 
crimes inflicted and suffered’, but frequently inadequately apprehended.13 
Trauma, moreover, is inherently phenomenological, triggering crises of 
subjectivity and ontological disordering which are pivotal to how trauma is 
experienced, understood and represented. Radstone and Sielke both isolate the 
work of Ruth Leys in tracing the genealogical foundation of trauma through her 
description of mimetic and anti-mimetic subjective positions. The mimetic strand, 
according to Leys, involves ‘a kind of hypnotic imitation or identification in 
which, precisely because the victim cannot recall the original traumatogenic 
event, she is fated to act it out or in other ways imitate it’.14 For the anti-mimetic 
position, under the hypnotic imitation the subject is distanced from the moment of 
trauma ‘in the sense that she remains a spectator of the traumatic scene, which she 
can therefore see and represent to herself and others’.15 Radstone’s summary of 
                                                          
13 Berger, p. 570. 
14 Ruth Leys, Trauma: A Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), p. 298. 
15 Leys, p. 299. This apparently binary split is a misnomer: Leys herself suggests that it is ‘unresolved’ (p. 
305), and Radstone similarly isolates the suggestibility of traumatized subjects ‘who are neither in control of 
nor in charge of themselves’ under the conditions of hypnosis (Radstone, p. 14). 
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the two contending positions – ‘in the mimetic theory, trauma produces psychical 
disassociation from the self; in the anti-mimetic theory, it is the record of an 
unassimilable event which is dissociated from memory’ – neatly encapsulates the 
circular dynamic of Freud’s revisions to work on trauma, and how these have 
generated a schism in trauma theory, reflecting, as Berger argues, a differentiation 
in emphasis on the role of acting out and working through: a differentiation 
reflected, in his view, in the contrasting theoretical approaches of Cathy Caruth 
and Dominick LaCapra. 
 The cultural elevation of trauma theory during the 1990s, coupled with its 
formulation through deconstruction and poststructuralist psychoanalysis, overlaps 
with Hustvedt and Auster’s early critical engagement with the mechanics of 
postmodern fiction, and the continuation of their careers in the ‘after 
postmodernism’ moment. Following 9/11, Hustvedt and Auster both wrote first-
person testimonies about the events of that morning. Auster’s response was 
immediate, penning ‘Random Notes – September 11, 2001 – 4.00pm’ which was 
published by Die Zeit two days later. It begins with a moment of familial rupture: 
on her first day at high school his daughter travelled alone on the subway, passing 
under the World Trade Centre less than an hour before the towers fell. She, like 
many others in the city that evening, does not come home; Auster and Hustvedt 
are fortunate: their daughter is unharmed and able to spend the night with friends 
in the city. As they watch the towers burn from the top floor of their house in 
Brooklyn, Hustvedt’s sister calls ‘to tell us about the screams she heard after the 
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first tower collapsed’.16 Later Auster describes walking with Hustvedt through 
Park Slope, their neighbourhood, where they encounter people wearing masks and 
handkerchiefs over their faces; a symbiotic alternate to the spectral New Yorkers 
of Lower Manhattan, wandering through the apocalyptic streets shrouded in the 
white dust of the collapsed towers, dust which now blows across the Hudson 
River into their home: ‘the smells of the fire have settled into every room of the 
house. A terrible stinging odor: flaming plastic, electric wire, building 
materials’.17 Auster declines to mention the human beings trapped in the burning 
ruins or pulverised to microscopic matter, although he speaks to his barber whose 
neighbour was talking to her brother-in-law, who was still inside one of the towers 
when it collapsed. He thinks of his friend, the high-wire artist Philippe Petit, who 
in 1974 crossed the space between the totems to capitalism in ‘an act of indelible 
beauty’.18 His compact account of the day closes with a rueful observation: ‘And 
so the twenty-first century begins’.19  
 Hustvedt’s essay, ‘9/11 or One Year After’ – jointly published by The 
Observer and Die Zeit in 2002 – is possessed of a temporal perspective missing 
                                                          
16 Paul Auster, ‘Random Notes – September 11, 2001 – 4.00pm’ in Collected Prose, pp. 517-18 (p. 517). 
17 Auster, ‘Random Notes’ in Collected Prose, p. 517. 
18 Auster, ‘Random Notes’ in Collected Prose, pp. 517-18. 
19 Auster, ‘Random Notes’ in Collected Prose, p. 518. Auster’s ‘NYC = USA’, published one year after the 
attacks, includes the following observation: ‘we experienced that day as a family tragedy’. In the article he 
also calls New York, ‘the true heartland’ of the US: ‘the five boroughs are a living embodiment of what the 
United States is all about: diversity, tolerance, and equality under the law […] No matter how we fail to live 
up to those ideals, that is America at its best’ (Paul Auster, ‘NYC = USA’, in Collected Prose, pp. 520-23 
[pp. 520-22]). 
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from her husband’s random notes. However, like Auster, she too acknowledges 
the paradigm-altering events of 9/11 as being: 
A threshold and a way of telling time – before and after, pre and post. It 
has been used to signify the dawn of a new era, an economic fault line, the 
onset of war, the presence of evil in the world, and a loss of American 
innocence.20  
In the days and weeks that followed, Hustvedt and Auster joined the city’s 
residents in trying vainly to overcome the disorientating effect of what had 
happened, focusing their attention on family, friends and the wider community:   
For New Yorkers, whether we were far from the attacks or close to them, 
September 11 remains a more intimate memory. For weeks afterwards, the 
first question we asked friends and neighbours whom we hadn’t seen since 
the attacks was: ‘Is your family all right? Did you lose anybody?’21 
Like Auster, she recounts the experiences of her sister in Tribeca, her friend Larry 
who worked at the Wall Street Journal in the shadow of the towers, Charlie the 
liquor store owner who lost his sister-in-law, friends in John Street who were 
trapped inside their building. September 11, she summarises, was ‘a story of 
collective trauma and ongoing grief’:22  
                                                          
20 Siri Hustvedt, ‘9/11 or One Year After’ in A Plea for Eros, pp. 119-30 (p. 119).  
21 Hustvedt, ‘9/11’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 119. 
22 Hustvedt, ‘9/11’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 120. 
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The attacks on the World Trade Centre can only be understood through 
individual people, because if we lose sight of the particular – of one man’s 
or one woman’s or one child’s suffering and loss – we risk losing sight of 
our common humanity, and that is form of blindness, not only to others but 
to ourselves.23 
Hustvedt’s approach to representing the impact of 9/11 on New York is guided by 
her abiding interest in psychoanalysis, and discursive investigations into the field 
of neurobiology. This is evidenced by her easy application of terms and rhetorical 
tropes linked to trauma theory, such as ‘traumatic events are often accompanied 
by a form of dissociation’, and ‘those of us who are not widows, widowers, or the 
children of a dead parent have moved from active grief to the repression necessary 
for recovery’, alongside narrativised reflections upon recent developments in 
neuroscience.24 Hustvedt’s method of engagement with trauma is 
transdisciplinary, dialogic and intertextual: by making repeated excursions into 
the worlds of science, medicine, psychoanalysis, and various cultural and literary 
theories, while blurring fact and fiction within her narrative to foreground the 
individual and collective effects of trauma.25 In her trauma-focused non-fiction 
                                                          
23 Hustvedt, ‘9/11’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 130. In fact, her use of the psychoanalytic term ‘repression’ in 
relation to grief here is problematic, with repression and resistance typically connected by Freud to the 
process of acting out, rather than working through. 
24 Hustvedt, ‘9/11’ in A Plea for Eros, pp. 121-125. 
25 Hustvedt’s narrative of autobiographical selfhood is partially informed by traumatic affect and ontological 
estrangement, as she describes in a 2012 article for The New York Times: ‘As an infant I had febrile 
convulsions. In 1981 I had a brief seizure that threw me against a wall, followed by a yearlong migraine. In 
2006 I developed a mysterious seizure disorder that manifests itself in violent shaking…I once had a seizure 
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work The Shaking Woman, Hustvedt recounts in detail the ‘mysterious seizure 
disorder’ that followed the death of her father.26 The first occurred when 
delivering his eulogy; further seizures followed when she delivered a speech in 
public. The act of writing this exploration of trauma theory, repetition 
compulsion, and psychoanalytic history became for Hustvedt an essentially 
cathartic enterprise, a post-traumatic exploration of identity, memory and 
intersubjectivity. 
 By contrast, Auster’s trauma narratives lack this explicit transdisciplinary 
emphasis. Auster’s narratives eschew any mention of the key psychoanalytic texts 
and advances in neurobiology of Hustvedt’s, and more by the empathic 
possibilities, and limitations, of establishing communities founded on Buberian 
mutuality in the wake of a traumatic event. Nevertheless, Auster’s The Brooklyn 
Follies, like Hustvedt’s The Sorrows of an American, constructs what Jill Bennett 
identifies as ‘a certain affective dynamic internal to the work’ through a ‘language 
of sensation and affect’ through its examination of the impact of 9/11, the 
necessity of the movement from melancholia to mourning, and trauma’s 
                                                          
while climbing a mountain, which was probably caused by hyperventilation’ (Siri Hustvedt, ‘Reliving the 
Crash’, The New York Times [18 February 2012], [qtd in Jean-Michel Rabaté, ‘History and Trauma in Siri 
Hustvedt’s The Sorrows of an American’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity, ed. by Hartmann, Marks and Zapf, 
pp. 329-340 (p. 330)]).   
26 As noted earlier in Chapter one, her father’s death, and his experiences in the Second World War, made a 
significant contribution to the narrative of her post-9/11 novel, The Sorrows of an American, with his journal 
entries and letters from the Philippines appearing as verbatim transcripts in the text. 
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genealogical, transgenerational constituency.27 It is the contention of this chapter 
that this can be read as the consequence of Auster’s dialogic verbal and 
intertextual engagement with the ideas of Hustvedt. 
 In order to reflect upon how Hustvedt and Auster attempted to narrativise 
the trauma of 9/11, I will first look at this apparent distinction between latency 
and transference, as outlined in the respective texts of Caruth and LaCapra. In the 
following section, I will conduct a brief review of existing studies into 9/11 
fiction, and theoretical approaches to art which attempts to represent trauma in an 
empathic way. Thereafter, I will look at Hustvedt and Auster’s 9/11 novels to 
establish how they approached representing the terror attacks, their depictions of 
transgenerational affect within the community of New Yorkers, and the 
metonymic application of this model to reflect upon the transhistorical sorrows of 
America. In the conclusion, I will reflect upon how their work is enfolded within 
the wider post-9/11 literary and aesthetic response to September 11, and the 
implications for the dialogical nature of their writing relationship. 
 
  
                                                          
27 Jill Bennett, Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma and Contemporary Art (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2005), pp. 1-2. 
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Latency and acting out 
 Hustvedt’s observation that ‘traumatic events are often accompanied by a 
form of dissociation’ can be traced directly to Freud’s Nachtraglichkeit (meaning 
belatedness or the temporal deferral of meaning) conception of trauma, 28 the 
moment of affect incurred by a shocking event remains difficult to locate for both 
victim and analyst.29 In an 1895 letter to his friend Wilhelm Fleiss, Freud isolates 
psychic rupture as the site of trauma:  
This first stage of hysteria may be described as ‘fright hysteria’: its 
primary symptom is the manifestation of fright accompanied by a gap in 
the psyche…repression and the formation of defensive systems only occur 
subsequently, in connection with the memory; and thenceforth defence and 
                                                          
28 Hustvedt, ‘9/11’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 121. Hustvedt has recorded her own dissociative detachment 
following a car crash in Brooklyn which destroyed the car in which she, Auster and their daughter Sophie 
were travelling. ‘After the accident, I was clearly in a dissociated state – weirdly detached from myself – and 
although I left the hospital without an injury that could be seen on a CT scan, both my memory and my sense 
of self had been altered by the shock. My amnesia for the accident and the flashbacks that followed, belong to 
my psychological state, but they are also, of course, part of my physiological state that involved changes in 
my brain…I am not entirely free of the ‘physioneurosis’ that began with a car accident almost 10 years ago’. 
(Siri Hustvedt, ‘Reliving the Crash’, The New York Times [18 February 2012] [qtd in Jean-Michel Rabaté, 
‘History and Trauma in Siri Hustvedt’s The Sorrows of an American’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity, ed. by 
Hartmann, Marks and Zapf, pp. 329-30]). 
29 Luckhurst, p. 81. The traumatological concept of ‘belatedness’, what Caruth limns as 
‘incomprehensibility’, is intertwined with the ‘belatedness’ of Boxall’s contemporary and Green’s late 
postmodernism, particularly the conflation of post-Holocaust aesthetics with postmodernism.  
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overwhelming [of the ego] (that is the formation of symptoms and the 
outbreak of attacks) may be combined to any extent in hysteria.30  
The psychic gap fundamental to the formation of trauma is essentially generative: 
without beginning treatment, the sufferer will continue acting out the hysterical, 
or traumatized, symptoms. Written in the wake of the Great War, Freud’s Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle (1920) documents the iterative changes in psychoanalytic 
technique made necessary by new and emerging forms of trauma, stating ‘the 
immediate aims of psycho-analytic technique are quite other today than they were 
at the outset’.31  
 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud identifies a variant form of 
‘traumatic neurosis’ which prior to the conflict had been commonly associated 
with mechanical concussion, railway accidents or sudden risk to life; its 
symptoms closely resembled ‘hypochondria or melancholia’. What was initially 
an ‘art of interpreting’, and thereafter a means of uncovering ‘the patient’s 
resistances’, the psychoanalytic method continued to encounter what Freud 
labelled ‘transference neurosis’: a struggle between remembering, repeating and 
working through, reliant upon drawing out painful memory. For patients whose 
traumatic experience was deeply buried in the psyche through repression, this 
process of transference was largely inconclusive: 
                                                          
30 Sigmund Freud, ‘Draft K’ in The Freud Reader, ed. by Peter Gay (London: Vintage, 1995), pp. 89-96 (p. 
96). 
31 Sigmund Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ in The Freud Reader, ed. by Gay, pp. 594-626 (p. 601). 
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The patient cannot remember the whole of what is repressed in him, and 
what he cannot remember may be precisely the essential part of it. Thus he 
acquires no sense of conviction of the correctness of the construction that 
has been communicated to him. He is obliged to repeat the repressed 
material as a contemporary experience instead of, as the physician would 
prefer to see, remembering it as something belonging to the past.32 
Freud’s concern here is not simply with the traumatized patients who appear to 
resist the cathartic process of psychoanalysis, but with the intertwining of 
incomprehensible trauma and unconscious resistance to transference, determining 
that ‘there is no doubt that the resistance of the conscious and unconscious ego 
operates under the sway of the pleasure principle: it seeks to avoid the unpleasure 
which would be produced by the liberation of the repressed’.33 Psychoanalytic 
treatment therefore focuses on mastering and disposing of the stimuli which 
overwhelm the ego and force the patient to continually act out the symptoms of 
trauma, while channelling the patient’s remembrances as a counter to their 
instinctive urge to return to a pre-traumatic, inorganic state (what was referred to 
earlier as the ‘unpleasure principle’, or ‘death-drive’, which Lacan later reworked 
as the Real).34 However, the process of working through cannot always be 
achieved successfully; instead, the acting out of latent trauma preoccupies the ego 
of the shattered subject. 
                                                          
32 Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ in The Freud Reader, ed. by Gay, p. 603. 
33 Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ in The Freud Reader, ed. by Gay p. 603. 
34 Freud, ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ in The Freud Reader, ed. by Gay p. 612. 
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 In Unclaimed Experience (1996), Cathy Caruth builds upon these early 
Freudian conceptions of belatedness, resistance and repression to foreground the 
delayed telling – an ungovernable tension between aporia and anamnesis – that 
follows a traumatic event:  
The wound of the mind…is not, like the wound of the body, a simple and 
healable event, but rather an event that…is experienced too soon, too 
unexpectedly, to be fully known and is therefore not available to 
consciousness until it fully imposes itself again, repeatedly, in the 
nightmares and repetitive actions of the survivor.35 
Trauma, according to Caruth, ‘is always the story of a wound that cries out, that 
addresses us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise 
available’.36 Yet, as reading Freud reminds us, the phenomenological constituency 
of that event and the possibility of representing it through action or discourse are 
denied to consciousness, and instead characterised by ‘the often delayed, 
uncontrolled repetitive appearance of hallucinations and other intrusive 
phenomena’.37 Caruth situates the latency of trauma within the individual’s 
temporally-dislocated acknowledgement, cognition and cathartic closure of its 
‘shocking and unexpected occurrence’:38 
                                                          
35 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996), p. 3-4. 
36 Caruth, p. 4. 
37 Caruth, p. 11. 
38 Caruth, p. 6. 
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The shock of the mind’s relation to the threat of death is thus not the direct 
experience of the threat but precisely the missing of this experience of the 
threat, that fact that, not being experienced in time, it has not yet been fully 
known.39  
The psychic wound constitutes nothing less than a ‘breach in the mind’s 
experience of time, self, and the world’,40 one which eludes understanding and is 
only acknowledged retrospectively. Trauma narratives represent ‘a kind of double 
telling, the oscillation between a crisis of death and the correlative crisis of life: 
between the story of the unbearable nature of the event and the story of the 
unbearable nature of its survival’.41 
 Working through Freud’s conception of trauma as first explored in Studies 
in Hysteria and Beyond the Pleasure Principle, then turning to his fictionalization 
of the traumatic history of the Jews contained in Moses and Monotheism (1934-
38), Caruth plausibly argues that latency is determined by the ‘peculiar 
incomprehensibility of human survival’. 42 It is this very incomprehensibility 
which produces history defined by transgenerational aporia and ‘political and 
ethical paralysis’.43 For Caruth, as for Freud, ‘a history can be grasped only by the 
                                                          
39 Caruth, p. 62. 
40 Caruth, p. 4. 
41 Caruth, p. 7. 
42 Caruth, p. 58. Again, here we see a distinct overlap with postmodern fiction’s problematization of historical 
knowledge and its tendency towards ironic inversions of epistemological models. This is particularly acute in 
the writing of Thomas Pynchon, David Foster Wallace, John Barth and Don DeLillo.  
43 Caruth, p. 10. 
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inaccessibility of its occurrence: history is ‘the endless repetition of previous 
violence’.44 Trauma is not simply repressed but incubated: it consists ‘not in the 
forgetting of a reality that can hence never be fully known, but in an inherent 
latency within the experience itself’.45 Drawing upon Freud and the semiology of 
Paul de Man, Caruth equates trauma with departure: what she labels the 
‘unconsciousness of leaving’, or surviving a fall. Survival is a phenomenon as 
enigmatic as the traumatic event itself: ‘it is because the mind cannot confront the 
possibility of its death directly that survival becomes for the human being, 
paradoxically, an endless testimony to the impossibility of living’.46 Survival, and 
the will to testimony, forces the disarticulation of repression and resistance in 
favour of confrontation not only with the trauma itself, but with the perpetrator. 
Latency, Caruth counterintuitively proposes, is inherently restorative, forging a 
link between trauma and survival, witnessing and testimony, which are axiomatic, 
self-referential and self-perpetuating: the trauma survivor is ‘forced, continually, 
to confront it over and over’, while the super-ego alternately raises and lowers the 
barrier to sensation and knowledge which prevents recognition and expression of 
‘the enigma of survival’.47 The drive to unpleasure in confronting trauma is 
simply a drive towards self-affirmation. 
 Caruth’s interpretive model is particularly successful when applied to the 
work of French film director Alain Resnais, whose fragmentary post-Holocaust 
                                                          
44 Caruth, p. 62. 
45 Caruth, p. 17. 
46 Caruth, p. 62. 
47 Caruth, p. 58. 
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narratives enact the ambiguous separation between incomprehensibility and 
disarticulation favoured by Caruth. In this regard, Hustvedt and Auster’s ‘after 
postmodernism’ aesthetic mode of production develop the frustrated apprehension 
of traumatic affect and transferential reconciliation of postmodernism, while 
pushing towards empathic recognition in the vein of Buber’s dialogic I-Thou 
model. However, Caruth’s textual re-presentation of Freud’s ambitious yet 
ambiguous traumatology presents a number of problems.48 Far from slipping 
loose of the contradictions of poststructuralism and deconstruction, her theory of 
trauma finds itself further entwined. For LaCapra, Caruth fails to fully account for 
the generative quality of belatedness: in his words, it repeats ‘whether consciously 
or unconsciously, the disconcertingly opaque movement of post-traumatic 
repetition in a seeming attempt to elucidate that movement’.49 The primacy of ‘not 
knowing’, as he puts it, and its relationship to affect and unconsciousness, moves 
us further from the traumatic point of origin. Poststructuralism and 
                                                          
48 It ascribes, in one sense, supremacy to trauma which is ethically problematic and tautologically complex. 
Caruth’s observation indicates the confluence of poststructuralism and phenomenology within the traumatic 
field: firstly in her affinity for semiotician Paul de Man’s approach to referentiality and the resistance to 
theory as a means of perceiving history; secondly with the establishment and identification of the binary 
nature of trauma in order to deconstruct its apparent oppositionality; and finally in the problematic link 
between events which are consciously perceived and unconsciously stored. Under Caruth’s logic the 
totalizing structures critically challenged by poststructuralism, and the localized and self-referential micro-
narratives which followed thereafter, of which transhistorical or collectivised trauma is one, simply supplant 
one metanarrative (history as knowledge) for another (history as incomprehensibility). Caruth’s observation 
that ‘a history can be grasped only by the inaccessibility of its occurrence’ further illuminates this point 
(Caruth, p. 18). 
49 Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 
p. 184. 
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postmodernism, with their focus on self-reflexivity, contingency and slipperiness, 
are particularly ill-suited to this purpose, according to LaCapra. We must instead 
locate the study of trauma within his preferred field of historiography, locating the 
source of traumatic affect through empirical study, in tandem with the testimonial 
power of the memento mori.  
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Transference and working through 
 Trauma, according to LaCapra, is a ‘disruptive process that disarticulates 
the self and creates holes in existence’.50 The principal focus of LaCapra’s 
Writing History, Writing Trauma (2001), is to acknowledge, understand and 
attempt to resolve how ‘trauma and its symptomatic aftermath pose acute 
problems for historical representation and understanding’.51 Like Caruth, LaCapra 
draws upon trauma theories first developed by Freud in collaboration with a 
number of established neurologists during the late nineteenth century, and latterly 
through a highly idiosyncratic series of discursive essays on the subject of 
psychoanalysis. Leys’ identification of mimetic and anti-mimetic modes of trauma 
can be traced to Freud’s acquaintance in the mid-1880s with the work of two 
French theorists, Jean-Martin Charcot and Hippolyte Bernheim. Both were early 
proponents and practitioners of hypnosis as part of a transferential treatment of 
neurasthenia.52 Freud soon departed from this hypnosis-as-treatment method of 
psychoanalysis, instead working with Josef Breuer, pioneer of the ‘talking cure’ 
                                                          
50 LaCapra, p. 41. 
51 LaCapra, p. ix. 
52 According to his biographer Peter Gay, Freud believed Charcot’s ‘somatic’ theory deployed the ‘external 
stimuli’ of hypnosis most effectively ‘when there is a particular disposition of the nervous system and 
therefore that only neuropaths (especially hysterics) are hypnotizable’. By contrast, Bernheim saw that the 
‘physical effects, effects of ideas which are provoked in the hypnotised subject or not’ constituted ‘all the 
phenomena of hypnosis’, and therefore hysteria. Power and desire are implicated in the hypnotic process, as 
Leys notes above, coupled with the dual constitution of disassociation which decentres the subject and 
determines the extent of traumatic repression, resistance or repetition (Sigmund Freud, ‘Review of Forel’s 
Hypnotism’ [1889] [qtd in The Freud Reader, ed. by Gay, p. 45]). 
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which, according to Rachel Bowlby, emphasised communication as a means to 
recovery, and the ‘stress fell on the auditory, not the visual’ symptoms of 
trauma.53 Breuer and Freud’s co-authored Studies in Hysteria (1895) produced the 
famous observation that ‘hysterics suffer for the most part from reminiscences’,54 
which varying from a series of partial traumas to one central destabilising event, 
and were heightened by the psychical sensitivity of the sufferer, thereby 
conferring the ‘distressing affects of fright, anxiety, shame or physical pain’ upon 
them. 55 For Breuer and Freud, traumatic memory instilled within the sufferer a 
‘double consciousness’ or ‘hypnoid’ dissociative state,56 thereby preventing the 
lessening of affect: they recorded, ‘if the reaction is suppressed, the affect remains 
bound up with the memory’.57 The cathartic method of Breuer’s talking cure 
focused on the movement from an anhedonic state towards confrontation and 
apprehension, and eventual abreaction, of the original trauma:  
Remembering without affect almost always fails to be affective; the 
psychical process that had originally taken place has to be repeated in as 
vivid a way as possible, brought to its status nascendi, and then ‘talked 
                                                          
53 ‘In the talking cure, there is no one language, but a constant movement of boundaries between languages 
themselves and between language and other domains. […] The Greek word cathartic, adopted to describe the 
new therapeutic treatment, carries the connotation of a (good) riddance of bodily or emotional matter’ (Rachel 
Bowlby, ‘Introduction’, in Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud, Studies in Hysteria [London: Penguin, 2004], 
pp. vii-xxxiii [pp. viii-xiv]).  
54 Breuer and Freud, p. 11. 
55 Breuer and Freud, p. 9. 
56 Breuer and Freud, p. 14. 
57 Breuer and Freud, p. 11. 
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through’ […] allowing its trapped affect to drain away through speech; it 
then submits the idea to associative correction by drawing it into 
consciousness’. 58 
Modlinger and Sonntag record that the symptoms of hysteria and the problems of 
remembrance lie ‘at the core of recent debates on the nature, transmission, 
treatment – and telling – of trauma’.59 Unlike Caruth’s insistence on the 
unspeakable nature of trauma, LaCapra’s reading of Freud’s work emphasises the 
verbal and nonverbal dynamics of transference embedded in ‘melancholia and 
mourning, acting out and working through’ as a means of consciously 
reconstituting shattered subjectivities:60 
These processes of working through, including mourning and modes of 
critical thought and practice, involve the possibility of making distinctions 
or developing articulations that are recognised as problematic, but still 
function as limited and as possibly desirable resistances of undesirability.61 
                                                          
58 Breuer and Freud, p. 10-19. 
59 Modlinger and Sonntag, p. 2. 
60 LaCapra, ix. 
61 LaCapra, p. 22. LaCapra’s dynamics of trauma overlap with the phenomenological register of Hustvedt’s 
approach to visual art in the narrative of What I Loved, whereby the boundaries between subject and object, 
viewer and viewed collapse as characters enter into the artworks; as Schulz-Hoffman notes: ‘The interior 
kinesis of the character is transferred to the ambience, becoming a unity with it’ (Schulz-Hoffman, ‘Siri 
Hustvedt’s Visual Imagination’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity, ed. by Hartmann, Marks and Zapf, p. 277). 
To rework Hustvedt’s observation, perhaps all traumatic events require a spectator to initiate the process of 
transference.  
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The dynamics of trauma, LaCapra believes, ‘are not fully owned by anyone, and 
in various ways affect everyone’,62 while transference, like trauma itself, involves 
‘the implication of the observer in the observed’.63  
 Critical for LaCapra is what he describes as an ‘empathic unsettlement’ 
and the discursive, or dialogic, nature of that unsettlement – a revisionist trope 
which develops Breuer’s ‘talking cure’ – through what he refers to as a ‘middle 
voice’ affected by the ‘tangled and difficult relations of proximity and distance’ to 
the other.64 This neutral middle voice establishes a conscious barrier and 
intersubjective recognition of self and other which is necessarily interpretative, 
empathic and non-judgemental. Hyperbolic responses to trauma, such as the 
irrational, hallucinatory and highly subjective symptoms of hysteria, anxiety, 
neurosis and so on, constitute a ‘necessary affective response’ to trauma’s 
impact.65 From this individuated and empirical position, both analyst and patient 
are able to begin the painstaking process of working through the traumatic 
experience.66  
 LaCapra’s particular theoretical framework applies these Freudian ideas to 
the sociocultural and political realities which guide historiography, as opposed to 
                                                          
62 LaCapra, p. xi. 
63 LaCapra, p. 36. 
64 LaCapra, p. xi. 
65 LaCapra, p. xi. 
66 Here LaCapra’s empathic unsettlement recalls Buber’s philosophy of dialogism, particularly the split 
between the Lacanian register of the I-It paradigm, and the dialogic mutual reciprocity of Buber’s favoured I-
Thou model. The phrase ‘middle voice’ similarly echoes Buber’s notion of the ‘between’: an ambiguous, 
oscillating zone of transference between self and other. 
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the literary-theoretical route of poststructuralism, or deconstruction, which 
influences the work of Caruth. Generalizations about the effects of trauma, 
according to LaCapra, serve to obscure the critical distinctions – individual, 
historical, sociocultural, or geopolitical – between specific traumatic events, while 
impeding the possibility of understanding and reaching cathartic closure; 
responses to mediatized trauma being a case in point. Distinct to Caruth, LaCapra 
points to this limiting ‘faith to trauma’ as a form of misrecognition: a desire to 
remain close to the latency of trauma to preserve the sanctity of its inaccessible 
memory, which thereby ‘invalidates a form of conceptual or narrative closure’.67 
While he values the necessity of writing trauma to make sense of trauma, LaCapra 
quotes Perez Zagorin to question poststructuralism’s reduction of ‘all modes of 
thought to the common condition of writing’.68 The self-referential nature of 
Barthesian écriture, and the intimation of enduring ambivalence between survivor 
and witness, and perpetrator and victim, has problematic implications for the 
empathic unsettlement LaCapra valorises: 
Undecidability and unregulated différance, threatening to disarticulate 
relations, confuse self and other, and collapse all distinctions, including 
that between past and present, are related to transference and prevail in 
trauma and post-traumatic acting out in which one is haunted or possessed 
by the past and performatively caught up in the compulsive repetition of 
                                                          
67 LaCapra, p. 22-23. 
68 Perez Zagorin, ‘Postmodernism: Reconsiderations’ (qtd in LaCapra, p. 9). 
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traumatic scenes – scenes in which the past returns and the future is 
blocked or fatalistically caught up in a melancholic feedback loop.69   
By its very nature, self-referentiality favours acting out over and above working 
through: ‘in acting out tenses implode, and it is as if one were back there in the 
past reliving the traumatic scene. Any duality (or double inscription) of time (past 
and present and future) is experientially collapsed or productive only of aporias or 
double binds’.70 Moreover, poststructuralism’s problematization of self-other 
distinctions holds implications for the identities of victim and perpetrator, which, 
according to LaCapra, ‘seem to undercut the problems of agency and 
responsibility’.71 This necessarily extends to the transferential nature of the 
analyst and patient relationship and the cathartic possibilities of the talking cure. 
 LaCapra also distances his thinking from that of more abstract 
generalizations of affect which have problematic ethical implications for trauma 
studies, sometimes resulting in the fetishized ‘wound culture’ identified by 
Seltzer. LaCapra questions the validity of reading all history as the history of 
trauma, stating that ‘at times it has even become an obsession or an occasion for 
rash amalgamations or conflations (for example, in the idea that contemporary 
culture, or even all history, is essentially traumatic)’.72 The transferential nature of 
trauma, coupled with its elevated position within in contemporary culture, self-
reflexively generates a cultural milieu in which theoretical abstraction is placed in 
                                                          
69 LaCapra, p. 21. 
70 LaCapra, p. 22. 
71 LaCapra, p. 25. 
72 LaCapra, p. x. 
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greater authority than truth claims arrived at through historiographic practice. 
While Caruth’s reading of Freud appears to locate truth in subjectivity, LaCapra 
seems to situate it in the objective world, describing the cultural tendency to 
‘convert trauma into sublimity’, which ‘paradoxically become[s] the valorized or 
intensely cathected basis of identity for an individual or group’.73 This 
psychically-grounded transgenerational resistance to transference and catharsis, 
LaCapra seems to suggest, is wilful and deliberate: ‘one possessed, however 
vicariously, by the past and reliving its traumatic scenes may be tragically 
incapable of acting responsibly or behaving in an ethical manner’.74 
 By contrast, according to LaCapra, the process of working through trauma 
‘involves the effort to articulate or rearticulate affect and re-representation in a 
manner that may never transcend [it]’, but which, crucially, ‘counteract[s] a re-
enactment, or acting out, of that disabling dissociation’.75 Here he finds some 
common ground with Caruth, acknowledging the emergence of what he terms 
‘traumatic realism’ through literary and other artistic representations, forms which 
emphasise ‘mutual interactions and resistances’ while offering a ‘disconcerting 
exploration of disorientation, its symptomatic dimensions and possible ways of 
responding to them’.76 The disconcerting, disorientating and indefinable qualities 
of such an aesthetic seem to offer a means to comprehend trauma’s 
incomprehensibility while it remains unavailable to consciousness. LaCapra 
                                                          
73 LaCapra, p. 23. 
74 LaCapra, p. 28. 
75 LaCapra, p. 42. 
76 LaCapra, p. 186. 
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places a higher value upon ‘ambivalent’ or ‘allegorical’ art which ignores 
traumatic events or specific figures, citing the work of Kafka, Beckett, Celan and 
Blanchot – all writers whose work Auster has expressed some admiration for. 
Writing trauma, for LaCapra, involves a process of acting out, working over and 
working through in analysing, understanding and ‘giving voice’ to the past.77 In 
The Brooklyn Follies, it is possible to see such a moment: a retrospective narrative 
ostensibly about 9/11 in which all mention of the signifying trauma is withheld 
until the final page, thereby resisting the ‘wound culture’ Seltzer critiques. In The 
Sorrows of an American, the layering of intergenerational trauma and first-person 
testimony gesture towards the transhistorical nature of traumatic affect 
foregrounded by the national tragedy of 9/11. Both novels, as we shall see below, 
owe a debt of gratitude to Freud.  
 
  
                                                          
77 LaCapra, p. 186. 
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Narrativising 9/11 
 The attack on the Twin Towers on the morning of September 11 has been 
described as ‘unique’,78 a ‘semiotic event’,79 and ‘emotional phenomena’.80 9/11 
was, moreover, ‘exceptional, unheard of, and unimaginable, raising the 
fundamental question of its representability in language and in art’.81 The visceral 
power of the 9/11 attacks, and its shattering of ‘the symbolic resources of the 
culture’,82 seemed to demand what the author Don DeLillo described as a 
‘counter-narrative’.83 For Heffernan and Salvan these narrative responses to 9/11 
were conditioned by their appropriation of trauma theory or simulacra theory. The 
terror attacks delineated the ‘historical logics of globalisation’ and the ‘trans-
                                                          
78 Kaplan, p. 14. 
79 Kristiaan Versluys, Out of the Blue: September 11 and the Novel (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2009), p. 2. 
80 Roland Bleiker ‘Art after 9/11’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political (31: 1, 2006), 77-99 (p. 90). 
81 Hubert Zapf, ‘Trauma, Narrative and Ethics in Recent American Fiction’, in Other People's Pain: 
Narratives of Trauma and the Question of Ethics, ed. by Martin Modlinger and Philipp Sonntag (Oxford: 
Peter Lang, 2011), pp. 145-168 (p. 163). 
82 Versluys, Out of the Blue, p. 1. 
83 Don DeLillo, ‘In the Ruins of the Future’, Harpers (December 2001), p. 33-40 (p.39).  Hustvedt, DeLillo 
and Auster are friends, with Auster dedicating Leviathan to DeLillo. Falling Man utilises an ekphrastic 
technique akin to that of Hustvedt, using representations of two Giorgio Morandi paintings to reflect upon the 
empathic and cathartic qualities of visual art. The title of DeLillo’s article is taken from a piece by Gerhard 
Richter. ‘Double Exposure’, Hustvedt’s essay on Richter, was published in Modern Painters in 2002, while 
’The Drama of Perception: Looking at Morandi’ was published in the Yale Review in 2009 (both were 
reprinted in Living, Thinking, Looking). DeLillo’s other novels also deploy ekphrastic techniques, particularly 
the lengthy description of the Zapruder film of President Kennedy’s assassination in Underworld (1997), and  
his representation of Douglas Gordon’s 24 Hour Psycho video installation in Point Omega (2010).. 
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realistic effects’ of ‘the cultural logic of postmodernism’; ‘an expression of global 
terror, but also a ‘performance’’ specifically designed for maximum intermedial 
impact.84 Its semiotic consistency, phenomenological hybridity and 
intersubjective impact forced writers to ‘confront the signal event that reorients 
the culture and marks it in its deepest substratum’.85 For Bennett these narratives 
were grounded in the vicarious trauma of the non-survivor: ‘for many secondary 
witnesses – those affected by the tragedy, but not directly involved – the 
symptomology of trauma offered a means to articulate an affective response’.86 
According to Versluys, novelists, being possessed of a ‘affective and empathetic 
understanding’, described a multiplicity of restorative-narrative forms within 
which the individual is ‘healed’ and ‘made whole’ through ‘narrative and 
semiosis’.87  
 In his survey of fiction responding to 9/11, 88 Versluys identifies two 
categories: those novels characterised by a textual depiction or engagement with 
the immediate aftermath of the attacks, critically addressing the ‘perpetrator-
victim dichotomy’ of mainstream political and cultural responses through a 
                                                          
84 Julian Jimenez Heffernan and Paula Martin Salvan, ‘The Stricken Community: Recidivism and Restoration 
in American 9/11 Fiction’, Arizona Quarterly (69: 2, 2013), 145-69 (pp. 145-46). 
85 Versluys, Out of the Blue, p. 12. 
86 Bennett, p. 20. 
87 Versluys, Out of the Blue, p. 12; p. 4. 
88 Versluys, Out of the Blue, p. 1. 
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‘triangulating discourse’ which ‘appeals for an ethics of responsibility’;89 and 
those novels which reflect a temporal and emotional distancing from the 
immediacy of 9/11 to re-contextualise its impact. With their concern for what 
T.M. Luhrman calls ‘quiet traumas’,90 9/11 exists as a ‘vestige’ or 
‘spectralisation’, while the narrative delineates a metonymic exploration of ethics, 
morality and responsibility within the new context.91 The post-9/11 canon 
Versluys describes seems to respond to Butler’s call for the minimisation of 
global violence and acknowledgement of independency as the basis of a ‘global 
political community’,92 while ‘foregrounding that practices and perceptions of 
power are inseparable from processes of memory, mediation and forgetting’.93 
Literary fiction penned in response to 9/11 applied this framework on a 
microcosmic, or glocal, scale. In many of these narratives, trauma’s 
intersubjective foundation is reiterated through their focus on New York’s 
grieving citizens, while being referentially delineated by the disappearance of the 
                                                          
89 Works of fiction in this category included notable narrative responses by New Yorkers: DeLillo’s Falling 
Man, Jay McInerney’s The Good Life (2006), and Jonathan Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredibly 
Close (2005) (Versluys, Out of the Blue, p. 183). 
90 T.M. Luhrmann, quoted in Kaplan, p. 19. 
91 If there is a difficulty with these categorizations it is that, as time passes, all novels written after September 
11 could be considered part of the post-9/11 canon. Here one sees an equivalent position in Robert Eaglestone 
equation of postmodernism with post-Holocaust aesthetics, specifically the philosophies of Levinas and 
Derrida, both of whom have influenced the writing of Hustvedt and Auster. As with the artists, writers and 
thinkers of the late Twentieth Century, all contemporary writers live and work in the post-9/11 era. See 
Robert Eaglestone, The Holocaust and the Postmodern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
92 Butler, p. xii. 
93 Sielke, p. 396. 
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familiar figures of the Twin Towers: ‘their visual absence was traumatic’, the 
concretisation of a psychical ‘gap or lack’ in the Manhattan skyline.94 Absence as 
a trope of trauma draws upon the latency identified by Caruth, with Radstone 
observing that the relationship between representation and actuality is defined by 
‘the absence of traces’.95 Alternatively, trauma narratives that recontextualised 
9/11 within a history of transgenerational trauma and Western cultural hegemony 
took their theoretical and structural cues from LaCapra.   
 Other critical approaches to the canon Versluys identified have found the 
response by American writers to 9/11 to be more problematic. In targeting the 
symbols of political, economic and cultural power that had characterised and 
coloured the texture of the late Twentieth Century, the origins of the attack are 
inscribed in the narrative of American hegemony and ‘first world privilege’ that 
preceded it,96 and in the ‘conditions of heightened vulnerability and aggression’ 
that followed.97 It triggered a new cycle of ‘military violence and retribution’ 
under the guise of the Bush Administration’s War on Terror,98 which bequeathed 
to the global community armed interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, further 
destabilisation and Islamist insurgency across the Middle East, and the global 
proliferation of localised jihadi networks. Experienced globally through digital 
                                                          
94 Kaplan, p. 12. 
95 Radstone, p. 12. 
96 Butler, p. xii. 
97 Butler, p. xi. 
98 Butler, p. xii. 
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and mass media, it enacted a ‘rupture for everybody’;99 its visual nature ‘seemed 
to feed trauma’ by making individual and collective trauma inseparable and 
reinforcing: being experienced by those who survived it, witnessed it first hand or 
watched the broadcast images, transacting a transnational victimology.100 While 
Bennett argues that ‘we are all victims of the 9/11 attacks, by some degree of 
association’,101 others such as Kamila Shamsie, Richard Gray and David 
Holloway highlight representations of the 9/11 terror attacks which are burdened 
by a native insularity and myopic victimology which fail to adequately reconcile 
the strange (Other) with the familiar (domestic) required to reach empathic 
resolution.102 
 The trauma narratives of Hustvedt and Auster are inevitably drawn into 
these critical debates, while the authenticity of their empathic narratives is 
                                                          
99 Bennett, p. 20. 
100 Kaplan, p. 13. 
101 Bennett, p. 20. 
102 Shamsie in particular critiques American incredulity at the 9/11 terror attacks as being symptomatic of its 
incapability of critically distinguishing between ‘America in the world’ and ‘the world in America’: the false 
dichotomy of the ‘brutal military power’ and realpolitik of American foreign policy, and the ‘exuberance and 
possibility’ of its cultural hegemony. Shamsie writes: ‘all of America looked at America with one eye shut’, 
while further highlighting, ‘with pitifully few exceptions’, the domestic concerns of 9/11 novels penned by 
Americans. (See Kamila Shamsie, ‘The Storytellers of Empire’, Guernica (01 February 2012) 
<http://www.guernicamag.com/shamsie_02_01_2-12> [Accessed 23 June 2017]). Like Shamsie, Gray seeks 
to establish an alternative post-9/11 canon, positing Homi Bhaba’s notion of interstitiality as a means of 
transcending the ‘spaces between cultures’ which concretise the separation of self and other, through the 
formal and thematic possibilities of narrative. See Richard Gray, After the Fall: American Literature Since 
9/11 (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2011), p. 93. 
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problematized by the perspectives of Shamsie, Gray and others. Nevertheless, the 
novels that will come under consideration in this chapter are characterised by 
intersubjective exchange between victim and witness or artist and audience, and 
the move from the melancholia of compulsive repetition towards the ‘active work 
of mourning that allows one who has lost an object to move beyond grief’.103 
Debra Shostak compares this process with LaCapra’s definition of melancholia, 
which is ‘characteristic of an arrested process in which the depressed, self-
berating, and traumatised self, locked in compulsive repetition, is possessed by the 
past’.104 The embodied nature of witnessing trauma and its dissociative effects 
invites an intermedial exchange between surviving or witnessing trauma, and 
forming an aesthetic response to art which is summarised by Hustvedt’s comment 
that ‘seeing isn’t always believing’:  
The temperamentally sensitive will be more vulnerable to shocks and 
blows than the temperamentally robust. This applies to art as well. Our 
temperaments in tandem with our personal stories as we grow as human 
beings will affect our responses… and become part of the dialogue.105  
                                                          
103 Debra Shostak, ‘In the Country of Missing Persons: Paul Auster’s Narratives of Trauma’, Studies in the 
Novel (41: 1, 2009), 66-87 (, p. 67). Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia (1917) predates Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, but this spit between latent trauma (melancholia, acting out, incomprehensibility) and the process 
of transference (mourning, working through, apprehension) is present in the earlier text. 
104 Dominick LaCapra, ‘Reflections on Trauma, Absence and Loss’, p. 189, qtd in Shostak, p. 67. Shostak 
also highlights LaCapra’s separation of absence and loss, with absence being ‘existential’ and loss ‘temporal’. 
Absence for LaCapra, is not an ‘event’ in the way that 9/11 was, but a transhistorical, ontological condition 
(Shostak, p. 67). 
105 Hustvedt, ‘Embodied Visions’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, pp. 344-45. 
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The textual hybrid spatiality and drive towards restorative mutuality deployed by 
Hustvedt and Auster in their respective post-9/11 narratives further indicates a 
movement towards a metamodernistic mode of writing. It equally serves to 
reinforce the dialogic constituency of their writing relationship, where these 
separate and distinct approaches to narrativizing 9/11 co-exist in complementary 
symbiosis.   
 
 
1: Representing unrepresentability 
 This section will examine how Auster and Hustvedt attempted to 
narrativise 9/11 by exploring the tension between latency and transference. The 
difficulty of adequately representing the event and traumatic aftermath of the 
September 11 terror attacks is located within its phenomenological 
incomprehensibility. Luckhurst, drawing upon Bruno Latour’s ‘hybrid 
assemblages’, describes the traumatic event as a ‘tangled object’ that blurs 
binaries and confuses the ‘fundamental categories of subject and object, human 
and non-human, society and nature’.106 Leys contends that ‘language bears 
witness…only by a failure of witnessing or representation’,107 thereby issuing an 
‘ethical obligation on the listener’.108 For Sielke, ‘trauma does not simply escape 
the symbolic...rather it marks the limits of the symbolic, while at the same time 
                                                          
106 Luckhurst, p. 14. 
107 Leys, p. 268. 
108 Leys, p. 269. 
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being retained and conserved across time, escaping historicity while compulsively 
returning’,109 what Luckhurst elsewhere describes as ‘a fundamental tension 
between interruption and flow, blockage and movement’. Consequently, 
according to Luckhurst, ‘if trauma is a crisis in representation, then this generates 
narrative possibility just as much as impossibility’.110 Katharina Donn concurs, 
observing:  
While the impact of trauma, with its disturbing flashbacks and haunting 
memories undermines the epistemological categories of a purely empirical, 
diagnostic approach from the start, the symbolic complexity of a literary 
text can offer a way out of this paralysing shock.111 
The oscillation between paralysis and agency, incomprehensibility and 
representation, empiricism and imagination, and mourning and melancholia are 
discursively delineated by Hustvedt and Auster in their two post-9/11 novels.  
 The Sorrows of an American revisits the thematic and theoretical concerns 
of What I Loved, developing the triangulation of traumatic affect, self-other 
recognition and an aesthetic of cathartic mutuality established by Hustvedt in the 
                                                          
109 Sielke, p. 391. 
110 Luckhurst, p. 83. 
111 Katharina Donn, ‘Crisis of Knowledge: Trauma in The Sorrows of an American’ in Zones of Focused 
Ambiguity in Siri Hustvedt’s Works, ed. by Hartmann, Marks and Zapf, pp. 341-56 (p. 342). 
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earlier novel. As Elizabeth Kovach records, ‘life in The Sorrows of an American 
is characterised by mutability and insecurity’: 112 
In a city proven vulnerable by 9/11, Hustvedt’s characters must deal with a 
confounding simultaneity of contradictory conditions on a most personal 
as well as greater socio-political levels.113  
In Hustvedt’s fifth novel, a middle class New York family tries to come to terms 
with paterfamilias Lars Davidsen, while the wider community attempts to come to 
terms with the traumatic aftershocks of 9/11. Hustvedt principally utilises self-
other dialectics in tandem with psychoanalytic theory to explore the national 
trauma of 9/11, and the deaths of Lars and his daughter Inga Blaustein’s husband 
from cancer. As Mark C. Taylor suggests, ‘absence – what is unsaid and, perhaps, 
unsayable – always sets the story in motion’.114 Hustvedt’s novel opens with Erik 
recalling: ‘My sister [Inga] called it ‘the year of secrets,’ but when I look back on 
it now, I’ve come to understand that it was a time not of what was there, but of 
what wasn’t’. (Sorrows 1) 
 We enter the narrative through the embodied subjectivity of Hustvedt’s 
psychiatrist/psychoanalyst protagonist Erik Davidsen. Through his solipsistic 
narration, we learn that Erik is affected by a sense of joylessness – what he terms 
                                                          
112 Elizabeth Kovach, ‘Violated Securities: Symptoms of a post-9/11 Zeitgeist in Siri Hustvedt’s The Sorrows 
of an American’, eTransfers: A Postgraduate ejournal for Contemporary Literature and Cultural Studies (2: 
2012), 1-18 (p. 5.) <http:qmul.ac.uk/cagcr/etransfers/docs/86154.pdf> [Accessed 26/03/2017]. 
113 Kovach, p. 5. 
114 Mark C. Taylor, ‘Wounding Words’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity, ed. by Hartmann, Marks and Zapf, 
pp. 153-184 (p. 166). 
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‘anhedonia’ (Sorrows 122) – following the death of his father, and the suicide of a 
patient, Sarah, with whom he was having an affair. Intoning ‘I’m so lonely’ at 
moments of quiet crisis and personal insecurity, (Sorrows 17) Erik finds himself 
subjected to the same unconscious pressures as his patients, friends and family 
members. His repeated verbalisations form an intersubjective link to Erik’s 
deceased father, who suffered a similar affliction in his closing years ‘at the 
nursing home’, where ‘he would utter Marit [his wife’s name] over and over’. 
(Sorrows 16)  Erik’s professional identity – with its necessary tension between 
proximity and distance to the other – is engrained with intersubjective 
implications which complicate his relationship with others.115 His predominantly 
perception-driven narration becomes a framing device within which the language 
of psychoanalysis and the tropes of trauma interweave with the structural and 
inherently transferential elements of Hustvedt’s literary technique, as the author 
herself observes: 
The analyst as a neutral figure has long struck me as a flawed idea […] 
Erik knows he is not neutral, knows that psychotherapy happens in the 
land of Between, that wilderness between you and me. Although the 
patient’s narration must dominate, the analyst can steer, probe, wander, 
                                                          
115 ‘Writing as Erik, I felt an underground music that determined the rhythms of the book’s form. I knew I 
was writing a verbal fugue, point and counterpoint, themes chasing themes and variations on them that kept 
returning: telling and not telling, listening and deafness, parents and children, the past and the present, on 
generation’s sorrows living on in the generations that follow it’ (Siri Hustvedt, ‘The Analyst in Fiction: 
Reflections on a More or Less Hidden Being’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, pp. 152-65 [p. 165]).  
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and interpret, while he or she maintains a thoughtful, sympathetic 
professional distance.116  
Similarly, Erik’s narration elicits a response within the reader which is equally 
thoughtful, sympathetic and interpretative, a process reaffirmed by Hustvedt: 
‘there is no real other in a novel, only imagined others. But writing novels is 
nevertheless a form of open listening to those imagined others’.117 
 Hustvedt’s use of a psychoanalyst narrator, therefore, not only offers an 
ironic inversion of the patient-analyst relationship, drawing the reader deeper into 
the drama between self and other, but it also offers a more concretised means by 
which she can adequately narrativise the aftermath of 9/11. For Zapf, Hustvedt 
includes 9/11 ‘as one contemporary background for the semi-autobiographical 
traumas of everyday life’.118 Hustvedt’s treatment of trauma in her fiction 
revolves around an openly discursive exploration of a range of other voices: the 
disciplines of psychoanalysis, psychiatry, neuroscience and literary theory.119 
Donn goes further, proposing that Hustvedt’s ‘imaginative mode…makes the 
novel a space for developing a multi-dimensional knowledge not without, but 
beyond the rational’.120 Through the nexus of multiple perspectives and 
                                                          
116 Hustvedt, ‘The Analyst in Fiction’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 157. 
117 Hustvedt, ‘The Analyst in Fiction’ in Living, Thinking, Looking, p. 165. 
118 Zapf, ‘Trauma, Narrative and Ethics’ in Other People’s Pain, ed. by Modlinger and Sonntag, p. 164. 
119 Zapf, ‘Trauma, Narrative and Ethics’ in Other People’s Pain, ed. by Modlinger and Sonntag, p. 164. 
120 Donn, ‘Crisis of Knowledge’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity, ed. by Hartmann, Marks and Zapf, p. 342. 
Rather than problematizing knowledge through the historiographic metafiction delineated by Hutcheon, for 
Donn Hustvedt’s novel indicates a new epistemology which attempts to move beyond the ‘crisis of 
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theoretical positions identified by Zapf and Donn, Hustvedt begins to delineate an 
ethical position in relation to trauma, one which emphasises its intergenerational 
and transgressive constituency: what Taylor terms ‘psychic inheritance’. Erik’s 
initial apprehension of trauma, according to Jean-Michel Rabaté, is initially 
Caruthian: as Erik observes, ‘trauma isn’t part of a story; it is outside the story. It 
is what we refuse to make part of the story’.121 (Sorrows 52) Later, according to 
Rabaté, the narrative of The Sorrows of an American: 
Gains a Freudian dynamism of its own…it affirms that talking, like 
writing, can lift the trauma. Writing can transform the unspeakable wound 
into a metaphorical scar – a true ‘scar-letter’.122 
In The Sorrows of an American, Hustvedt explores how the tension between 
incomprehensibility and belatedness of affect, and the split between loss and 
absence, constitute a crisis of subjectivity (melancholia) which must be worked 
through to achieve catharsis (mourning).123 Further, according to Elizabeth 
                                                          
knowledge’ trauma engenders. This overtly empathic epistemological mode is rooted in a framework of 
embodied intersubjectivity and reciprocal mutuality. 
121 Jean-Michel Rabaté, ‘History and Trauma’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity, ed. by Hartmann, Marks and 
Zapf, p. 337.  
122 Rabaté, ‘History and Trauma’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity, ed. by Hartmann, Marks and Zapf, p. 337. 
123 ‘A man a came to think of as my imaginary brother…brought up in Minnesota by parents very much like 
mine, he was the boy never born into the Hustvedt family’. (Shaking 5) For Mark C. Taylor, ‘Erik, the 
psychoanalyst, and Inga, the philosophy student and writer, are pseudonyms for two Siri’s who write the 
text.’ Taylor also highlight’s Hustvedt’s drawing upon Kierkegaard’s Either/Or as an intertext for The 
Sorrows of an American, isolating Kierkegaard’s belief in ‘psychic inheritance’ whereby ‘the sins of the 
father are visited on sons and daughters in the form of dread, which can become overwhelming. From 
generation to generation, psychic debt (de Schuld) is compounded and guilt (die Schuld) increases’. (See 
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Kovach, Hustvedt presents 9/11 in a liminal and vertiginous way, allowing it to 
pervade ‘the story and structure’ through its myriad fragmentary and fleeting 
appearances, represented through the differing remembrances of the 
Davidsen/Blaustein family members.124 The events of 9/11 are largely peripheral 
to the emotional core of the central narrative.  
 This peripherality similarly applies to Auster’s The Brooklyn Follies. 
Auster’s first and only novel to deal directly with the national trauma of 9/11 can 
be read as one novel in a sequence which progresses postmodern fiction’s 
exploration of the tension between traumatology and the limits of historical 
knowledge. Debra Shostak proposes that ‘Auster’s framing of the novel’s action 
between moments of personal and national trauma points to one of the abiding 
preoccupations of his career’.125 For Heffernan and Salvan, the novel ‘enacts the 
                                                          
Mark C. Taylor, ‘Wounding Words’ in Zones of Focused Ambiguity, ed. by Hartmann, Marks and Zapf pp. 
166-68.)  
124 Kovach, p. 2. 
125 Shostak, p. 66. According to Shostak, this interest in trauma is a long-standing one: the writing of his first 
published non-fictional text – The Invention of Solitude – was triggered by the sudden death of his father, and 
examines this through a central presence as absence organising motif. Auster’s book also addresses the 
transgenerational trauma of his grandfather’s murder at the hands of his grandmother, and the effect of the 
Holocaust. The existential narratives of Auster’s early fiction – New York Trilogy, In the Country of Last 
Things, Moon Palace, The Music of Chance and Leviathan – all exhibit postmodern techniques self-
reflexively rendered through the effects of trauma, and the contingent frustration of cathartic recovery, with 
the narrative suggesting a metonymic commentary upon the socio-cultural failings of contemporary America. 
After Leviathan, Auster’s novels switch to a more obliquely empathic mode which gives precedence to linear 
storytelling: the causality-focused ethical narratives of Mr. Vertigo, Timbuktu and The Book of Illusions in 
particular move beyond the mechanistic contingency of his earlier fiction. In this sense less of a departure, 
more of a deepening and rebalancing of these empathic concerns: nihilism ceding to optimism, dissolution 
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conjunction of historical terror, Utopian community and American literature in a 
characteristic meta-literary turn’.126 Auster’s first, and only, novel to notionally 
engage with the national trauma of 9/11, The Brooklyn Follies is an episodic, neo-
picaresque text in the tragi-comic mode. His protagonist is Nathan Glass, a former 
life-insurance salesman and cancer survivor, who is retelling the past few month 
of his life. Nathan, like Hustvedt’s Erik, is a Brooklynite, and possessed of 
typically-Austerian cratyllic surname, although the New York he shows us is not 
the Manhattan of destabilising reflections of Auster’s City of Glass, but the 
empathic Brooklyn the author now calls his home. His narrative opens with a 
typically Austerian non-sequitur – ‘I was looking for a place to die’.127 
Conversely the novel closes with a joyous declaration of certainty and emotional 
rectitude, after the narrator is discharged from hospital following another brush 
with mortality: ‘I was happy my friends, as happy as any man who had ever lived’ 
(Follies 304).  
  At the close of the novel, Auster dispels the tragi-comic absurdities of 
Nathan’s empathic narrative with a reference to the 9/11 terror attacks:  
                                                          
giving way to narrative resolution: ‘the narrators pursuing their objects engage in a therapeutic process which 
brings them towards accepting loss, contingency and thwarted desire’. Shostak similarly notes LaCapra’s 
separation of ‘absence from loss, acting out from on working though, mourning from melancholy’ in Auster’s 
narrativised confrontations with trauma.  (Shostak, pp. 66-8.) 
126 Heffernan and Salvan, p. 161. 
127 Paul Auster, The Brooklyn Follies (London: Faber, 2005), p. 1. Hereafter referred to in the text as Follies 
with page numbers cited. Compare this opening with that of The Book of Illusions (‘everyone thought he was 
dead’). 
327 
 
It was eight o’clock when I stepped out onto the street, eight o’clock on 
the morning of September 11, 2001 – just forty-six minutes before the first 
plane crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Centre. Just two 
hours after that, the smoke of three thousand incinerated bodies would drift 
over toward Brooklyn and come pouring down on us in a white cloud of 
ashes and death. (Follies 303-04) 
This reflects what Heidi Elisabeth Bollinger identifies as an inversion of the ‘deus 
ex machina’ trope, an otherwise ‘miraculous intervention’, which precipitates the 
‘unsettling and frustrating conclusions [which] invoke the confusion and sense of 
unreality generated by mass disasters’, and offers an opportunity to ‘reread the 
historical disaster in light of its outcome’.128 For Bollinger, the ‘paradigm-
shattering’ close of The Brooklyn Follies problematizes ‘not only the future 
beyond the plot’s end but the meaning of all preceding events’.129 By contrast, 
Heffernan and Salvan emphasise the positivity of the novel’s close, suggesting 
that ‘Auster creates a narrative where violence is projected into the future, into a 
suspended ‘not-yet’ time – immediately before 9/11 – and place – Brooklyn – 
where he can build a Utopian community’ which will survive future violence’.130  
 Bollinger argues that ‘Auster’s ending does not befit his plot, but 
punctures it’, suggesting that at that moment it switches from being a pre-9/11 
novel to a post-9/11 one. Auster’s approach to representing the ‘semiotic’ event of 
                                                          
128 Heidi Elisabeth Bollinger, ‘The Danger of Re-reading: Disastrous Endings in Paul Auster’s The Brooklyn 
Follies and Jhumpa Lahiri’s Unaccustomed Earth, Studies in the Novel (46:4, 2014), 486-506 (pp. 486-87). 
129 Bollinger, p. 487. 
130 Heffernan and Salvan, p. 162. 
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9/11 is equal parts playful and thoughtful: by positioning the event at the close of 
the novel, he deliberately steps away from other post-9/11 novels which employ a 
degree of foreshadowing, or indeed backshadowing, in relation to the event. The 
linearity, temporality and ethicality of the novel are called into question: our 
understanding and knowledge of the events of the preceding pages are shaded 
with new meaning. On the one hand, it is fundamentally a novel about 9/11, 
where the ‘invocation of 9/11 amplifies the meaning of trauma’; on the other, 9/11 
is so superfluous to the narrative its arrival appears blandly superficial, much like 
the mediatized representation the global community experienced. Bollinger’s 
belief that ‘the sucker-punch ending dramatizes the meaninglessness of the type of 
‘everyday people’ storytelling in which Auster has indulged’ overlooks the 
credibility of Auster’s narrative: this is a novel about trauma in which the limit 
event appears belatedly. In metamodernistic terms, it is both and neither approach 
to representing trauma: it oscillates between critical reflexivity and critical 
distancing which preserves Auster’s customary ambiguity, while similarly 
retaining his pervasive and persuasive empathic concerns about the impact of 
trauma on the city of New York, and an American nation comprised of citizens, 
families and communities united in melancholia and mourning.  
 
2. A nation united in grief?  
 Radstone’s contention that ‘a theory of subjectivity is implicit within 
trauma theory’ is developed within the trauma narratives of Hustvedt and Auster 
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in an aesthetic mode that is intersubjective, dialogic and empathic.131 The 
problematic a priori autonomy of the traumatised subject, the difficulty of moving 
from melancholia to mourning, and the oscillation between latency and 
transference in the abreaction of trauma, seem to reinforce the ontological 
boundaries of perception, while allowing for an epistemologically-grounded self-
other dialogue which is inherently intersubjective. Their use of first person 
perspective allows for what Beverley Haviland describes as the ‘rhetorical 
continuity of the subject’, thus transcending the ‘discontinuity and rupture that 
characterise his or her traumatic experience’ and permitting their survival, even if 
that speaking is fragmented and comes long after the fact’.132 Within this first 
person narration, Hustvedt and Auster also attempt to integrate ‘multiple subject 
positions’ – partially through empathic narration and the co-deployment of 
Buberian self-other dialectics – as a means of representing the tropes of identity, 
community and transgenerational trauma.133   
 Marks notes that ‘the survivors in The Sorrows of an American have 
ongoing connections to the people they have lost – they feel their presence, listen 
to their voices, and enter dialogues’.134 For Hustvedt, the cathartic potential of 
language is defined by its ability to cross ‘the boundaries of the body’, (Sorrows 
16) and pass between the living and the dead in a dialogic exchange. In this 
                                                          
131 Radstone, p. 13 
132 Beverley Haviland, ‘After the Fact: Mourning, Melancholy and Nachtraglikeit Novels of 9/11’, 
Amerikastudien (55:3, 2010), 429-49 (p. 430). 
133 Haviland, p. 430. 
134 Marks, p. 185. 
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regard, language is inextricably linked to the genealogy of trauma; equally, 
traumatic affect foregrounds the memory problematic explored in Chapter one of 
this thesis. While clearing out his late father’s belongings, Erik discovers a journal 
which contains Lars’ experiences while serving as a soldier in the Second World 
War, prompting him to reflect:  
Every memoir is full of holes. It’s obvious that there are stories that can’t 
be told without pain to others or to oneself, that autobiography is fraught 
with questions of perspective, self-knowledge, repression, and outright 
delusion. (Sorrows 8)  
Erik and his sister Inga later discover a letter containing a family secret in which 
Lars is implicated. Here, Hustvedt returns to her interest in objects as vessels of 
traumatic memory, aligned to the absence-as-presence affect that these object 
confer upon their owners: ‘memory offers up its gifts only when jogged by 
something in the present’. (Sorrows 80) Erik’s repeated reading of his father’s 
journals and this letter suggest the unconscious acting out of melancholia rather 
than a consciously mournful working through, and as a consequence his 
achievement of catharsis is frustrated: ‘my scrutiny of his memoir and my daily 
jottings about the man were clearly forms of grief, but there was something 
missing in me, too, and that absence had turned into agitation’. (Sorrows 122) The 
difficulty of transference is perhaps one consequence of his father’s 
unavailability: to borrow from Husserl and Freud, Erik’s trauma is literally 
unspeakable due to the absence of the intended object of his grief. When Erik 
states ‘after my father died, I couldn’t talk to him in person anymore, but I didn’t 
stop having conversations with him in my head’, (Sorrows 1) Erik’s imagined 
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dialogues with Lars offers the possibility of psychical reconciliation, while 
alternately preserving the melancholic psychic inheritance which deepens his 
anhedonia. 
 Elsewhere the transgenerational constituency of trauma is further 
developed through Hustvedt’s dialogic exchange between Erik’s narration and 
transcripts from his father’s journal. Erik imagines ‘my father’s paternal 
grandfather lowering the trunk he would take to America down the mountain at 
Voss by rope and pulley, and the dugout where he first lived, a hole in the earth 
covered with grass’ in the harsh landscape of the American Midwest. (Sorrows 
187) The log cabin that Olaf, Lars’ grandfather, eventually builds later burns with 
him trapped in it, prompting this remembrance by Lars: ‘he was in bed the last 
time I saw him, unable to speak. He put his scarred hand on my head as if to bless 
me’. (Sorrows 187) The narrative occupies this zone of ambiguity between the 
incomprehensible present and the barely-legible recesses of the past, plunging 
vertiginously into the history of the Davidsen family or Lars’ combat experiences 
through his journal and letters:  
We were badly shelled for three nights…They pounded our beach in a 
systematic and repetitive manner …The terror you felt when you knew 
that the next one might dig a cellar where you lay is war at its worst. 
(Sorrows 69) 
After his death, Lars leaves the tiny Minnesotan house his family shared during 
the Depression to Erik, thus conferring the pattern of trauma established by his 
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ancestor’s departure from their Norwegian homeland: blessing him with his own 
scarred hand. 
  Hustvedt’s acknowledgement of the historically-engrained 
incomprehensibility of trauma brings the transgenerational suffering detailed in 
Lars’ journal into intersubjective alignment with the contemporary trauma of his 
children:  
The smoking sky on September eleventh, the television images from Iraq, 
the bombs that burst on the beach where my father had dug himself a 
trench in February 1945 burned in unison on the familiar ground of rural 
Minnesota. Three detonations.  (Sorrows 232)   
Inga Blaustein’s physical shaking and emotional instability – recorded by Erik as 
dating from early childhood, and drawing from Hustvedt’s own malady in the 
wake of her father’s death – signify the neuroses of three recent trauma: her 
father’s death, the death from cancer of her author husband Max Blaustein, and 
her survival of the attacks on the Twin Towers with her daughter Sonia: ‘On the 
morning of September 11, 2001 […] they were just blocks from the burning 
towers’ (Sorrows 3). Erik’s diagnosis that, ‘I’m convinced now that Inga was 
suffering from absences’ (Sorrows 25) reflects this continued state of psychical 
conflict and emotional stasis, a symptom of her inability to work through the 
gradations of trauma she has suffered. Like their Norwegian ancestors, death and 
trauma has turned New York into a city of ‘sibling ghosts’, (Sorrows 11) whose 
inhabitants carry the physical and psychical scars that refuse to heal. Her own 
personal testimony of surviving 9/11 remains absent from the narrative; in its 
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place, Erik’s abridged and mediated retelling of Inga and Sonia’s story: ‘they ran 
north to White Street without saying a word to each other, running with hundreds 
of other people pushing away from the fires’. (Sorrows 49)  
 As with the death of Lars, Hustvedt seems to connect Inga’s husband’s 
death to the events of September 11 as a commentary upon the inability of 
America to protect its child-citizens from the physical and psychical pain 
threatened by globalised terrorism:135 
I had been worried about Sonia ever since her father died five years 
earlier…I know that Inga tried to hide her grief from Sonia, that when her 
daughter was at school my sister would turn on music, lie down on the 
floor and wail, but I had never seen Sonia give in to sobs, and neither had 
her mother. (Sorrows 3)  
Sonia’s trauma is deeper than that of her mother and uncle, but her proximity to 
the terror attacks exacerbates it: ‘it was only later that I discovered what Sonia had 
seen from her schoolroom window’ (Sorrows 3). Inga similarly senses the 
disruption to her daughter’s psyche: ‘I often wonder what she would have been 
like if there hadn’t been September eleventh’ (Sorrows 48). Sonia’s eventual 
                                                          
135 This approach, deployed in a number of post-9/11 narratives by American authors, has come under some 
criticism for reinforcing a mythos of American innocence which is conflated with an exceptionalist national 
creed. Gray and Holloway both critique this mythos, with the latter writing that ‘the early 9/11 novel had a 
particular tendency to sublimate contemporary anxieties about state activity, and about the state’s 
jeopardising of the safety of its citizens, in stories about the failures of family members to protect one another 
– particularly the failure of parents to protect children’. See David Holloway, 9/11 and the War on Terror 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), p. 108.  
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collapse arrives on the second anniversary of the terror attacks, in a physical 
expression of belated affect: ‘After freezing in front of the pane, Sonia put her 
hands on either side of her head and shouted, ‘I don’t want this world, I don’t 
want it’. Then she sank to her knees and began to sob uncontrollably’: (Sorrows 
229) 
The second anniversary opened an internal crack in Sonia, a fissure which 
she released the explosive feeling that had horrified her for two years. The 
conflagration that had burned so many, that had pushed people into the 
open air, onto the ledges from which they jumped, some of the on fire, had 
left its unspeakable images inside my niece. (Sorrows 230) 
Hustvedt’s narrative shows the Davidsen family acting out the symptoms of 
trauma and struggling to work through it. Trauma is directly rendered as a 
fragmentation and blurring of the actual and the unreal, the observable and 
unobservable, the psychical and physical; individual trauma is once more 
contextualised as an intersubjective, collective and transgenerational experience, 
where the borders between self and other are collapsed and mutually reaffirmed.  
 Auster’s depictions of traumatic affect in The Brooklyn Follies are more 
muted and mutable, composed chiefly of the cruelties and calamities family 
members inflict upon each other: ‘everyone knows what dangers lurk behind the 
closed doors of family life. It can be poison for all concerned’. (Follies 3) At the 
beginning of the novel, Nathan’s family has fallen apart. A philanderer and dinner 
table demagogue, Nathan finds himself in a mess of his own making: ‘the divorce 
wasn’t my idea…I was planning to stay with Edith until the end. She was the one 
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who wanted out’. (Follies 3) Nathan’ solipsism, more than implied by his 
divorcee status, is confirmed by his fractious relationship with his daughter 
Rachel:  
It looked as if Rachel was about to cry, but she blinked back the tears and 
called me a cruel and selfish person instead. No wonder ‘Mom’ had finally 
divorced me…Being married to me must have been an unending torture, a 
living hell. A living hell. (Follies 2) 
Here Auster effects an inversion of the motif of presence-as-absence underpinning 
traumatic experience: Nathan is the distanced paterfamilias of a problematically 
patriarchal society, and conversely the misrecognised or unknown other to his 
female family members. In the opening pages of the novel, Auster offers a 
critique of the inability and unwillingness of parents – perhaps as a metonym for 
the patriarchal panopticon of American power – to protect their children and other 
vulnerable members of society at times of crisis.136  
 Nathan’s narration seems to issue a challenge to the empathic qualities of 
the reader, rather than the clarion call to mutuality this novel seems to invoke. 
Nathan is an unreliable and unlikeable narrator: an inelegant, ineloquent windbag. 
This is doubly ironic given the deluded Nathan prides himself on being a good 
listener, of having the qualities one would equate with psychiatry – ‘you can’t sell 
                                                          
136 Auster’s invocation of Sartre’s famous line from No Exit (1944) – ‘l’enfer, c’est les autres’ – offers an 
ironic doubling with the living hell of surviving trauma to imply Nathan’ cynical register of his daughter’s 
authentic complaint: ‘not once has she come up with an original remark, with something absolutely and 
irreducibly her own’. (Follies 2) 
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life insurance as successfully as I did by alienating your customers…You have to 
be sympathetic. You have to be able to listen. You have to know how to charm 
people’ (Follies 2) – while dismissing the ‘platitudes’ and ‘meddling advice’ of 
his daughter. However, his self-aggrandizing solipsism lapses from enhanced self-
awareness to self-pity, with Nathan eventually conceding his own inconsistencies 
in dubious fashion:  
I suppose there is something nasty about me at times. But not all the 
time…I wouldn’t want to contradict her memories, but the truth is I cared 
for them in my own way, and if I sometimes found myself in the arms of 
other women, I never took any of those affairs seriously. (Follies 3)  
The only true picture Nathan presents of himself is when he details his cancer 
diagnosis, and the physical and emotional impact of the treatment:  
The shock of the cancer had been so great, I still didn’t believe in the 
possibility of surviving it. I had given myself up for dead, and once the 
cancer had been cut out of me and I’d gone through the debilitating ordeals 
of radiation treatment and chemo, once I’d suffered the long bouts of 
nausea and dizziness, the loss of hair, the loss of will, the loss of job, the 
loss of wife, it was difficult for me to imagine how to go on. (Follies 3) 
Here we a presented with a detailed view of Nathan’ predicament, and realise that 
he is acting out the effects of the cancer diagnosis: the sudden rupture of his 
masculine, philandering former identity, and the dawning realisation of imminent 
mortality. ‘Hence Brooklyn’, he writes, ‘hence my unconscious return to the place 
where my story began’. (Follies 3)  
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 Elsewhere Auster directly appropriates the tropes of hysteria when 
recounting the story of Flora, Harry Brightman’s daughter, who suffers from a 
manic condition which fluctuates between moments of mimetic and anti-mimetic 
trauma. The source of Flora’s mania, as described by Harry and Tom, is not fully 
disclosed, but seems to be a psychic condition which has troubled her from birth. 
Earlier in the narrative, Tom describes meeting for the first time ‘a strange 
dishevelled creature with darting eyes and a foul, acrid smell hovering around her 
body’ who has ‘trembling nicotine-stained fingers’ and is ‘agitated, bristling with 
anger’. (Follies 33-34) Nathan recounts ‘Tom recognized it as the smell of the 
permanently unwashed, the smell of the insane’.137 Alongside the physical 
representation of mania, Flora exhibits moments of apparent perspicacity in 
identifying the cratylic nature of Tom’s name: ‘Tom Wood. I know all about you. 
In the middle of life’s journey. I lost my way in a dark wood. But you are too 
ignorant to know that. You’re one of those little men who can’t see the wood for 
the trees’. (Follies 34).  Later she describes Harry Brightman, whose original 
name was Dunkel, as ‘a dark man, and he lives in a dark wood. He pretends he’s a 
                                                          
137 Some elements of Auster’s stark depiction of Flora’s mania, with its implicit connection to her father’s 
homosexuality and her confused home life, could be considered ethically questionable, unsympathetic and 
perhaps even misogynistic. However, I think we can allow Auster a little leeway here. His own sister was 
committed to an institution as a young woman, partly as a consequence of their parents’ fraught marriage: 
‘His parents eventually divorced when Auster was in high school…He morphed into a withdrawn, unhappy 
teenager. His younger sister, always a fragile girl, simply, he says, ‘snapped in her 20s and has never put 
herself together again’ (Hadley Freeman, ‘American Dreams’, Guardian (26 October 2002) 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2002/oct/26/fiction.fashion [Accessed 23 July 2016]). Auster writes 
about his sister’s mental illness in The Invention of Solitude and Report from the Interior.   
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bright man now, but that’s only a trick. He’s still dark. He’ll always be dark – 
right up until the day he dies’. (Follies 35) 
 Later, as Flora’s mania deepens, Auster describes her performatively 
acting out symptoms which echo the fort-da game Freud describes in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle: 
Somewhere or other, she had come across a set of statistics that calculated 
how many people in the world were born and died each second on a given 
day…That was the truth of the world, she told her father at breakfast one 
morning, and in order to get a grip on that truth she decided to spend the 
day sitting in the rocking chair in her room, shouting out the word rejoice 
every fifty-eight seconds and the word grieve every fifty-eight seconds. 
(Follies 49) 
This rocking and shouting has an existential tone, with death being inscribed in 
our moment of generation: 
Rejoice for the ten who are born…Rejoice for them and do not stop. 
Rejoice unceasingly, for this much is certain, this much is true, and this 
much is beyond doubt: ten people live who did not live before. […] Grieve 
endlessly for the dead. Grieve for the men and women who were good. 
Grieve for the men and women who were bad. Grieve for the old whose 
bodies failed them. Grieve for the young who died before their time. 
Grieve for a world that allows death to take us from the world. Grieve! 
(Follies 49-50) 
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Flora’s grief has been triggered by her recognition of the purgatorial nature of 
unresolved trauma: framed by the irreconcilable impossibility of living and the 
inevitability of death. She has locked herself into a repressive, regressive act of 
vacillation, unable to move through the repetitive symptoms of her hysteria – and 
additionally unable to find that empathic other with whom she can commence the 
difficult process of transference. Flora’s trauma is essentially Caruthian: it is 
incomprehensible to her and Nathan, and is never fully revealed to us as readers. 
 Flora’s verbose melancholia, giving voice to her existential trauma, is 
delineated sharply against the self-imposed silence of Lucy, Tom Wood’s niece. 
Here Auster fully realises the transgenerational nature of traumatic experience and 
its impact on identity formulation. Lucy, the daughter of Tom’s errant sister 
Aurora, suddenly appears on his doorstep one morning: ‘It was Lucy. A silent, 
nine-and-a-half-year-old Lucy with short dark hair and her mother’s round hazel 
eyes, a tall, preadolescent girl...Tom hadn’t seen her in six years, but he 
recognised her at once’. (Follies 131-32) This moment of other-recognition later 
proves pivotal within Auster’s narrative, and changes everything for Tom, and by 
proxy Nathan. For the moment, both Tom and Nathan find themselves once more 
ill-equipped to deal with Lucy’s traumatic symptoms, with Nathan recording 
‘there was nothing physically or mentally wrong with her’: (Follies 135) 
No retardation, no signs of autism, northing organic to impede her 
interaction with others. What was it then? Had she suffered some terrible 
trauma that had shut down her ability to talk? Or, for reasons, that were 
still impenetrable, had she decided to take a vow of silence, pushing 
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herself into voluntary mutism in order to test her will and courage – a kid’s 
game that she would eventually grow tired of? (Follies 135)  
Using Lucy as the multi-faceted personification of a post-traumatic episode, 
Auster conjures the differentiation in modes of dissociation identified by Leys: 
dissociation from the self, and dissociation from the event. She is, moreover, a 
metonym for the transgenerational nature of trauma, with her symptoms reflecting 
the shared trauma of living with her fanatical step-father Daniel Minor. Her 
silence a consequence of his God-fearing psychological brutality, and the 
instruction of her mother not to reveal her whereabouts:  
I catch a glimpse of her mother as a young girl. Aurora. The absent 
Aurora, lost somewhere in the mythical land of Carolina Carolina, a 
shadow-woman behind the reach of the living. If she is anywhere now, it is 
only in her daughter’s face, in the little girl’s loyalty to her, in Lucy’s 
unbroken promise not to tell us where she is. (Follies 198) 
Unlike the hysterical Flora, Lucy moves from mimetically acting the unspeakable 
nature of the trauma she has witnessed, to a process of asymmetrical transference 
with her pseudo-patriarchs, Nathan and Tom. Lucy’s condition is partially 
abreacted from watching Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times (1936) with Tom and 
Nathan, later released during their stay at the Hotel Existence, and fully released 
near the close of the novel when she is reunited with Aurora:  
There was an early rush of happiness immediately following the reunion, 
but after a while resentments and hostilities began to surface. […] Through 
no fault of her own the mother had slashed a wound across the daughter’s 
341 
 
soul, and how can the wound ever heal if the daughter doesn’t cry out at 
the top of her lungs and announce to the world: I’m in pain; I can’t stand it 
anymore; help me? (Follies 284) 
Here, Auster seems to suggest, the process of cathartic transference is as troubled 
and violent as the original trauma; but elsewhere in the novel the process is less 
traumatic.  
 
3. Cathartic communities  
 Sielke believes that ‘defining 9/11 as a cultural trauma necessarily raises 
the issue of new collectivities and communal alliances’.138 Heffernan and Salvan 
propose that a number of literary responses to 9/11 were guided by ‘the key notion 
of community’,139 or what Ferdinand Tonnies identified as Gemeinschaft: ‘a 
social group brought into existence’ through ‘the positive relationship’ of ‘mutual 
encouragement and the sharing of burdens and achievements…functioning both 
inwardly and outwardly as a unified living entity’.140 Heffernan and Salvan’s 
interpretation of the inception of a notional community overlaps with those of 
Caruth and LaCapra:  
Communities originate as the outcome of a violent event…The epistemic 
eclosion of its foundation (the inscription of freedom and equality) is 
                                                          
138 Sielke, p. 392. 
139 Heffernan and Salvan, p. 148.  
140 Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Civil Society, p. 17 (qtd. In Heffernan and Salvan, p. 148). 
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enforced through an expenditure of violence that weakens or destroys a 
previous community…traces of eventual violence keep reemerging in 
communal life, uncannily repeating its constitutive catastrophe.141 
The catastrophe of 9/11, and the consequent formation of what Butler describes as 
‘a tenuous ‘we’ of us all’ makes it possible to conceive of the establishment of ‘a 
community on the basis of vulnerability and loss’.142 
 For exponents of empathic art such as Roland Bleiker and Jill Bennett, 
working towards an aesthetic of communal catharsis enables individuals and 
communities to move away from the politically problematic and ethically limited 
representations of rationalised fear which characterised the initial responses to 
9/11, towards ‘a much wider political project that seeks to provide stability, 
subsistence, dignity, basic human rights, and freedom from fear’.143 Here the 
novel can enact ‘a double role’, according to Heffernan and Salvan: ‘while its plot 
dramatizes an inter-communitarian transference, its language instantiates a 
potential communicative purification’.144 LaCapra’s concept of empathic 
unsettlement is fundamental to this process, underscored by Hustvedt and 
Auster’s affinity for Buber’s credo of mutuality. The transferential process of 
achieving catharsis, according to Haviland, takes place as a dialogue between self 
and other where ‘past and present are strands of the narrative which the two 
                                                          
141 Heffernan and Salvan, p. 148. 
142 Butler, p. 20. 
143 Bleiker, p. 95. 
144 Heffernan and Salvan, p. 152. 
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people are telling and living together’.145 These communities are not hidebound 
by local geography: in the post-9/11 novels of Hustvedt and Auster, New York, 
and Brooklyn in particular, are deployed in a metonymic mode to represent a 
global community in mourning. 
 In The Brooklyn Follies, ‘restored communication features as the 
accumulation of confessions around the main characters’ Nathan, Tom and Harry. 
146 Nathan and Tom attempt to forge ‘a new community from previous, 
historically marked, disintegrating ones’ in the form of a ‘brotherhood’ distinct to 
‘familial, professional or ideological affiliation’.147  As Tom remarks: ‘We’ve 
entered a new era, Nathan. The post-family, post-student, post-past age of Glass 
and Wood’. (Follies 159) The centrepiece of Auster’s novel is the road trip 
Nathan, Tom and Lucy take in the chapter ‘Dream Days at the Hotel Existence’. 
Arriving at the hotel, Nathan finds himself immediately drawn to the ‘lost and 
tormented’ Stanley Chowder, who compulsively mows his lawn following his 
wife’s death, identifying him as ‘a shattered man struggling to pick up the pieces’. 
(Follies 167) Continuing Auster’s fascination with the contingent and transitory 
modes of existence being on the road entails, their eventual arrival at the Chowder 
Inn prompts Nathan’s attempt to establish a restorative vision of a utopian 
America: 
                                                          
145 Displacing notions of authorship, authority and solipsistic subjectivity are critical to forming ‘the narrative 
analogue to the temporal belatedness that characterises Nachtralichkeit and the asymmetrical reciprocity that 
characterises the play of transference and countertransference’ (Haviland, p. 433). 
146 Heffernan and Salvan, p. 159. 
147 Heffernan and Salvan, p. 159. 
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I want to talk about happiness and well being, about those rare, unexpected 
moments when the voice in your head goes silent and you feel at one with 
the world…I want to talk about Tom and Lucy, about Stanley Chowder 
and the four days we spent at the Chowder Inn, about the thoughts we 
thought and the dreams we dreamed on that hilltop in southern Vermont. / 
I want to remember the cerulean dusks, the languorous rosy dawns, the 
bears yelping in the woods all night. (Follies 166) 
The Hotel Existence signals a paradigm shift in Auster’s narrative, from the 
compulsive repetition of acting out trauma in the search for absent others, to the 
acceptance of the contingent nature of existence.148 It is, moreover, an 
intersubjectively constituted space, originally a fictive construct of the childhood 
imagination of Tom’s employer, Harry Brightman, who elsewhere explains the 
etymology of the hotel’s name:  
Existence was bigger than just life. It was everyone’s life all together…it 
didn’t matter how small your life was. What happened to you was just as 
important as everyone else. […] So I imagine this place called the Hotel 
Existence, and I immediately turn it into a refuge for lost children. (Follies 
101-02)   
                                                          
148 Commenting upon Auster’s ‘concern with the chance nature of events’, Shostak concurs: ‘Auster’s fiction 
shows its narrators attempting to control the randomness of an event, if not in the happening itself, but in their 
understanding of it. The fiction finally suggests that the narrators must learn that contingency does not mean 
– that loss simply happens. Only once they reconcile themselves to this knowledge can they move beyond 
nostalgic, narcissistic melancholia to return to the historic present’ (Shostak, p. 68).  
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For Tom, by contrast, the Hotel Existence holds a more distinct cathartic 
possibility: of ‘sharing a life with people I love and respect’: (Follies 106) 
I want to live in a new way, that’s all. If I can’t change the world, then at 
least I can try to change myself. But I don’t want to do it alone…I miss 
everyone I’ve lost. I get so sad sometimes, I can’t believe I don’t just drop 
dead from the weight that’s crushing down on me. What’s my Hotel 
Existence, Harry? I don’t know, but maybe it has something to do with 
living with others. (Follies 106)   
The meaning of the Hotel Existence is deliberately ambiguous, holding alternative 
meaning for the characters, for Auster, and for his readers. It is a site of 
Bakhtinian and Buberian dialogue, of transcendent intersubjectivity and another 
destination on the long journey to reconciliation and catharsis for the troubled 
participants of Nathan and Tom’s adventure.   
 The penultimate section of the novel finds Nathan hospitalised once more. 
During this visit he once more acknowledges his tenuous identity, observing ‘I 
was no one’. His musings on death seem to foreshadow the events of 9/11, a 
moment where, according to Bollinger, ‘the machinery of the historical events and 
the readers’ internal archive of remembered images overtakes control of the 
narrative’.149 The significance of his observations is limned by the reader’s prior 
awareness of what happened in New York beyond his narrative framework: 
                                                          
149 Bollinger, p. 504. 
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Most lives vanish. A person dies, and little by little all traces of that life 
disappear…A few objects, a few documents, and a smattering of 
impressions left on other people. These people invariably tell stories about 
the dead person, but more often than not the dates are scrambled, facts are 
left out, and the truth becomes increasingly distorted, and when those 
people die in their turn, most of the stories vanish with them. (Follies 301) 
When Nathan states ‘Rodney Grant was no one’ it is with pre-existing knowledge 
about the events of September 11, and the cultural value given to those lives lost 
in the tragedy. His Bios Unlimited project – an empathic rejoinder to the more 
cynical Book of Human Folly he undertakes at the beginning of his narrative – 
references the Portraits of Grief published in the days after 9/11:150   
My idea was this: to form a company that would publish books about the 
forgotten ones, to rescue the stories and facts and documents before they 
disappeared – and shape them into a continuous narrative, the narrative of 
a life. (Follies 301) 
Here, Auster’s text offers a metonymic means of memorialising the fallen of 
September 11: an act of aesthetic catharsis for himself, his fellow New Yorkers 
and the wider global community. Auster has said that the cosmopolitan New York 
is not ‘part of America’, but rather that it ‘belongs to the world’.151 The Brooklyn 
                                                          
150 Bollinger, p. 502. This observation can be closely aligned to Versluys’ description of the biographies of 
the victims, which ‘derive their poignancy from the portrayal of ordinary lives’, consisting of ‘anecdotes that 
are striking because they describe daily routines which have been rudely broken off’ (Versluys, Out of the 
Blue, p. 8). 
151 See Brown, p. 1. 
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Follies offers up Auster’s plea for understanding of America’s own place within 
the world, as part of a global community of grief-stricken survivors and witnesses, 
and the cathartic need for transference from melancholia to mourning. 
 In The Sorrows of an American, Hustvedt uses Sonia’s poetry to revisit the 
idea of establishing an effective empathic aesthetic. Sonia, who witnessed people 
jumping from the Twin Towers, finds her ability to adequately represent the 
trauma blocked by its incipient incomprehensibility:  
There’s supposed to be one about September eleventh next, but I haven’t 
been able to write it. I’ve tried over and over again, but it’s too hard. 
Maybe I’ll just have a blank there, a nothing, a big empty spot with only 
the text.152 (Sorrows 127) 
Sonia’s poetry attempts to avoid the false representation of September 11, but its 
absence forms an overwhelming presence within the structure of her poem, and 
even when not directly abreacted it still insinuates itself into her poetry:  
Policemen came one day to search our roof  
two long faced men with gloves and plastic bags.  
They climbed the stairs in hope of finding proof  
that body parts still lay beneath the flags 
we flew before their meaning turned to spoof. (Sorrows 127)  
                                                          
152 ‘I want to remember it all, if all is too much to ask, then some of it. No, more than some of it. Almost all. 
Almost all, with blanks reserved for the missing parts.’ (Follies 166) 
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Sonia’s writing marks the first stage of working through her trauma, though with 
her po-faced poetry she struggles to find an original empathic voice, and 
continues to repress her symptoms. Though markedly different to her poetry, the 
photographer Jeffrey Lane’s quasi-Baudrillardian simulacra aesthetic similarly 
absorbs and reflects back the imagery of 9/11. (Sorrows 217) As a child Lane lost 
his parents in a car crash: his interpersonal relationships are damaged by his 
obsessive behaviour, and his art is compromised by its over-reliance on aggressive 
imagery. Erik describes Lane’s series of confrontational photographs titled 
Fathers:  
Near my own image, I saw one of Lane’s father, a photo of George Bush, 
the Twin Towers, a hospital corridor, and war images from Iraq. I backed 
away from the pictures, suddenly nauseated, and staggered into the bright 
light of Twenty-fifth Street, where I squatted on the sidewalk for a 
moment with my head lowered to prevent the faint. Fathers. (Sorrows 263) 
Through his invasive, hyperreal photography, Lane fails to establish a meaningful, 
transactive aesthetic, and like Sonia, he continues to act out the symptoms of his 
own trauma. Moreover, rather than encouraging an empathic unsettlement in a 
viewer such as Erik, they are instead forced into violent confrontation with their 
own neuroses. Here Hustvedt presents the negative register of self-other dialectics 
more characteristic of Lacanian objectivity and the I-It model of relationality 
described by Buber. 
 By contrast, Hustvedt seems to suggest that the dolls and dioramas of Aunt 
Lisa and Lorelei Kavacek are highly personalised representations of trauma which 
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produce the requisite empathic unsettlement. The dolls exist in a suspended state 
of physical pain or psychical grief: ‘The doll’s mouth had been stitched with red 
thread in imitation of a full-throated scream’. (Sorrows 244) While they ‘belonged 
to a universe with laws and logic similar to our own…where children fell, broke 
bones, wore casts, needed crutches’, (Sorrows 198) they only exist as a means of 
communication for Aunt Lisa and Lorelei, both of whom on the surface appear to 
lack the emotional and intellectual capacity for verbal transference and anamnesis. 
Hustvedt presents both women unsympathetically, but the dolls are rendered with 
excruciating care. As Erik observes, ‘I wondered what the women were living 
through these figures’: (Sorrows 199) the dolls are ‘testimonies of some sort’, 
(Sorrows 201) ‘telling but not telling’; distilling the transferential process of 
abreaction, anamnesis and catharsis in fabric form. Aunt Lisa’s ‘three dioramas’ 
(Sorrows 244) finally reveal the secret Lars Davidsen took to his grave: his burial 
of Aunt Lisa’s illegitimate, stillborn baby. They become objects of catharsis not 
only for the teller, but also for those who are being told, Erik and Inga. These 
dolls have little to do with September 11; but again, this very absence of a specific 
reference within the wider context of the novel constitutes a referential presence: 
I also had an uncomfortable feeling of re-enactment. It wasn’t déjà vu, that 
curious sensation of having lived through an identical event. Rather, it was 
a form of parallelism. The word ‘revenant’ appeared in my mind. (Sorrows 
242) 
350 
 
This seems to recall LaCapra’s own observation: ‘something of the past always 
remains, if only as a haunting present or symptomatic revenant’.153 The dolls 
concretise the latency and absent traces of traumatic affect within its narrative, 
while representing the cathartic possibilities of empathic art.  
 In ‘9/11, or One Year Later’ Hustvedt remarks upon the mythology of 
New York: ‘real New York and imaginary New York aren’t easily separated. The 
stuff of a city isn’t only material; it’s spiritual as well’.154 The city remains a site 
of identity, memory and empathic recognition which reflects and transcends its 
geo-spatial or temporal location. The mosaic memories of the afflicted served to 
reinforce the spiritual essence of the city: ‘we are unique. No other place comes 
close to our diversity…The terrorists understood nothing. When they hurt New 
York, they hurt the whole world’.155 Hustvedt’s novel closes on this note, 
describing a cascade of emotion and remembrance, a fluid passage of memory 
distilled. Interweaving fragments of the narrative – Lars’ journal entries, Erik’s 
recollections, disembodied voices of those living and dead – it is the linguistic 
equivalent to Eggy’s string:  
It’s new, Sonia says about being in love. It’s new. The New World. A 
dugout on the prairie. The vanished. His vacant corpse had left the man I 
knew. Joel will never know his father. Kyss Papa. My young mother bends 
                                                          
153 LaCapra, p. 49. 
154 Hustvedt, ‘9/11, or One Year Later’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 128. 
155 Hustvedt, ‘9/11, or One Year After’ in A Plea for Eros, p. 129. 
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over the body of her father. The war is still going on. The wars are raging. 
Men and women are raging. (Sorrows 303)  
Trauma is layered upon trauma: individual and collective; compacted and 
condensed; resolved and unabreacted. In trying to ‘tie everything together’ – 
(Sorrows 270) to repair, remedy and recover – this section reflects Hustvedt’s 
belief that ‘memory is flux’:  shared and intersubjective. It is the final cathartic 
transference of Erik’s anhedonia from narrator (and author) to reader, ‘when the 
boundary between inside and outside loosens, and there is no loneliness because 
there is no one to be lonely’. (Sorrows 301).  Within this quasi-cinematic cascade 
of images Hustvedt locates multiple references to falling, what Caruth elsewhere 
describes as the unifying feature of intergenerational trauma:156   
A Japanese officer falls over in the long grass. Sarah jumps, falls. Eggy 
falls. Sonia watches from the window. People are jumping, falling. 
They’re on fire. The buildings fall. (Sorrows 303)  
The last lines of the novel lean towards this ambiguous resurrection in Erik’s 
recollection of his last meeting with Ms W: 
She is smiling at me, and she uses the word again: reincarnation. ‘Not after 
death, but here when we’re alive.’ She puts out her hand and I take it. She 
says, ‘I will miss you.’ / ‘I will miss you too.’ (Sorrows 304)   
                                                          
156 Here Hustvedt is implicated in what Gray critically apprehends as the ‘recurrent tendency in American 
writing…to identify crisis as a descent from innocence to experience’ (Gray, p. 2). 
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Through the hybrid spatiality of her novel, Hustvedt utilises a multiplicity of 
theoretical and intersubjective positions to emphasise the mutable nature of 
memory and trauma. In this regard, The Sorrows of an American enacts 
Hustvedt’s personal plea for communal empathy before national fear and 
trembling. 
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Conclusion 
  September 11 confounded consciousness, knowledge, and the possibility 
of representation. Like many writers and artists exposed to the mediated affect of 
9/11, Hustvedt and Auster felt compelled to respond to its apparent 
incomprehensibility and supposed unrepresentability. In The Sorrows of an 
American and The Brooklyn Follies, Hustvedt and Auster deploy an 
intersubjective framework to narrativise the difficult psychical processes required 
to move from acting out to working through trauma. These narratives engage 
dialogically with the split in Freudian thinking perceived by Caruth and LaCapra, 
while discursively continuing the empathic relationality of their earlier fiction. 
Both novels provide an ideological counterpoint to the aggression which 
characterised public discourse and the political and military response to 
September 11, offering narratives possessed of an affective dynamic which are 
transactive and communicative.  
 Hustvedt seeks to re-contextualise the catastrophe as the latest traumatic 
event in the painful history of a nation which has been characterised by extreme 
poverty, violent death, individual isolation and loss of identity. Auster’s 
picaresque and allegorical adventure tale is notable for its spatial distancing from 
9/11, and its shift from the metalinguistic mechanics of his earlier fiction towards 
a newly sincere aesthetic mode of production. Of the two, Hustvedt is more 
explicitly engaged with troping traumatic affect, reflecting her interdisciplinary 
interests and continuation of the thematic preoccupations of her earlier work. 
Moreover, Hustvedt and Auster’s shared witnessing of September 11 in the 
intimate space of their home is crucial for understanding the form and function of 
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their narrative response: both novels carry a dedication to their daughter Sophie, a 
fact which serves to re-emphasise their empathic concern at the intersubjective 
and genealogical implications of global terror for future generations.  
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Conclusion 
 
In the introduction of this thesis, I outlined my intention to explore the 
literary marriage and collaborative partnership of the American authors Siri 
Hustvedt and Paul Auster. My principal focus was the identification of discursive 
intertextual engagement between Hustvedt and Auster’s narratives, while 
acknowledging and differentiating between their independent authorial identities. 
This thesis would explore the dynamic of symbiotic mutuality between Hustvedt 
and Auster’s work: a mutuality characteristic of what Vera John-Steiner terms the 
‘interdependence of thinkers in the co-construction of knowledge’.1 As ‘partners 
in thought’, Hustvedt and Auster utilise a range of philosophical positions which 
have emerged through generative dialogue, foregrounding the reciprocal 
foundation of their marriage.2 This generative dialogue is as intellectually 
stimulating as it is emotionally freighted, and is characterised by the confluence of 
centrifugal and centripetal forces. As this thesis emphasises, this dynamic is 
expressed on occasion through a conscious and explicit dialogical engagement 
with the work of the other. Unconscious dialogical and intertextual exchanges 
                                                          
1 John-Steiner, p. 3. 
2 John-Steiner, p. 3. As John-Steiner points out, this aligns with Dorothy Miell and Karen Littleton’s belief 
that ‘negotiating and constructing shared understanding is an inherently creative phenomenon, and its 
achievement a fundamentally social and collaborative process’ (Dorothy Miell and Karen Littleton, 
Collaborative Creativity: Contemporary Perspectives (London: Free Association Books, 2004), p. 2 [qtd. in 
John-Steiner, p. xv]).  
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intertwine throughout Hustvedt and Auster’s texts, further ratifying John-Steiner’s 
observation that ‘through collaboration we transcend the constraints of biology, of 
time, of habit, and achieve a fuller self, beyond the limitations and the talents of 
the isolated individual’.    
In the first chapter of this thesis I attempted to show how Hustvedt and 
Auster’s respective ideality of an authorial self emerges with the establishment of 
core consciousness in childhood. This ideality is concretised through Hustvedt 
and Auster’s multiple narratives of autobiographical selfhood, which depict the 
plurality of the self and the ‘strangeness of being alive’. The ontology of 
embodied connectedness present in these autobiographical narratives draw upon 
and respond to Roland Barthes’ alternative approach to life-writing, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of embodied subjectivity and models of consciousness 
depicted by neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio. The opening chapter goes 
on to propose that this sense of a nascent authorial sensibility intensified during 
Hustvedt and Auster’s adolescence; their respective response to canonical 
literature is complex, nuanced and holds ramifications for gendered readings of 
their work. The discursive relationship between reading and writing is crucial 
Hustvedt and Auster’s construction of an authorial self: much of Auster’s critical 
reading occurred while at Columbia University, and slowed thereafter; for 
Hustvedt, critical reading has been part of a long, difficult process of engaging 
with established and emerging forms of knowledge. Hustvedt’s benevolent 
response to a range of masculinised disciplines complicates her self-positioning as 
a feminist, while we might also conceive that her interest in these alternative 
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forms of knowledge or uncertainty has been fundamental in shaping her work, and 
that of Auster.3  
In the second chapter I sought to illustrate how poststructuralist literary 
theory and the postmodern critical frameworks served to generate a cultural milieu 
and literary epoch out of which Hustvedt and Auster’s early fictional narratives 
emerged. These early narratives were discursive, ambiguous and highly 
intertextual, generating an open-ended hybrid spatiality within their texts which 
today aligns itself more closely with the oscillation between modern commitment 
and postmodern detachment described by Thomas Vermeulen and Robin van den 
Akker. While declarations of the demise of postmodernism are not immune to 
criticism, metamodernism offers a means of moving the writing of Hustvedt and, 
particularly, Auster beyond the critically-limiting postmodern paradigm. In the 
third chapter I opened up the hybrid spatiality of Hustvedt and Auster’s 
increasingly ethical and empathic fiction to consider how alternative models of 
self-other dialectics can be perceived in Hustvedt and Auster’s depiction of 
interpersonal relations in their narratives. Through characterisation, plot, and the 
inherently psychological terrain of their narratives, Hustvedt and Auster’s writing 
implicitly references the psychical otherness of Jacques Lacan and the social 
                                                          
3 Hustvedt’s discursive interest in neurobiology, consciousness and plasticity prompted Auster to remark 
when promoting 4321 that ‘memory and imagination are the same thing. Even physically, in the brain, it is 
the same thing. Siri brilliantly said the feeling that comes over you as a novelist is that you’re remembering 
things that never happened’. Meadhbh McHugh, ‘Paul Auster: We should respond to Trump’s stupidity with 
a world boycott of American goods’, Irish Times (3 February 2017) 
<http://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/paul-auster-we-should-respond-to-trump-s-stupidity-with-a-world-
boycott-of-american-goods-1.2957017> [Accessed 31 March 2017]. 
358 
 
dialogism of Mikhail Bakhtin, while both Hustvedt and Auster have 
independently of each other expressed an affinity for Martin Buber’s credo of 
mutuality. These concepts encircle one another within the texture of Hustvedt and 
Auster’s novels, while the authors resist affirming the veracity of one theoretical 
model over another.  
The fourth chapter extended these intersubjective models to Hustvedt and 
Auster’s intermedial narratives and ekphrastic techniques, which in Auster’s 
words, invite the reader ‘into the minds and souls of people you don’t know, who 
become real in the course of reading and can affect your sense of the world’.4 
Hustvedt and Auster have both spoken of their enthusiasm for the work of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which is made explicit through their extensive writing on 
the embodied nature of subjectivity. Their application of the aesthetic technique of 
ekphrasis in their novels foregrounds these phenomenological frameworks, while 
re-emphasising the collaborative creative process shared by reader and writer. For 
the fifth chapter, I described how Hustvedt and Auster’s approach to narrativising 
9/11 were partially attuned to the new paradigm of identity politics, pragmatic 
idealism and sincerity. Reflecting both sides of the post-Freudian schism in 
trauma theory, the post-911 narratives of Hustvedt and Auster illustrate their 
commitment to empathic mutuality as a collective response to traumatic affect. 
Hustvedt and Auster’s most recent narratives are explicitly polyphonic, 
frequently intermedial and disclose highly personal philosophical and political 
                                                          
4 Meadhbh McHugh, ‘Paul Auster: We should respond to Trump’s stupidity with a world boycott of 
American goods’, The Irish Times (3 February 2017). 
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inflections in a mode which is ethically congruent, but philosophically mobile and 
aesthetically idiosyncratic. As James Peacock says of Auster, the hybrid spatiality 
of Hustvedt and Auster’s work presents ‘an amorphous set of ideas that 
constellate in new forms at appropriate times’;5 Hustvedt herself believes that ‘I 
really do not have a final position on a great many profound questions’, but that 
her alternative epistemology represents ‘a long accumulation of knowledge, and 
changing my mind, rethinking…or discovering some other earlier thought that’s 
wrong’.6 According to Kate Womersley, Hustvedt’s latest collection of essays 
focuses on ‘the central role of emotion in the practice of science as well of art’, 
while offering ‘a critique of its reputation as a female impurity that stains 
objectivity’;7 quoting Simon Weil’s statement that ‘doubt is a virtue of 
intelligence’, Lara Feigel proposes that in our contemporary era of social media 
echo-chambers and so-called fake news, Hustvedt’s ‘kind of uncertainty matters 
more than ever’.8  
                                                          
5 Peacock, Understanding Paul Auster, p. 48. 
6 Michelle Dean, ‘Siri Hustvedt: ‘Trump was elected because misogyny is alive and well’’, Guardian (16 
December 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/dec/16/siri-hustvedt-trump-was-elected-because-
misogyny-is-alive-and-well-> [Accessed 31 March 2017]. 
7 Kate Womersley, ‘Siri Hustvedt’s thoughts on art, science and the human condition’, Spectator (21 January 
2017) https://www.spectator.co.uk/2017/01/siri-hustvedts-thoughts-on-art-science-and-the-human-condition 
[Accessed 14 June 2017]. 
8 Lara Feigel, ‘A Woman Looking at Men Looking at Women review – In praise of doubt’, Financial Times 
(26 November 2016) <https://www.ft.com/content/960e8f8c-b001-11e6-9c37-5787335499a0> [Accessed 14 
June 2017]. 
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Katie Roiphe proposes that marriage is ‘perpetually interesting; it is the 
novel that most of us are living in’.9 While Roiphe’s not entirely unproblematic 
romanticisation might be rejected by any number of thinkers, feminist or 
otherwise, it does overlap with Hustvedt’s comment ‘I have never been bored’ by 
marriage to Auster. That first encounter at the 92nd St Y can be seen as triggering 
two alternative aesthetic and intellectual responses: for Hustvedt, it encompassed 
the individual and unconscious formulation of erotic attraction;10 for Auster, it 
reaffirmed the vagaries of chance, or what he later redefined as ‘the 
unexpected’.11 It also initiated and stimulated a process of discursive interaction 
with the creative intellect of the other, and grounded Hustvedt and Auster’s 
emotional relationship in a critically reflexive mode from its inception. Indeed, it 
is that first meeting of Hustvedt and Auster at the 92nd St Y, and the longevity of 
their relationship, which is vital for our understanding the shape and trajectory of 
                                                          
9 Katie Roiphe, Uncommon Arrangements: Seven Portraits of Married Life in London Literary Circles 1910-
1939 (London: Dial Press, 2008)  p. 7. 
10 ‘In the taxi I am already in love, crazed, enthralled, smitten, and am trying to hide it. The man beside me is 
not. I can see it in his shrouded, thoughtful eyes.’ Hustvedt, ‘Extracts from a Story of the Wounded Self’ in A 
Plea for Eros, p. 226. 
11 Auster has ascribed his preoccupation with ‘the unexpected’ to a freak accident: the lightning strike which 
killed another boy in front of him while at summer camp at the age of 14. In an interview with Paul Laity for 
The Guardian, Auster says ‘I’ve always been haunted by it, the utter randomness of it’, and calls it ‘the most 
important day of my life’. Paul Laity, ‘I’ve waited my whole life to write this book’: Interview with Paul 
Auster, Guardian (21 January 2017), p. 2. Yet alongside this accident we can situate his meeting with 
Hustvedt as being fundamental in providing him with the emotional and intellectual support to be able to 
write City of Glass and his subsequent novels.  
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what we might term their shared aesthetic. Remembering Auster’s description of 
Hustvedt in Winter Journal, here is Hustvedt’s own view of her husband:  
Sometimes I like to look at my husband’s face in photographs because he 
becomes a stranger in the pictures, an object fixed in time. Over many 
years, I have come to know him through my other senses – the feel of his 
skin, the changing smell of his body in winter and spring and fall and 
summer, the sound of his voice, his breathing and sometimes his snoring at 
night. When I look at him in a photograph, my other senses are quiet. I 
simply see him, and because I find him beautiful, his unmoving face 
excites me.12 
As these complimentary descriptions of the spousal other show, and as this thesis 
has repeatedly indicated, the confluence of influence between Hustvedt and 
Auster is bidirectional, dialogical and intertextual: the product of consciously and 
unconsciously-rendered representational motifs and references which draw upon 
their life together.  
However, this confluence of influence is also framed and re-framed by 
competing cultural forces and gender misrepresentations. All too frequently the 
narrative of Hustvedt and Auster’s emotional and intellectual life as a married 
couple is simplified along gender lines. One of the principal motivations of 
undertaking this work is to counter this perception, and to highlight Hustvedt’s 
unique contribution to knowledge formation in our contemporary era, which lies 
beyond the preoccupation with her marriage to Auster. Merely comparing 
                                                          
12 Siri Hustvedt, ‘Notes on Seeing’ in Living, Thinking, Looking (New York: Picador, 2012), p. 230. 
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Hustvedt and Auster’s work side by side risks inviting accusations of gender bias; 
any alignment of Hustvedt’s ideas with those of Auster threatens to destabilise or 
diminish her authorial identity. This thesis seeks to dispel the positioning of 
Hustvedt as a lesser writer simply by dint of her being married to a more 
commercially successful and famous male author.13 Deeply ingrained, this 
interpretation pervades the cultural and critical spheres and operates on a number 
of levels. Hustvedt’s work remains largely undiscovered by the Anglophone 
academic community, while mainstream criticism of her recent work has focused 
on its difficulty or sense of self-importance. From this one may surmise that 
women writers are not yet permitted equivalent cognitive capabilities of their 
male counterparts; as Hustvedt observes: ‘women who write books about ideas 
are not instantly anointed in the way that men are. You get a lot of criticism for 
being too intellectual, too cerebral’.14 Hustvedt’s personal experience of misogyny 
                                                          
13 Hustvedt addresses this at length in her essay ‘No Competition’ from A Woman Looking at Men Looking at 
Women. 
14 Reviews of Hustvedt’s latest collection of essays in The Evening Standard and Slate were particularly 
strident in their criticism of her difficulty: ‘Hustvedt makes little effort to welcome readers with her prose’, 
according to Katy Waldman, who also complained of ‘the author’s preening self-regard’; Johanna Thomas-
Corr similarly believed Hustvedt ‘preens at her own cleverness’. Here one is reminded of James Wood’s 
scabrous anti-Auster article in The New Yorker, ‘Shallow Graves’, in which he decries Auster’s ‘fake realism 
and shallow scepticism’, and observes ‘he does nothing with cliché except use it’. Some critics seem to take 
particular pleasure at pricking what they seem to perceive as Hustvedt and Auster’s overly-inflated egos. See 
Katy Waldman, ‘A Woman Looking at Men Looking at Women by Siri Hustvedt reviewed’, Slate 
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/books/2017/01/a_woman_looking_at_men_looking_at_women_by_siri_hu
stvedt_reviewed.html> [Accessed 14 June 2017]; Johanna Thomas-Corr, ‘A Woman Looking at Men Looking 
at Women: Essays on Art, Sex and the Mind by Siri Hustvedt – review’, Evening Standard 
<http://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/books/a-woman-looking-at-men-looking-at-women-essays-on-art-sex-
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and misrepresentation has perhaps pushed her further into this interrogation of the 
masculine hard sciences while standing defiantly outside the disciplinary tent.15 
This can be construed as a political decision by Hustvedt informed by her 
feminism; as a male author, Auster is not subject to the same pressures and 
requirements of self-definition as Hustvedt. 
As married artists, Hustvedt and Auster’s relationship is especially unique, 
particularly in the longevity of their careers and the commercial success of their 
work. The focus on dialogical intertextuality between their texts offers a new 
critical framework for considering the writing of other married writers of past, 
present and future.16 Some work has already done in this area by John-Steiner, 
                                                          
and-the-mind-by-siri-hustvedt-review-a3405241.html> [Accessed 14 June 2017]; James Wood, ‘Shallow 
Graves’, New Yorker (30 November 2009) <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/11/30/shallow-
graves> [Accessed 14 June 2017].  
15 Here one is reminded of Hustvedt’s comment to Susanne Becker about Harriet Burden being a 
‘Kierkegaardian figure…Like S.K. she is too clever, too ironic, too brilliant for her own good and she suffers 
because others cannot understand what she is up to.’ (Becker, ‘Deceiving the reader into truth’ in Zones of 
Focused Ambiguity, ed. by Hartmann, Marks and Zapf, p. 414.) Hustvedt can be viewed as a similarly-
Kierkegaardian figure, as Auster suggests: ‘This is what I fear for poor Siri is there is no consciousness out 
there that can fully grasp what she’s doing. It’s so big. It’s going to take years for people to absorb the 
insights she’s had in all kinds of fields’. See Appendix 1.  
16 We might use this methodological approach when considering the existence of dialogical intertextuality 
between the work of Joan Didion and John Gregory Dunne, Nicole Krauss and Jonathan Safran Foer, Alice 
Sebold and David Glenn Gold, or Zadie Smith and Nick Laird. Didion and Dunne’s relationship seems 
particularly closely aligned to that of Hustvedt and Auster, with both relying upon the other as the first reader. 
Dunne’s death, which followed the hospitalisation of their daughter Quintana Roo Dunne Michael, prompted 
Didion to write the critically-acclaimed grief memoir The Year of Magical Thinking (2005), which shares 
with the life-writing of Hustvedt and Auster a deliberate self-distancing in the Barthesian mode. 
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Roiphe and others, yet this may be one of the first of its kind to advance a 
developed response to their fictional narratives in tandem. There are limitations to 
this methodology, which I acknowledge cannot make any claim as a definitive, or 
exhaustive, study of Hustvedt and Auster’s biographical history or literary output. 
Both have penned a significant number of texts over almost forty years, and it 
would be impossible to refer to them all. Inevitably, some important texts – such 
as Hustvedt’s The Blazing World and Auster’s The Music of Chance and 
Leviathan – have been almost entirely overlooked. However, these are texts that 
could be returned to in a more developed study. These are areas where 
differentiation is stronger than affiliation within their work: Hustvedt’s myriad 
disciplinary interests are highly complex, constantly evolving and her perspective 
upon them continually shifting; the relationship Auster’s writing to questions of 
Jewish identity and the Shoah,17 nor his admiration for writers of the American 
Renaissance, particularly Nathaniel Hawthorne.18 While this thesis has found both 
concrete and speculative evidence through the twin processes of empirical 
scrutiny and imaginative interpretation, I have been careful to preserve a 
                                                          
17 See: Josh Cohen, ‘Desertions: Paul Auster, Edmond Jabès and the Writing of Auschwitz’, The Journal of 
the Midwest Modern Language Association (33: 3, 2000), 94-97; Lily Corwin, ‘Is That All There Is? Martin 
Buber, Sufficiency, and Paul Auster’s ‘The Book of Memory’, Studies in American Jewish Literature (30, 
2011), 68-79; Stephen Fredman, ‘‘How to Get Out of the Room That Is the Book?’ Paul Auster and the 
Consequences of Confinement’, Postmodern Culture (6: 3, 1996) <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/27576> 
[Accessed 17 September 2013]  
18 See: Mark Ford, ‘Inventions of Solitude: Thoreau and Auster’, Journal of American Studies (33: 2, 1999), 
201-219; Heiko Jakubzik, ‘Paul Auster und die Klassiker der American Renaissance’ (unpublished 
dissertation, University of Heidelberg 1999)  <http://archiv.ub.uni-
heidelberg.de/volltextserver/7259/1/AusterUB.pdf> [Accessed 17 September 2013].  
365 
 
respectful demarcation between the public and the private when critically 
responding to Hustvedt and Auster’s collaborative relationship. As Roiphe 
proposes, ‘much of what happens in a marriage occurs when you are not 
looking’.19 There are certain biographical and quotidian – such as domestic 
responsibilities – that it would be without academic value to speculate upon, but 
which will inevitably impact upon the mechanics of narrative and aesthetic 
production for Hustvedt and Auster.20    
Throughout this thesis I have resisted the temptation to make value 
judgements about Hustvedt and Auster’s work, their ethical positions or their 
political persuasion. Nevertheless, it is possible to conceive of Hustvedt and 
Auster’s ethical narratives as comprising part of a determined self-positioning as 
political writers and public intellectuals. This shift perhaps reflects their move into 
late middle age: Auster turns 70 this year, while Hustvedt is in her early sixties. 
Changing cultural, scientific and geo-political conditions have further shaped their 
approach to the creative process, and the nature of this generative dialogue; it has 
also effected their contributions to public discourse. Both lent their support to 
Salman Rushdie following Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against the author in 
1989. In 1994 Auster and Don DeLillo collaborated in the writing and publication 
of the Salman Rushdie Defence Pamphlet, which was inserted into hundreds of 
                                                          
19 Roiphe, p. 25. 
20 In an interview for Identity Theory Hustvedt outlined the daily ‘logistics’ of living in what she terms ‘that 
strange place of the book’ that constituted her marriage to Auster. Siri Hustvedt, ‘Interview with Robert 
Birnbaum’, Identity Theory (6 May 2003) http://www.identitytheory.com/siri-hustvedt> [Accessed 17 
September 2013].    
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thousands of books sold on the anniversary of the fatwa. Hustvedt and Auster’s 
political voices have become particularly pronounced in the years since 9/11 and 
the Bush Administration’s War on Terror.  In 2012, Auster was embroiled in a 
public spat with then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan after stating 
in an interview to the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet that he would not visit the 
country due to its imprisonment of writers and journalists.21 
Following the election of Donald Trump as 45th President of the United 
States, Hustvedt and Auster have been two of the more prominent voices of 
opposition from the global artistic community. In October 2016, Hustvedt and 
Auster were interviewed together for the Swiss publication Das Magazin, which 
offers an intriguing document of their differentiated positionality on Trump’s 
candidacy: Hustvedt reflects upon the misogyny of the anti-Clinton rhetoric which 
steered Trump to the White House, stating that ‘Trump’s ascension is connected 
with the loss of what these people regard as the golden age of male, white power’; 
                                                          
21 Prime Minister Erdogan labelled Auster an ‘ignorant man’ and said of Auster: ‘As if we need you? Who 
cares if you come or not?’ Auster responded ‘According to the latest numbers gathered by International PEN, 
there are nearly one hundred writers imprisoned in Turkey, not to speak of independent publishers such as 
Ragip Zarakolu, whose case is closely being watched by PEN Centers around the world. All countries are 
beset by myriad problems, Mr. Prime Minister, including my United States, including your Turkey, and it is 
my firm conviction that in order to improve conditions in our countries, in every country, the freedom to 
speak and publish without censorship or the threat of imprisonment is a sacred right for all men and women’. 
David Itzikoff, ‘Paul Auster Responds After Turkish Prime Minister Calls Him ‘An Ignorant Man’’ in The 
New York Times (1 February 2012) <https://www.nytimes.com/blog/artsbeat/2012/02/01/paul-auster-
responds-after-turkish-prime-minister-cals-him-an-ignorant-man> [Accessed 23 March 2017]. 
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for Auster, Trump’s election is bound up in the faltering narrative of American 
exceptionalism which he critiqued in Report from the Interior: 
If Trump wins, it will be another country. America will turn into a joke. 
We will be a mockery and ashamed of ourselves. Shame becomes the 
predominant national feeling. That we could make such an unqualified, 
incompetent, ignorant, uninterested, narrow-minded liar as president, we 
will never forgive ourselves. The most important land in the free world, 
led by an idiot.22 
On the eve of the election in November 2016, Auster was interviewed by BBC 
Newsnight; in the interview Auster stated he was ‘scared out of my wits’ at the 
prospect of a Trump presidency, while denouncing the billionaire New Yorker as 
‘demented and deranged’ and proposing that Trump’s call to ‘Make America 
Great Again’ was a populist call to arms to ‘Make America White Again’.23    
                                                          
22 Siri Hustvedt and Paul Auster, ‘Interview with Sacha Batthyany and Martin Kilian’, Das Magazin (22 
October 2016) <https://www.dasmagazin.ch/2016/10/21/siri-hustvedt-und-paul-auster/> [Accessed 31 March 
2017]. In her interview for Identity Theory, Hustvedt identified the ideology that presaged the rise of Trump: 
‘I have always thought it was very interesting that in a country that was founded by intellectuals that this 
should be so widespread. And it is. There is an anti-culture, anti-intellectual presence in the whole ball of 
wax. That does make itself felt…If you cloak yourself in a kind of populism then it works or can work. You 
notice, for example, that the right-wing ideologues in this country now brandish a kind of working class 
[persona] and none of these guys are working class guys.’ Siri Hustvedt, ‘Interview with Robert Birnbaum’, 
Identity Theory.  
23 Paul Auster, ‘‘I’m scared out of my wits’: Paul Auster on US election’, BBC Newsnight (3 November 
2016) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n-f4sDQ4Ck>  [Accessed 31 March 2017] 
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Following Trump’s unexpected victory, Hustvedt penned a series of highly 
critical articles, alongside participating in a number of combative interviews. In 
both she highlighted the symbolic misogyny of Trump’s victory and Clinton’s 
defeat, while re-emphasising her nuanced feminist position. Writing for The 
Guardian she recorded that ‘we are witnessing the politics of humiliation’ and 
that ‘those who voted for Trump are living in a state of vicarious narcissism’:  
People who grew up with a powerful sense of white masculine privilege 
(as well as others who sympathise with that image of power), people for 
whom that sense of superiority was always precarious and always needed 
protection, found in Donald Trump a figure for their own fantasy of the 
restoration of an era now gone.24  
Misogyny, according to Hustvedt, ‘is alive and well among women and men’, 
particularly white women in their rejection of Clinton and their refusal to take 
ownership of the historical moment. For Hustvedt, it was no small irony that 
Trump ‘played the female role: the out of control angry hysteric. And yet, he has 
been perceived as a robust, masculine figure by a large portion of the US 
public’.25 Trump’s inauguration coincided with the promotional tours for Auster’s 
                                                          
24 Siri Hustvedt, ‘We are witnessing the politics of humiliation’, Guardian (12 November 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/nov/12/we-are-witnessing-the-politics-of-humiliation-siri-
hustvedt-joyce-carol-oates-and-more-on-the-us-election> [Accessed 31 March 2017]. The Guardian invited a 
number of leading American women authors and academics to respond to Trump’s election, including 
Jennifer Egan, Joyce Carol Oates, Cynthia Bond and Katie Roiphe.  
25 Michelle Dean, ‘Siri Hustvedt: ‘Trump was elected because misogyny is alive and well’’, Guardian (16 
December 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/dec/16/siri-hustvedt-trump-was-elected-because-
misogyny-is-alive-and-well-> [Accessed 31 March 2017]. 
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latest novel 4321. As with Hustvedt’s own promotional duties for her collection of 
essays, it provided Auster with a platform to fulminate about what he termed the 
‘the most appalling thing I have seen in politics in my life’.26 Trump’s election 
has pushed both Hustvedt and Auster towards a greater degree of political 
engagement, with Hustvedt attending the Women’s March on Washington with 
her daughter in January, and Auster offering to accept the Presidency of PEN 
America after declining the invitation for a number of years: ‘I’ve decided to 
speak out as often as I can, otherwise I don’t think I can live with myself’.27 
Hustvedt and Auster were one of a number of co-signatories of a letter from PEN 
America urging President Trump to overturn his Executive Order banning 
immigration from Muslim-majority countries.28 Between Trump’s election and his 
inauguration, I interviewed Hustvedt and Auster at their Park Slope home in 
Brooklyn. The full transcript of this interview can be read in the Appendix to this 
thesis. Hustvedt and Auster’s warmth and willingness to discuss their marriage 
and work at length were humbling; their avowals of resistance to the Trump 
Presidency were enervating.  
                                                          
26 Paul Laity, ‘‘I’ve waited my whole life to write this book’: Interview with Paul Auster’, Guardian (21 
January 2017), p. 2. 
27 Paul Laity, ‘‘I’ve waited my whole life to write this book’: Interview with Paul Auster’, Guardian (21 
January 2017), p. 2. 
28 Rachel Donadio, ‘In Open Letter, 65 Writers and artists Urge Trump to Reconsider Visa Ban’, New York 
Times (21 February 2017) http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/21/books/22pen-america-letter-to-donald-trump-
visa-ban.html [Accessed 11 April 2017]. Other signatories included Chimamanda Adichie, Margaret Atwood,  
J.M. Coetzee, Jonathan Franzen, Nicole Krauss, Jhumpa Lahiri, Jonathan Lethem, Orhan Pamuk, Philip Roth, 
Alice Sebold, Zadie Smith and Anne Tyler. 
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Hustvedt and Auster can be considered writers whose liberal politics have 
been largely ancillary to the narrative propulsion of their fiction, yet with the 
election of Trump their collaborative relationship appears to have taken an overtly 
political turn. This overt political turn instils a rhetorical power to their ethical 
narratives, past and future. It also concretises Hustvedt and Auster’s commitment 
to the empathic communities indicated in their post-9/11 narratives, a 
commitment to pragmatic idealism which exists beyond the platitudes of the page. 
Hustvedt and Auster’s vocal opposition to Trump can be interpreted as another 
collaborative moment in the novel of a marriage which began with two unknown 
poets falling in love one cold February night in New York in the early 1980s, 
before becoming two major literary figures of the late Twentieth and early 
Twenty-First Centuries: two married writers whose working lives were defined by 
a dynamic of dialogic mutuality, a microcosm of care and responsibility toward 
the other. 
Appendix: Interview with Siri Hustvedt and Paul Auster 
 
This interview was conducted at Hustvedt and Auster’s home in Park Slope, 
Brooklyn, on the afternoon of Saturday 3 December 2016. 
 
Interview transcript 
Paul: No-one has done this. No one has written about the two of us together. 
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Siri: Actually, there are some dissertations from Germany. 
Paul: There are? Well I hadn’t heard about them. 
Alex: So, 4321. Can you tell me how that came about? Because there was 
obviously a bit of a pause between that [book] and Sunset Park. 
Paul: I’ll tell you. Sunset Park was a book I wrote in a fever. I wrote it in about 
six or eight months. And it just took a lot out of me. I don’t know why. It was a 
very intense book. And I really wasn’t up to writing fiction right away. I started 
something else, another novel, and I got farther into it than any other abandoned 
work, maybe 90 or 100 pages of a novel that I couldn’t get a handle on. It kept 
spreading out. 
Alex: I read that in an interview. Is that the one about a twenty-year-old guy…? 
Paul: Yeah, that’s right. 
Siri: But the whole family. 
Paul: It was going to be about the whole family. I just could never master it, I 
couldn’t control it. So I literally put it aside. There was, however, in that book an 
account of the panic attack – which happened in this chair – and I used that in 
Winter Journal, which is what I wrote instead. Also, in the novel, he was 
watching the movie D.O.A., which appears in Winter Journal. So it wasn’t a 
complete waste of time. And then that book led to the next one, which is probably 
the oddest book I’ve ever written: Report from the Interior. 
Alex: Why ‘the oddest’? 
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Siri: Yeah, I don’t know: why? 
Paul: I don’t know. I was into it…I was writing it when Lydia [Davis] sent me all 
those letters. I wasn’t planning on putting them in it. I didn’t even know of the 
existence of these letters. 
Siri: That’s right, I remember. 
Alex: So you’d literally forgotten you’d written them? 
Paul: Yeah. I mean, I was 19, 20, 21. 
Siri: But also, the stunning thing about it was that there were people referred to in 
the letters that you couldn’t remember. Which is exactly what the nature of 
memory is. 
Alex: So from the days at Columbia, or the time in Paris, or both? 
Siri: Columbia. 
Paul: The Columbia years. ’66 to…I think the last letter is 69. 
Siri: But then of course we have to say that the novel [4321] is engaged in that 
same time period. 
Paul: These two meditations, poems, pieces of music: whatever you want to call 
these books… 
Siri: Sent you back. 
Paul: I think they primed the territory for me to write 4321. 4321 would not have 
been written without those two, emotionally, psychologically. 
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Siri: But I think the movement between those two books is a sort of an organic 
movement. You’re sort of answering yourself in some way. 
Paul: Yes. 
Siri: I’ve often thought that, weirdly enough, The Shaking Woman, or A History 
of my Nerves, and The Blazing World are related works, because they’re related 
structurally, in the sense that there are multiple perspectives that are, sort of, 
whirling around you.  
Paul: Yes, yes. 
Siri: And what you end up with is, as I articulate in that book [A Woman Looking 
at Men Looking at Women], zones of focused ambiguity but no final answer. It 
was a totally unconscious thing, because it wasn’t until I finished The Blazing 
World that I thought ‘oh – these texts are bizarrely connected’. I mean, in ways 
that have nothing to do, obviously, with the story, but the structure. 
Paul: Me too. The evolution of one’s work. Invisible and Sunset Park are the first 
novels in which I have multiple points of view. And then it became possible for 
me to write 4321 because of that. Previous books of mine, as you know, the 
perspective does change a few times. For example in Moon Palace, where 
suddenly everything is in the third person, where you are hearing Effing’s story 
through Fogg, or Leviathan, you’re hearing Sachs’ story through Aaron. But it’s 
not quite the – 
Siri: It’s located in a teller. 
Paul: Exactly. 
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Siri: And that’s not really skipping points of view. 
Paul: But how this book, 4321, came about I don’t really know. It’s a question 
that I’ve been mulling all my life, you know: ‘what if’. 
Siri: You have, of course. And that’s a very Austerian proposition, right? So in 
some ways this work is a complete continuation of those things. I also think that, 
because I have been talking for years now about the very strange culture-matter 
dilemmas, that also had an effect on this book. I mean for me it is the most perfect 
illustration –  
Paul: Nature/nurture. 
Siri: Nature/nurture where that division is not concretely made. I think it’s stupid 
to make it. And I’ve been hacking away at this thing about how culture becomes 
material, literally material in the brain – this kind of false dichotomy which has 
led to all kinds of terrible mistakes in the sciences and the humanities. 
Alex: You are quite strongly anti-Cartesian.  
Paul: Anti-dualist. 
Siri: I am strongly anti-Cartesian, as you can see from the book.  
Alex: Which is interesting because Paul’s last two semi-autobiographical pieces 
the mind-body split is structurally present. Though there’s cross-pollination 
between the two... 
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Paul: Well we do have bodies, and it was interesting to write about the body. And 
we do form moral and political thoughts and form ideas about the world. And so I 
focused on one in one book, and the other in the other. 
Siri: It’s a false dichotomy, I know you agree with me. 
Paul: Of course, of course. 
Alex: It’s an interesting structure. And I really enjoyed the explorations of 
youthful consciousness in those books. They reminded me a little of The Book of 
Memory, especially those descriptions of Daniel coming into conscious being 
when he’s about three years old. 
Paul: I had a conversation with Andy Martinez the other day. He’s a younger 
friend, he’s in his thirties, he’s a journalist. Somebody I like very much. And he 
finished reading 4321, and he said the astonishing thing for him was how well he 
thought I captured the different stages of boyhood. He said ‘I really felt what it 
was like to be four’, and ‘I really felt what it was like to be ten’. 
Siri: That of course is a part of the process of memory as a form of fiction. You 
could call it the ‘fictional memory’. I mean memory is a form of fiction anyway, 
but it triggers these feeling states in the reader. Otherwise we couldn’t read, could 
we, if we weren’t in some strange way re-experiencing these fictive states?  
Paul: It was such a challenge to try to imagine a story that a bright fourteen year 
old boy would write. So I came up with the story about the shoes. 
Alex: The ‘Sole Mates’ story. 
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Siri: It’s more fun to do this as ‘sophisticated older people’, I think.  
Paul: Of course, of course. 
Siri: There’s always that distinction between what you wrote when you were 
fourteen. I mean I remember Paul showed me something, a poem – 
Paul: Ah, but that was when I was a pretentious oaf. I was seventeen years old 
and I was reading all this horrible romantic poetry. It was really the most awful 
poem I’ve ever seen in my life. 
Siri: Well it wasn’t a good one, let’s put it that way. Sometimes eleven and 
twelve year olds write better poems than seventeen year olds. 
Alex: They’re freer. 
Siri: They’re much freer. Our daughter wrote a few poems – 
Paul: When she was nine or ten. 
Siri: She read a lot of poems. We gave her a lot of poems. 
Paul: Mostly Emily Dickinson and Blake. 
Siri: Which were poems that my mother gave to me. And I did just like my 
mother did. Without pressure. Just gifts. And then I found out a year later that she 
was really into Emily Dickinson.  
Paul: She wrote some beautiful poems that were selected for some anthology of 
kids’ writing. 
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Siri: I know. But they were really beautiful. And I remember when she showed 
them to me I thought ‘holy shit’. Of course you could feel that she had been 
reading poetry. But really wonderful. Now of course she writes lyrics, some great 
lyrics. But when she got a little older she wrote some very drippy poems. I 
remember she read them to us – 
Paul: They weren’t good at all. [Laughs]  
Siri: We said, ‘there are some problems’. [Laughter] 
Alex: ‘You’ll have to use a pseudonym if you’re going to publish’. 
Siri: And later she said, ‘mom and dad, you didn’t tell me that they were just 
really great’, you know. When you’re really doing it, all those influences are 
unconscious. They have left the realm of consciousness. 
Paul: In 4321 – it’s in a parenthesis in Ferguson 4 – his new uncle Gil 
Schneiderman says, ‘you have to read everything you possibly can and then try to 
forget it’. What you can’t forget is going to form the foundation of your work. 
Siri: But if you’re talking about conscious memory then I don’t think… 
Paul: I’m not talking about conscious memory. 
Siri: Because it really is that it suddenly becomes part of the repertoire of ability. 
Alex: I was going to ask you, Siri, about this idea of reading everyone you can 
and then putting it them to one side because your approach is different. 
Siri: You mean conscious reference? In ‘The Delusions [of Certainty]’ when I’m 
really trying to convince an ordinary intelligent reader it is essential.  
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Paul: I’m going to make tea. Would you like tea? 
Alex: I’d love a cuppa. 
Siri: First of all you use a lot of footnotes because if people want to go there you 
want them to go there. A bibliography would be ridiculous. And of course in The 
Blazing World too, there’s a sort of dizzying referential apparatus which is part of 
the book to partly mislead. There is the editor. I didn’t want this person, a man or 
a woman, to be a kind of mediocrity. I wanted them to be better than that, but not 
ahead of Harry. So Harry is really ahead. And the smart reader is really reading 
for that. 
Paul: [Placing a Fortnum and Mason tin of Earl Grey on the table] This is the tea. 
Siri: You’re showing him your tin? 
Alex: A great British institution. 
Paul: And this is the cup I use for my tea. [Places child-sized Beatrix Potter The 
Tale of Peter Rabbit branded mug on the table.]  
Siri: It was Sophie’s. That’s his secret. No one knows about it. 
Paul: I’ve written about it! In Report from the Interior. Or Winter Journal. 
Siri: It’s not even a secret anymore. 
Alex: You don’t get a lot of tea in there. 
Paul. No. But it’s perfect for the lips. 
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Siri: So absolutely, you’re right. Although, one thing I learned with a book like 
[The Enchantment of] Lily Dahl, where the book is embedded with all sorts of 
complicated references, is that no one understood it. And I remember that I 
thought when I was writing it how unbelievably clever it was, and how carefully 
structured. I was so proud of it. I really did think that this extremely complex 
intellectual philosophical material was going to be understood. [Laughs] Which 
was my absolute total stupidity and naivety. I mean it was just a thud of 
incomprehension. [Laughs] And then I had to wake up. 
Paul: A friend of ours is a very good film-maker, Wim Wenders. There was a 
moment when he wanted to make a film of Lily Dahl, and I was going to write the 
screenplay.  
Alex: You know, I think it would make a good film. 
Siri: It would. It’s the only one that would. 
Paul: But I realised that every paragraph was so good, I couldn’t eliminate 
anything. It would have been a sixteen hour movie. You couldn’t cut anything out. 
It was all so wonderfully evoked. Also – something you don’t know – we did 
write a screenplay together once. 
Siri: Although we took our names off. 
Paul: We took our names off.  
Siri: The screenplay had nothing to do with the film. So we unhooked ourselves. 
Paul: We were pleased with the results. We liked working with each other. 
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Siri: We were really good. We were terrific together. 
Paul: We were cooking with gas. We wrote it in two weeks. 
Siri: The impulse, the joy I got working with you on a screenplay, part of that was 
later realised in The Summer without Men, which was my comedy, where I’m 
referring to films all the time. We both love screwball comedies, we both like 
these men and women teaming up, making silly… 
Alex: Like Bringing up Baby? 
Siri: Bringing Up Baby is for both of us a little too broad. The Awful Truth, which 
I cite in The Summer Without Men, is the epigraph – that is, I think, a masterpiece. 
There are a number of others. 
Paul: My Man Godfrey. 
Siri: My Man Godfrey. 
Paul: Have you seen any of these? 
Alex: Sadly, no. 
Paul: You’ve got to go back. 
Siri: You’ve got to go back. These are really brilliant comedies. 
Paul: The best book to read about these films is by Stanley Cavell. It’s called 
Pursuits of Happiness. 
Siri: Also referred to in The Summer Without Men.  
Alex: So maybe that’s it: screenwriting as a future collaborative project… 
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Siri: The way the movies work I can’t see it, unless I helped you [Paul] write it 
and you directed it. 
Paul: We also talked, although we’re not going to do it, for years we talked about 
translating Hamsun’s Hunger together.  
Siri: I let that rumour out once, sort of, in an interview. And there was a guy who 
was willing to pay us to do it. A Norwegian, of course. 
Alex: You’ve done a huge amount of translating in the past, but not so much for a 
while. 
Paul: No. Although there was a new book of translations of Andre de Bouchet. 
Yale University Press did it in 2014. It was a collaboration [with Hoyt Rogers]. 
And really what I did was resurrect old the translations I’d done. I did them in the 
60s and early 70s. And I revised some of them. 
Siri: Translating poetry is a really extraordinary thing. 
Paul: The Apollinaire, that was new. For the book [4321]. ‘The Pretty Redhead’. 
I worked on that long and hard. 
Siri: And I heard the various drafts. And it got better and better. And I have to say 
I think it’s the most beautiful translation in English by far – 
Paul: I think so. I think by far. 
Siri: By far. 
Paul: But it took a lot of work. But the old ones, the Desnos and the Eluard I did 
back as an undergraduate. And, just to tell you too, a couple of the excerpts of 
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Ferguson 4’s writings were things I wrote back then, like ‘The Droons’. I wrote 
that when I was 19. Just was lying, you know, never published. And the whole 
‘Scarlet Notebook’, that was something I started writing way back, way back. 
Siri: It’s good to be able to rob one’s self. 
Paul: So those are real, real texts.  
Alex: So why the change from scarlet to red? 
Paul: Because I’ve written a book called The Red Notebook. 
Siri: No, but what was the original title? 
Paul: The Red Notebook. It was originally The Red Notebook. 
Alex: I see. 
Paul: But I used that title again. The American edition is not the British edition. 
Siri: But in using ‘scarlet’, you’re making a self-reference as well. 
Paul: He said as bright as the ‘A’ on Hester Prynne’s frock [from Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter].  
Siri: Yeah, yeah – of course. I know. 
Alex: 4321 is a book of memory effectively. It’s the memories of the four boys, 
and there’s the joke that opens the novel, that ironic statement: ‘I have forgotten’. 
Paul: It’s a real joke. But it’s not ‘ich hab’, its ‘shoin fargessen’. That is the 
normal way of telling the joke in Yiddish. What I wrote was ‘I’ve forgotten’. 
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Because ‘shoin fargessen’ – Shane Ferguson – is not as funny. But Ichabod is 
much funnier to me. 
Siri: Ichabod is very funny. But also a book which is an essential construction of 
memory should have as its central joke ‘I have forgotten’ is a very wonderful 
thing. 
Alex: And not just one memory book, but four. 
Siri: Four. And for the outside critical reader that’s one of the profundities of the 
book. This aspect of memory and fiction. 
Paul: And just to set the records straight with you, there’s surprisingly little direct 
autobiographical stuff in there. A few things. I used a few. One of them being the 
basketball game in Newark that nearly led into a race riot. I was in that game, it 
really was a triple overtime, it really was one of the last second winners when the 
kid threw and we won by a point. And then the family called the Rosenblooms, 
from South Africa. They’re based on a real family, the Rosenbaums, whom I 
knew back then. And the girl, Diana, not Dana, moved to Israel. She died of 
cancer in her mid-forties. I loved that family. So there they are. 
Siri: It’s what I like to think of as variations on a life, right? Variations of 
memory in some important way. But also the fact is that the territory that you are 
plumbing is absolutely the territory of your childhood.  
Paul: Sure, the geography. 
Siri: The geography. Both of us care for the Francis Yeats Art of Memory book, 
and the explorations of artificial memory, which I think actually are profoundly 
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important for real memory. There is no autobiographical memory without place, it 
does not exist, it does not happen. You need space, you absolutely have to have 
space to have an autobiographical memory. In The Shaking Woman I realised that 
I had moved a memory, this early memory of humiliation when I was a kid and I 
comfort my cousin. And it’s happening in my mind in my aunt’s house and I 
understood way, way later in my adulthood that that house had not been built. I 
had moved the spatial –  
Paul: We do that all the time. 
Siri: We do that all the time. But that is why artificial memory, the artificial 
systems we devise, are so powerful. Because it’s not just artificial memory 
training yourself. Artificial memory is something about memory itself. Which is 
that we do shift locations. 
Paul: Names too. In Winter Journal I write about the little boy who whacked me 
over the head with the rake, and then let my dog loose and caused the death of my 
dog. I called him Michael. But I realised Michael was his older brother, and he 
was Eric. I got it wrong.  
Siri: That is a kind of displacement similar to what happens in dreams. It seems 
that that kind of mental imagery, or that kind of material, is not as much about 
perception per se as it is about dreams, fantasy, so on. 
Alex: Is that like reconsolidation – how you remember the last memory or the 
remembrance of a memory? 
Siri: Reconsolidation, yes. 
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Paul: Another example I could give. Of course I went to Columbia and of course 
I was there during the revolution of ‘68, but I was never a reporter for the 
newspaper.  
Siri: No, of course not. I’m talking about broader autobiography. I’m talking 
about the spaces between these boys, the four. Three of them are fictional. 
Paul: I resisted adding another layer: me. PA, as the inventor of AF. I had to cut it 
off at some point. You have to believe in the reality of Ferguson 4. He says that he 
would be a character too, but a somewhat fictionalised version of himself. So he’s 
changing his own life. 
Siri: He’s saying that his own life is another fiction of a kind. Actually, I hadn’t 
thought about this until now, which is grist for the mill: I had a similar experience 
to Paul for about a year after The Blazing World. A novel that failed. And he 
would read these little parts of it. 
Paul: It was all beautifully written. You couldn’t get a handle on what you were 
trying to do. 
Siri: I didn’t know where it was going. It was terrible. And then this summer after 
we returned from Europe. And I took this manuscript because I was all in a tizzy, 
and I was trying to work on it but I couldn’t work on it because there was 
something terribly, awfully, horribly wrong with it. When I got home I realised I 
had to abandon it. Although the weird thing is I am writing another book and I am 
very happy writing it and it is a bizarre form of re-visiting a time in my life which 
also involves fiction, which is the period prior to writing The Blindfold. I realised 
as I was writing it. But it is completely different, it is radically different. It’s taken 
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from a period in New York over the course of a year in the late 70s, a young 
woman who has come to write a novel. She saved up money. And may or may not 
go to graduate school. The architectures, the time, the place of this story are very 
much revisiting my own ready-made memory material. None of the things that 
happen to her in it happened to me. It’s not autobiographical in that sense. It’s not 
auto fiction.  
Paul: That always made me thing about novels about cars. ‘Auto fiction’. 
Siri: The terrain of fiction and memory are very much the same. I know people 
invent worlds. But it has to be invented out of something. Whatever imaginative 
distances are travelled, the reader has to be able to place him or herself into that 
world that’s created in the book. And it always has to have some relation to stuff 
that’s happened, to what the reader is living. For example, re-reading. I re-read 
Djuna Barnes Nightwood, which I have convinced myself is a work of genius. 
When I read it for the second time I thought I was going to go back to this beloved 
book of my youth and not love it anymore. When I read that for maybe the third 
time it was after I’d written The Sorrows of an American, and I realised that the 
character of Burton had been influenced by Dr O’Connor, the great figure in 
Nightwood. And I had absolutely no awareness of it while I was making him talk. 
I was just having a high old time. I think all the years I have spent on Dickens 
have come back. It’s detectable. And I would think that with both of our works 
there are things like that that are happening too. That’s what happens. And 
especially with the intimacy that you have with someone else’s texts. I mean how 
could it not? I mean – I ended up dropping it – it was the beginning of a paragraph 
and Paul said ‘Siri, you know I wrote a sentence almost exactly like that in Moon 
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Palace’. And I said ‘oh my god’ and, you know, out with that. And he’s done the 
same thing. He wrote a sentence and it was almost word for word from 
somewhere, and he changed it. Work that you care about becomes imprinted 
somewhere in your soul. But you know, you don’t know about it anymore. 
Alex: Was it quite hard to ditch that novel? 
Siri: I’ve used little parts in this new book. And I have a feeling, maybe this is the 
optimist’s view, but maybe I had to go through that hell hole in order to get to this 
thing that I wanted to write. And maybe that’s part of the process. 
Alex: When you’ve written a novel as big as The Blazing World it must be quite 
tough to start something new anyway. Was it like finishing What I Loved? 
Siri: That was another big novel. Finishing The Blazing World I didn’t want to lie 
on the floor and cry for a week but I did feel that ‘I have done this’. And I had 
also found – and maybe I’ll never do this again – a form that was so flexible, so 
open, that it was a shockingly capacious form. That doesn’t mean you could go on 
forever, because no reader would want that, but the form that I discovered as I was 
working on it, was so exciting, so enlivening, almost a magical form. To leave this 
behind was difficult because it was so great. But you have to bag it. Even before 
that I started this novel with this tiny little man. That was only a few pages. The 
anti-Harry. Though if you’re writing against yourself there’s nowhere to go. That 
was hopeless. It just wasn’t going anywhere.  
Paul: [Returning to the table with his e-cigarette and some post] Sorry, the first 
two were duds. 
388 
 
Siri: He said you could take them back. 
Paul: I will. [Opening a package and holding up a book] Seven Stories Press. This 
is what I have to read. Kurt Vonnegut. Out loud, at the Brooklyn Public Library. 
Seven Stories is doing this book with me. We delayed it for a year. It’s a book of 
conversations about every one of my books. It took three or four years. With this 
Danish professor. Who set up the Paul Auster Study Centre at the University of 
Copenhagen. And it’s an amazing thing. Seven Stories is just a small thing. An 
American publisher is doing it here.  
Siri: Oh no, it’s your book. 
Paul: Wonderful, thank you. [Holding up a pocket diary] My date book for next 
year. Thank you Siri. 
Siri: You’re welcome. I thought usually when I order books they’re a little bigger 
than this.  
Paul: Another product of Great Britain. Charing Cross. Made in England. They’re 
wonderful date books. It fits in my pocket. There. See? Is it the same size? Yep. 
So this is my year.  
Siri: Now you have another year. 
Alex: I wanted to ask you both about Merleau-Ponty. You both have very 
different approaches. 
Paul: Well I was the first of the family to read him, because first of all I’m a lot 
older than Siri. 
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Siri: You are. 
Paul: As a young undergraduate I was very interested in reading philosophy. I 
didn’t take many classes. Only one, which was a huge disappointment to me. It 
was all analytical. Such dreary stuff. Just awful. I hated it. 
Alex: There’s a portion of 4321 where you describe the Freshman syllabus at 
Columbia... 
Paul: The Columbia programme was so helpful to me. It was such an enormous 
boon to my brain and my soul. I think everyone should read those books. 
Alex: So when you say ‘you need to read everything and then forget it’ that’s 
because you have done exactly that.  
Paul: Yes. So, Merleau-Ponty. I read him. In addition to others. The two 
twentieth century philosophers I was most attracted to were Wittgenstein and 
Merleau-Ponty. Completely different. But very exciting and challenging and 
thought-provoking. 
Siri: Especially the late Wittgenstein. You were not so interested in the Tractatus.  
Paul: Yeah, but I like the Tractatus because it’s so beautifully written, so elegant. 
But Merleau-Ponty seemed to me the most profound, the one who understood this 
whole embodied self, as Siri calls it. And it had a tremendous impact on me. And 
that little sequence of notes from the composition book, you’ve read that? I was 
twenty. So that reflects the reading. ‘The world is in my head. My body is in the 
world.’ It was pretty good for a twenty year old to come up with that. 
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Siri: It was. It was brilliant. Beautiful. 
Paul: So I’ve always walked around with this warm feeling about Merleau-Ponty, 
but I haven’t re-read it. It was planted in me when I was nineteen or so, and it 
certainly influenced me. But then at some point, years ago, I urged Siri to read 
him, and you fell in love. And now you’re so much more into him than I am. 
Siri: It was for me – and it’s absolutely true Paul was the one who said ‘I think 
you have to read this’ – and now I return to it all the time. One particular essay, 
The Visible and the Invisible, which I think is the shockingly – 
Paul: It’s the unfinished book, that’s why. 
Siri: It’s the unfinished book, but the working notes –  
Paul: 54, 56? How old was he? 
Siri: It was so young. It’s really sad. There was so much more that he could have 
done. In The Visible and the Invisible he’s clearly getting into the most profound 
possible answers to this question of mind and flesh, and the ideas that he has in 
this book about what the flesh is and the chiasmus. It’s really dizzying, and it’s 
quite hard. It’s much harder than The Phenomenology of Perception.  
Paul: For me it was The Phenomenology of Perception that had the huge impact. I 
did buy all of them. Northwestern University Press. They were offering all the 
books in translation and I bought every one I could get my hands on. I did not 
read every single thing, I must confess. But The Phenomenology was a great 
experience. 
391 
 
Siri: It’s interesting because we have the book in our library, that’s how I got it, 
its Paul’s book. What Paul underlined are precisely the things that I wouldn’t 
underline. [Laughs] It was really a fascinating exercise. 
Paul: I was reading it through the lens of a nineteen year old poet. 
Siri: I know. But he would have these markings in pencil, I don’t think there’s 
much commentary –  
Paul: Then I stopped underlining it, if I was reading every sentence there’s no 
point in underlining it. 
Siri: One of the fascinations for me about Merleau-Ponty is that he was interested 
in biology and neurology in the way that I am interested in biological realities. 
And you don’t even touch that stuff.  
Paul: I wasn’t interested in that. 
Siri: There’s not a mark. All the neurology, of which there is quite a bit in the 
early part. 
Paul: It’s possible I didn’t read the whole book. Quite possible. Its 450 pages. 
Though this should be interesting for you: Siri and I have remarkably similar 
tastes in literature, art, films. But there are differences. I think Siri has a larger 
world of beloved writers than I do. I have not been able to get through 
Middlemarch. I’ve never finished it. 
Siri: I’ve read it about four times. It’s one of my most beloved books. 
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Paul: I just can’t get past page fifty. And I can’t really read Henry James either. 
Some. And I liked it very much. But I don’t feel a great urge to plunge into the 
Henry James novels. The novellas.  
Siri: I got you some of the novellas. The Aspern Papers. 
Paul: The Aspern Papers I loved. I’ve just never been a great enthusiast for those 
two writers. 
Siri: I finally got you to read, however, To the Lighthouse. 
Paul: I read it for the first time this summer. I think it’s one of the most beautiful 
novels. At eighteen I read two Virginia Woolf books. I was in my full phase of 
James Joyce adulation. Finished reading Ulysses. I was in Dublin. It was the 
summer of 1965. I then read two Woolf books. The Waves and Orlando. And I 
didn’t like either one of them. So I just sort of crossed her off my list. For fifty 
years! 
Siri: I don’t like those books that much either. 
Paul: Then Siri urged me to read To the Lighthouse. I felt overwhelmed. I think 
it’s one of the most beautiful novels of the twentieth century. And I would read 
paragraphs two, three, four times. 
Alex: I read some Woolf for my Masters. Including Orlando. I can’t remember 
much of it though. That’s the problem with reading: I forget. 
Paul: Me too. Siri remembers but I forget everything. So: similar tastes in most 
things, but not always congruent. Siri has lost all interest in baseball. Which I 
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taught her in the early days of our being together. And you seemed to love it. 
Then as soon as you got pregnant and had the baby you suddenly lost interest. 
Siri: During the season Paul watches with a lot of passion. This season I 
remember walking in and watching a game and it was very exciting. I got all 
wrapped up in it. Then I said to myself, ‘no, I do not have the emotional room for 
baseball’. I do not have it, I do not want to have it. I have to cut myself off from it. 
Paul: It’s a legitimate position.  
Siri: That’s my position. It’s not that I don’t like baseball, it’s not that I don’t 
understand baseball. It is that the way my life goes now, if I were to give any 
more of my life to baseball considering what I do… 
Paul: You’d be oversaturated, I know. Siri’s not particularly interested in 
westerns either. I have a fondness for them. Siri’s not interested in movies without 
women in them. 
Siri: [Laughs] It’s generally true. It’s not always true. For example A Man 
Escaped doesn’t have many women in it. I love that movie, I think it’s one of the 
greatest movies, period. And there isn’t a single woman in it. These movies that 
are the myth of the autonomous male wandering around with his six-shooter…But 
I like High Noon.  
Paul: Grace Kelly’s in that. And Katie Jurado. 
Siri: You know what I’m saying. Some of these movies with the mythos is just... 
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Paul: I’m just throwing it out. Visual artwork, very close. I think we respond to 
the same pieces. 
Siri: Yes. The deepest ones, but I think I have the broadest taste. I think there are 
ones where you’d say, ‘I think that’s terrible’, and I’ll say, ‘No, that’s not terrible. 
That’s interesting.’ And it’s interesting for taste reasons. 
Paul: You do have broader tastes that I do.  
Alex: [To Siri] Are you reading more scientific texts now, or more of an equal 
split between fiction and non-fiction? 
Siri: Certain problems in science push me back to philosophy. I read fiction too. 
Paul: She reads Husserl on airplanes. Just so you get an idea of what she is able to 
do. 
Alex: How about you, Paul? 
Paul: Very much less. I used to be able to devour books. Pretty much throughout 
my college years I was reading a book a day. Just eating books.  
Siri: You’ve had a different arc. 
Paul: The more I’ve written, the less I’ve read. I certainly don’t read fiction while 
I’m writing it. I read in between books. Novels. Often just catching up on my 
friends’ work. And then new things, like the Virginia Woolf. New things I haven’t 
read. I like going back. I think I’m launching myself into another reading of Don 
Quixote now. I think I want to do that. Because I am cooked after that big book. I 
have no idea what I’m going to do next. So I am taking a pause. Even if I did 
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come up with an idea, February 1st I start travelling. I’m going to be gone for huge 
stretches of time. 
Alex: Where to? 
Paul: I’m doing the US and Canada. Then I’m going to England in early March. 
Then to Germany, to Holland. A week in each place. And in England. I think I 
was last there for Winter Journal. I’m going to Manchester. There’s a theatre 
company, called Productions 59, who have done a lot of things, they’re kid of 
wizard technicians of light and theatrical effects. They did some of the things at 
the London Olympics. But they’ve never actually done a play all of their own. 
They’re contributed to other people’s plays. But what they’ve done is they’ve 
adapted City of Glass, so it’s premiering in Manchester and then going on to the 
Hammersmith in London. I’ve been reading one draft of the script after another 
and now it’s just about perfect. 
Siri: That’s so great. 
Paul: The guy really has done a good job. Duncan Macmillan is his name. Five 
drafts and now I think he’s pretty much there. I can’t wait to see it. I think it’s 
going to be spectacular to look at. So that’s one of the lures of going to England 
this time. Oxford also. But the bulk in London. Five city reading tour in Germany. 
Amsterdam, the Hague and Brussels for a day. It’s going to be a lot. And then in 
the summer I go back to Europe for a while. Edinburgh festival wants me. It’s 
their 70th birthday and my 70th birthday, and then I’m going to go to Scandinavia 
and Spain and Portugal. 
Alex: How about your time in Germany, Siri? 
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Siri: I enjoyed it. First I was in Norway for this psychiatric conference, where I 
gave a keynote and one of the side panels. So I got there on the morning of the 
eighth, the day of the election, went to bed, woke up in the morning and turned on 
the TV and there it came. 
Paul: The horror, the horror. 
Siri: Because I was ‘the American on the opposite shores’ I was solicited to write 
about the election, so I wrote an editorial for one of the big papers in Norway. 
They edited it and published it a couple of days after the election. And then while 
I was in Germany I did a few things about Trump. I was on TV talking about 
Trump. So it was a weird, ‘Trump: what are the neo-fascist features’, while giving 
these speeches. The keynote at the psychiatric conference went well. And then I 
gave three lectures at Tubingen. ‘The Writing Self as Psychiatric Patient’ I gave in 
Norway. I wrote something else for about psychiatry, neurology and the mind-
body problem and how this infects the discipline. I gave four talks in Tubingen. 
One was about narrative. Narrative and the self, and its uses in medicine, which I 
had first delivered as a lecture at Columbia. I did that as my opening lecture in 
Tubingen. And…my brain is dead. 
Paul: It doesn’t matter, you were busy. I was on the BBC, right before the 
election. I don’t know if you saw that. It was so awful. I didn’t watch it. But my 
daughter Sophie came here on the night of the election and we watched it 
together, and she showed me on her phone my interview. I look so damn nervous, 
so anxious. I was stammering and I usually I don’t stammer in my interviews. All 
the dark fears turned out to be true.  
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Alex: We’ve had our own experience in the UK. 
Siri: Right, with Brexit. What you are looking at are the politics of humiliation. In 
every country there is a difference, but what has shifted is we are not looking at a 
politics of reflection, but these huge overwhelming feelings of having lost 
something. That’s humiliation. And that’s why they are specifically white-
centered and deeply related to misogyny. That you can see from country to 
country, from place to place. That is what binds them. Very specific domestic 
situations, of course, are different.  
Paul: In The New York Times magazine tomorrow there’s an Ian Buruma piece 
about England and America. Brexit and Trump. I didn’t know Trump’s last ad 
was attacking Jews. The World Bank. Antisemitism bubbling up in America has 
not been the case for decades. Vicious antisemitism. Horrible anti-black and anti-
women and anti-Muslim, the most vilified of all.  
Siri: Do you know Rene Girard’s book on the scapegoat? He’s a brilliant thinker 
who, as many French thinkers has tendency to push things further than they ought 
to be pushed, at least in my mind. The scapegoat has to do with mimetic desire of 
what the other has. The great example is two kids are playing in a room, and 
there’s a puppet lying in the room. The kids are ignoring it. Then the little girl 
sees the puppet and takes it and is playing very happily in her corner. The little 
boy sees this and wants the puppet. Gerard brilliantly works this out to such a 
degree that people who are working on social identity theory acknowledge him as 
a source. There’s more empirical data that goes along with it. That’s what is 
binding all this: Trump, Brexit. The fantasy of some kind of manly autonomy is 
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also part of this. These white guys and the women who identify with them in the 
middle of the country feel like they’ve lost their status. They don’t have to be 
poor. Anyway, it’s a false thing. 
Paul: Brexit. I just think that there is a parallel. We have one decent evening news 
show in the US. It’s called the PBS News Hour. They were covering the lead up 
to the Brexit vote pretty thoroughly. They had this guy, Michael Brabant, a British 
journalist. He’s was in some southern British town and walks up to a woman, 
probably in her 50s, well dressed, well pulled together, middle or upper middle 
class, and identified herself as the wife of someone in the military, a major or 
something like that. So he said, ‘how do you feel about the vote?’ And she said ‘I 
hope they take that tunnel and fill it up with cement so that no foreigner will come 
and bother us again’. The hatred pouring out of this pulled-together woman was 
shocking to me. The hatred. And you multiply that by millions of other people and 
that’s the attitude. 
Alex: The parallels are there.  
Paul: Its anti-globalisation. 
Alex: Its false nostalgia for a time that never existed. 
Siri: The faux Golden Age. 
Paul: That’s why the old voted for Brexit and the young voted to stay. Anyway, 
pertaining to your project, our politics are very similar. We really do agree on just 
about everything.  
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Siri: Nevertheless, I have to say this event, this terrible event in our history, has 
really changed things. I’ve written for Liberation and The Guardian about 
Obama, about missing Obama. It’s shocking. To be welcomed by Barack Obama 
is so radically different to what is being posited now as the face of America. It is 
the worst of us rather than the best of us. 
Paul: But Obama incited this reaction from the white haters, and he unnerved 
them to such a degree that the right tightened. They got what they wanted now. 
And may the Lord save us. 
Siri: Part of my thinks: okay. You deserve it. You assholes. Now you’re going to 
see what you have wrought. Take it. The irony of this is the protection of the rich. 
Our lives are not going to be radically altered by Trump, unless it’s World War 
Three or something. But what he’s doing is turning on the people who voted for 
him. Those are the people who are going to suffer.  
Paul: I mean, the Cabinet. He’s got an Attorney General who doesn’t believe in 
civil rights. He’s got a Secretary of Education who doesn’t believe in public 
school. He’s got an environmental head who doesn’t believe in global warming. 
On and on and on. He’s got a health secretary who doesn’t want medical 
insurance. [Paul leaves to take a phone call] 
Siri: Back to the thesis. If I were doing this, I would be looking at textual overlaps 
and developments between two stories. That’s where there’s more information.  
Alex: I’m trying to address the independence-interdependence conundrum, 
certainly in terms of personal aesthetics. You’ve been very open and honest about 
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moments where there are influences, but there’s a keenness to preserve your own 
personal identity. And that’s quite difficult. 
Siri: Well. We haven’t talked about this, and I think it’s fair to talk about the 
sexism. The sexism means essentially this – and I mention this in an interview 
with a very smart woman in De Zeitung – basically if Paul says in interviews Siri 
said this or Siri told me this – I mean I’ve heard it – once the interview is 
published, I’m out. If I talk about Paul at all in the interview, I mean AT ALL, it’s 
the headline. And that difference is not about our friendship, our relationship 
inside our world together, whatever that is, or the two worlds coming into contact. 
That’s about feeling certain inhibitions because of the way the stories are read. I 
don’t mean our texts, but the story of the marriage. So that the truth is after all 
these years I often though ‘Paul is really famous and of course people are going to 
join me to him in ways that don’t go back and forth’. Well I can tell you that in 
Germany I sell more books, I’m just as famous and the response is exactly the 
same. The sexism doesn’t go away. It’s not about how many copies you sell, how 
famous you are. It’s about, whether it’s conscious or unconscious, people do not 
want the influence to be both ways. I have been told by journalists that Paul taught 
me neuroscience, he taught me psychoanalysis. I’ve sat on chairs here with 
journalists who have told me, completely sincerely, that Paul taught me 
everything I know. Not to be…I do have a PhD. What happened here? Some 
journalists are saying that after this book I should start thinking of myself as a 
full-fledged intellectual. I have been a fully-fledged intellectual for many years. 
Paul: Did someone actually say that to you? 
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Siri: All the time. Some of it is kind of ignorant, but some of it is constant…it 
never goes away. 
Paul: I’ve often told Siri that we should get publicly divorced and then secretly 
live together. 
Siri: That wouldn’t change it. Because I’m old now, because I’ve written a lot of 
books, because I can tell what is sexism is, because places where I am more 
famous than you they still do it. That to me suggests sexism. It’s not ‘oh there’s 
Paul Auster’s wife, I guess she writes books too’. That does happen, I guess in 
some places. But you also start to realise what the frame is, even in certain 
publishing. The further east you go in the world, the fewer women they publish. 
Places like Greece and Turkey, places where I am read by ardent small numbers 
of fans, they’re just not very interested in publishing novels by women. 
Paul: One thing I console myself with is that there are 7.2 billion people on the 
planet. I heard the numbers the other day. And a good percentage of them have 
not heard of me or you. 
Siri: That’s not the point, Paul.  
Paul: I know, I know. 
Siri: What we are talking about here is overt sexism that affects me all the time. 
And you know it does because you’ve witnessed it all the time. You’ve witnessed 
it day in, day out. 
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Paul: I know it does. The preliminary conversation of this interview book was 
‘why did you do it’? There are two reasons. There have been a lot of books 
written about me. I have most of them I think.  
Siri: There’s a lot of books. About forty. 
Paul: They come to the house and I flick through them. Academic books. Then I 
put them away. But there was one book. The writer said all my autobiographical 
writing was fiction, and all my fiction was autobiographical. That was one reason, 
just to set the records straight. My fiction is fiction, my autobiography is 
autobiography. And then: Siri. I’m doing this to set the record straight, very 
directly. I did not teach Siri psychoanalysis, I did not teach her about Jacques 
Lacan, about Bakhtin or any of these things. 
Alex: So it’s very much the reverse. 
Siri: He never read – he didn’t even read it. That’s the problem. 
Paul: I tell you what I read of Bakhtin. I read the translator’s introduction to The 
Dialogical Imagination. [Laughs] 
Siri: Because who gave it to you? 
Paul: And I got that story about Bakhtin smoking his book, which I used in the 
screenplay of Smoke. 
Siri: Yes, because I told you about it. 
Paul: I don’t really care about his theories of the novel. I don’t really care that 
much about these things.  
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Siri: The Lacan thing got so out of hand. 
Paul: I read one thing about Lacan. His Purloined Letter piece. 
Siri: I worked and worked on Lacan. And I have to say that that becomes very 
strange. You can make mistakes and what you discover is that you can correct 
mistakes but people do not want to know. In other words, when it comes to me 
what people want to think is that Paul is the clever intellectual and that I am the 
bumbling woman who is writing about her feelings. But I run into it time and time 
again. People really do not want this upset. They really do not. So that you can do 
an interview, talk about what you care about, and you are met with total hostility. 
Real anger. And that does not happen to him. It simply does not happen to him. 
Paul: No. People kick me around, but for different reasons. 
Siri: People kick you around for different reasons, and it is never linked to me. 
People don’t ask him about me in general. 
Paul: And most of the time during an interview when I do talk about you, its cut 
out.  
Siri: It’s thoroughly excised. So if he says ‘well Siri was talking about this, about 
something’, then it’s gone. But it’s your knowledge. 
Paul: I did this interview for Publishers Weekly, it came out last week. The things 
I said about you are there. The publicist for my publisher said, ‘what really comes 
through is how much you love your wife’. 
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Siri: What happens to me is there is an inhibition. If I talk about you, it’s the 
headline. That’s a problem because I would like to able to be free to talk about 
how important you have been to me. I said this in lots of interviews when I was 
younger, and I very quickly learned that was all anybody wanted me to say. Now 
it’s about my work. This is my work. I wish the world wasn’t like that. I wish the 
frames for were different, because its women who lose out. 
Paul: [To Alex] That’s why it’s nice that you’re doing what you’re doing. You’re 
putting us on equal footing. 
Siri: It is a kind of utopian vision that does not exist. And there are people who 
are just not aware of it. You run into situations where there is real malignance. It 
happens every time I go out in the world. Like the Tubingen thing. An important 
person at the University who shall not be named, who did not sponsor me, who 
just came in at the end, was so hostile. When he introduced me it was so 
condescending and shocking that people noticed. 
Alex: There’s a real sense in your most recent essays that you’re stepping up a 
gear intellectually. 
Siri: The Shaking Woman was a major turning point. 
Alex: There’s nobody else really writing like this at the moment. 
Paul: Nobody. And this is what I fear for poor Siri is there is no consciousness 
out there that can fully grasp what she’s doing. It’s so big. It’s going to take years 
for people to absorb the insights she’s had in all kinds of fields. 
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Siri: I know what is original, what is taking from a large body of things, and I 
also know that nobody has said ever this. That of course is lost on 99.9% of the 
readers. The people who know about neurobiology do not know about the 
philosophy or the other references. So I find that even when I start talking like I 
did at the psychiatric conference, I have to use a story of a girl called Alice who 
had an episode and developed a phobia. And this is to psychiatrists. I almost feel 
like I know more about psychiatry than they do. Not about dealing with patients, 
though I’ve had my four years. The theory, the history, what it means, how you 
philosophically frame the problems. 
Paul: I think you are one of the most formidable thinkers and writers about art. 
Visual art. No one comes close to you.  
Siri: The point is that you have to get to one place. And it does happen within the 
disciplines. I mean I’m giving another lecture next week. I wouldn’t be invited to 
Tubingen if I wasn’t recognised. 
Paul: The way the world works is they don’t want people doing more than one 
thing. I got this when I was directing movies. There’s this built in resentment: 
‘How dare you come into our domain’? I can’t think of a person who has been a 
novelist and a philosopher, I think that’s what I would call you. Include the art 
and the literary things. Sartre wrote philosophy and novels. And plays.  
Siri: So did Simone de Beauvoir. 
Paul: And so did Simone de Beauvoir. Camus also wrote essays and novels. 
Susan Sontag wrote essays and novels. I can’t really think of anybody else but 
406 
 
those four. And Siri I think is the best novelist of the five by far. And I think 
you’re intellectual work is just as good as anything they ever wrote. 
Siri: Well maybe we’re getting a little – 
Paul: No, I’m telling you.  
Siri: I’m doing a conversation with Simon Critchley, the philosopher. He’s 
genuinely serious, coming out of a continental tradition. And what you realise is 
that he will most definitely understand the philosophy coming out of these. The 
neurobiology is non-existent. The concern at all is that the biological approach, 
the most original thing I’m going to pursue in there, is the placenta. People are co-
constituent, there is no self without the other, but it is biologically grounded 
through the placenta.  
Paul: It’s an organ shared by two people. 
Siri: Everyone in the philosophical tradition has ignored what people have 
known, that tribal peoples have known, that this organ is like a twin. Almost every 
tribal culture understands the placenta as this organ which is crucial to how we are 
made. How it is possible that the entire western tradition would never address the 
fact that human beings begin inside another human being is an astounding fact 
that has never been properly addressed by anyone. There’s a lot of work being 
done of the dyad, and prenatal life. And neotony. We retain juvenile 
characteristics for far longer than most mammals. We are the most slowly 
developing mammal by far. We are cared for years. So the obvious philosophical 
question is ‘why the hell is that?’ It allows adaptions to be made that couldn’t be 
made. And one thing I discovered this afternoon, guys, is that Neanderthals had 
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much more mature systems much earlier. They didn’t last. They can tell this from 
– I love this stuff – molar studies. So this includes brain systems and plasticity. I 
mean speculative, and it is born out in other mammals. So our very retarded 
development may be a key to the reason why we survived. Then what you have is 
this very long attachment system. That child-grown up attachment system is a co-
reality. So now you see these studies focusing on the in-between. I’ve seen a colt 
being born and within an hour it was up on its wobbly legs. It’s a year before 
human infants can get up on their legs. What is happening between people? 
There’s all these things. Face-to-face encounters. Chimpanzees are on the 
mother’s back. This is also implicated in this long, slow development, this very 
long plasticity so that change can happen. 
Paul: So what other questions do you have? 
Alex: I think that ought to do it. 
Siri: Was it useful? 
Alex: Definitely useful. 
Paul: Well I’d be interested to read this thing that you’ve cooked up. 
Siri: I said before, if I were doing this a lot of things would be based on looking at 
texts and feeling for echoes or distinctions. 
Paul: Oh, I did thank you in a text. At the end of Sunset Park. It was the only 
novel that had some thank yous. And I said, thank you Siri Hustvedt for ‘the 
strangeness of being alive’. 
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Siri: Oh, that’s right. 
Alex: That phrase crops up in 4321. 
Paul: Yes. Once. ‘How strange, how strange it was to be alive’. 
Siri: That’s true. That’s my sentence.  
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